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SUMMARY 
 
The thesis is focused on the question of how responsibilities for the performance of 
public functions are assigned to levels or spheres of government.   The term “public 
function” refers to the activities performed by governments in order to satisfy 
identified community needs.   There is a paucity of validated knowledge concerning 
the particular phenomenon,  and the purpose of the study is to make a research 
based contribution in this connection.   Because of the exploratory nature of the study 
particular attention is paid to the orientation of the research in Public Administration 
terms,  as well as to research design. 
 
A study of the assignment of responsibilities in a selection of foreign countries was 
undertaken,  and the findings are recorded and evaluated.   The conclusion reached 
is that in none of the countries studied a clear,  comprehensive demarcation of 
governmental responsibilities has been achieved. 
 
Regarding South Africa,  the thesis encompasses a historical overview,  followed by 
separate analytical examinations of the arrangements set in place by the 1993 
(“interim”) and the 1996 (“final”) Constitutions.   In the pre-democratic era (1910 to 
1994),  ideological considerations patently played a prominent role.   The treatment 
of the assignment question by the 1993 Constitution is found to have had substantial 
shortcomings,  especially with regard to conceptual and technical aspects,  the 
realisation of assignment principles,  and the substance of assigned responsibilities.   
In the author’s opinion a satisfactory deployment of responsibilities was not achieved.   
The 1996 Constitution improved the assignment scheme,  notably through the better 
realisation of assignment principles,  the introduction of exclusive powers for the 
provinces,  and in dealing with the municipal domain.   However,  the 1996 
Constitution also did not achieve a credible and clear-cut assignment of 
responsibilities. 
 
In assessing the degree to which a scientific approach to the assignment question is 
in evidence,  the finding is that such an approach has not been established.   A 
 2
theoretical assignment model,  following a Public Administration approach,  is then 
presented.   The model covers language,  classification,  assignment principles,  and 
methodology.   The thesis concludes with a reflection on the research,  as well as on 
the practicalities of achieving improvement in the assignment of responsibilities. 
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THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC 
FUNCTIONS TO LEVELS OR SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1:  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
It may be assumed with safety that in the vast majority of states more than one level or 
sphere of government has been found necessary for the performance of public 
functions.   By the term “public function” is meant broadly the activities performed by a 
national or subnational government in order to satisfy an identified community need.   
(The term and the underlying concept is looked at more closely in chapter 3 of the 
thesis.)   The plurality of governments in a state has far-reaching implications for its 
system of government and administration.   A key question which arises is how 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions are,  or perhaps should be,   
assigned or distributed amongst the various levels or spheres of government.   As will 
become apparent as the thesis unfolds a substantial problem presents itself in this 
connection:  despite the rather obvious importance and the implications of the 
assignment of public function responsibilities to levels or spheres of government,  there 
is a paucity of scientific knowledge concerning the phenomenon.   This is evident from 
the research record,  the available literature,  as well as from the limited treatment 
accorded the particular subject in academic curricula,  three matters which are reported 
on in chapter 2 of the thesis.   In essence the present study is an endeavour to respond 
to what is perceived as a decidedly problematic situation,  and in the process to make a 
research based contribution to the body of knowledge which is Public Administration.  
 
The importance of the assignment question,  already referred to above,  is addressed in 
the following section.   This is followed by short sections dealing with some salient points 
in relation to the study,  viz the demarcation of the field of study,  the originality of the 
study,  and the approach followed with the study.   There follows a section in which the 
structure of the thesis is surveyed,  with a concise indication of the content of each of the 
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remaining chapters.   A summary concludes the chapter and leads into the next chapter,  
which contains the scientific orientation of the study. 
 
 
1.2 Importance of the assignment question 
 
The assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions is tantamount 
to the distribution of political power in the state and is consequently a matter of 
fundamental importance in every country.   That this is so,  was borne out recently in 
South Africa by the proposals,  debate and argument which the assignment question 
elicited in relation to the “powers” of the provinces in the widely reported process of 
putting together an “interim” (1993) and a “final” (1996) constitution for the country.   On 
each occasion the assignment scheme enacted into law was a compromise of political 
give-and-take,  rather than a conclusive agreement based on a scientifically guided 
investigation.   The assignment question continues to crop up in the ongoing national 
debate on  government and administration. 
 
The assignment of responsibilities to the national and subnational levels of government 
serves to set in place a basic structure for representative government,  and the exercise 
of political power at or in the respective levels or spheres.   The content and the limits of 
governmental authority,  as well as the power relationships between governments at or 
in the various levels or spheres,  are determined,  thus providing clarity as to the legally 
permissible role of each government.   In the process,  the task of governing the country 
is divided and the portions spread vertically and horizontally throughout the country.   As 
the assignment of responsibilities is accompanied by the fixing of accountability,  the 
locus of accountability in respect of any particular public function can be determined,  
and the process of enforcing accountability facilitated.   The assignment of 
responsibilities affects to a substantial degree the efficiency and effectiveness which can 
be achieved by those mandated to govern,  as well as the extent to which they will be 
perceived to give value for revenue collected from individuals and institutions.   Finally,  
and significantly,  an employment structure is provided for the recruitment,  development 
and advancement of those with the talent and inclination to represent and to govern. 
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From the viewpoint of the public at large - assuming that the state is a democratic one - 
the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions is important as 
a determining influence on public attitudes to government.   Public acceptance and,  
ideally,  public appreciation of the structures and functions of government will be 
enhanced to the extent that there is a general perception that political power has been 
effectively harnessed in the service of the community,  and that the distribution of power 
amongst the various levels or spheres of government is sensible in terms of the kinds of 
needs to be satisfied at each level or in each sphere.   With a tiered system of 
government,  it is reasonable to expect that essentially local,  essentially regional,  and 
essentially national concerns will be accommodated by the appropriate assignment of 
responsibilities to the respective levels or spheres of government.   How the assignment 
is done can affect,  either positively or negatively,  the general perception amongst the 
public of the relative closeness or remoteness,  accessibility or inaccessibility,  
responsiveness or unresponsiveness of government.   It will also go a long way towards 
determining the degree of interest shown by the public in public affairs,  as well as their 
willingness to participate actively in the system of government and administration. 
 
Another major aspect to be noted in looking at the importance of the assignment of 
public function responsibilities,  is the effect of such assignment on the structures and 
processes of public administration.   The assignment decided upon provides the basis 
for the design of organisation structures and the determination of post establishments at 
or in the various levels or spheres of government.   It also determines the need for and 
the nature of intergovernmental arrangements,  especially as far as the delegation of 
authority,  control or supervision,  and reporting are concerned.   In financial 
administration the assignment scheme gives direction to the linking of the possible 
sources of revenue to the various levels or spheres of government,  as well as to the 
sharing of revenue between levels or spheres of government where this is indicated.   It 
determines the size and shape of national,  regional and local budgets,  and provides the 
basis for auditing the performance of the various authorities in terms of value for money 
considerations.   As far as human resource management is concerned,  the assignment 
of responsibilities determines the deployment of public servants throughout the country,  
either as members of a single public service or of a plurality of public services.   It further 
determines to a substantial degree the occupational and skills profiles of the public 
servants required at or in the various levels or spheres of government,  depending for 
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instance on whether a particular function,  or aspect of a function,  is concerned 
essentially with policy making,  regulation and control,  or service provision.   For the 
individual seeking to build a career in public service it provides an occupationally 
focused,  function related framework of employment opportunities in which personal 
development and advancement can take place. 
 
In whatever context the matter is viewed,  and particularly with regard to the aspirations 
of political parties,  the expectations of the public,  and the requirements of public 
administration,  the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions 
is of the greatest importance to a country,  providing the raison d’etre for the authorities 
instituted at or in the various levels or spheres of government,  and giving direction and 
coherence to the manifold activities in the public domain of the state.   It is not surprising 
therefore to find that this question lies at the heart of the constitutions adopted by states. 
 
 
1.3 Demarcation of the field of study 
       
The study focuses on the assignment question as manifested in South Africa,  dating 
from the establishment of the South African state in 1910.   In order to contextualise the 
assignment question over a wider front,  a study was also done of the assignment 
schemes of a selection of other countries (vide chapter 4 of the thesis),  but essentially 
the study has to do with the assignment of public function responsibilities in South Africa.   
It is necessary to emphasise this point in order to make it clear that any findings or 
proposals emanating from the study will not necessarily apply,  or apply to the same 
extent or in the same way,  in any other country. 
 
The study does not deal with the question of the adoption of functions as public functions 
per se,  that is to say with an examination or rationalisation of what the government 
sector should,  or should not,  take upon itself.   A comprehensive study concerning this 
matter was done some years ago in South Africa (Loxton 1993).   The study also does 
not deal with the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions at 
or within a level or sphere of government,  that is to say with the assignment of 
responsibilities to particular ministries,  departments,  services or offices.   An intra-level 
or intra-sphere examination of the distribution of responsibilities between the institutions 
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making up a particular level or sphere of government would probably be of limited 
academic value because of the discretion  usually enjoyed by heads of government in 
matching specific blocks of governmental responsibility with the available human 
resources at cabinet level,  and which could have an effect on the functional 
demarcation of departments and other governmental institutions. 
 
 
1.4 Originality of the study 
 
As will be apparent from the literature review essayed in chapter 2 of the thesis,  which  
in addition to the discipline of Public Administration,  also focused on relevant literature 
in the discipline of constitutional law and in the field of federalism,  there is no existing,   
defined,  or generally acknowledged body of knowledge dealing specifically and 
systematically with the assignment question as conceptualised in the present study. 
 
As far as could be ascertained,  no master’s dissertation or doctoral thesis dealing in a 
comprehensive manner with the subject matter of the present thesis,  has previously 
been undertaken at any South African university.   There is also no record of any 
comparable research undertaken by any other local research establishment.   
Substantial work regarding the assignment of public functions to levels of government 
was,  however,  done in-house by the former Commission for Administration during 
1993,  with a view to making a contribution to the multiparty negotiating process then 
underway.   The Commission did not publish a report on its work,  but its input to the 
negotiating process is a matter of public record.   The work in question,  in which the 
author was closely involved,  is examined in chapter 6 of the thesis. 
 
 
1.5 Approach followed 
  
The assignment question has in general been approached from a Public Administration 
perspective.   In this connection it needs to be borne in mind that in addition to public 
administrationists,  constitutional lawyers and political scientists have a legitimate 
professional interest in the deployment of governmental powers and functions within the 
state,  albeit from their own disciplinary perspectives (vide the synopsis of the literature 
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review in section 2.6.5 of the thesis).   It is conceivable,  therefore,  that a constitutional 
lawyer or a political scientist would approach what the author refers to as “the 
assignment question” in a different manner,  probably using different terminology,  and 
would formulate findings and proposals in a way which would be relevant within the 
bounds of his or her own discipline. 
 
Following a Public Administration approach entails at the outset that cognisance be 
taken of the political aspect of the assignment question.   In view of its direct link to the 
distribution of political power in the state,  the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions will inevitably attract the attention of political parties and 
factions.   When and where any aspect of an assignment scheme is in dispute,  it would 
seem that,  ultimately,  it can be resolved only by political means,  that is to say by the 
strongest party asserting its will,  or by the parties involved negotiating a compromise.   
The present study has,  notwithstanding,  been embarked upon on the assumption that 
while the substance of assignment questions ultimately has to be resolved by political 
means - which could entail a constitutional amendment - it is possible to approach the 
assignment of responsibilities in an objective and logical manner within the discipline of 
Public Administration and,  in so doing,  to contribute substantially to informed and 
defensible decision making at political level. 
 
What the following of a Public Administration approach entails is elaborated more fully in 
chapter 9 of the thesis dealing with a theoretical model for the assignment of public 
function responsibilities. 
 
In view of the patently under-researched status of the assignment phenomenon,  which 
has the effect inter alia of imparting an exploratory character to the study,  it was 
considered essential to orientate the assignment question appropriately in scientific 
terms,  and to pay particular attention to the design of the research project (vide 
chapters 2 and 3 respectively of the thesis).   The author has thus endeavoured to follow 
a reasonably scientific approach in doing the study with the objective of setting in place a 
propositional base which hopefully can serve as an aid in promoting a better 
understanding of the assignment phenomenon. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
 The thesis consists of ten chapters in all,  including the introductory and concluding 
chapters.   The content of the chapters following this,  the introductory chapter,  is 
summarised below. 
 
Chapter 2:  Scientific orientation:  The chapter endeavours to orientate the study in 
scientific terms.   Public Administration as a discrete body of knowledge is brought into 
focus and the content of this body of knowledge is examined briefly.   A problem 
statement regarding the assignment question is developed,  followed by a formulation of 
the purpose of the study.   This is to make a research based contribution regarding the 
assignment of public function responsibilities to the body of knowledge constituting 
Public Administration.   To this end some pertinent research questions are identified.   
The chapter concludes with a literature review,  which in addition to encompassing the 
discipline of Public Administration,  also touches upon the disciplines of Constitutional 
Law and Political Science. 
       
Chapter 3:  Research design:  Because of the under-researched nature of the 
assignment question particular attention was paid to research design,  following an 
approach generally applied in the social sciences.   The chapter is structured into 
sections dealing respectively with the unit of analysis,  the conceptualisation of the 
research problem,  the operalisation of the study,  the nature of the study,  research 
paradigms,  sources of data,  the collection and presentation of data,  and the analysis 
and interpretation of data. 
 
 Chapter 4:  Assignment of responsibilities in other countries:  Chapter 4 contains the 
findings of a broadly comparative study of the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions in a selection of other countries,  together with some 
critical comment.   This part of the study was considered to be necessary in order to 
contextualise the assignment phenomenon over a wider front.   The countries chosen 
were Australia,  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  and the United Kingdom.   These countries 
were selected as being of particular interest within the ambit of the present study,  as 
explained in the introduction to the chapter. 
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Chapter 5:  Assignment of responsibilities in South Africa:  historical overview:     
Landmark developments since the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 up 
to the commencement of the multi-party negotiations which culminated in the interim 
Constitution of 1993 are described,  analysed and evaluated.   The chapter records the 
initial system of government which was set in place in 1910 and the changes which were 
effected over a period of 84 years prior to the implementation of the first democratic 
constitution;  it then proceeds to examine the ways in which public function 
responsibilities were assigned within the various systems of government.   The chapter 
concludes with a general critique of the assignment of responsibilities in the pre-
democratic era. 
 
Chapter 6: Assignment of responsibilities:  1993 Constitution:  This chapter provides at 
the outset a brief overview of the Multiparty Negotiating Process which culminated in the 
adoption of the country’s first democratic constitution,  generally referred to as the 
“interim” Constitution.   An important feature of the negotiations was the development of 
a set of constitutional principles which were to be applied in the drafting of a new 
constitution;  a substantial number of these principles were directly relevant to the 
assignment of responsibilities.   The relevant principles are examined and evaluated.   A 
section of the chapter deals with the input of the erstwhile Commission for Administration 
to the negotiating process;   a contribution which is significant in the context of the 
thesis.   The assignment scheme introduced by the Constitution is described and 
subjected to close and critical examination. 
 
Chapter 7:  Assignment of responsibilities:  1996 Constitution:  The examination,  
analysis and evaluation of the so-called “final” Constitution is structured in essentially the 
same manner as the previous chapter,  which deals with the 1993 Constitution.   As the 
Constitutional Court was required to certify that all the provisions of the Constitution 
complied with the constitutional principles which had been adopted in 1993,  the 
certification actions of the Court are examined and commented on.   The Constitution is 
particularly noteworthy for the emphasis which it places on co-operative government,  
and this matter is therefore also highlighted. 
 
Chapter 8:  Summary,  analysis and interpretation of research findings:  Chapter 8 
consists of two main parts,  viz a summary of the research findings,  and an analysis and 
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interpretation of the findings.   The summary provides a digest of the literature review,  
the assignment of responsibilities in other countries,  the history of the assignment 
question in South Africa prior to 1994,  the 1993 Constitution,  and the 1996 Constitution.   
In the second main part of the chapter,  an assessment is made of the extent to which 
the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions can be said to 
constitute a scientific endeavour.   To be able to make a credible assessment,  a 
purpose-specific set of criteria was developed,  against which the research findings are 
weighed.         
 
Chapter 9:  A theoretical model for the assignment of responsibilities:  In this chapter a 
provisional theoretical model is presented as a possible aid to the accountable 
assignment of public function responsibilities to levels or spheres of government.   For 
purposes of modelling,  a number of simplifying assumptions are made,  while it is 
emphasised that a Public Administration approach to the assignment question is 
followed.   Key elements of the model are language usage,  classification,  assignment 
principles,  and methodology;  these are elucidated in separate sections of the chapter. 
 
Chapter 10:  Reflection:  The brief concluding chapter returns to the problem identified in 
the very first paragraph of the thesis,  as well as to the purpose of the study as indicated 
there.   It reflects on the results achieved with the research by focusing on,  and 
providing answers to,  the research questions which were identified in chapter 2 of the 
thesis as an aid in giving direction and focus to the study.   There is also brief reflection 
on the practicalities of achieving substantial improvement in the assignment of 
responsibilities to the three spheres of government in South Africa. 
 
 
1.7 Conclusion          
 
This chapter has served to identify a problematic situation with regard to the assignment 
of public function responsibilities,  to which the present study is a response,  and to 
emphasise the importance of the assignment question.   It also demarcates the field of 
study,  notes the originality of the study,  and comments briefly on the  approach 
followed.   In addition it surveys the structure of the thesis and provides a concise 
indication of the content of each of the remaining chapters of the thesis.   The next step 
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is to endeavour  to orientate the assignment question in scientific terms,  an objective 
which is pursued in the ensuing chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2:  SCIENTIFIC ORIENTATION 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In an endeavour to achieve an acceptable degree of validity with the present study,  it is 
necessary to orientate the work with some care in scientific terms.   This is necessary 
especially because – as will be evident from this and the following chapter – the 
phenomenon in question has not yet found a substantial place within the compass of 
Pubic Administration,  the topic of the thesis is under-researched,  and the literature 
bearing on the phenomenon is sketchy. 
 
In this chapter,  Public Administration as a discrete body of knowledge concerned with 
the ontological reality of public institutions and their activities,  is brought into focus.   
This is followed by the introduction and discussion of the research problem,  culminating 
in a formal statement of the problem.   On the basis of the problem statement a number 
of research questions are formulated with the purpose of providing direction to the 
collection of data.   The chapter then proceeds to a review of pertinent literature,  and 
ends with a concluding statement. 
 
 
2.2 Public Administration in focus 
 
Amongst public administrationists in South Africa – both academics and professional 
practitioners – there would appear to be a high degree of unanimity concerning what 
could be called a macro-paradigm for understanding and dealing with the phenomenon 
of public institutions and their activities.   In this broad framework a distinction is made 
between the ongoing,  actual activities of public institutions,  on the one hand,  and the 
systematic study of those institutions and their activities,  on the other.   Marais 
distinguishes between public institutions and their activities (which he somewhat 
confusingly calls “the civil service”) and the study of this reality,  which in his view 
constitutes the science of Public Administration.   He remarks laconically that the reality 
exists whether it is studied or not.   (Marais 1993:118-119.)   Wessels notes essentially 
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the same reality,  which he typifies as a first-order reality,  and which he identifies as 
public administration,  using lower case initials in the spelling of the term.   This first–
order reality is studied by the researcher in Public Administration,  for which term 
Wessels employs capital initials.   He conceives of Public Administration as a body of 
knowledge,  made up of valid scientific statements.   (Wessels 1999a:365, 369.)   Pauw 
(1999:9) avers in succinct terms that Public Administration is the scientific study of public 
administration.   The picture emerging from these writings by three South African 
academics is clear:  there is a particular reality or practice,  and a science based on that 
reality or practice.   The first mentioned is public administration,  and the second Public 
Administration.   In the author’s time as a public servant it was customary to think and 
talk about one’s day to day activities as “practice”,  and of what one was taught at 
university as “theory”.   Pauw (1999:10) – who was himself a public servant – 
acknowledges this usage. 
 
For purposes of the study,  the public administration / Public Administration scheme,  as 
noted above,  is accepted as a useful ordering framework.   It is accepted further that 
Public Administration as a science falls predominantly in the category of the human or 
social sciences.    For purposes of scientific orientation it seems necessary to make and 
state this acceptance or assumption explicitly as the categorisation is not necessarily 
self-evident.   In the author’s experience a great deal of the activities of public institutions 
consists in the application of knowledge and techniques forming part of other sciences,  
for instance the natural sciences and the law sciences.   The postulate that there is a 
simple distinction to be made between the major categories of science is probably 
debatable in taxonomic terms.   However,  judging by the structure of academic 
departments generally current in universities,  as well as by the reality of separate 
research institutions for the natural and the social sciences,  it seems reasonable to 
accept that Public Administration belongs with the social sciences.   Methodologically 
viewed,  there has been recent confirmation in the literature of Public Administration that 
social science methods are applicable to its study (Wessels 1999b:382). 
 
On the basis of the foregoing assumptions as to the nature and scientific locus of Public 
Administration,  the approaches and methodology of the social sciences have been 
adopted for present purposes.   The comprehensive and systematic treatment of these 
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matters by Mouton (1996) is acknowledged specifically as the basic set of research 
guidelines giving direction to the present work. 
 
To return to Wessels’s conception of Public Administration as a body of knowledge 
made up of valid scientific statements (vide supra) a question which arises is the 
following:  Can we demarcate this body of knowledge and demonstrate its contents?   A 
further question,  specifically relevant to this study,  presents itself:  Has the subject of 
the present study found its proper place within the body of knowledge which is Public 
Administration and,  if so,  to what extent?   These questions are addressed below. 
 
There is an ongoing debate in South Africa about the proper content of Public 
Administration as a body of knowledge,  or as an academic discipline to be taught at 
university.    The debate has been ongoing for some years amongst local academics,  
and has become known as “the paradigmatic debate” – vide for example Botes (1987) 
and Schwella (1999).   The content question also featured prominently in the so-called 
Mount Grace Resolution adopted in 1991 (McLennan & Fitzgerald 1991:23).   Schwella 
(1999:333) has called the debate “a continuing struggle”.   To attempt to review this 
debate,  or even to join it,   would   divert the present argument far beyond the 
immediate need to demarcate a body of scientific knowledge relevant to the study.   A 
practical approach in the author’s view would be to note what university departments of 
Public Administration actually include within their curricula.   Of course,  an assumption 
has to be made, viz that a department’s curriculum represents its understanding of what 
constitutes the body of knowledge with which it is concerned.   This would appear to be 
a reasonable assumption to make.   A further assumption which can be made,  is  that 
one can limit the scrutiny of the curriculum to its undergraduate part,   on the grounds 
that a university department would want to acquaint its students at undergraduate level 
with the full reach of the particular discipline,  even if certain aspects are only touched 
upon or dealt with in a superficial,  introductory manner.   How else could a graduated 
student be said to have majored in a particular subject?   The making of assumptions 
within a particular context is acceptable in scientific work (Mouton 1996:14).   The Public 
Administration components of two local universities,  viz the Department of Public 
Administration and Management of the University of South Africa (UNISA) and the 
School of Public Management and Administration of the University of Pretoria (UP),  
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have been selected for scrutiny.   The two universities happen to be the oldest in the 
country offering Public Administration as a major subject of study. 
 
On the basis of the published curricula for undergraduate studies of the two universities 
(UNISA 2004b;  UP 2004b),  the following picture emerges:  Although there are 
differences in the structure of the curriculum,  as well as differences in the structure and 
content of particular subject modules,  there is obviously a large measure of agreement 
between the two universities as to what a well-rounded study of Public Administration 
should encompass.   The following are focal points in the Public Administration curricula 
of both universities: 
 
?? Overview of public administration as a composite of activities originating in the 
Constitution,  as the basic plan for the government and administration of the country; 
?? theory of Public Administration; 
?? policy studies; 
?? public human resource management; 
?? public financial administration; 
?? organisation studies; 
?? accountability,  ethics,  and administrative justice; 
?? public management (skills);  and 
?? the functional role of the state in society. 
(UNISA 2004b:374-375;  UP 2004b:111-112.) 
 
As regards the last mentioned focus – the functional role of the state in society -  UNISA 
(2004b:374-375) makes provision for separate optional subject modules dealing with 
protection services,  the creation of wealth,  welfare and social services,  culture and 
education,  and environmental affairs.   UP (2004b:111) has a single,  compulsory 
module dealing with the role of the state,  accentuating its developmental role and its 
protective role respectively,  and encompassing virtually the same functional areas as 
the UNISA modules taken together,  although the treatment is necessarily more concise.      
 
There are some apparent differences:  UNISA (2004b:375) links financial administration 
to its module on public policy,  UP (2004b:112) subsumes financial administration under 
a module dealing with public sector economics.   UP (2004b:112) provides a module on  
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information management,  UNISA does not.   UNISA (2004b:374) provides modules on 
the structuring and functioning of public services,  and the foundations of Public 
Administration (including the generic functions of policy making,  planning,  personnel 
provision and utilisation,  and funding and logistics).   Although UP does not provide 
corresponding courses under the same names,   the particular aspects are subsumed 
under the various courses which do form part of its curriculum (Roux 2004).   UNISA 
(2004b:375) also provides an optional module on comparative public administration,  
government and politics,  and one on public administration dynamics,  with specific 
reference to transformation and transactional dynamics.   At UP the undergraduate 
student has to enrol for all twelve Public Administration modules set out in the 
regulations when specialising in public management for the B Admin degree (UP 
2004b:63);  at UNISA a measure of module selection is permitted in compiling a course 
of study with Public Administration as a major subject (UNISA 2004b:374-375).   In 
summary,  although there are some differences at the fringes – so to speak – there is 
clearly a large area of focused scientific interest concerning Public Administration,  with 
an associated accumulation of generally accepted knowledge,  which the two 
universities would appear to have in common.  
 
As regards other universities and,  until the end of 2003,  technikons offering Public 
Administration as a subject,  it was not considered necessary for present purposes to 
examine their respective Public Administration curricula.   With due respect to the 
institutions concerned,  it is unlikely that the curriculum of an institution offering 
comprehensive subject content in Public Administration,   would differ substantially from 
the combined curriculum reach of UNISA and UP.   It may be mentioned that a survey of 
21 universities and 15 technikons offering Public Administration as a subject,  which was 
conducted by the School of Public Management and Administration of the University of 
Pretoria for the United States Agency for International Development in 1999,  came to 
the conclusion that,  as regards curricula,  it appeared that all institutions cover the same 
focus areas of Public Administration,  except where some universities and technikons 
tend to focus more on particular sub-fields of Public Administration such as local 
government administration,  policy analysis,  and development management (UP 
1999:1B).         
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A further,  insightful,  perspective on the content of Public Administration as a body of 
knowledge,  is provided by the proposed unit standards of the Standards Generating 
Body for Public Administration and Management instituted by the South African 
Qualifications Authority.   The Standards Generating Body has identified eleven 
categories of unit standards in the particular field,  viz policy analysis and management;  
development management;  public organisational development and management;  
managing public service delivery;  human resources management;  financial 
management and procurement;  information,  knowledge,  communication and 
technology;  public management ethics;  public administration and management history,  
theory and research;  disaster studies;  and intergovernmental relations.   (SGB 2006.)   
There is evidently a large measure of agreement between these categories and the 
combined content of the university curricula dealt with supra. 
 
The purpose of the foregoing examination and discussion of university curricula is,  as 
stated at the outset,  to demarcate a body of knowledge which reasonably could be said 
to constitute,  however imperfectly,  the science of Public Administration.   In the author’s 
view each of the two universities could fairly claim that its undergraduate curriculum in 
Public Administration represents its understanding of the body of knowledge (science) 
with which it is concerned,  and which is the base and the focus of its research and 
teaching.   Writing about research within the social domain,  Mouton (1996:14) puts 
forward the view that a science consists of different kinds of components,  such as 
factual and descriptive statements,  explanatory hypotheses,  laws and models,  various 
kinds of assumptions and postulates,  and usually implicitly held beliefs and values.   
This scientifically broadminded view would to the author seem to be an eminently 
acceptable one,  also when applied to Public Administration.   It is not to be expected 
that every part or element of a particular body of knowledge – in the present case,  
Public Administration - when assessed at a particular point in time,  would evince the 
same degree of “scientificness”,  or be equally acceptable to all scientists active in the 
particular field.   On this point,  Mouton (1996:16) mentions that scientific knowledge 
consists of statements with varying degrees  of substantiation or empirical support,  and 
which do not have the same epistemic (knowledge) status.   Again,  the applicability of 
the approach to Public Administration is evident.   However,  there would appear to be 
nothing in the approach to hinder the continuing development of a social science – such 
as Public Administration - with increasing degrees of substantiation and empirical 
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support for its key propositions.   The author comes to the conclusion that researchers 
and students of Public Administration can with justification assert its status as a science 
and continue to work at its further development as a science – an endeavour which 
would appear to be obligatory for all serious proponents of the discipline. 
 
The second question which was raised above,  viz “Has the object of the present study 
found its proper place within the body of knowledge which is Public Administration and,  
if so,  to what extent?” - can now be addressed.   Again,  the search for an answer is 
focused on the respective curricula of UNISA and UP which,  taken together,  in the 
author’s postulated argument are broadly representative of the existing body of 
knowledge which is Public Administration. 
 
The respective responsibilities of the various levels (or spheres) of government for the 
provision of services are dealt with by both universities at an early stage of their 
undergraduate programmes in Public Administration.   At UNISA the matter is dealt with 
in the published study guide for subject module PUB 102-9 (Openbare dienste:  
strukturering en funksionering) (Wessels 2000:27-36);  at UP – which does not publish 
study guides – the matter is,  according to the responsible lecturer,  covered in its 
subject module PAD 151 (Constitutional framework for public administration) (Van Dijk 
2004).   In both instances the location of the matter within the respective curricula would 
to the author appear to be appropriate – the assignment of responsibilities to levels or 
spheres of government is indeed a fundamental (constitutional) aspect of government 
and administration,  and it is fitting that beginning students in Public Administration 
should,  as part of their basic orientation in the subject,  be introduced to the various 
levels or spheres of government and be made aware of their respective responsibilities 
for the performance of public functions. 
 
According to Van Dijk (2004) the treatment of the matter in question at undergraduate 
level at UP is essentially descriptive;  no attempt is made to look at the assignment of 
responsibilities in an analytical or critical manner.  The attention of students is invited to 
what the text and the relevant schedules of the Constitution stipulate regarding the 
responsibilities of the various levels or spheres of government,  without embarking on a 
detailed examination of these responsibilities.   In the UNISA study guide referred to 
above,  an essentially descriptive approach is also followed.   However,  the particular 
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part of the study guide culminates in the posing of a key question,  viz “Op watter 
owerheidsvlak moet ‘n diens gelewer word?”   The discussion of the question is brief,  
consisting of 24 printed lines.   Reference is made to the phenomenon that responsibility 
for many public services is shared between the three levels of government to a greater 
or lesser extent,  as well as to a rule (subsidiarity) which could be applied in this 
connection.   A concise explication of the subsidiarity rule is provided.   (Wessels 
2000:27-34.)   The subject matter of the present thesis is directly linked to the question 
briefly posed in the UNISA study guide referred to. 
 
Regarding studies at postgraduate level,  it was ascertained from a professor attached to 
the UP School of Public Management and Administration that at this level the 
assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government would probably be 
subsumed under the subject module “Intergovernmental relations” (Roux 2004).   The 
University offers such a module as an elective module at the so-called “pre-masters” 
level (UP 2004a:12).   It could not be established to what extent the particular aspect is 
dealt with in an analytical or critical manner within the parameters of the module referred 
to.   In the author’s experience it is possible to study or investigate intergovernmental 
relations while taking the basic assignment of responsibilities to governments as a given.   
Turning to UNISA,  this university does not make provision for a subject module at 
postgraduate level in Public Administration under the title “intergovernmental relations”.   
Of the postgraduate subject modules which are offered,  none would,  on the basis of its 
title,  appear to include intergovernmental relations as a distinct subject.   A professor 
attached to the University’s Department of Public Administration and Management 
confirmed that intergovernmental relations is not dealt with as a distinct subject at 
postgraduate level (Wessels 2004).   As indicated supra,  the Standards Generating 
Body for Public Administration and Management has identified a category of unit 
standards relating to intergovernmental relations.   The information concerning these unit 
standards available on the particular website,  does not contain a specific reference to 
knowledge or competence regarding the assignment of responsibilities to levels or 
spheres of government. 
       
To summarise,  the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions 
to levels or spheres of government would appear to have its place in the developing 
body of knowledge which is Public Administration.   It is to be found at the point where 
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the study of Public Administration turns to the question,  which in any country is a 
fundamental one,  of how responsibilities for the performance of public functions - or the 
provision of public services – is distributed amongst levels or spheres of government.   It 
can reasonably be assumed that this question,  together with its underlying 
phenomenon,   can,  like so many other questions in the social domain,  be addressed 
with varying degrees of scientific intensity.   As to the extent to which the assignment of 
responsibilities is dealt with in university curricula of Public Administration in South 
Africa,  it would seem,  on the basis of the sources consulted and the enquiries made,  
that the particular question is not at present accorded substantial,  in-depth treatment.   
Apart from a brief mention in a UNISA study guide no evidence could be found of an 
analytical or otherwise essentially scientific approach in dealing with the question. 
 
   
2.3 Problem statement 
 
The phenomenon forming the object of the present study,  viz the assignment of 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels or spheres of 
government,  is manifest over a particularly wide front.   States in general (vide the 
comprehensive reference work on constitutions edited by Blaustein and Flanz 1971) 
evince a structure consisting of two or more levels or spheres,  and formally assign,  in 
their constitutions and other laws,  responsibilities for the performance of public functions 
to their respective levels or spheres of government. 
 
As to the importance of the assignment of responsibilities,  of this there can be little 
doubt.   This subject is dealt with more fully in the introductory chapter of the thesis,  
where the following main points are made: 
 
(a) In the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the first democratic constitution 
in South Africa in 1993,  the assignment of responsibilities to the provinces was a major 
issue. 
 
(b) The assignment of responsibilities determines the formal deployment of 
institutionalised political power throughout the state and sets in place a structure of 
governmental accountability. 
  
20 
 
(c) The pattern of assigned responsibilities has a determining influence on the 
public’s acceptance and perception of the structures and programmes of government,  
on the degree of interest shown by the public in public affairs,  and on the willingness of 
people to participate actively in the system of government and administration. 
 
(d)  The assignment of responsibilities determines the structures and to a large 
extent also the processes of public administration.   Among a multitude of dependent 
variables the following are key:  the design of organisation structures,  the determination 
of post establishments,  intergovernmental arrangements and relations,  the sharing of 
revenue,  the size and features of budgets,  the deployment of public servants 
throughout the country,  and the occupational or skills profiles required at or in the 
various levels or spheres of government. 
 
Despite the world-wide manifestation of the phenomenon,  and its obvious importance 
within the domain of government and administration,  the assignment of responsibilities 
has received relatively little recognition and attention in the study of Public 
Administration in South Africa.   It is reasonable to expect that a topic of such importance 
would occupy a substantial place in the curricula of university departments or schools of 
Public Administration or Public Management.   However,  at the present time  this would 
appear not to be the case – vide the brief discussion of the curricula of two leading 
universities in the preceding section.     
 
The fact that the subject matter of the thesis does not at present feature prominently in 
the Public Administration curricula in South Africa poses something of a problem for the 
study.   According to Mc Curdy and Cleary (quoted in Wessels 1999a:367) one of the 
criteria for deciding whether an issue is a “core” issue within the field of Public 
Administration,  is whether the topic or issue under study is central to Public 
Administration;  in practical terms whether the general subject warrants at least a few 
pages of treatment in leading text books on Public Administration.   Such leading text 
books will be surveyed as part of the literature review (vide section 2.6.2 infra).   
However,  if Mc Curdy and Cleary are right,  one could argue that the general topic,  if 
indeed it is important,  should also feature commensurately in university curricula.   This 
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is patently not the case – certainly not as far as South African universities are 
concerned. 
 
In the circumstances,  one may well ask whether there is a problem in existence with 
sufficient substance to require research,  and specifically whether the present study is 
worthwhile.   To be worthwhile within the particular field the research should at least be 
relevant.   Wessels (1999a:378) touches on the question of relevance and expresses the 
opinion that if research results do not form part of the debate within a specific subject,  it 
is perhaps an indication of a lack of relevance of the work for the specific subject.   The 
question of the debate,  if any,  concerning the assignment of responsibilities to 
subnational governments will be addressed in the review of literature (vide section 2.6.2 
infra). 
 
Having noted the reported observations on the questions of the importance and 
relevance of research work within a particular field of study,  the author is nonetheless 
convinced of the importance and relevance of the assignment question to the study of 
Public Administration (vide the motivation provided in the introductory chapter and the 
summary of its main points supra).   The problem may not be the lack of importance or 
relevance of the thesis topic,  but the very fact that a matter which is important and 
relevant has not yet found its proper place in Public Administration curricula or,  as will 
be apparent from the literature review (vide section 2.6.2 infra) is not adequately or 
properly dealt with in the literature of Public Administration.   Taking a positive view,  it 
could be argued that there is a substantial need to be supplied within the developing 
body of knowledge constituting Public Administration,  and that supplying the need 
presents a challenge to researchers. 
 
As will be apparent from an examination of the available research record (vide section 
2.6.1 infra) the object of the present study has for all intents and purposes not been 
researched previously in South Africa.   Whether the in-house work done by the 
erstwhile Commission for Administration preceding the adoption of the 1993 
Constitution,  and which is described and examined in section 6.4 of the thesis,  could be 
regarded as a research project,  is a moot point.   However, it was not reported as such. 
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In summary,  the problem to be addressed in the present study consists in essence of a 
phenomenon – the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government  - 
which is manifest in the systems of government of all countries which provide for more 
than one level or sphere of government,  but in respect of which a body of scientific 
knowledge has not yet emerged.   This paucity of scientific knowledge is evident from 
the available literature (vide section 2.6 infra) and is confirmed by the apparent lack of 
substantial treatment of the particular subject in academic curricula,  as pointed out 
supra.   From a scientific point of view this is a puzzling and unsatisfactory state of 
affairs,  given the fact that the assignment of responsibilities to a large extent determines 
the structure and the functioning of the system of government and administration in a 
country.   The implications of assigning responsibilities in one way rather than another 
would appear to be far-reaching and,  if this is indeed the case,  the assignment question 
is surely one deserving of proper  scientific attention. 
 
Confronted with a situation in which a significant phenomenon in the governmental 
domain of the societal world is not well documented in scientific terms,  the scientific 
response is to attempt to remedy the situation by subjecting the phenomenon to 
research and,  in so doing,  getting to “know it better” in scientific terms.   In Mouton’s 
formulation (1996:8-2) an “epistemic interest” in the matter is engendered,  and such an 
interest can be satisfied only by means of research properly focused and conducted.      
Writing about research in Public Administration,  Wessels (1999a:365) refers to the 
objective of contributing valid scientific statements about public administration,  and thus 
adding to the body of knowledge which is Public Administration.   It is submitted that the 
present study is focused on this objective. 
 
 
2.4 Purpose of the present study 
 
Against the background of the problem statement in the preceding section,  the general 
purpose of the present study can be stated as follows:  to make a research based 
contribution to the body of knowledge constituting Public Administration and specifically 
concerning the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions to 
levels or spheres of government in South Africa.    
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2.5 Research questions 
 
In considering how the stated purpose of the study as stated above,  can best be 
accomplished it would seem helpful to reflect upon and then to formulate the key 
questions to which the study should endeavour to provide answers.   This will ensure 
that the object of study is adequately covered and provide the necessary direction and 
focus to the research.   Some key questions to be answered are set out below. 
 
What is the position as regards relevant literature?    The study should establish to what 
extent the available literature bearing on Public Administration,  and related fields of 
study like Political Science and Constitutional Law,  has addressed the question of the 
assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government.   Because of the 
substantial and far-reaching implications of the assignment of responsibilities for the 
practice of public administration,  it is particularly important to ascertain the extent to 
which assignment matters have found a place in the body of knowledge known as Public 
Administration. 
 
What recognition does the assignment question enjoy in academic circles?   The fact 
that the assignment of responsibilities has been accepted as an appropriate topic for the 
present doctoral research constitutes recognition in itself of the importance of the matter.   
However,  it can be assumed that the true proof of the recognition of a matter as forming 
part of a body of scientific knowledge is to be found in its inclusion in the curricula of the 
appropriate academic departments.   It is considered necessary therefore to survey, as 
part of the study,  the curriculum content of the subject Public Administration at South 
African universities.   (This question has been dealt with in section 2.3 supra.) 
 
What does the research record show?   It goes without saying that the study should 
ascertain the extent and the nature of research into the assignment question previously 
undertaken in South Africa.   While any relevant research done in other countries could 
be of value to the present study,  a comprehensive global survey is considered to be 
beyond the bounds of the present research project.   The assumption is made that if 
relevant and significant research has been done it will be reflected or referred to in the 
literature to be surveyed. 
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How do other countries assign responsibilities?   The assignment of responsibilities to 
levels or spheres of government is virtually a universal phenomenon.   The authoritative 
reference work on the constitutions of the countries of the world (Blaustein and Flanz: 
1971 (with periodic supplements)) shows that the vast majority of countries function with 
more than one level or sphere of government,  and that their constitutions accordingly 
assign responsibilities to the national and subnational levels or spheres of government 
respectively.   It is considered necessary,  as part of the present research,  that a study 
be made of the assignment schemes of a sample of other countries,  in order to extend 
the frame of reference and to ascertain to what extent universal regularities and common 
themes are perhaps to be discerned. 
 
How have  responsibilities been assigned in South Africa?   It lies at the heart of the 
present research project to establish how responsibilities have been assigned to levels 
or spheres of government in South Africa,  commencing with the establishment of the 
South African state in 1910.   This calls for a detailed examination based essentially on 
the successive constitutions which have been adopted and implemented over the years,  
such constitutions falling into two broad categories,  viz the racially based constitutions 
operative prior to 1994 and the democratically based constitutions operative since then. 
 
Where do we stand in scientific terms with the assignment of responsibilities?   Having 
surveyed the literature,  and having examined the actual assignment of responsibilities in 
South Africa and a number of other countries,  the question may well be asked to what 
extent the assignment of responsibilities has achieved scientific respectability. 
    
Can a model be constructed for the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government in South Africa?   Exploratory research along the lines envisaged in the 
study may provide sufficient theoretical insights to make it possible to propose a basis 
on which the assignment of responsibilities in South Africa can be done in an orderly and 
accountable manner.   Recognition of this possibility is seen as an important factor in 
focusing the research effort.                              
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2.6 Literature review 
 
In surveying literature with a bearing on the study,  a broad distinction was made 
between the available research record and published books and journals.   The research 
record was taken to include post-graduate dissertations and theses presented at South 
African universities,  the published reports of research institutes and other bodies which 
have produced research reports,  and in-house work done by the erstwhile Commission 
for Administration.   In reviewing books and journals it was found to be useful to focus in 
turn on two major disciplines,  viz Public Administration and Constitutional Law,  and one 
specialised body of literature,  viz that dealing with federalism. 
 
2.6.1 The research record 
 
With the assistance of the UNISA main library,  electronic searches were conducted in 
the Nexus database of current and completed research in South Africa,  as well as in the 
Index of South African theses and dissertations,  with a view to ascertaining whether 
research relevant to the subject of the present study has previously been done or 
embarked upon in South Africa.   The key terms used were “South African Constitution”,  
“government powers”,  ”function”,  “government”,  “provincial government”,  
“decentralisation”,  “powers”,  “local government”,  “federal”,  “federalism”,  “provincial 
powers”,  “division of powers”,  and “provincial functions”.   A total of 50 research records 
were identified in this way. 
 
No doctoral thesis or master’s dissertation dealing with the assignment of responsibilities 
to levels or spheres of government was found.   A LLM dissertation by Potgieter (1996) 
deals with provincial powers from a federal perspective but does not address the 
research problem as elucidated in section 2.3 supra,  or purport to have a purpose 
similar to that of the present study as stated in section 2.4 supra.    
 
Although not identified in the electronic searches which were conducted,  there is a 
South African doctoral thesis of which the author is aware,  which deals with public 
functions largely as conceptualised for purposes of this thesis (vide section 3.3.3 of the 
thesis),  although it does not employ the same term throughout to connote the key 
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concept.   The thesis bears the title “A criteriological approach to the functional structure 
of central government administration in South Africa” (Loxton 1993).   Loxton’s work is 
similar to the present thesis in dealing with public functions in a comprehensive and 
analytical manner,  but differs fundamentally in being focused differently,  viz on the 
question concerning which activities or services should rationally be undertaken or 
rendered by government,  rather than being left to other sectors of society.   As is 
evident from the reference to central government in the title of the thesis,  Loxton’s work 
is not concerned with the distribution of functions between levels or spheres of 
government. 
 
As far as other research is concerned,  there is a record in the Nexus database of 
research undertaken at the University of Cape Town,  and completed in 2002,  under the 
general title “Co-operative government in South Africa:  a study of the design and 
implementation of South Africa’s new system of multi-sphered government”,  together 
with an indication of an intention to publish a report on the research (Nexus project 
978143).   Professor Murray,  who headed the research programme,  was approached 
with a view to obtaining a copy of the report referred to,  but it appeared that no such 
report has been published. 
 
The Nexus database shows that the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 
conducted a substantial programme on federalism round about the time of the 
finalisation and adoption of the 1996 Constitution.   The outcome of the programme was 
a monograph series on the theory and application of federalism.   Volume 1 of the series 
consists of a general overview of federalism by a prominent author on the subject 
(Elazar 1995),  followed by contributions on federalism as experienced in a number of 
countries (Switzerland,  India,  Nigeria,  and Spain).   Elazar’s overview was perused 
and found to be exactly that - an overview of a mode of political association - but 
focused particularly on the United States.   He does not deal with the assignment of 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions in a comprehensive way,  
referring only in passing to the distribution of “the great constitutional powers”.   Elazar 
refers specifically to commerce,  and especially interstate  commerce,  and mentions the 
increasing involvement of the states in matters of foreign commerce.   All in all,  the 
HSRC monograph series does not constitute a directly relevant source of research 
materials for present purposes. 
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A substantial,  relevant research endeavour which is not recorded in the available 
databases,  but with which the author was closely associated,  was one undertaken by 
the erstwhile Commission for Administration in 1993.   This work was done with the 
purpose inter alia of making a professional contribution to the constitutional development 
process regarding the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of functions,  or 
aspects of functions,  to governments within a three-tiered governmental structure,  as 
envisaged by the negotiating parties.   The design and execution of this programme,  as 
well as its outcome - in the form of the input made to the Multiparty Negotiating Process 
- is dealt with in section 6.4 of the thesis. 
 
2.6.2 Public Administration 
 
There is a vast literature on Public Administration and therefore a practical limit to the 
number of publications which could be perused for purposes of the study,  and be 
commented on in the thesis.  On the other hand,  the fact that the subject of the thesis is 
dealt with from a Public Administration perspective required that a substantial sample of  
Public Administration literature be examined.   It was decided to include in the review 
most of the works published locally,  as well as a number of books published in other 
countries,  which were selected in an essentially pragmatic way.   The review is 
arranged under two headings,  viz “local publications” and “foreign publications”. 
 
2.6.2.1    Survey of local publications 
 
The seminal,  general work on Public Administration published in South Africa is Cloete’s 
Inleiding tot die Publieke Administrasie (Cloete 1967).   The book did not examine the 
vertical separation of powers between levels of government or - in the wording of the 
thesis - the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions to 
levels of government.   The same finding applies to Cloete’s updated introductory text,  
with the title Public Administration and Management,  which was published in 1994.   
Another well-known general text of Cloete’s is his Central,  regional and local 
government institutions of South Africa,  of which the latest revised edition was 
published in 1992.   It could have been expected that this work would have contained a 
section dealing with the vertical separation of powers regarding public functions between 
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the various levels or spheres of government;  it does not,  although there are references 
in passing at various points in the text to the interfaces between levels of government,  
and to the exercising of control over the subnational levels of government.   The book is 
descriptive,  not analytical or polemical,  true to the author’s stated intention of providing 
a basic reference work to assist members of the public,  students and politicians who  
“ … wish to be informed about the public institutions and their activities” (foreword by the 
author). 
 
Notable amongst the other general textbooks on Public Administration published in 
South Africa are those of Bayat and Meyer (1994),  Botes,  Brynard,  Fourie and Roux 
(1996),  and Du Toit and Van der Waldt (1999).   Neither of the first two of these books 
deals with the vertical separation or division of powers between levels or spheres of 
government.   Du Toit and Van der Waldt provide a brief description of how work is 
divided between three levels of government,  illustrated with some examples.   Their 
treatment of the matter is,  however,  limited to putting forward a broad and somewhat 
obvious view that the national level of government has power over matters of national 
interest,  while the provincial and local levels of government have powers over matters 
which can best be dealt with at the respective levels.   (Du Toit & Van der Waldt 
1999:192-193).   There is no attempt at analysis or any discussion of principles or 
criteria which could be applied in determining the vertical separation of powers. 
 
A number of more specialised books on Public Administration published in South Africa,  
viz those of Gildenhuys (1988),  Hanekom,  Rowland and Bain (1990),  Hanekom and 
Thornhill (1993),  Van der Waldt en Helmbold (1995),  and Cloete (1996) were also 
perused as part of the research. 
 
Gildenhuys (1988) provides a record of the proceedings at the so-named Winelands 
Conference of 1987,  which was arranged to celebrate the centenary of the recognition 
of Public Administration as an academic discipline in its own right.   The topic of the 
present thesis was not raised or dealt with at the Conference.   In the book of Hanekom,  
Rowland and Bain (1990),  which purports to deal with key aspects of Public 
Administration,  the separation or division of powers between levels of government is not 
identified as such a key aspect.   The work of Hanekom and Thornhill (1993),  which 
focuses on public administration in contemporary society,  also does not refer to the 
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matter.   Van der Waldt en Helmbold (1995) write about the “new public administration” 
in the context of the adoption of the 1993 Constitution.   They identify constitutional 
principle XVI (“Government shall be structured at national,  provincial and local levels”) 
as one of five principles which are particularly important from a public administration 
perspective (Van der Waldt & Helmbold 1995:27),  but do not examine the actual 
assignment of responsibilities within the structure of government as stipulated in the 
1993 Constitution.   Cloete (1996:52-57) briefly describes the role of a “hierarchy of 
legislatures”,  but does not deal with the vertical separation or division of legislative and 
concomitant executive powers. 
 
An electronically facilitated survey of articles within the domain of Public Administration 
did not produce a single article which deals in a comprehensive and critical way with the 
assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions.   An article by the 
author published in 1998,  which does deal with the subject,  is not recorded in the Index 
of South African Periodicals.   The particular article takes a critical look at the 
assignment of public functions,  and conditions governing their performance,  as 
stipulated in the 1996 Constitution.   The conclusion reached is that the matter is not 
dealt with in a satisfactory manner by the Constitution,  which in other respects is 
considered to be an exemplary one.   The opinion is expressed that a satisfactory 
ordering of public functions is achievable,  and the view advanced that a significant 
contribution to this end can be made from within the discipline of Public Administration.   
(Robson 1998a.) 
 
In summary,  it would appear that scant attention is paid to the assignment of 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels or spheres of 
government in the available South African literature on Public Administration.   There is 
no record of any systematic examination of the phenomenon,  or of any theoretical 
insights concerning the matter,  or of any recognition of its importance - other than the 
author’s own venture into print in 1998 - on which the present thesis can build. 
   
2.6.2.2    Survey of foreign publications 
 
Even though the following survey of foreign publications is necessarily concise,  it is 
deemed to be essential and fitting to include a substantial reference to the watershed 
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article published by Woodrow Wilson in 1887 (reprinted in Gildenhuys 1988:7-20) which,  
if not the first article ever published on Public Administration,  was certainly one of the 
most influential. 
 
Within the confines of a single journal article,  and presumably with a great deal of 
convincing to do,  the future President of the United States could not have been 
expected to deal at length with the separation of powers,  whether the focus be the 
horizontal or the vertical separation of powers.   His article does,  however,  contain a 
key passage dealing with the separation of powers which is so insightful and relevant to 
the subject of the present study,  that it is quoted in full: 
 
“There is,  indeed,  one point at which administrative studies trench on constitutional 
ground - or at least upon what seems constitutional ground.   The study of 
administration,  philosophically viewed,  is closely connected with the study of the proper 
distribution of constitutional authority.   To be efficient it must discover the simplest 
arrangements by which responsibility can be unmistakably fixed upon officials;  the best 
way of dividing authority without hampering it,  and responsibility without obscuring it.   
And this question of the distribution of authority,  when taken into the sphere of the 
higher,  the originating functions of government,  is obviously a central constitutional 
question.   If administrative study can discover the best principles upon which to base 
such distribution,  it will have done constitutional study an invaluable service.   
Montesquieu did not,  I am convinced,  say the last word on this head “ (Wilson 1887, in 
Gildenhuys 1998:14). 
 
The reference to Montesquieu may seem to suggest that Wilson had in mind the 
horizontal separation of powers,  but it is altogether possible that he was also referring to 
the vertical separation of powers.   His remarks are certainly apposite to the subject of 
the present study. 
 
The foreign published books on public administration selected for perusal,  are sixteen in 
number and cover a period of some fifty-six years,  starting with the work of Finer 
published in 1950,  and ending with the book by Greene published in 2005. 
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Chapter 2 of book 1 of Finer’s primer (1950) is titled “The separation of powers”.   In this 
chapter the author takes a critical look at the doctrine of the horizontal separation of 
powers between the legislative,  executive and judicial components of government,  as 
propounded by Montesquieu,  but does not deal with the vertical separation of powers 
between levels of government.   In another part of the work (chapter 4 of book III) Finer 
analyses the relationship between the central government and the local authorities in the 
United Kingdom,  and finds that at the time (1950) the local authorities were in essence 
agencies of the national administration.   This being the case,  it is in Finer’s view 
important to determine the degree of central control to which a service should be 
subjected.   He proposes three basic criteria which point to centralisation,  viz  
  
?? that the service is of national and not local importance; 
?? that all citizens should enjoy similar standards of service;  and 
?? that the service cannot be greatly improved without aggregating units of 
administration.   (Finer 1950:108.) 
 
Although dealing with a country specific situation obtaining at the time,  Finer’s insights 
on the centralisation / decentralisation question have some relevance to the subject 
matter of the thesis. 
 
Van Poelje (1953) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of centralisation and 
decentralisation and deals with certain forms of decentralisation,  viz territorial 
decentralisation and decentralisation on the basis of services (desentralisatie volgens 
diensten),  but includes nothing pertinent to the subject of this thesis.   In editing a book 
on ideas and issues in public administration,  Waldo (1953) mentions in the preface that 
one principle (sic) followed in compiling the readings was coverage of the subjects 
embraced in most general courses in Public Administration.   Significantly,  none of the 
19 chapters deals with the separation of powers between levels of government.   
According to another preface (Rowat 1961),  the author sees his book as representing 
an attempt to present contending points of view on controversial issues in all the major 
areas of public administration.   Forty issues,  arranged under nine headings and 
featuring arguments for and against a certain position,  are presented.   The division or 
separation of powers between levels of government does not find a place in Rowat’s 
array of controversial issues. 
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One of the 53 chapters in a comprehensive collection of readings on public 
administration published in 1966 (Golembiewski,  Gibson & Cornog 1966) has some 
bearing on the subject matter of the thesis.     In chapter 37,  written by J D Millett,  
reference is made to the situation which has arisen in the United States where the 
federal government’s role in the system of government has increased immensely relative 
to that of the states,  including its extensive involvement (inter alia by means of grants-
in-aid) in programmes conducted by the state and local governments.   A critical 
examination of the assignment of responsibilities to the various levels of government is,  
however,  not attempted.   The increasing role of the higher levels of government is also 
highlighted in the well-known textbook by Dimock and Dimock (1969).   Chapter 6 is 
eloquent on the complexity and confusion regarding government responsibilities which 
have arisen since the end of the 19th century,  as the federal and state governments 
intervened more and more in state and local responsibilities.   Mention is made of the 
resulting huge demands which are made on people in public administration who are 
tasked with functioning within a complex system.   Hodgson (1969) refers broadly to 
three levels of government,  listing some local government services but having virtually 
nothing to say about the national and regional levels.   The author makes the point that 
the different levels do not always have exclusive jurisdiction in their various fields of 
activity.   (Hodgson 1969:17-18.)   No attempt is made to deal analytically or normatively 
with the question of which responsibilities properly belong at each level. 
 
Caiden (1971),  writing on the dynamics of public administration,  has cause to devote a 
chapter (chapter 6) to the identification and elucidation of public functions,  distinguishing 
between “traditional functions”,  “nation building functions”,  “economic management 
functions”,  “social welfare functions”,  and “environmental control functions”.   He does 
not,  however,  deal with the vertical separation of powers or responsibilities in relation to 
these functions.   Self (1977) devotes a chapter (chapter 2) of his book to an 
examination of “the organisation of government” and within the chapter,  a section to the 
“allocation of functions”.   His concern is with the practical utility of four competing 
principles of organisation,  propounded especially by Gulick,  in determining the 
functional demarcation of government departments,  viz the purpose served,  the 
processes employed,  the persons or things dealt with,  and the area covered (Self 
1977:55).   The Gulick principles are a hardy perennial in organisation theory but are not 
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directly applicable in discourse on the vertical separation of powers within a tiered 
structure of government.  
 
Henry’s (1975) general textbook contains a chapter (chapter 11) dealing with 
intergovernmental administration.   Focusing exclusively on the United States,  he finds 
that the concept,  structure and practice of federal relations in the United States have 
been in “turmoil” since the inception of the federation.   He proceeds to deal with the 
turmoil and the extraordinarily complex system which has evolved.   He does not,  
however,  deal with the fundamental question of the appropriate assignment of 
responsibilities to the national and subnational governments.   Although also presented 
as a general work on public administration,  the book by Simon,  Thompson and 
Smithburg (1991) – the latest edition of a book first published in 1950 – constitutes an 
approach to public administration which differs markedly from the more conventional 
approaches.   The authors treat the domain of public administration from an organisation 
behavioural point of view.   In 561 pages they do not raise the question of the vertical 
separation of powers between levels of government. 
 
Cox,  Buck and Morgan (1994) present five distinct perspectives on public 
administration,  viz normative foundations,  public administration as management,  public 
administration as organisation theory,  public administration as planned change,  and 
public administration as politics.   They state that their aim in writing the book was to re-
examine,  expand,  and build upon the theoretical and historical foundations that define 
the study of public administration.   (Cox et al. 1994:2-4.)   The book does not deal with 
the vertical separation of powers and functions amongst levels of government.   Heady 
(2001) provides a comparative perspective on public administration in a book which,  
according to the preface,  is the sixth and updated edition of a book first published in 
1966.   The author uses “bureaucracy” as the focal point for purposes of making 
comparisons between countries.   He views bureaucracy as an institution defined in 
terms of three basic or pivotal characteristics,  viz (1) hierarchy,  (2) differentiation or 
specialisation,  and (3) qualification or competence.   He is especially concerned with the 
higher civil and,  where appropriate,  military bureaucracies.   (Heady 2001:75-78.)   The 
book does not include a comparison of schemes for the assignment of public function 
responsibilities between levels or spheres of government. 
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Editing a book on the foundations of contemporary public administration,  Osborne 
(2002:vii-ix) organises the contributions of the selected authors under four headings,  viz 
the background to public administration and management,  critiques of the public sector 
and of public administration,  the “new public management”,  and an analysis of the “new 
public management”.   According to one of the contributors,  “new public management” 
arose circa 1976 and usually embraces seven “doctrinal components”;  these are listed 
as hands-on professional management,  explicit standards and measures of 
performance,  greater emphasis on output controls,  a shift to disaggregation of units in 
the public sector,  a shift to greater competition in the public sector,  stress on private 
sector styles of management,  and stress on greater discipline and parsimony in 
resource use (Hood 2002:186-187).   The book does not contain contributions directly 
relevant to the subject of the thesis. 
 
A handbook of public administration edited by Guy Peters and Pierre (2003) is,  as the 
name suggests,  a voluminous publication running to 640 pages,  with over fifty 
contributors.   The book is structured in fourteen sections covering a wide field,  from 
“public management:  old and new” and “human resource management”;  through 
“politics and administration” and “administration and society”;  to “accountability” and  
“intergovernmental relations” (Guy Peters & Pierre 2003:v-ix).   It is the last mentioned of 
the fourteen sections which,  on the face of it,  may have relevance for the present study.   
The introduction to the section identifies the division of powers and functions as one of 
the dimensions of intergovernmental relations (Painter 2003:591).   The three 
contributions making up the section deal respectively with co-ordination (Wollmann 
2003:594-606),  instruments of intergovernmental management (Radin 2003:607-618),  
and multi-level governance (Smith 2003:619-628).   However,  none of the contributors 
addresses the question of how the public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  to be 
performed at the various levels of government are to be determined. 
 
The most recent general textbook on Public Administration included in the sample of the 
discipline’s literature is that of Greene (2005).   In the preface to the book the author 
states that the purpose of the book is to fill the need for a concise,  introductory textbook 
for masters of Public Administration students who lack background in Public 
Administration and Political Science;  and further that it is written at a level appropriate to 
both undergraduate and graduate students.   The closest the book comes to dealing with 
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the subject of the present thesis is in two brief sections focusing on intergovernmental 
relations (Greene 2005:19-22, 101-103).   The author does not,  however,  examine the 
deployment of public function responsibilities over the various levels of government. 
 
In summary,  the survey of a selection of foreign published works dealing with Public 
Administration in a more or less comprehensive way leads to a finding similar to that in 
respect of comparable South African literature (vide section 2.6.2 supra),  viz that there 
is little evidence of a developed body of knowledge concerning the assignment question 
within the field of Public Administration on which the present thesis can build.    
 
2.6.2.3 Evaluation 
 
Judged on the sample of literature dealing with Public Administration,  the vertical 
separation of powers between national and subnational governments does not emerge 
as a major issue or one enjoying substantial recognition within the particular science.   
On the other hand,  the references in the literature to complexity and confusion (Dimock 
& Dimock 1969),  and even turmoil (Henry 1975),  in relation to the respective 
responsibilities  of national and subnational governments,  tend to confirm the position 
taken in this thesis that it is an important matter.   There is reason to surmise that 
Woodrow Wilson,  the “father” of Public Administration,  might have regarded it in that 
light.                            
 
2.6.3 Constitutional law 
 
Moving to the field of constitutional law,  five books on constitutional law published in 
South Africa were consulted,  viz those of Wiechers (1985),  Basson and Viljoen (1988),  
Rautenbach and Malherbe (1994),  Basson (1995),  and Chaskalson,  Kentridge,  
Klaaren,  Marcus,  Spitz and Woolman (1996).   A number of articles written by local 
experts on public or constitutional law were also examined as part of the research. 
 
2.6.3.1 Survey of local publications 
 
In the book by Wiechers (1985),  the public functions assigned to subnational levels of 
government for performance are referred to and described but without critical 
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examination or analysis.   The matters for which the then provincial councils were 
competent to adopt ordinances,  are set out quite comprehensively (Wiechers 1985:407-
415).   The finding is generally the same as regards the book by Basson and Viljoen.   
They do not deal with the public function responsibilities of the subnational governments 
in a comprehensive or analytical manner.   They do highlight the distinction between 
“general affairs” and “own affairs” as stipulated in the 1983 Constitution,  but the 
treatment is descriptive,  not analytic.   There is a brief reference to matters on which the 
provincial councils could pass ordinances,  but again no analysis.   Services which local 
authorities were authorised to render,  are listed.   (Basson & Viljoen 1988:145-146, 288, 
298.) 
 
Following the adoption of the 1993 Constitution,  Basson published a comprehensive 
section by section commentary on this,  the first fully democratic Constitution.   He 
quotes but does not deal analytically with the functional areas of legislative competence 
assigned to the provinces;  and makes the observation that the provinces are not given 
autonomous powers with regard to their designated areas of legislative competence.   
(Basson 1995:198-201.)  He notes the constitutionally inferior position of local 
government in relation to central and provincial government,  and remarks that local 
governments would have no functions and powers at all if these were not awarded to 
them by national or provincial legislation (Basson 1995:242). 
   
The books by Rautenbach and Malherbe (1994) and Chaskalson et al. (1996) were also 
published subsequent to the adoption of the 1993  Constitution. 
 
Rautenbach and Malherbe use the term “owerheidsfunksie” with much the same 
connotation as that given to the term “public function” in this thesis (Rautenbach & 
Malherbe 1994:54; section 3.3.3 of the thesis).   They discuss briefly and in general 
terms the question of which “owerheidsfunksies” should be performed at each level of 
government,  noting the importance in this connection of historical,  geographic,  
economic, and administrative factors.   Also important in their view are the nature and 
distribution of the population,  the size of the state,  and ideological considerations.   
They venture the view that it may be possible to determine in a relatively objective way 
where each function can be performed in the most efficient manner.   They mention that 
“in public administration” different criteria are developed for the allocation of functions to 
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the various levels of government,  and refer to Self in this regard.   However,  Self (1977: 
chapter 2) does not deal with the allocation of functions to levels of government;  his 
concern is with the functional demarcation of departments at the national level of 
government.   Somewhat surprisingly,  Rautenbach and Malherbe do not mention the 
so-called “subsidiarity principle” (vide section 3.3.3 of the thesis).    
 
The book by Chaskalson et al. (1996) is essentially a manual for lawyers,  dealing with 
constitutional law in South Africa and focused in the main on the 1993 Constitution.   
Well over half the book is devoted to the elucidation and interpretation of fundamental 
rights as set out in chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution.   There are brief references to the 
constitutional provisions concerning the legislative authority of the national legislature  
(p. 3-1) and the provincial legislatures (p. 4-1),  but no treatment of the phenomenon of 
public functions per se,  or any discussion as to where responsibility for the performance 
of particular functions could or should be placed.   The manual contains a chapter 
(chapter 5) on “federalism”,  but this does not deal with the theory or practice of 
federalism;  it is an examination and interpretation of the provisions of the 1993 
Constitution which regulate the exercise of the legislative,  and the associated executive 
authority,  given by the Constitution to the national and the provincial spheres of 
government respectively.    
 
The adoption of the 1993 Constitution and subsequently the 1996 Constitution,  gave 
rise to a large number of journal articles written by local experts in public or constitutional 
law.   Because of the close link between the Constitution and the subject matter of the 
thesis,  a selection of these articles - based on the perceived relevance of their titles and 
the introductory paragraphs - was perused as part of the research.   No article was found 
which addresses in a fundamental way the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions,  or which postulates or suggests a particular rationale or 
model for such assignment.   When the authors do deal with the assignment question – 
also referred to as the division of powers – they are interested in or concerned about 
aspects such as the following: 
 
?? The extent and limits of provincial powers (without examining the actual functions to 
which the powers relate) (Carpenter 1994:229-230;  Malherbe 2001:255-285;  
Erasmus 1994:407-429); 
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?? the importance of maintaining national unity (Botha 1994:241-242;  Erasmus 
1994:422); 
?? the constitutional principles dealing with the assignment of powers (Beukes 
1994:393-406); 
?? the phenomenon of concurrent powers for the national and the provincial 
governments;  the resolution of related jurisdictional disputes,  including especially 
the role of the Constitutional Court;  and the implied need for co-operative 
government (Erasmus 1994:416-418; Malherbe 2001:255-285; Malherbe 2002:547;  
Steytler 2001:241-254); 
?? the manifestation in legal terms of the subsidiarity principle in the new constitutional 
dispensation (Du Plessis 2000:201;  De Visser 2002:240); 
?? the problem of unfunded mandates,  that is to say making the provinces responsible 
for a particular public function without providing the necessary means for them to 
perform the function (Malherbe 2002:541-548); 
?? the new constitutional status of local government,  with legislative and executive 
powers recognised – for the first time – in the Constitution (De Visser 2002:223-243);  
and 
?? commenting on specific court decisions regarding disputes between the national and 
the provincial governments (Carnelly 1999;  2002).          
 
One question which the public law experts do not examine is which public functions,  or 
aspects of public functions,  properly belong to the respective levels or spheres of 
government – in other words who does what,  or who should do what.   Their concern is 
with the exercise of power in relation to given matters,  rather than with the substance of 
the given matters.   The authors generally do not remark on the vagueness with,  or 
problematical way in which public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  are 
formulated in the Constitution,  and which could be an important causative factor in the 
jurisdictional disputes brought before the courts – vide  for examples of such disputes 
Malherbe (2001) and Carnelly (1999;  2002). 
 
For a general evaluation from a legal point of view of the structure and functioning of the 
present scheme for the assignment of responsibilities to spheres of government,  the 
article by Steytler (2001) is noteworthy.   He highlights the present state of domination of 
the legislative domain by the national government,  and the concomitant relative 
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inactivity of the provincial legislatures (Steytler 2001:242-246) – a finding which accords 
with that of Pottie (2001:42-43).   Steytler is critical of the Constitutional Court which in 
his view has,  by emphasising the concept of co-operative government,  tended not to 
favour the provinces in deciding jurisdictional disputes,  and which has therefore not 
arrested the drift towards centralisation.   He also notes an emerging tendency for key 
decisions regarding legislation in the concurrent category to be taken at joint political 
executive level (national / provincial),  that is to say outside the functioning of the 
provincial legislatures.   (Steytler 2001:254.)   The latter finding is echoed by Carnelly 
(2002:199).   The question may well be asked to what extent these tendencies may be 
ascribable to weaknesses inherent in the assignment scheme adopted for the country.               
 
2.6.3.2 Evaluation 
 
It is apparent that writers on public or constitutional law  are intensely interested in the 
vertical separation of powers within a country’s governmental structure,  but in their own 
peculiar way,  viz by being focused on the power relationships set up by a constitution 
between the national government and the subnational governments.   This follows from 
the established epistemological content of the discipline.   A leading textbook on 
constitutional law describes constitutional law as encompassing the totality of binding 
rules with regard to the division or exercise of governmental authority 
(“owerheidsgesag”).   Constitutional law determines in whom the governmental authority 
in the state vests and what the reach of that authority is.   By means of constitutional law 
two types of relationship are regulated,  viz (a)  the mutual relationship of the institutions 
which are the bearers of governmental authority in the state;  and (b)  the relationship 
between the institutions of state and the subjects of the state (or between the state as a 
legal persona and the subjects) to the extent that such relationship rests on authority.   
(Wiechers 1985:4.) 
 
The conclusion to be drawn,  is that constitutional lawyers are interested not so much in 
the actual public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  for which levels or spheres of 
government are made responsible,  but in the legal rules which govern the powers 
assigned to the various governments,  which include the fundamental power to perform 
public functions,  or aspects of public functions.   Whether a subnational level or sphere 
of government is made responsible for public functions a, b and c,  or x,  y and z,  or 
  
40 
whatever,  is a matter to be determined through an essentially political process by 
constitutional assemblies and legislatures;  for lawyers schooled in the content and the 
interpretation of the Constitution the actual distribution of public functions would appear 
to be a given. 
 
2.6.4 Federalism 
 
The literature on federalism has a degree of relevance for the present study.   It is 
necessary at the outset to pose the question,  What is federalism?   The definitions of 
two eminent authors on the subject are quoted below: 
 
“Federal government exists … when the powers of government … are divided 
substantially according to the principle that there is a single independent authority for the 
whole area in respect of some matters and that there are independent regional 
authorities for other matters,  each set of authorities being co-ordinate with and not 
subordinate to the others within its own prescribed sphere” (Wheare 1963:35). 
 
“Federalism is the mode of political association and organisation that unites separate 
polities within a more comprehensive political system in such a way as to allow each to 
maintain its own fundamental political integrity” (Elazar 1995:1). 
 
As federalism is not the subject of the present study,  these definitions are not subjected 
to critical examination or elaboration here.   The author can,  however,  venture the 
opinion that these definitions do not find a satisfactory fit when applied to South Africa.   
Neither the substantial division of powers referred to by Wheare,  nor the maintenance 
by constituent polities of their fundamental political integrity referred to by Elazar,  is a 
feature of the South African constitutional dispensation.   As will be apparent from the 
critical examination of the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions contained in chapters 6 and 
7 respectively of the thesis,  there is no division of power between the spheres of 
government in South Africa.   Even the “exclusive” powers in relation to certain matters 
given by the 1996 Constitution to the provinces,  are subject to intervention by the 
national government in certain circumstances.   What writers on federalism have to say 
concerning the vertical separation of powers is nevertheless relevant to the study.   A 
sample of foreign and local publications are examined in the following sections. 
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2.6.4.1 Survey of foreign publications  
 
Wheare’s definition quoted above,  clearly implies a vertical separation of powers within 
a country’s structure of government,  with some matters falling under the jurisdiction of 
the national government and some matters under the jurisdiction of the subnational 
governments.   He does not go into the substance of the matters – or public functions,  
or aspects of public functions - which properly belong with the national and subnational 
governments respectively.   In his discussion of the “division of powers”,  Wheare makes 
two points which have a degree of relevance to the present study: 
 
?? The simplest solution for the division of powers is to have one list of matters which 
fall under the jurisdiction of the national government,  leaving the rest to the 
subnational governments,  or vice versa,  with such a list being exclusive. 
?? In practice,  however,  concurrent powers (for the national and subnational 
governments) in relation to some matters would appear to be unavoidable for certain 
reasons identified by him.   One of these reasons is the perceived difficulty to 
allocate certain matters exclusively to one level of government.   Wheare goes on to 
suggest that concurrent powers could be assigned as a transitional measure. 
(Wheare 1963:77-79.) 
 
It is also worth noting that Wheare (1963:40-42) identifies a number of factors which 
could produce a desire in subnational units to be autonomous for certain purposes,  viz 
previous existence as distinct entities,  a divergence of economic interests,  geographic 
factors,  differences of nationality,  language,  race,  or religion,  and dissimilarity of 
social institutions.   Although the author does not say so,  these factors could provide 
some clues as to matters which should be placed under the jurisdiction of subnational 
governments.  
 
Riker (1964:53) provides a comprehensive categorisation of what he calls “functional 
areas of government action” but does not propose a model for the assignment of 
responsibility for matters falling within such functional areas to the national and 
subnational governments respectively.   He does provide a historical overview of how 
the actual powers of the two levels of government in the United States have changed,  in 
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the light of Presidential actions,  legislation adopted by Congress,  and decisions of the 
Supreme Court (Riker 1964:51-84).   The circumstances and arguments recorded by 
Riker may be useful in identifying criteria to be used when applying the subsidiarity 
principle – vide section 3.3.3 of the thesis.   From a subsidiarity perspective,  the 
question to be asked is,  “What constitutes a ‘good reason’ for assigning responsibility 
for a particular function to a higher level of government,  rather than assigning it to a 
lower level?” 
 
Although going back into history to point to early manifestations of federalism,  Friedrich 
– like Riker – is focused principally on the United States.   In his view the modern federal 
state was “discovered” in America in the late 18th century with the drafting of the 
Constitution of the United States.   He notes that in the American model the federal 
government exercises only the powers assigned to it,  while the constituent states hold 
the residual powers.   The intention was to restrict the powers of the federal sphere;  
however,  in the course of time the federal powers have expanded steadily.   Writing as 
far back as 1968,  Friedrich comes to the conclusion that “ … more  and more the states 
appear as administrative subdivisions of the nation”.   (Friedrich 1968:3-6, 17-18, 24.)   
One may well ask whether such a development was not to be expected,  in the light of 
the very rudimentary treatment (by modern standards) of the assignment of powers in 
the Constitution of 1787.   Friedrich does not provide a model for the separation of 
powers between the federal and the state governments in relation to the performance of 
particular public functions.      
 
Elazar (1987, 1995) provides a penetrating analysis of federalism as a mode of political 
association,  identifying federalism as one of three basic models of government (the 
others being what he calls the centre-periphery model and the hierarchical model).   He 
deals with numerous aspects,  such as the ambiguities inherent in federal arrangements 
(in seeking to perpetuate both union and non-centralisation);  the basic elements of 
federal relationships;  the variety of political systems which evince federal characteristics 
(including the South African system);  the principles of federalism;  and elements which 
serve to maintain federal principles.   Echoing Friedrich,  he states that modern 
federation as a system was invented in America with the adoption of the Constitution of 
the United States in 1787.   He has an insightful observation regarding unity and 
diversity,  which in his view are not opposites;  unity should be contrasted with disunity 
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and diversity with homogeneity (Elazar 1987:39, 64).   Elazar does not deal with the 
assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions.   Commenting on 
the situation in the United States,  he refers in passing to “ … the contemporary 
distribution of the great constitutional powers”.   He mentions commerce,  and especially 
interstate commerce,  as well as the increasing involvement of the states in matters of 
foreign commerce.   He also refers to the field of human rights – noting the role of the 
Supreme Court – and to the promotion of the general welfare.   (Elazar 1995:56-57.)   
There is,  however,  no systematic examination of the separation of powers in relation to 
particular public functions. 
 
The publications of two authorities on the federal systems of their own countries were 
included in the research. 
 
Laufer’s (1991) work deals comprehensively with the federal system of Germany,  
including the evolution of federalism in Germany,  the origins of the present system,  the 
key aspects of the system,  and the need for reform.   He devotes a section of his book 
(section 3.4) to both the division and the intertwinement (verflechtung) of functions 
between the federation and the Länder.   His treatment of the division of functions is 
descriptive,  not analytic;  he does not examine the division of powers critically or 
present a rationale for assigning functions to one level of government rather than 
another.   Although Laufer mentions the subsidiarity principle in a few places in his book,  
and provides a definition of the principle in the lexicon appended to his book – vide also 
section 3.3.3 of the thesis - he does not refer to the principle in his discussion of the 
division of powers.   One of his main findings is particularly noteworthy,  viz that the 
Basic Law presumption regarding the primary legislative competence of the Länder has 
been largely reversed by developments,  with the exercise of state powers and the 
performance of state functions having become in a high degree matters for the federal 
organs.   This is especially evident with respect to legislation,  where the federation plays 
the dominant role,  and the Länder parliaments,  as legislative organs,  have been 
reduced largely to inactivity (Untätigkeit).   However,  the Länder provide the major part 
of the country’s administration,  being charged with the execution of both federal and 
Länder laws.   Laufer emphasises the thick net of functional intertwinement which has 
developed between the federation and the Länder,  and warns that the degree of 
intertwinement is gradually working against the constitutionally intended division of 
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powers.   (Laufer 1991:91-94.)   Seen against this background,  it is not surprising that 
co-operation between the federation and the Länder has become a matter of great 
importance,  and Laufer devotes a chapter (chapter 7) of his book to what he calls 
Politikverflechtung im kooperativen Föderalismus. 
 
In his comprehensive analysis of and comment on constitutional development in 
Belgium,  Senelle (1990) avers that the allocation of competences between the national 
authority,  on the one hand,  and the community and regional authorities,  on the other 
hand,  has been governed by four principles,  viz 
 
(a) the decrees adopted by the community and the regional authorities have the 
same force in law as the national laws; 
(b) the communities and the regions have exclusive competences; 
(c) the communities and the regions have only the competences vested in them by 
the Constitution,  or pursuant thereto;  and 
(d) the authority competent to legislate on a matter is also responsible for the 
implementation of the legislation,  and vice versa (Senelle refers to this principle 
as the “principle of verticality”) (Senelle 1990:40). 
 
In another part of his book Senelle deals with what he calls the “principle of residuary 
competence”.   Because,  in his view,  it is impossible to specify every matter for which 
either the national authority or the subnational authorities will have legislative 
competence,  it is necessary to provide for residuary competence in respect of such 
matters,  and to specify the authority with which the residuary competence will lie 
(Senelle 1990:155-156). 
 
Senelle’s four basic principles,  as well as his principle of residuary competence,  are 
focused generally on the requirements of constitutional law rather than on providing a 
basis for determining which public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  belong with 
each of the various levels or spheres of government (or authorities as he calls them).   
However,  the principle of exclusivity – postulated by Senelle at (b) above – does have 
relevance for present purposes by requiring that a public function,  or aspect of a public 
function,  once the responsibility for its performance has been assigned to a level or 
sphere of government,  should fall within the exclusive purview of the particular level or 
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sphere.   Whether a government competent to legislate on a matter should in principle 
also implement or administer the legislation – as postulated by Senelle in (d) above – is 
debatable;  practical considerations may in certain circumstances point to a departure 
from such a “principle” - which in any case would seem to be a rule or guideline rather 
than a principle. 
 
Like Laufer,  Senelle does not propose a rationale for the assignment of functions to one 
level or sphere of government rather than another.   He does deal quite comprehensively 
with the actual competences of the communities and the regions but the treatment is 
essentially descriptive (Senelle 1990:43-125). 
   
Senelle has made a contribution to the “language” of the allocation of competences 
which is noteworthy.   He puts forward the following terms: 
 
“shared exclusive competences” – where one aspect of a matter is assigned to one level 
of authority and another aspect of the same matter is reserved exclusively for another 
level of authority; 
 
“limited concurrent competence” – where a competence is assigned subject to 
compliance with minimum standards,  or general or sectoral conditions,  laid down by the 
national authority.   Senelle includes so-called “outline legislation”,  where the national 
authority makes only “general regulations”,   leaving some legislative space to the 
subnational authorities,  within the connotation of “limited concurrent competence”;  and 
 
“parallel competence” – where power in a given area of competence is exercised 
cumulatively and in parallel at various levels of authority whose legal rules stand in no 
hierarchical relationship to one another.    
(Senelle 1990:81, 86-87, 134.) 
 
It can be foreseen that in model development regarding the assignment of  
responsibilities for the performance of public functions it will be necessary to employ 
appropriate terminology.   Although one may,  or may not,  accept Senelle’s terms or his 
definitions,  his recognition of the need for dedicated terminology,  is deserving of 
acknowledgement. 
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2.6.4.2 Survey of local publications  
 
Moving on to South African publications on federalism,  Kriek (1992a) points out that 
federal states can be created on different bases,  although the most common base is the 
territorial one.   Two of the other possible bases mentioned by him are – 
 
?? corporate units,  where distinct cultural communities inhabit specific localities,  each 
community attending to its own domestic interests,  but co-operating with one 
another in matters of common concern;  and  
?? person-orientated units,  where distinct cultural communities are intermingled within 
the same geographic area and public functions are divided between two categories,  
viz those which can be “personalised” - with reference especially to lifestyle,  culture,  
and language - and those which cannot.   (This is an obvious reference to the 
Belgium system of government.)   (Kriek 1992a:19-24.) 
 
The possibility of proceeding from different conceptual bases in building a structure of 
government is presumably not necessarily relevant only to states which are formally 
described as federations,  and Kriek’s categories are therefore of interest to the present 
study.   The particular foundation on which a state’s governmental structure is erected,  
could obviously have a substantial influence on the manner in which responsibilities for 
the performance of public functions are deployed. 
 
Kriek deals briefly with what he calls the “division of functions between levels of 
authority”.   He identifies a number of broad “domains”,  such as foreign affairs,  defence,  
economic affairs,  and so on (eleven in total),  and notes that within these broad domains 
more detail can be worked out.   He proceeds to describe some of the domains in detail,  
indicating the (public) functions of which they are constituted.  Kriek argues that when 
functions are described in the way he suggests,  it should be possible to bestow 
responsibilities for a particular domain exclusively on one or jointly on several levels of 
government,  “ … depending on which level is best equipped for the particular function”.   
He also deals with what he calls “techniques” for formally setting out the public function 
responsibilities of the central and the middle-tier governments.   (Kriek 1992a:25-28.)   
Kriek does not get to grips with the question of the basis on which decisions ought to be 
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taken as to the public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  for which the various 
levels of government will be responsible. 
 
Another South African author deals with “the division of powers in a federation” (chapter 
heading) and states at the outset that that he is focusing on the vertical division of 
powers between levels of authority (Wessels 1992: footnote).   Wessels refers to Kriek – 
vide supra – concerning principles and techniques for the division of powers,  but does 
not himself take a critical look at how particular public functions,  to which the powers 
relate,  are assigned to levels of authority,  or propose a rationale for the assignment.   
He surveys the assignment schemes of four countries which are regarded as federations 
(the United States of America,  India,  Switzerland,  and Canada) but his treatment of the 
subject is descriptive rather than analytical or critical of what is assigned or why it is 
assigned.   (Wessels 1992:9-19.)   Although Wessels refers to the division of powers as 
“the central principle of federalism”,  he is concerned essentially with the power 
relationship between the central government and the subnational governments.   Like 
other writers on federalism,  he refers to the complexity of assignment schemes - and 
the concomitant need for co-ordination mechanisms - and emphasises the importance of 
residual powers in determining the relative positions of power of the national and 
subnational governments in a federation (Wessels 1992:5-6, 9). 
 
De Villiers (1996) emphasises the importance of a country’s constitution providing legal 
certainty as far as possible as to which level of government is responsible for a particular 
function.   As in the case of other writers on federalism he does not go into the allocation 
of particular functions.   He mentions that in South Africa the national government and 
the provincial governments have concurrent powers over 31 “items”,  while the provinces 
have exclusive power over 12 “items” (the reference is to the functional areas listed in 
schedules 4 and 5 respectively of the 1996 Constitution).   He gives some examples of 
functional areas in each category,  but does not examine the rationale for placing items 
in the two categories.   He is critical of concurrent powers because such powers cause 
confusion as to which level of government is responsible for a particular function and 
encourage the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements,  which in turn reduce 
transparency and increase public uncertainty.   He also points out that such agreements 
have no constitutional basis,  which means that the constitutionality of regulations and 
proclamations arising from them could be challenged.   De Villiers nonetheless holds the 
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view that no constitution can provide an exact allocation of every single (public) function,  
a circumstance which gives rise to the need for co-operation amongst the national 
government and the provincial governments.   (De Villiers 1996:6-7, 9, 37.)    
       
At the time of the Multiparty Negotiating Process,  which culminated in the drafting of the 
1993 Constitution,  an international conference on federalism was held in South Africa 
under the auspices of the Human Sciences Research Council.   The contributions made 
at the conference by numerous foreign experts were published the following year (De 
Villiers 1994).   The question of the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of 
public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  to one level or sphere of government 
rather than another,  was not dealt with at the conference.   However,  some of the 
observations made and views expressed at the conference are of interest and value to 
the present study and are acknowledged in the following paragraphs. 
 
Watts (1994:8) identifies a number of key concepts,  including “federal political systems”.   
He uses the term to refer to the genus of political organisation which provides for the 
combination of shared rule and self-rule within a country.   Following Elazar (1987, 1995) 
he enumerates a number of species encompassed by the genus,  including federation,  
confederation,  federacy,  associated statehood,  unions,  leagues,  constitutional 
regionalisation,  and constitutional home-rule.   As indicated in the discussion of his work 
supra,  Elazar holds the view that discourse on federalism should not be restricted to 
federations as such,  of which the United States of America is held by him and other 
writers on federalism to be the model,  but should also embrace political (governmental) 
systems which evince federal characteristics – like that of South Africa for example.   
This insight has value for the present study in suggesting the applicability of political 
factors which could influence decisions regarding the question which level or sphere of 
government should be responsible for what,  in countries other than acknowledged 
federations – again like South Africa for example. 
 
The question of symmetry versus asymmetry in relation to the assignment of powers to 
subnational governments attracted a great deal of attention at the 1993 conference.   
Five of the chapters in the book under review (De Villiers 1994) deal with this question,  
focusing on developments and experiences in Australia,  Spain,  Germany,  and 
Canada.   According to Mullins and Saunders “symmetry” means that the relationship 
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between subnational units of government to the centre is essentially the same for each 
unit,  with equal representation and predominantly equal division of power.   There is an 
absence of special forms of representation,  protection,  or autonomy for individual units.   
“Asymmetry” again,  has reference to the extent to which individual units of government 
evidence such special forms.   (Mullins & Saunders 1994:43.)   Going by the contribution 
of Agranoff (1994) on Spain,  and that of Gagnon (1994) on Canada,  there would seem 
to be a natural tendency to favour a symmetrical allocation of powers to subnational 
governments,  with a proponent of an asymmetrical allocation being saddled with the 
onus of having to make his or her case.  
 
Some other noteworthy contributions at the conference,  with a degree of relevance for 
the present study, are as follows: 
 
?? Russell (1994:35) warns against “over-writing” a constitution by listing federal and 
provincial powers in too much detail. 
?? Boase (1994:92) provides a concise description of a consociational system as a form 
of federation,  viz as a device to moderate the bluntness of majoritarian democracy in 
culturally and linguistically divided societies – to protect minorities from majorities. 
?? Both Moreno,  writing about Spain,  and Peeters,  commenting on developments in 
Belgium,  remark on the phenomenon that in both countries the division of powers or 
decentralisation is not the result of a once-off decision or political agreement,  but is 
proceeding in an inductive or evolutionary manner.   Peeters also remarks that 
developments in Belgium are not based on any scientific method.   (Moreno 
1994:171; Peeters 1994:206.) 
 
The most recent local publication with relevance for the subject of the thesis is the book 
– and more specifically certain chapters of the book – on intergovernmental relations in 
South Africa,  edited by Levy and Tapscott (2001). 
 
An important issue touched upon in the introductory chapter of the book,  written by the 
editors,  is that of concurrent powers,  a feature of both the 1993 and the 1996 
Constitutions.   The editors express concern about the particular mechanism,  but are 
not as outspokenly critical of the mechanism as is De Villiers – vide comment on De 
Villiers’s 1996 publication supra.   Levy and Tapscott point out there is still - five years 
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after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution -  uncertainty over the precise responsibilities 
of the different levels of the “administrative echelon”,  and express the view that due to 
the ambiguities of concurrent responsibilities it is not always clear whether the provinces 
are merely the implementers of national policy,  or whether they can shape their own 
identities.   According to another contributor to the book (Murray) the (responsibility) 
boundaries between the spheres of government have been described as “soft”,  and it is 
these soft boundaries with overlapping responsibilities which make proper 
intergovernmental relations essential.   Murray deals with the way in which the 1996 
Constitution sets out the powers of the national and the provincial governments,  but 
does not examine the powers (or more specifically the matters to which they relate) in 
any detail.   She observes that the list of concurrent powers (schedule 4 of the 
Constitution) contrasts “starkly” with the scant list of exclusive provincial powers 
(schedule 5 of the Constitution).  She also notes that there is very little provincial 
legislation in the concurrent areas and that national legislation governs the particular 
matters.   (Murray 2001:67-69.) 
            
In a contribution to the same publication,  Haysom,  who was closely involved in the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process,  reports on a fundamental choice which the constitution 
makers had to make:  either to attempt to compile two exhaustive lists of national and 
provincial powers respectively,  or to rather “constitutialise the logic,  the formulae” which 
would serve to express the legitimate interests of different levels of government in a 
multitude of functional areas affecting social life.   They  opted for the latter approach, 
and thus wrote a single list of concurrent powers into the Constitution.   This approach 
necessarily had to be linked to a mechanism designed to allocate pre-eminence,  and 
subordination,  to one or other level of government in the event of a conflict of legislative 
or executive authority.   As the direct outcome of the approach followed,  limited 
exclusive powers were eventually allocated to the provinces in the final (1996) 
constitution.   (Haysom 2001:47-48.)   Haysom’s observations and insights concerning 
the constitution making process are referred to again in chapter 7 of the thesis dealing 
with the 1996 Constitution. 
 
In their introductory chapter,  Levy and Tapscott also pick up the theme of asymmetrical 
allocation of powers to subnational governments – vide the references supra to the 
substantial treatment accorded this subject at the conference on federalism held in 
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South Africa in 1993.   Given the disparities in governing and administrative capacities 
which they find to exist between the various provinces,  they venture the view that where 
provinces or municipalities lack adequate capacity,  competences could be assigned to 
them incrementally.   (Levy & Tapscott 2001:20.)   This would imply the existence of an 
asymmetrical situation as to the powers of the various subnational governments,  at 
least for a time. 
 
In common with other publications surveyed in this section,  the book edited by Levy and 
Tapscott  does not contain any attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the nature or 
substance of public functions,  or any proposals or model for the assignment of particular 
functions,  or aspects of public functions,  to the various spheres of government.   There 
is a notable reference to a finding by a group of experts,  convened by the Consultative 
Business Movement at the time of the multi-party negotiations,  that more than one level 
of government might be involved in a particular functional area and that,  as a 
consequence,  function allocation could not be done according to available federal 
models,  which mostly rely on mutually exclusive lists of powers with,  perhaps,  a short 
list of areas of joint responsibility (Haysom 2001:46).   What is evident from the parts of 
the book referred to,  is that (a) the division of powers between the national and the 
subnational spheres of government was a major issue dealt with in the constitution 
making process;  (b) that the determination of a comprehensive and precise division of 
powers was given up as being impracticable;  (c) that the mechanism of concurrent 
powers was seen as providing the solution to the problem of dividing powers;  and that 
(d) in the absence of a precise division of powers,  intergovernmental relations,  and 
especially co-operative government,  has assumed great importance in South Africa. 
 
2.6.4.3 Evaluation 
 
Although the sample of literature examined is admittedly limited in extent it is fairly 
representative of insights and viewpoints on federalism.   It would seem that,  generally,  
writers on federalism are not strongly focused on public functions per se,  at least not to 
the extent of looking critically at which public functions are assigned to what level or 
sphere of government,  or of developing models for such assignment.   They are 
concerned essentially with the constitutional accommodation of political power within the 
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state and the role which federalism as a theory can play in achieving an accommodation 
acceptable to both national and subnational polities. 
 
There would seem to be a consensus that the form of government established for the 
United States of America in 1787 is the quintessential model of the federal form of 
government.   However,  a leading expert like Elazar has made a major contribution by 
widening the federalism debate to encompass not only “true” federations – a la the 
United States – but also to include forms of government which display federal features.   
This approach opens the way to discuss federalism in relation to the governmental 
structure of a country like South Africa,  without having to get involved in a rather futile 
argument as to whether it is a federation or a union,  or mainly one rather than the other. 
 
Although not providing a developed theory or a detailed model for the assignment of 
particular public functions to one level of government rather than another,  the federalism 
literature does cover some pertinent aspects which need to be noted and which could be 
of value in developing an assignment theory or model.   Included amongst these are the 
following: 
 
?? There are different bases for the division of powers for the performance of public 
functions which can be applied,  for instance territorial,  corporate territorial,  person-
oriented,  or consociational; 
?? the asymmetrical assignment of powers to subnational governments is an option 
which may be desirable in certain circumstances; 
?? the allocation of residual power is an important factor to be considered in designing 
an assignment scheme; 
?? there are signs of a nascent methodical (scientific) approach to the assignment 
question,  evidenced by the attention paid to ways of listing the powers of different 
levels of government,  suggestions regarding terminology,  and the postulating of 
some principles (including the subsidiarity  principle),  which could be followed in the 
division of powers between levels of government;  and 
?? at least one warning as to the perceived dysfunctionality of “over-writing” a 
constitution in setting out the responsibilities of the various governments in a country. 
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A matter of considerable importance to the present study is the view expressed by 
several writers that the division of powers between levels of government,  and especially 
the allocation of exclusive powers to subnational governments,  is an extraordinarily 
difficult matter to determine.   The main reason for the perceived difficulty would appear 
to be the fact that in respect of many major public functions,  more than one level of 
government is involved,  or desires to be involved,  in the performance of the function,   
a situation militating against  a precise division of powers.   The mechanism of 
concurrent powers,  by which the same powers are allocated to the national and the 
regional governments,  coupled to rules for determining pre-eminence in the event of 
conflicting legislation,  has been invented as one solution to the problem.   However,  the 
mechanism is seen as a problematic one:  it allegedly leads to confusion and uncertainty 
about governmental responsibilities,  and is also criticised on the ground that it tends to 
remove the regulation of the respective powers of governments from the ambit of the 
constitution,  and to leave jurisdictional questions to be resolved by means of interaction 
between the political executives concerned.   The research also suggests that in 
countries where concurrent powers are provided for constitutionally,  the national 
government comes to dominate the legislative domain. 
 
There is considerable evidence in the literature on federalism that the division of 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions gives rise to complexity and an 
intertwinement of responsibilities within the structure of government of a country.   This 
phenomenon leads to a premium being placed on intergovernmental relations,  generally 
marked by a need to co-ordinate activities as well as a willingness on the part of 
governments to co-operate with one another in good faith. 
 
The literature on federalism is also valuable in putting forward certain key political factors 
which could have a substantial influence on the division of powers between levels of 
government.   These include a fundamental argument that democracy can best be 
promoted by a federal form of government,  inter alia by bringing government as close 
as possible to the people,  without watering down the need for national unity and loyalty 
to the nation and state as a whole (the German author Laufer (1991:86, 94) writes of  
“Bundestreue” and “Bürgernähe”).   A federal approach also serves to cultivate a political 
awareness of the factors which induce a desire in subnational units to be autonomous in 
certain areas (Wheare 1963:40-42),  and which could translate into guidelines for the 
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allocation of powers to the lower levels of government.   It would seem that the 
application of a federal approach might encourage acceptance in political circles that 
responsibilities should not be assigned to a higher level of government when they can be 
discharged as well or better at a lower level (subsidiarity principle). 
 
Finally,  there is evidence in the literature on federalism that the division of powers 
between levels and spheres of government need not – and arguably,  should not – be a 
once-off action by constitution makers following a process of political negotiation.   Few 
will dispute that the only thing certain in government – as in virtually all areas of life in 
society – is that there will be change,  including change in the needs of society and in 
conceptions of the ways in which those needs can best be supplied by the institutions of 
government.   It would seem to make sense that the division of powers between 
governments – or more accurately,  the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions – should be seen not only as a fundamental but also as 
a dynamic feature of the state machinery,  which needs to be reviewed from time to time.  
 
2.6.5 Synopsis                                  
 
In embarking on the present research project it was accepted that there were three 
established fields of scientific interest the literature of which may contain materials 
relevant to the subject of the study,  the three fields being Public Administration,  
Constitutional Law (as a component of Public Law),  and Political Science.   In the latter 
case it was especially the concept of federalism which provided a potentially important 
focus.   To review the literature of three major disciplines in a search for writings relevant 
to a specific research project,  is no easy task.   The only way in which the literature 
review could be kept within manageable bounds was to select a limited number of 
publications for detailed examination.   Given the vast volume of publications making up 
the three bodies of literature,  as well as their wide reach and evident diversity,  it was 
apparent that an attempt to apply established sampling methods in the selection of 
publications would be a futile exercise.   It is highly doubtful whether acknowledged 
criteria for representativeness could have been satisfied even if the samples drawn were 
huge in scope.   More importantly,  there was a real danger that random sampling could 
result in important findings or insights being missed.   Publications were therefore 
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selected in a pragmatic way,  based inter alia on the status of authors within a field,  as 
well as on the titles of publications. 
 
The literature of Public Administration was found not to include a substantial body of 
knowledge dealing with the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public 
functions to levels or spheres of government.   It would seem that the assignment 
question is not a major issue attracting the attention of authors within the particular field.   
There are,  however,  especially in the writings of American authors,  references to 
complexity,  confusion,  and even turmoil regarding the assignment of responsibilities,  
which would perhaps suggest that public administrationists should pay more attention to 
the subject.   The article published by Woodrow Wilson as far back as 1887 would seem 
to suggest that this highly respected pioneer in the scientific study of public 
administration might have supported this view. 
 
Moving to the publications of constitutional and public law experts,  it was found that 
these writers are intensely interested in the vertical separation of powers between levels 
of government within a state,  but in their own peculiar way.   They would appear to be 
focused essentially on the legal rules which govern the institution and functioning of 
legislative and executive institutions concerned with the administration of the state,  as  
well as on the role which judicial institutions have to play in this connection.   How 
exactly responsibilities for the performance of public functions are divided between 
levels and spheres of government,  would seem to be for them largely a given.   Their 
attention is of course attracted when there is conflict,  or looming conflict,  in the 
discharge by the respective governments of their assigned responsibilities.   Their 
professional response in such circumstances is to examine,  apply and interpret the 
Constitution and other law in relation to the particular case,  as well as to examine 
critically the decisions of a court which may have been required to adjudicate in the 
case. 
 
As regards the literature on federalism,  as assessed in relation to the subject of the 
present study,  it would seem that writers in this field are not strongly or critically focused 
on the substance of the assignments as such,  but are concerned essentially with the 
accommodation of political power within the state,  which inter alia would be evidenced 
by the assignment of public functions to the national and subnational levels of 
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government respectively.   Elazar’s widening of the reach of federal discourse to include 
all forms of government which display federal features,  is particularly noteworthy.   Of 
the three bodies of literature surveyed,  that on federalism has relatively greater 
relevance and value for the present study than the available literature on public 
administration and constitutional law respectively.   This is not so much because the 
publications provide a developed theory or model for the assignment of functions to 
levels or spheres or government – which they do not - but rather because the available 
literature can be of value in delineating a framework of principles,  approaches,  
influential factors,  and experiences which need to be considered in any serious attempt 
at developing an assignment theory or model.   Somewhat more space has therefore 
been devoted to reporting on and evaluating this part of the literature survey than to 
dealing with the literature of Public Administration and Constitutional Law respectively.                          
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to orientate the study in scientific terms.   The reason for doing 
so,  was the realisation at an early stage of the research that the particular subject of 
study was not well established within the domain of Public Administration,  and did not 
appear to be regarded as a core issue. 
 
Public Administration is well established as a science within the broad category of the 
social sciences,  although there is an ongoing debate about its proper content.   It can be 
accepted that the methods of the social sciences are generally applicable to it,  a feature   
which of course serves to facilitate the planning and conduct of research within the field.   
Public Administration constitutes a distinct body of knowledge,  the boundaries of which 
can be discerned in an approximate and practical way by noting the curriculum content 
given to the subject at leading universities.   Being based on the activities of public,  and 
more especially government institutions,  the particular body of knowledge ought to 
include valid scientific statements about the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions to levels or spheres of government within the state.   
However,  at the present time the assignment question has not found a substantial place 
within the domain of Public Administration;  at best it can be said that it is touched upon.   
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There is evidently considerable scope for research into the topic with the aim of adding 
to the established body of Public Administration knowledge in the particular respect. 
 
To the extent that research is often the result of a problem becoming manifest within a 
particular societal domain,  engendering what the metascientist refers to as an epistemic 
interest in a matter,  it has been necessary to reflect on the nature and extent of the 
problem to be addressed in this thesis.   In succinct terms,  the problem is simply this:  
Despite the obvious importance of the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres 
of government,  with far-reaching implications for the system of government and 
administration,  and despite the relevance of the question for practically all countries,  a 
body of scientific knowledge dealing specifically with it,  has not emerged.   This being 
the case,  the present study finds its purpose in an endeavour to make a research based 
contribution regarding an important matter to the body of knowledge constituting Public 
Administration.    In pursuing this goal a number of key questions have been identified 
which need to be addressed (vide section 2.5 supra). 
 
The review of relevant literature which is demanded of any serious research effort was 
expanded to include two major disciplines other than Public Administration,  viz 
Constitutional Law and Political Science.   Because of the vast volume of literature 
generated over the years by the three disciplines,  only limited samples in each field 
could be examined.   The review has confirmed the under-researched and,  one could 
say,  under-debated status of the assignment question.   What has also emerged is that 
scholars in each of the three disciplines have their own peculiar interest in the division of 
powers between or the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government,  something which needs to be borne in mind in studying and evaluating 
their approaches and propositions.   Although no developed theory or model dealing 
specifically with the assignment of responsibilities was found in the literature examined,  
the review did bring forward a number of insights which could be of value in developing 
an assignment theory or model. 
 
Given the paucity of research based knowledge about the assignment question within 
Public Administration,  and the stated purpose of the present study to make a 
contribution in this respect,  the need to design with care a research project which could 
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generate useful information and insights is evident.   Supplying this need is the subject 
of the ensuing chapter of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Having spent some time on searching for relevant literature,  and after checking the 
available records of previous research,  it became apparent that the assignment of 
responsibilities to governments for the performance of public functions was a 
phenomenon which was under-researched,  or largely unresearched.   It was also 
established by means of a survey of the curricula of South African universities that the 
particular subject did not yet occupy a substantial place within the body of knowledge 
which is Public Administration.   Nevertheless,  there can be little doubt about the 
importance and the implications of the assignment question for the system of 
government and public administration (vide section 1.2 of the thesis).   The present 
study therefore took on the nature of a pioneering venture aimed at exploring the 
particular phenomenon and hopefully achieving a better understanding of it.   With this 
perspective on the study,  it was realised that particular attention would have to be paid 
to the design of the research project.   This chapter,  which is more substantial than it 
would have been if the object of the study was better known in scientific terms,  is the 
result.   A full explication of the research design will hopefully enhance the usefulness of 
the work for others who may have or may develop an interest in the assignment 
question,  and assist them in evaluating the findings and recommendations. 
 
The chapter is structured in a way which should be familiar to social scientists.   
Because of the exploratory nature of the work,  particular emphasis is placed on the 
identification of the unit of analysis,  the conceptualisation of the research problem,  the 
operationalisation of the project,  and the nature of the study. 
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3.2 Unit of analysis 
 
The first step in developing a research design is,  of course,  to determine what it is that 
is to be explored,  described,  analysed,  and possibly explained.   Mouton (1996:47) 
refers to certain categories of entities that can be subjected to research,  and mentions 
that these entities can also be referred to as “units of analysis”.   Wessels (1999a:369-
371) also employs the latter term – which he has adopted from Babbie’s earlier (1992) 
work – in dealing with categorisations of the social world analysed by researchers.   The 
term “unit of analysis”  would appear to enjoy wide acceptance and was considered the 
appropriate one to use in identifying the object of the present study. 
 
Mouton (1996:47) identifies seven categories of social entities – or units of analysis – viz 
individuals,  collectives,  organisations,  institutions,  actions,  interventions,  and cultural 
objects.   His categorisation is very similar to that of Babbie,  as set out by  Wessels 
(1999a:369-370).   Moving into the domain of Public Administration,  Wessels 
(1999a:371) expresses the opinion that “interventions” and “organisations” would 
probably feature very strongly as units of analysis in Public Administration.   On the 
basis of his experience in government organisation and policy development,  the author 
would agree up to a point with this finding,  but wishes to express a reservation 
concerning a particular feature of the categorisations of Babbie and Mouton,  viz the 
setting up of separate categories for “institutions” and “organisations”.   Such a 
distinction is not sustainable,  and would not,  in his opinion,  satisfy the taxonomic 
requirement of mutual exclusivity.   A more useful approach would be to regard 
organisation as an attribute of institutions,  and not to view “organisations” as a separate 
category or unit of analysis.   However,  a lengthy discussion of the matter is not justified 
within the structure of the thesis. 
 
If one regards the governmental component of the state as a giant institution – and the 
author would argue that it can so be regarded – it could be said that the unit of analysis 
relevant to the present study is that of “institutions”,  and more specifically the 
organisational aspect of the state as institution.   Even more specifically,  one could say 
that the study is focused on the macro-organisational aspect of the governmental 
component of the state as an institution.   The study is after all concerned with what the 
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major components of government within the state,  viz the national government and the 
various subnational governments,  are required to do or,  as indicated in the title of the 
thesis,  the responsibilities assigned to them for the performance of public functions.   
On the face of it,  this is an organisational matter,  and an organisational matter is 
inseparably linked to the particular institution which is in need of organisation.   On the 
basis of this reasoning,  the unit of analysis relevant to the present study would be that 
of “institutions”.   However,  the matter requires more reflection. 
 
Before any institution – including the institution of government – is established,  or any 
organisational elaboration or refinement of the institution is embarked upon,   there 
needs to be clarity concerning what the institution,  or any particular part of the 
institution,  is required to do – which,  in relation to the institution of government,  is the 
subject of the thesis.   In the present context,  the “what is to be done” question is a  
policy question – so for that matter are the associated questions of how,  by whom,  with 
what,  and when the “what” is to be achieved.   As pointed out by a South African author 
many years ago this,  fundamentally,  is what policy and policy making is all about 
(Cloete 1967:57).   Seen in this light,  the study could be said to be focused on decisions 
of a directive nature which in a logical sequence would precede the establishment of the 
institution of government and its further organisational refinement.   Such decisions can 
only be seen as policy decisions,  and it could therefore be argued that in the case of the 
present study,  the relevant unit of analysis is the one having to do with policy and policy 
making.   In his treatment of the categorisation of social entities Mouton indicates that 
“interventions” can include programmes,  policies and systems (Mouton 1996:50).   This 
would appear to be an acceptable interpretation;  policy making in the government 
domain can readily be viewed as a form of intervention in the functioning of society.   
Following Mouton – and also Cloete -  it could thus be concluded that the relevant unit of 
analysis for the present study is “interventions”.   In the author’s view,  the assignment 
question is essentially a policy matter and he is therefore comfortable with the 
identification of “interventions” as the relevant and appropriate unit of analysis in the 
present instance. 
 
Settling on a particular unit of analysis is not seen as academic hair-splitting.   Identifying 
one unit of analysis rather than another could have a bearing on the orientation of the 
researcher towards his or her investigation and as a consequence influence the amount 
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of attention which he or she will pay to certain aspects in carrying out the research and 
in formulating the research findings and proposals.                           
 
 
3.3 Conceptualisation 
 
Public Administration can be described as a conceptual science.   In the author’s 
experience it is not focused on concrete objects in the natural or physical world,  but on 
representations and abstractions of certain institutions and certain activities within the 
social domain which play a substantial role in the functioning of society and which 
influence the level of well-being experienced in society.   Public Administration is rife with 
concepts such as “policy”,  “planning”,  “organisation”,  “control”,  “function”,  “process”,  
“accountability” – and many more.   The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines the word 
“concept” in general terms as follows:  “An idea of a class of objects,  a general notion”.   
For purposes of scientific discourse a more precise definition would obviously be helpful. 
 
3.3.1 The nature and function of concepts 
 
Mouton observes that concepts are the primary “building blocks” of scientific knowledge,  
and suggests that concepts may be defined as the most elementary symbolic 
constructions by means of which people classify or categorise reality.   He goes on to 
refer to a concept as “a symbol of meaning”.   (Mouton 1996:181.)   Writing about the 
concept “public administration”,  Pauw (1999:9-25) emphasises the need to differentiate 
in scientific discourse between three verbal tools,  viz “word”,  “concept”,  and “term”.   In 
his view a concept is a thinking tool ,  and constitutes a single meaning which can be 
expressed in different words.   A word on the other hand is a language tool,  and may 
have different meanings.   A term consists of one or more words with a fixed meaning in 
a specific,  usually technical discourse.   (Pauw 1999:11-12.)   For purposes of the 
present study,  Pauw’s explication of the scientist’s verbal  “tools of the trade” is 
acceptable and practically useful.   The words “word”,   “concept” and “term” are 
therefore employed in the thesis,  generally,  in accordance with Pauw’s guidelines.   It is 
to be noted that Pauw and Mouton are essentially in agreement as to the function of a 
concept in scientific discourse,  viz to stand for or symbolise a meaning. 
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It is accepted that in any discourse concepts are of necessity referred to or represented 
by means of words or terms,  such as “policy”,  “planning”,  and “organisation”.   In 
scientific discourse it would,  following Pauw,  be appropriate to use the word “term’” 
when referring to a key concept.   To explicate a concept - to make clear what one is 
referring to - it is necessary to give a particular term a specific meaning,  in other words 
to define it in a certain way.   This in turn requires some attention to the logic of 
definition. 
 
According to an introductory work on logic a definition states the meaning of a term,  but 
there are different senses of the word “meaning”.   The authors emphasise the special 
importance of defining general or class terms,  which are terms which are applicable to 
more than one object.   To understand the meaning of a general or class term is to know 
how to apply it correctly,  and in this connection they differentiate between a term’s 
denotative and connotative meanings.   In short,  the denotative meaning consists of all 
the objects to which the term may be applied correctly;  the connotative meaning 
consists of the totality of attributes shared by all and only those objects.   They illustrate 
the distinction by reference to the general term “skyscraper”:  The connotative meaning 
of the term consists of the attributes common and peculiar to all buildings over a certain 
height,  while the denotative meaning has reference to all existing buildings,  identifiable 
by name or location,  to which the term can be applied correctly.   (Copi & Cohen 
1990:141-142.)   To illustrate by means of an example taken from the discipline of Public 
Administration,  one would define the term “policy” connotatively by listing all the general 
or common attributes which policies possess,  and denotatively by reference to specific 
policies which have those attributes,  like foreign policy,  education policy,  health policy,  
and so on. 
 
3.3.2 Conceptual orientation of project 
 
Having thrown some light on what is meant by a concept and how it functions in 
scientific discourse,  the conceptualisation of the present study can be attended to.   
Following the formulation of a research problem,  the conceptualisation of the problem is 
the next major step to be taken in conducting research within the social domain (Mouton 
1996:63-66).   Conceptualisation involves essentially two activities,  viz – 
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(a) the clarification or analysis of key concepts in the problem statement;  and 
(b) relating the problem to a broader conceptual framework or context 
(Mouton:1996:66). 
 
Conceptual clarification should lead to a statement or statements indicating the meaning 
of a key concept in a particular context,  that is to say,  to its definition.   Key concepts 
are usually those referring to the key features of the phenomenon to be studied.   If 
standard definitions are available,  these should be used;  if not,  the researcher has to 
ensure that the meanings of key concepts are clearly specified.   (Mouton 1996:66.) 
 
The phenomenon forming the object of the present study and the problems associated 
with it,  have been identified and discussed in section 2.3 of the thesis.   The study is 
concerned,  in a South African context,  with the responsibilities entrusted to the various 
levels or spheres of government for the performance of public functions.   The 
phenomenon is captured in the full title of the thesis and it is proposed to use this 
wording as a basic problem statement for purposes of conceptualisation.   Any key 
concepts not apparent in the problem statement,  but which are linked in a meaningful 
way to concepts already evident in the problem statement,  should of course also be 
identified and defined. 
 
The orientating research done as part of the present study – vide especially sections 2.2 
(Public Administration in focus) and 2.6 (literature review) of the thesis – did not produce 
anything resembling a complete conceptual framework dealing specifically with the 
assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels or  
spheres of government.   No other directly applicable research – research which focuses 
on the assignment question as a whole – could be found.   The Public Administration 
curricula of South African universities do not at present provide for substantial,  in depth 
treatment of the matter,  although a reference and brief explication of the so-called  
subsidiarity principle was encountered.   Public Administration literature virtually ignores 
the assignment question,  while in the literature of Constitutional Law the public 
functions,  or aspects of public functions – often referred to as “matters” – for which 
levels or spheres of government are responsible,  would appear to be a given.   Great 
interest in the responsibilities of governments is to be found in the literature dealing with 
federalism,  but viewed specifically in the light of the distribution of (governmental) power 
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within the state;  there is no apparent interest in analysing public functions per se,  or in 
taking a normative line by suggesting how the distribution of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  could or ought to be 
done. 
 
3.3.3 Analysis,  clarification and definition of key concepts 
 
A number of key concepts relating to the assignment question are analysed,  clarified 
and defined below. 
 
“Assignment” 
 
The word “assignment” is employed for purposes of the study as the noun form of the 
verb “assign”.   The appropriate meaning of the word “assign”,  as given in the Shorter 
Oxford dictionary,  is “the action of appointing as a share,  allotment”.   Used as a term in 
the context of the present study,  “assignment” refers to the allotment of responsibility as 
a share of the totality of governmental responsibility in the country.   The assumption 
needs to be made that governmental authority can be conceived of as a whole,  a whole 
which can be and  commonly is apportioned and shared amongst whatever levels or 
spheres of government are or have been instituted.   As will be apparent from the thesis,  
assignment in the particular context can be problematic;  and where appropriate 
reference is made in the text to the “assignment question” in order to convey the 
problematic nature of the subject. 
 
The assignment of responsibilities to governments is essentially a constitutional matter.   
So,  for instance,  the 1996 Constitution effectively determines the responsibilities of the 
three spheres of government - national,  provincial,  and local - by stipulating the matters 
in respect of which the legislatures in the various spheres of government may make 
laws,  and by vesting associated executive authority in the national and subnational 
political executive bodies.   This is a simplified view of a rather complex scheme.   There 
are a number of constitutional provisions,  qualifications,  and safeguards which serve to 
refine and determine the actual distribution of legislative and executive powers in the 
country.   However,  it is considered that these matters do not require detailed 
examination at this point. 
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The 1996 Constitution employs a variety of technical expressions like,  for instance,  the 
“vesting of legislative authority” in section 43,  the “conferring of power” in section 
44(1)(a),  the “assignment of powers” in section 44(1)(a)(iii),  the “vesting of executive 
authority” in section 85(1),  and the “assignment of the administration of a matter” in 
section 156(4),  in dealing with the ways in which responsibilities are or can be located in 
the various spheres of government.   To facilitate discussion and argument the single 
term “assignment” is used in the thesis to cover all these modalities. 
 
“Responsibility” 
 
The Shorter Oxford dictionary defines the word “responsibility” inter alia as a “charge,  
trust,  or duty for which one is responsible”;  and the word “responsible” inter alia as 
“answerable,  accountable (to another for something);  liable to be called to account”.   
The word  as generally defined,  can readily be adopted as a term for purposes of 
technical discourse on a relevant aspect of public administration as well as in the study 
of Public Administration.   Governments – at whatever level or in whatever sphere – are 
indeed given a charge,  trust or duty which they are required to discharge or perform,  
and in a democracy are answerable and accountable to,  and liable to be called to 
account by the elected representatives of the citizens for the manner in which they 
discharge their assigned responsibilities.   “Responsibility” is evidently a key concept 
within the conceptual framework of the present study,  and bears the connotative 
meaning of a charge,  trust or duty assigned to a government and for which it is 
answerable or accountable to the elected representatives of the people for which it has 
been instituted to serve as a government. 
 
In the title of the thesis,  which also serves in a technical sense as a problem statement 
for purposes of elucidating the particular conceptual framework,  and at many places in 
the text of the thesis,  the plural form of the term “responsibility” is used.   Where 
appropriate according to context,  the term “responsibilities” encompasses both the 
legislative and the executive responsibilities of governments.   When it is necessary to 
refer to the one or the other,  the terms “legislative responsibilities” or “executive 
responsibilities” are used.   The term “executive responsibilities” includes the 
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responsibilities discharged at both the political executive level (typically by ministers) and 
the administrative level (typically by officials). 
 
In developing a conceptual framework for the assignment question,  it is necessary to 
make the assumption that the assignment of a responsibility to a government,  or an 
individual member of a government,  would be meaningless unless the government or 
member of government is given appropriate and adequate power or authority to 
discharge the particular responsibility.   This would appear to be axiomatic – even in 
everyday life.   One cannot make the gardener responsible for mowing the lawn,  but 
withhold from him the authority to use the lawnmower;  again,  one cannot charge a 
teacher with the responsibility of teaching a class of learners,  but withhold from her the 
authority to interact with the class,  or to direct them to do the work which she indicates.   
Conceptually and practically viewed,  responsibility goes hand-in-hand with the power or 
authority to act.   These latter concepts are deserving of some attention at this point. 
 
“Power” and “authority” 
 
A public administration dictionary offers the following definitions: 
 
“authority”:  the ability of a person or group to get organisations or individuals to act in a 
certain manner when they would not otherwise do so,  and at the same time to have 
them accept the control as legitimate (Fox & Meyer 1995:10); 
 
“power”:  the ability (potential or actual) of one actor (who could be an individual,  group,  
government or state) to bring about an outcome in a relationship with another political 
actor in a way which is contrary to the latter’s desires (Fox & Meyer 1995:99). 
 
Another public administration dictionary (Chandler and Plano 1988) provides a definition 
of “authority” but not one for “power”,  bringing the power concept into the picture in their 
discussion of the concept “authority”.   “Authority” they define as the right to invoke 
compliance by subordinates on the basis of formal position and control over rewards and 
sanctions.   Authority in their view is institutionalised power;  power has to do with the 
ability to coerce compliant behaviour.   They go on to point out that without authority,  
power relationships develop according to status,  knowledge,  and informal 
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characteristics.   Authority,  however,  is based on legitimate foundations that formally 
establish structure and position within an organisation.   (Chandler & Plano 1988:122.) 
 
Turning to general usage dictionaries,  the connotative meanings of the words “power” 
and “authority” are noticeably similar.   The Shorter Oxford dictionary,  for example,   
includes,  inter alia, the following meanings: 
 
“power”:  Possession of control or command over others;  dominion;  government,  sway;  
authority over.   Legal ability,  capacity,  or authority to act,  especially delegated 
authority; 
 
“authority”:  Power or right to enforce obedience.   Derived or delegated power. 
 
One could conclude that the two words are virtually synonymous,  or that the underlying 
concept to which the words refer,  is essentially one and the same.   However,  for 
purposes of discourse in Public Administration the use of both “power” and “authority” as 
relevant terms would appear to be unavoidable and,  indeed,  necessary.   This being 
the case,  the achievement and maintenance of some consistency in the use of the two 
terms is obviously desirable. 
 
The term “power”,  often combined with the term “function”,  features extensively in 
South African public law,  both in the Constitution and in other statutes.   In the 1996 
Constitution reference is made inter alia to the powers and functions of the President 
(section 84),  the powers and functions of ministers (section 91),  and the powers and 
functions of (provincial) premiers (section 127).   To take an example from ordinary law:  
The Public Finance Management Act,  1999,  refers inter alia to the functions and 
powers of the National Treasury (section 6) and the functions and powers of a provincial 
treasury (section 18).   When it comes to the competence to pass and implement 
legislation,  the 1996 Constitution uses the terms “legislative authority” and “executive 
authority” respectively – vide sections 44(1) and 85(1) in relation to the national 
government,  and sections 104(1) and 125 (1) in relation to the provincial governments.   
To complicate matters regarding the use of the terms “power” and “authority”,  the 
Constitution stipulates in section 44(1) that  “ - - - The national legislative authority as 
vested in Parliament  - (a) confers on the National Assembly the power  - - - (to pass 
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legislation) (author’s emphases).   Similar wording is used in relation to the provincial 
legislatures (1996 Constitution: section 104(1)).   It would seem that the two terms could 
just as well have been used the other way round,  or that one term could have been 
used throughout.    
 
Public administrationists - a term employed here to signify both those directly involved in 
public administration and those who study and teach Public Administration - have little 
choice but to note the use of the terms “power” and “authority” in public law,  and to 
ensure that their references to these terms as they appear in laws are accurate.   Public 
administrationists should also have no problem with the usage of the term “power” in the 
literature of Political Science or Political Studies,  where the various aspects of the 
phenomenon of power in society – who has it,  where it comes from,  how it is obtained,  
how it should be exercised – are fundamental questions.   As far as public administration 
specifically is concerned,  it would seem that the appropriate term to use is “authority” 
rather than “power”.   In this connection it can be postulated that at a fundamental level 
the Constitution is the means by which an authority to act is given by the people to the 
institutions and office holders charged with the responsibility to act.   Authority is a 
formalised,  specified,  qualified,  and limited competency.   Seen in this light,  the 
concept differs somewhat from the concept of power,  which would seem to symbolise a 
capability or potency to act which in certain circumstances could extend beyond - or 
challenge - formalisation,  specification,    qualification,  or limitation.   Put another way,  
authority could be regarded as power harnessed effectively within and for the proper 
purposes of a democratic system of government.   It is in this sense that the concept is 
used in the conceptual framework. 
 
In the author’s opinion,  the authority concept,  as clarified above,  fits in well with the 
general conceptual framework of Public Administration.   It also has an essential function 
to perform within the specific conceptual framework of the present study,  viz as the 
indispensable companion to the  concept of responsibility.                
 
“Public function” 
 
The concept of a public function is central to the conceptual framework of the present 
study.   Care and precision needs to be applied in using the term “public function” as it is 
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amenable to more than one definition and could be applied to various entities,  activities 
and occurrences.   In the thesis it is used in a specific technical sense,  which is 
elucidated in the following paragraphs. 
 
The word “function”,  from which the term “public function” is derived,  has many and 
varied meanings:  the Shorter Oxford dictionary lists 6 meanings.   Two of these are 
particularly relevant for present purposes: 
 
(a) “The special kind of activity proper to anything;  the mode of action by which it 
fulfils its purpose”; 
(b) “the kind of action proper to a person as belonging to a class,  especially to the 
holder of any office”. 
 
The first meaning quoted relates to an impersonal “anything”,  which could therefore also 
be an institution of government.   The second meaning relates to a person or an 
individual,  which could include a political office holder or an appointed official. 
 
Moving into the public administration domain,  a glossary of public administration terms  
reflects the same dual meaning of the term “function”,  and serves to support the 
relevance of the two meanings to the present work.   The glossary offers the following 
definition: 
 
“Activity / work to be performed by an institution (for example a health clinic) or a 
functionary (for example the governmental function performed by a minister or the 
administrative function performed by a higher graded official)” (Cloete 1995:33). 
 
A public administration dictionary (Fox & Meyer 1995:52) gives only the institutional 
meaning,  defining “functions” as follows: 
 
“Public purposes served by governmental activities (education,  highways,  public 
welfare,  etc.)”. 
 
The functions mentioned in the problem statement are those suggested in the quoted 
dictionary and  glossary definitions as the actions or activities of institutions,   rather than 
the actions or activities of persons.   The focus of the study is on the activities 
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undertaken or which are directly controlled by governments,  at various levels or in 
various spheres of government.   As the activities of private institutions are excluded,  it 
is appropriate to add the qualifying word “public”,  and so to arrive at the key term “public 
function”.   An approximation of the sense in which the term is used in the thesis could 
be obtained by paraphrasing the relevant Shorter Oxford dictionary definition quoted 
above,  to read “ … the special kind of activity proper to a public institution; … by which it 
fulfils its purpose”.   Cloete’s definition, quoted above,  is appropriate for present 
purposes if it is accepted that the “institution” referred to is a public institution. 
 
The South African literature on Public Administration is replete with usages of the term 
“function”.   In a general work on public administration and management (Cloete 1994),  
the author devotes the first part of the book to an overview of what are referred to as 
legislative,  governmental,  judicial,  and administrative functions;  this is followed by a 
part dealing with what are referred to as administrative / managerial functions;  and a 
concluding part dealing with what the author identifies as auxiliary functions,  
instrumental functions,  and functional activities (also called “line functions”).   In another 
comprehensive work on public administration published locally (Botes,  Brynard,  Fourie 
& Roux 1996),  the authors use the term “function” extensively in describing the roles to 
be performed by political office holders and bodies,  various other bodies, and certain 
officials - vide for example pages 114 to 118 (President),  94 to 95 (National Assembly),  
170 to 171 (Human Rights Commission),  406 (advisory councils and commissions),  
237 to 238 (town treasurers),  and 318 (Auditor General).   In discussing the so-called 
“generic approach” to the study of Public Administration,  the authors employ the term to 
identify sets of activities common to all public institutions,  which they then go on to refer 
to as “processes” (Botes et al. 1996:297-302).   Another South African author has 
produced a work with the title “The personnel function” (Andrews 1988).    In a doctoral 
thesis (Loxton 1993) reference is made to the “functions of government” (p.xiii),  the 
executive functions of government (p.xv),  as well as to the “functions of the state” (p.xiv, 
360).   Against this background of the extensive  and varying use of the term “function” in 
South African Public Administration literature,  it is imperative that the term “public 
function” as employed in the present study be defined as clearly as possible. 
 
In an article by the author on public functions and the Constitution,  the term “public 
function” was taken to mean “ … a complex,  logically inclusive composite of activities 
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undertaken by a public institution under the control of government and directed at the 
satisfaction of a particular need of the community,  or part of the community” (Robson 
1998a:24).   On further reflection,  this definition is considered to be somewhat vague in 
referring to “a public institution under government control”.    Governments – and more 
specifically government departments as institutions of executive government – are the 
primary institutions charged with the performance of public functions;  only by extension 
do other institutions – controlled by government – come into the picture.   The 
outstanding examples of such other institutions are the so-called “public entities”,  which 
are regulated by chapter 6 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999,  and which 
are listed in schedules 2 and 3 of the Act.   Another shortcoming of the definition is the 
suggestion that a public function is performed by a single public institution.   This may 
well be the case,  the control of the currency by the Reserve Bank being a case in point;  
but it is also possible that a number of institutions may participate in the performance of 
a public function,  an example being the promotion of health.   The definition of the term 
“public function” is therefore adjusted to read as follows:  “A complex,  logically inclusive 
composite of activities undertaken by one or more government departments, or other 
public institutions,  and which is directed at the satisfaction of a particular need of the 
community,  or part of the community”.   The way in which and the extent to which a 
public function is a complex,  logically inclusive composite of activities will become 
clearer as the thesis unfolds.   However,  simply stated,  a public function is something 
which a government department or other form of public institution does,  a programme it 
carries out,  or a service which it renders.   In more formal language,  a public function – 
like the promotion of health or the provision of education – is performed.   This is in line 
with the established style of South African legal drafting,  as even a cursory perusal of 
the statute book will show.       
 
“Government” 
 
Fox and Meyer (1995:55) define “government” as a body of persons and institutions who 
make and apply all enforceable decisions for a society.   Cloete (1995:34) offers the 
following definition:  “The highest institution staffed by political office bearers in a state,  
province or municipality,  for example,  (a) the cabinet consisting of the president and 
ministers is the government-of-the-day of the Republic of South Africa; … Also the act of 
governing“.   These definitions are not specific enough for purposes of the present study,  
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and it is therefore necessary to develop a purpose-specific definition derived from 
general usage of the words “govern’ and “government”.    
 
According to the Shorter Oxford dictionary,  to govern means inter alia to “rule with 
authority”.   This  is exactly the concept which is relevant to the research.   Staying with 
the same dictionary and the same concept,  the term “government” is employed with the 
meaning inter alia of “the body of persons charged with the duty of governing”.   In Public 
Administration,  and in other disciplines like Constitutional Law and Political Science,  it 
is common to differentiate “governing bodies” into two parts,  viz a (usually elected) 
legislative body which makes laws and authorises programmes of activities aimed at the 
satisfaction of the needs of the community,  and a political executive body which 
administers laws and executes the programmes referred to.   In the conceptual 
framework of the study,  a “government” consists of both a legislative body and a 
political executive body.   When the term is not qualified,  it refers to the totality of a 
government,  that is to say to all persons involved in both legislative and executive 
actions.   When it is necessary to make a distinction,  the qualified terms “legislative 
government”  or “executive government” are used.   The associated terms “legislative 
authority” and “executive authority” are used where appropriate.   Executive 
governments consist of political office holders supported by appointed officials.   When it 
is necessary to refer to the one and not the other,  an appropriate distinction needs to be 
made. 
 
“Levels and spheres of government” 
 
The conceptual framework incorporates two ordering categories in dealing with the 
various governments within a state,  viz “levels” and “spheres”.   The term “level of 
government” implies a hierarchical ordering consisting typically,  from top to bottom,  of a 
national government,  a number of provincial,  state or regional governments,  and a 
number of local governments.   The term is encountered frequently in the literature 
surveyed for purposes of the research (Friedrich 1968:3; Kriek 1992a:25; Wessels 
1992:37; Venter 2000:244).   The term is also found within the domain of South African 
constitutional law,  the most recent and prominent manifestation being the references to 
levels of government in the constitutional principles which were adopted as part of the 
1993 Constitution – vide principles XVI,  XVII and XIX.   The use of the term in relation to 
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governments has a generally accepted connotation of one government being either 
superordinate or subordinate to another.   In the conceptual framework presented here 
the term is,   indeed,  used with this connotation.   It would appear that the drafters of the 
1996 Constitution developed an aversion to the term precisely because of the 
connotation of superordination or subordination which it contains. 
 
The 1996 Constitution dispensed with the term “levels of government” and replaced it 
with the term “spheres of government”;  the country thus has a national,  a provincial,  
and a local sphere of government.   Writing about the change,  an author avers that the 
change was motivated by a desire to move away from the hierarchical concept and to 
replace it with one that would connote an equality of status amongst the various 
categories of government (Bhabha 1997:13).   It is enlightening to read the new term in 
conjunction with chapter 3 of the Constitution,  which deals with co-operative 
government.   However,  in the author’s view the assertion of a constitutional  equality 
between the national,  provincial and local governments  is debatable.   The Constitution 
contains various provisions which point rather unmistakably to the provincial 
governments being subordinate to the national government,  and the local governments 
being subordinate to the respective provincial governments – vide for example the 
provisions dealing with legislative powers (1996 Constitution: sections 44, 104, 146, 
156),  and those dealing with supervisory powers (1996 Constitution: sections 100, 139). 
 
Nevertheless,  the term “sphere of government” is indispensable for purposes of the 
conceptual framework – not only because it is constitutionally established in South 
Africa,  but also because of its utility in dealing with systems of government which are 
not only hierarchically ordered,  but also in other ways,  ostensibly due to the importance 
attached to factors other than the geographical or the territorial.   The Belgian system of 
government,  with its dual focus on both geographic entities and culturally determined 
communities,  is a classic case in point.   The term can also be applied in referring to the 
“general affairs” and “own affairs” constitutional dichotomy introduced into South Africa 
by the 1983 Constitution,  and arguably also in referring to the array of ethnically based 
self-governing and so-called “independent” states which existed within South Africa’s 
national borders prior to the implementation of the first inclusive democratic constitution 
(1993 Constitution) in 1994. 
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“Subsidiarity” 
 
A concept found in the literature survey – vide section 2.6 of the thesis – which is of 
particular significance in the context of the present study is that of subsidiarity,  usually  
encountered in the form of the “subsidiarity principle”.   Indeed,  it can be said that the 
concept is an essential component of the conceptual framework.   The word 
“subsidiarity” is not always found in dictionaries.   Even as authoritative a work as the 
Shorter Oxford dictionary does not contain an entry for the word;  the same applies to 
the Concise Oxford dictionary of current English.   A useable general definition for 
present purposes is offered by Webster’s international dictionary of the English 
language,  and is quoted in full:  “A theory in sociology:  functions which subordinate or 
local organisations perform effectively belong more properly to them than to a dominant 
central organisation”.   This general wording can be adjusted readily to fit the disciplines 
of Political Science and Public Administration by substituting the plural and singular 
forms of the word “government” for the plural and singular forms of the word 
“organisation” respectively. 
 
In an University of South Africa study guide for undergraduate students in Public 
Administration,  with the title “Openbare dienste:  strukturering en funksionering:  enigste 
studiegids vir PUB 102-9”,  the author deals with subsidiarity in the form of a rule.   
Quoting Loxton (1993:80) it is stated that the rule of subsidiarirty entails that there is no 
valid reason for a higher institution to provide a public service which can be provided 
satisfactorily by smaller or lower institutions.   The point is made that when the 
subsidiarity rule is applied,  the government level which is closest to the particular 
community need,  will be responsible for its satisfaction.   (Wessels 2000:33-34.)   In a 
comprehensive work on the federal system of government in Germany,  it is stated that 
the crux of the subsidiarirty principle is that  “ … ubergeordnete Gemeinschaften nur 
solche Aufgaben wahrnemen sollen,  die nachgeordnete kleine Gemeinschaften nicht 
ebenso gut oder besser erfüllen können” (Laufer 1991:262).   It is to be noted that in this 
instance the criterion stipulated for the devolution of a duty or task (“aufgaben”),  viz 
equally good or better performance,   is more precise than the one given in Webster’s 
Dictionary,  viz effective performance,  or the one given in the Unisa study guide,  viz 
satisfactory performance. 
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The importance of subsidiairty as a concept in examining the assignment of 
responsibilities to levels or spheres of government is self-evident.   The concept is 
virtually indispensable in developing a theoretical assignment model – vide chapter  9 of 
the thesis.   It is therefore postulated as an important component of the conceptual 
framework directly relevant to the study.   Where in the thesis the subsidiarity principle is 
employed,  Laufer’s equally good or better criterion is implied. 
 
3.3.4 The broader conceptual framework or context 
 
In section 3.3.2 supra it was indicated that the conceptualisation of a research problem 
consists of two steps,  viz (1) the analysis and clarification of key concepts,  and (2) 
relating the research problem to a broader conceptual framework or context.   Having 
attended to the analysis and clarification of key concepts in the preceding section,  it is 
now necessary to look at the broader conceptual framework or context. 
 
As far as the study of Public Administration is concerned,  the conceptual framework 
relevant to the specific research problem,  as developed and elucidated in the previous 
section,  is not seen as being problematical in any way,  in other words the smaller,  
demarcated framework can be accommodated readily within the broader general 
conceptual framework of Public Administration.   Whether the research problem is a 
problem of policy or a problem of institutional organisation – vide section 3.2 supra – or a 
combination of the two,  is a significant question to pose,  but it is not one which can take 
the problem outside the bounds of the discipline;  Public Administration of course 
encompasses both these fields.   Again,  if Public Administration is viewed in terms of a 
number of generic functions,  both policy making and organising are recognised as two 
of the main such functions (Cloete 1994: chapters 5, 6).   Some comment on the use of 
terms is,  however,  called for. 
 
The Constitution does not employ the term “public function”.   In dealing with public 
functions entrusted to the subnational spheres of government the Constitution refers to 
“matters” falling within “functional areas”,  which are listed in schedules to the 
Constitution (1996 Constitution: section 104(1)(b), section 156, schedules 4 and 5).   
There is a rough concordance between a functional area as referred to in the 
Constitution and a public function as defined in the previous section but,  as will be 
apparent from the thesis,  the area of agreement has its bounds.   While the 
  
77 
constitutional language is presumably adequate when laws have to be made – it can be 
assumed that all laws deal with one or more matters,  and that a matter can be 
associated with a functional area – it does not facilitate precision in specifying what 
exactly the various spheres of government are actually responsible for.   Such precision 
could be promoted by identifying the public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  
which are the responsibility of the various governments.   An intriguing question arises:  
should uniformity in the use of terminology be pursued,  or is this an instance where two 
disciplines – Constitutional Law and Public Administration – should use the terminology 
which best suits their respective purposes?   Providing a definitive answer to this 
question is a matter which is considered to lie beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
As indicated in the preceding section,  the term “function” appears quite often in South 
African Public Administration literature,  but with different connotative meanings 
depending on context.   One of these meanings corresponds to the meaning given to the 
term “public function” in elucidating the conceptual framework relevant to the present 
study.   It is proposed that the qualified term “public function” be used when it is the 
intention to refer to the activities of government departments and other public institutions 
directed at the satisfaction of community needs or,  in other words,  to their programmes 
and services.   It is realised that there is a risk of the uninformed interpreting the term as 
a reference to a social event (function) to which the public is invited!   Appropriately 
trained and experienced public administrationists would of course not make this mistake.   
It should be borne in mind that the focus here is on a defined term used in a specific 
technical context,  and not on a combination of words which could have various 
meanings. 
 
In the author’s experience there is a tendency amongst political office holders and 
appointed officials to speak about the “powers” which subnational governments have,  or 
do not have,  or should have,  when they actually mean the community directed activities 
which such governments are authorised,  not authorised,  or should be authorised to 
carry out.   Strictly speaking,  the powers (and the associated functions) of subnational 
governments refer to their competence to make and administer laws,  and to authorise 
and  execute programmes of activities (as reflected in budgetary appropriations).   The 
actual public functions,  or aspects of public functions – or “matters within functional 
areas” as the Constitution would have it – in respect of which subnational governments 
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have the powers (and functions) referred to,  is  a separate issue.   The list of public 
functions or functional areas could be long or short,  well deliberated or hastily drawn up,  
scientific or unscientific,  without altering the basic (constitutional) role of the various 
governments.   The rationale for determining which public functions,  or aspects of public 
functions,  should be the responsibility of the various spheres of government is the main 
focus of the present research.   Greater accuracy and consistency in discussing the 
matters in question could contribute to the advancement of both the practice of public 
administration and its scientific study.  
 
While power may be a key concept within the disciplines of Constitutional Law and 
Political Science,  it would not appear to be such a concept in the case of Public 
Administration.   Accepting that public administration takes place within a legal 
framework determined through a political process,  it is suggested that discourse in 
Public Administration per se can take place without the employment of the power 
concept,  except where it is necessary to quote a law or a publication,  or to refer 
specifically to a political factor or a political development.   What in the author’s view can 
be postulated as a key concept in Public Administration is authority,  which is 
inseparably linked to a responsibility lawfully assigned to a government or an individual 
role-player within government - vide definitions of the terms “authority“ and 
“responsibility” in the preceding section. 
 
 
3.4 Operationalisation 
 
Following the conceptualisation of a research problem,  the scientific endeavour has to 
be operationalised into a research project capable of being carried out in practical terms.   
According to Mouton it is imperative in a scientific investigation to establish linkages 
between relevant concepts and the phenomenon which is the object of the investigation,  
and this is done through a process of operationalisation.   In his view,  operationalisation 
consists of the construction of  a set of operations or measures that link the research 
problem to the world.   (Mouton 1996:66.)   Goode (1984:29) defines operationalisation 
as the process of measuring a concept with a specific indicator,  but this definition would 
seem to be a rather narrow one,  one which implies that the researcher is working solely 
within a quantitative paradigm – vide section 3.6 infra. 
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Mouton (1996:124) emphasises the close link between conceptualisation and 
operationalisation,  which he attributes to the intrinsic relationship between the 
connotation and denotation of concepts – what they mean and what they refer to.   In 
section 3.3.1 supra it is stated – following Copi and Cohen (1990) – that the connotative 
meaning of a term consists of the totality of attributes shared by all the objects to which 
the term refers,  while its denotative meaning consists of the objects to which it may be 
applied correctly.   In short,  it could be said that before embarking on the empirical study 
of a phenomenon one needs to theorise meaningfully about what is to be studied;  this is 
done by identifying key concepts relating to the phenomenon and defining them 
connotatively,  that is to say determining what they mean.   Having done this,  the next 
step is to identify actual manifestations of the concepts in the real world,  in other words 
that which the concepts refer to (denote),  and subject these manifestations to 
systematic study.   For purposes of the study it is then necessary,  in Mouton’s 
formulation,  “ … to construct a set of operations or measures that link the research 
problem to the world” (Mouton 1996:66).   It is to be noted that Mouton’s formulation 
allows for the application of a qualitative or a quantitative approach,  or both – vide 
discussion of these approaches in section 3.6 infra.  
 
The approach followed in the present study is essentially a qualitative one.   This is so 
because,  as indicated in the following section,  the study is necessarily of an exploratory 
nature.   It is possible that an exploratory study may lead to the putting forward of an 
explanatory hypothesis capable of being tested – Copi and Cohen (1990:400) 
emphasise the necessity of scientific explanations being testable – but to start with,  no 
such hypothesis is available for testing.   This being the case,  the immediate deduction 
of propositions from a hypothesis which are capable of being quantified by observation 
and measurement in the real world,  had to be ruled out in the present instance. 
 
To return to the question of the operationalisation of the research project:  the central 
concept to be linked to the real world is clearly that of a public function.   All the other 
concepts implied in the problem statement (vide section 2.3 of the thesis) and explicated 
in the conceptual framework relevant to the research problem (vide section 3.3 supra),   
such as assignment,  responsibility,  and government,  have meaning in the context of 
the study only in relation to public functions.   It is therefore public functions as they 
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appear in the real world – the ontological aspect of public functions – which are to be 
subjected to empirical study.   However,  it is to be noted in the context of the present 
study,  that public functions “appear in the real world” as words or phrases in laws,  
schedules to laws,  and in other pertinent documents.   It is not the actual,  observable 
activities of the employees of departments and other public institutions,  which can be 
subjected to study,  but the symbolic representations (in words and phrases) of these 
activities as they appear in laws and related documents.   In the introduction to section 
3.3 supra it is stated that Public Administration is focused on representations and 
abstractions of certain institutions and certain activities,  rather than on concrete,  
observable objects.   Focusing on the representation and abstraction of public functions 
as specified above,  is therefore considered to be a legitimate approach within the 
domain of Public Administration as a science.   An empirical study of public functions by 
means of the identification,  observation and description of the myriad actual activities 
which make up such functions would,  of course,  be practically impossible. 
 
Taking “public function” as the central concept of the study,  the operationalisation of the 
research project entailed the carrying out of the following - to use Mouton’s expression - 
set of operations: 
 
(a) A study of the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public 
functions in a sample of countries other than South Africa.   This operation was 
considered to be necessary in order to contextualise the particular phenomenon over a 
wider front,  and in so doing provide a background against which the assignment 
question as it has manifested itself in South Africa,  could be examined. 
 
As the statistical population of countries which can be studied is large (well in excess of 
150) it could be argued that a sample of countries should have been determined by the 
application of objective sampling methods.   However,  as the individual entities are 
whole countries,  with diverse cultures and ideological orientations,  and often complex 
constitutional histories,  it is unlikely that a satisfactory sample could have been obtained 
in this manner,  or possible that the sample would have had to be so large in order to 
satisfy the requirement of representativeness,  that it would have overwhelmed the 
research project and detrimentally affected its balance and focus.   It was therefore 
decided to select for study a number of countries whose assignment schemes could,  for 
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reasons indicated in the particular chapter of the thesis,  be of value in looking at the 
assignment of responsibilities in South Africa. 
 
To derive as much benefit as possible from this part of the research it was considered 
necessary to bring into focus the broad structure of government in a country,  
highlighting the levels or spheres of government which have been instituted,  and then to 
note how responsibilities for the performance of public functions have been distributed 
between the various levels or spheres. 
 
It was to be expected that the term “public function” as such may not appear in source 
documents (vide section 3.7 below) – but the assumption was made that that it would be 
possible to identify the equivalent terms,  that is to say terms which connote the same 
concept. 
 
As “public function” is a second order concept - an abstraction from and a representation 
of directly observable activities - there is an obvious interest in how public functions are 
dealt with in source documents,  that is to say in the language used and,  assuming that 
the public functions indicated are numerous,  how they are arranged or ordered in such 
documents.   It was also of importance in this part of the research to establish what,  if 
any, formal assignment criteria are in evidence.   The examination of the assignment 
modes of the selected countries was to culminate in a critical evaluation of the way in 
which the assignment question is dealt with.                               
 
(b) A historical overview of the assignment of responsibilities in South Africa.   While 
no attempt was to be made to trace the history of the assignment of responsibilities in 
other countries,  it was considered to be essential for purposes of the study to do so in 
the case of South Africa.   The country focus of the study is South Africa and it is 
therefore appropriate that the thesis should deal with the assignment phenomenon as it 
has manifested itself in South Africa since its establishment as a discrete country in 
1910.   In looking at the history of South Africa,  and in order to better understand the 
developments which have taken place,  it seemed appropriate to distinguish between the 
pre-democratic and the democratic eras.   The watershed between the two eras is the 
Constitution adopted in 1993 and implemented in 1994.   Making this distinction is 
appropriate and significant in relation to virtually all aspects of government – certainly 
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also to the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels 
or spheres of government.   This part of the research therefore covered the period from 
the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 up to the implementation of the 
1993 Constitution. 
 
Apart from its time dimension,  the historical overview was to be structured in much the 
same way as the examination of the assignment phenomenon in the selected other 
countries.  It would therefore – 
 
??   trace the levels or spheres of government instituted in the country prior to 1994; 
??   note how responsibilities were distributed between levels or spheres of government 
in terms of successive Constitutions and other enactments;  and 
??   critically examine the technical aspects of assignment,  including the language used 
in source documents,  the ordering of public functions in such documents,  and the 
assignment criteria which were applied. 
 
The historical overview was to culminate in a summary and overall assessment of the 
assignment of responsibilities in the pre-democratic period extending over 84 years. 
 
(c) An analysis and evaluation of contemporary constitutional developments in South 
Africa.      South Africa experienced the adoption of two founding laws within the space 
of three years,  viz the so-called “interim” Constitution in 1993 and the so-called “final” 
Constitution in 1996.   The constitution development process was a planned and 
generally accepted one.   The 1993 Constitution was the product of a multiparty 
negotiating process,  aimed at bringing the country onto a democratic footing as quickly 
as possible,  while allowing time for a formally constituted constitutional assembly to 
draft the actual or “final” Constitution.   At the heart of both Constitutions – and this 
presumably applies to all constitutions – is the institution of subnational governments, 
and the stipulation of the public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  for which the 
various governments – national and subnational – will be responsible.   It was 
appropriate that the assignment question,  as reflected in the two Constitutions,  be 
examined in detail and evaluated. 
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From a scientific point of view the 1993 Constitution is of particular interest because of 
the adoption of  a set of constitutional principles,  which the drafters of the Constitution 
then followed,  and which,  significantly,  were to be honoured by the Constitutional 
Assembly in the drafting of the “final” Constitution (1993 Constitution: section 71).   
Some of these principles deal specifically with the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions,  and need to be thoroughly analysed and evaluated.   It 
is further of interest that one of the grounds on which the Constitutional Court initially 
refused to certify the draft of the “final” Constitution as conforming to the constitutional 
principles was the diminution,  in the finding of the Court,  of the powers given to the 
provinces in the 1993 Constitution (CC 1996a: para. 481-482).   Again,  the significance 
of this judgement,  and the drafting changes made as a result of the judgement,  need to 
be examined and evaluated in relation to the assignment question. 
 
It is considered to be appropriate that separate chapters of the thesis be devoted to the 
assignment of responsibilities as determined by the Constitutions of 1993 and 1996 
respectively.        
 
(d) Summary,  analysis and interpretation  of research findings.   It was accepted 
that the operations indicated in subparagraphs (a) to (c) above would generate a 
substantial volume of research findings.   These findings would encompass - 
 
??   particulars of and critical comment on the assignment schemes of a selection of 
foreign countries; 
??   comprehensive information on the assignment of responsibilities to governments in 
South Africa in the pre-democratic era,  covering a period of 84 years from the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 up to the implementation of the 
first democratic Constitution in 1994,  together with analysis and critical comment;  
and 
??   description,  analysis and critical comment on the assignment schemes contained in 
the South African Constitutions of 1993 and 1996.  
 
To the aforementioned empirical findings would be added the information obtained by 
means of the literature review contained in section 2.6 of the thesis,  as well as the 
findings regarding the place and treatment of the assignment question in the Public 
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Administration curricula of South African universities,  which are reported on in section 
2.2 of the thesis. 
 
The next major operation in carrying  out the research project was to be the compilation 
of an overall summary,  analysis and interpretation of the research findings.   The 
objective was a dual one:  firstly,  to arrive at an integrated view and understanding of 
the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions as a 
widespread phenomenon with far-reaching implications for public administration;  and 
secondly,  to assess the state of the assignment of responsibilities in objective scientific 
terms.   An important part of the exercise would be to move beyond description and 
criticism and to seek to understand assignment schemes and practices.   To this end it 
would be necessary to identify,  if possible, the postulates,  principles,  criteria,  and any 
other directive influences which explain,  however imperfectly,  the way in which 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions are assigned. 
 
(e) Theory building.   It was intended that the operationalisation of the research 
project should culminate in the putting forward of a model,  which may be no more than 
a tentative one,  to serve as a guide for the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions in South Africa.   The model would of course be linked to 
the research findings and provide,  to the extent possible,  a scientific platform on which 
assignment issues could be considered and resolved.   It was to be expected that the 
model would place considerable emphasis on the language of public functions – on the 
terminology to be used – as well as on the principles to be followed,  and the criteria to 
be applied.    
 
 
3.5 Nature and scope of the study 
 
The nature and scope of the present study are determined essentially by pertinent 
aspects which have been dealt with in chapter 2,  viz the problem statement (section 
2.3),  the stated purpose of the study which follows from the problem statement (section 
2.4),  the set of research questions which have been formulated with a view to giving 
more precise direction to the research (section 2.5),  and the review of relevant literature 
(section 2.6). 
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Evidently,  the specific object of the study has received scant attention in the literature of 
Public Administration,  while its treatment in the literature of Constitutional Law,  and of 
Political Science would appear to be determined by the respective,  peculiar concerns of 
constitutional lawyers (the formal,  legal relations between levels and spheres of 
government) and of political scientists (the distribution of power within the state).   The 
present study has its own particular focus,  viz the rationale according to which 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions,  or parts of public functions,  are 
assigned to one level or sphere of government rather than another.   No substantial 
literature dealing with this specific matter could be found.   The article published by the 
author in 1998 is very much an isolated contribution to the literature.   The conclusion 
must be drawn that the object of study of the thesis is under-researched. 
 
As pointed out in section 2.3 of the thesis the assignment question,  as conceptualised in 
section 3.3 supra,  has not achieved substantial treatment in syllabuses and curricula of 
university departments of Public Administration.   On the assumption,  however tentative,  
that the academic recognition and content given to a subject is a reflection,  however 
imperfect,  of its evolved “theory”,  it must be recorded that there is no developed theory 
of assignment to be discerned at the present time,  and that the assignment question 
does not yet occupy a substantial place within the body of knowledge which is Public 
Administration. 
 
In his general work on research in the social sciences,  Mouton deals with the kinds of 
studies which can be undertaken,  and provides a matrix in which four possible kinds of 
study are demarcated,  depending on the state of current knowledge of the subject and 
the kind of knowledge which is sought.   The four kinds of study arrived at by Mouton are 
as follows: 
 
?? Exploratory (little existing knowledge;  descriptive objective); 
?? replicatory (well-developed body of knowledge;  descriptive objective); 
?? hypothesis generating (little existing knowledge;  explanatory objective);  and 
?? theory testing (well-developed body of knowledge;  explanatory objective) (Mouton 
1996:102-104). 
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The four kinds of study do not appear to be mutually exclusive,  and Mouton does not 
suggest that they are.   Indeed,  it is not impossible to conceive of a particular study 
containing elements of all four kinds of study.   However,  Mouton’s matrix does provide 
a useful frame of reference for reflecting on the nature of a study which is to be 
embarked upon,  and for envisioning what the study could reasonably be expected to 
produce. 
 
In the absence of a developed body of pertinent scientific knowledge,  the present study 
can obviously not be aimed at replicating previous research,  and also has no theory or 
theories to test.   It has to be of an exploratory nature,  combined with the possibility of 
generating some hypotheses or hypothetical insights.   At this point,  it is appropriate to 
note what the general purpose of scientific research is.   Copi and Cohen (1990: 418-
419) emphasise that the scientist strives to understand phenomena,  and point out that 
the scientist does not only want to know what the facts are,  but also to explain them,  
and in the process to devise theories.   Mouton (1996: 46) agrees that the aim of 
research is to understand,  and states that understanding is to be achieved by 
describing,  explaining and evaluating phenomena.   It is understood that in an 
essentially exploratory study such as the present one,  the research will commence with 
the identification and description  of the pertinent phenomena,  which could be followed 
by their classification.   Copi and Cohen (1990: 461) point out that classification and 
description are really the same process.)   The study could end there,  but also move 
beyond the basic recording,  description and classification of the phenomena to 
encompass also the putting forward of some tentative explanation of the phenomena,  in 
other words the generation of one or more hypotheses concerning the object of study.   
From the outset it was the intention to channel the study along these lines. 
 
Although the study includes a survey of literature spanning a comparatively broad front,   
by both South African and non South African authors,  and also examines in some detail 
assignment practices not only in South Africa but also in a selection of other countries,  it 
is essentially a South African venture and its results,  or any part of its results,  will not 
necessarily have validity for or be exportable to any other country.             
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3.6 Research paradigms 
 
In dealing with the methodological dimension of social research,  Mouton refers to 
“methodological paradigms” and mentions three examples,  viz the quantitative,  the 
qualitative and the participatory action paradigms.   In his view,  paradigms in the 
research context are not merely collections of methods and techniques,  but also include 
assumptions and values regarding their use under specific circumstances or,  in other 
words,  the philosophies underlying the use of certain methods and techniques.    
(Mouton 1996:36-37.)   Mouton raises the so-called conflict between the quantitative and 
qualitative paradigms (suggesting that participative action can be subsumed under the 
latter) and argues in favour of the compatibility of the two major paradigms,  indicating 
that the choice between their utilisation in a particular research project is to be 
determined by the nature of the research problem (Mouton1996:38-40). 
 
Moving to the field of Public Administration,  Wessels (1999b:382-384) confirms the 
applicability of social science methods in the discipline,  and identifies the same three 
macro-research methods (or paradigms) referred to by Mouton,  viz the quantitative,  the 
qualitative,  and the participatory.   As also suggested by Mouton – vide preceding 
paragraph – he finds that participatory action research is more related to qualitative than 
to quantitative research (Wessels 1999b:408). 
 
The distinctive features of the three research paradigms can be summarised as follows: 
 
(a) Quantitative:  This approach is commonly referred to as “mainstream” social 
research,  and is accepted by perhaps the majority of social scientists as the framework 
within which to work.   Observation of a research object must have as its outcome exact 
measured quantities on which generalisations can be based.   (Wessels 1999b:386-
387.) 
 
(b) Qualitative:  This approach is concerned with how the social world is interpreted,  
understood and experienced.   Qualitative research aims to produce rounded 
understandings on the basis of contextual and detailed data (Mason,  quoted by 
Wessels 1999b:390). 
  
88 
 
(c) Participative:  In this approach,  research is not directed at people but is 
undertaken with people.   The aim is not to formulate universally true laws,  but situation-
specific insights,  in order to bring some or other change or healing to that particular 
situation (Wessels 1999b:392-393). 
 
The quantitative research paradigm could not be applied meaningfully in the present 
project.   Because of the lack of uniformity in the structure of assignment schemes and in  
the language used,  there would have been little point in trying to count the number of 
public functions – usually to be found in the form of entries in constitutions and other 
laws – for which responsibility has been assigned to governments in South Africa over 
the years,  or currently to governments in the selected sample of other countries.   Nor 
could any statistical analysis be carried out on such numbers in any meaningful way.   It 
may have been possible to compile a questionnaire about the assignment question and 
distribute it to a number of academics and practitioners for completion,  and then to 
analyse and quantify their responses,  but it is highly unlikely that such an exercise 
would have been worthwhile.   As pointed out in section 2.2 of the thesis the assignment 
question,  as demarcated for purposes of the study,  does not feature prominently in 
academic circles.   As regards practitioners,  there is no obvious “population” of 
practitioners available,  who are acquainted with the totality of the assignment question,  
from which a satisfactory sample could be drawn.   It goes without saying that there are 
practitioners with expert knowledge of the deployment of their own functions,  or perhaps 
of related groups of functions,  but what is required in this instance is an acquaintance 
with the assignment question as a whole. 
 
The major research paradigm applicable to the research project is the qualitative one.   
As indicated in the previous section of this chapter,  the research project is essentially of 
an exploratory nature.   The objective is to get to know more about the assignment of 
responsibilities as a phenomenon,  to endeavour to establish a body of valid knowledge 
about the phenomenon,  and to interpret the phenomenon to the extent that there can be 
meaningful interpretation.   By following this approach,  it is hoped to promote greater 
understanding of an important – but under-researched – aspect of government and 
administration.   Whatever insights can be gained are to be utilised in developing a 
theoretical model for the assignment of responsibilities,  however tentative such a model 
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may turn out to be.   To proceed in this way,  is to apply the qualitative research 
paradigm. 
 
There is also a substantial volume of participatory research which can be brought to 
bear on the research problem.   In the months leading up to the adoption of the first 
democratic Constitution in 1993,  the author was in charge of a major project aimed inter 
alia at formulating an input of the then Commission for Administration to the Multiparty 
Negotiating Process,  concerning the assignment of responsibilities for the performance 
of public functions under a new constitutional dispensation.   The work,  which was both 
analytical and creative,  was done by a team of people with expertise in organisational 
matters,  with the assistance and co-operation of officials in a large number of 
departments.   Assessed against the distinctive features of the participative approach – 
vide subparagraph (c) above – it certainly can be said to have produced “situation-
specific insights”,  and to have been directed at accomplishing change and even 
“healing” (of a fragmented and dysfunctional apartheid inspired governmental structure).   
How this work was done,  and what it produced,  is reported on in chapter 6 of the 
thesis.        
 
 
3.7 Sources of data 
 
The sources of data for the empirical part of the research were as follows: 
 
(a) In respect of the assignment of responsibilities in four of the selected foreign 
countries,  the respective Constitutions,  with some supplementation from relevant 
literature,  together with the Scotland Act 1998 in respect of developments in the United 
Kingdom; 
 
(b) in respect of the historical overview of the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions to governments in South Africa - 
 
?? the Constitutions of 1909,  1961 and 1983; 
?? a large number of relevant statutes,  other than the successive national constitutions,  
adopted during the period covered by the overview,  and dealing with the structures 
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of government and the assignment of responsibilities to the governments instituted;  
and 
?? a number of books published by South African authors in the fields of Public 
Administration and Constitutional Law,  dealing inter alia with the responsibilities 
assigned to various governments; 
 
(c) in respect of the assignment of responsibilities in terms of the 1993 Constitution – 
 
?? the 1993 Constitution; 
?? relevant documents of the Multiparty Negotiating Process,  which culminated in the 
drafting of the constitutional text which was adopted in 1993,  as indexed and saved 
in the National Archives Repository; 
?? documents of the erstwhile Commission for Administration relating to the 
Commission’s input to the Multiparty Negotiating Process concerning the assignment 
of responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels or spheres of 
government under a new dispensation;  and 
?? notes written and directions given by the author as the person planning and 
overseeing the project which was focused on the development of the Commission’s 
input to the Multiparty Negotiating Process;  and  
?? relevant literature. 
 
(d) in respect of the assignment of responsibilities in terms of the 1996 Constitution - 
 
?? the 1996 Constitution; 
?? the certification judgements (two) of the Constitutional Court concerning compliance 
of the draft constitutional text with the constitutional principles laid down by the 
(“interim”) 1993 Constitution; 
?? relevant documents of the Constitutional Assembly,  which drafted the “final” 
constitutional text,  as indexed and saved in the National Archives Repository;  and 
?? relevant literature. 
 
(e) in respect of the development of a theoretical model for the assignment of 
responsibilities to governments - 
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?? the published and unpublished documents covered in the literature survey reported 
on in section 2.6 of the thesis; 
?? the 1993 Constitution,  including the schedule of the Constitution in which the 
constitutional principles are contained; 
?? the 1996 Constitution; 
?? the findings of the research as reported on in chapters 4 to 8 of the thesis; 
?? documents of the erstwhile Commission for Administration;  and  
?? relevant materials forming part of the personal papers of the author. 
 
All sources used in writing the thesis are,  of course,  reflected in the alphabetical list of 
sources appended to the thesis.   The purpose of the foregoing exposition of sources is 
to set out in a clear way the key sources which were used in carrying out the various 
parts of the research project,  and in compiling the corresponding chapters of the thesis.   
It was considered necessary that such an exposition should be included in the thesis in 
order that the referral base underpinning the outcome of the research may be known 
and be accessible to  whoever may have an interest in the particular object of study. 
      
  
3.8 Collection and presentation of data 
 
In line with the exploratory nature of the research,  data collection took place almost 
exclusively by means of the study of relevant documents and the analysis of their 
contents.   The only exception to this procedure was the garnering of information 
concerning the curricula content of the subject Public Administration from members of 
the teaching staff of the Department of Public Administration and Management of the 
University of South Africa and of the School for Public Management and Administration 
of the University of Pretoria;  this information has been incorporated into section 2.2 of 
the thesis.   For the reasons indicated in section 3.6 supra no attempt was made to  
collect data by means of a questionnaire.   The practical manifestation of public functions 
is such (vide the operationalisation of the concept in section 3.4 above) that no direct 
observation was possible. 
 
Data collected in respect of the major parts of the research are presented in the 
applicable chapters of the thesis. 
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3.9 Analysis and interpretation of data 
 
Each chapter includes a critical evaluation of the situation as portrayed by the data 
collected regarding the particular aspect.   Chapter 8 presents an overall summary,  
analysis and interpretation of the research findings.   Moving on from what has been 
established regarding the existing state of affairs,  chapter 9 presents for consideration a 
theoretical model for the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public 
functions to spheres of government in South Africa.   Chapter 10 provides an 
assessment of what has been accomplished with the research,  with the assessment 
based on the research questions formulated as part of the scientific orientation of the 
project contained in chapter 2. 
 
     
3.10 Conclusion 
 
The preceding sections of the chapter seek to document a scientific basis and a practical 
plan for exploring what is considered to be an important phenomenon within the broad 
domain of government and public administration,  viz the assignment of responsibilities 
to governments for the performance of public functions.  In practical terms the research 
consisted of a set of major operations arising from the systematic operationalisation of 
the project as described in section 3.4 above.   These major operations are reported on 
in the ensuing chapters,  commencing with a study of the assignment schemes of a 
sample of countries,  other than South Africa.   
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CHAPTER 4:  ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN A SELECTION OF FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the findings are presented of an examination of the ways in which a 
number of countries assign responsibilities for the performance of public functions to 
levels or spheres of government. 
 
The countries selected for study are Australia,  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  and the 
United Kingdom.   In respect of the United Kingdom the focus is specifically on the 
recent devolution of functions and powers to Scotland.   Australia was selected because 
it was established as a state more or less at the same time as South Africa,  and the two 
states were both constituted from former colonies of the erstwhile British Empire.   
Belgium is of particular interest to a South African student of government organisation 
because of the way in which the linguistic-cultural groups making up the population have 
been accommodated in the system of government.   Germany warranted inclusion for 
the compelling reason that it reportedly served to a significant degree as the model for 
the development of South Africa’s present constitution.   Spain is important to the study 
because of the application in its constitution of the principles of voluntarism and 
asymmetry in determining the powers and functions of its autonomous communities.   
The United Kingdom was chosen as a focal point because of the topicality of the 
developments there and the perceived special challenges faced by the architects of 
devolution in modifying a closely knit,  unitary system of government which had been in 
existence for almost 300 years. 
 
The chapter looks at the patterns or schemes of assignment operative in the five 
countries included in the study.   The research has not traced the evolution of the 
assignment of responsibilities in each country,  or covered whatever ongoing debate 
there may be in the various countries concerning the assignment question.   The study 
has for the most part focused on the current constitutional texts,  and more particularly 
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those parts of such texts dealing with the structure of government and the assignment of 
responsibilities to the various levels or spheres of government within the overall 
structure.   It is not practical to capture within this chapter every nuance of the 
assignment scheme in each of the targeted countries,  that is to say every qualification 
or proviso,  every prescribed procedure or condition,  or every arrangement between 
levels or spheres of government for the co-ordinated discharge of their respective 
responsibilities.   Specific public functions – such as agriculture,  education,  or health – 
have not been examined;  this would be an enormous task extending well beyond the 
scope of the thesis,  and is in any case not necessary for the achievement of the 
objective of this chapter,  viz to elucidate how the assignment of responsibilities is dealt 
with in other countries. 
 
 
4.2 Australia 
 
A federal state to be known as the Commonwealth of Australia was established by the 
Commonwealth of Australia Act adopted by the British Parliament in 1900.   The 
Commonwealth,  which was to embrace a number of British colonies existing at the time,  
as well as any other colonies or territories which may be admitted at a future date,  was 
formally proclaimed in September 1900 and came into existence on 1 January 1901.   
(Rydon 1991:63.) 
 
On the establishment of the Commonwealth the constitution of each of the former 
colonies continued in force,  but was made subject to the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth (hereinafter referred to in this section as “the Constitution”).   Each 
constituent state retained the competence to amend its constitution in accordance with 
the provisions of such constitution (Australia Constitution: section 106).   As a 
consequence,  the Constitution does not contain stipulations as to the structures of the 
constituent states,  treating these as a given and referring to them in passing where 
necessary – vide for example section 9 dealing with methods for the election of 
senators.   The Constitution does of course set out the composition,  functions and 
powers of the federal institutions - vide for instance chapter I (Parliament) and chapter II 
(Executive Government). 
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On even a cursory examination of the Constitution,  it is apparent that the 
Commonwealth is based on a federal model.   Section 51 of the Constitution sets out the 
matters with respect to which the federal parliament shall have power to make laws,  but 
does not specify matters falling under the legislative authority of the states.   By 
implication the residuary legislative power within the system of government vests in the 
states;  they are free to make laws in regard to any matter not falling under the assigned 
legislative authority of the federal parliament - an essentially federal approach.   The 
Constitution (section 108) provides that until such time as the federal parliament has 
made a law dealing with a matter assigned to it,  a law of a former colony relating to 
such a matter shall continue in force in the particular state,  and the state shall have the 
power to alter or repeal the law.   The possibility of conflict between a federal law and a 
state law is eliminated by a provision in the Constitution (section 109) which stipulates 
that where a law of a state is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth,  the federal 
law shall prevail and the state law,  to the extent of the inconsistency,  shall be invalid. 
 
The continuing legislative authority of the constituent states referred to in the preceding 
paragraph,  did not apply to three matters which from the commencement of the 
Commonwealth were placed under the exclusive legislative authority of the federal 
parliament (Australia Constitution: section 52).   These matters are as follows: 
 
(a) The seat of government of the Commonwealth,  and all places acquired by the 
Commonwealth for public purposes; 
(b) matters relating to any department of the public service the control of which is by 
the Constitution transferred to the executive government of the Commonwealth;  
and 
(c) other matters declared by the Constitution to be within the exclusive power of the 
federal parliament. 
 
The Constitution contains no general,  connotative definition of the type or class of 
matter which belongs appropriately under the legislative (and associated executive) 
authority of the federal government or of the governments of the constituent states.   
Such matters are defined (identified) in a denotative manner,  that is to say by listing.   
As indicated above,  the list is contained in section 51 of the Constitution.   The list,  
which is appended to the thesis as annexure 1 and contains 39 entries,  is a largely 
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unstructured one;  there is no subdivision into broad categories of related items,  
although in some parts of the list preceding and succeeding items do appear to bear 
some relationship to one another - vide for example items xxi and xxii dealing with 
marriage and divorce respectively,  and items xxxii to xxxiv dealing with railways.   The 
items in the list are not presented in alphabetical order,  and there is no reason to 
suspect that the sequence of listing conveys any particular meaning or intent. 
 
Included in the list of matters in respect of which the federal parliament is competent to 
legislate are matters referred to it by the parliament or parliaments of any state or states,  
with the proviso that any such law shall apply only to states by whose parliaments the 
particular matter was referred,  or which afterwards adopt the law (Australia Constitution: 
section 51(xxxvii)).   According to note 12 of the editorial notes contained in the 
publication consulted,  six of the states,  over a period stretching from 1915 to 1966,  
adopted 24 Acts which referred matters to the federal parliament in terms of the 
particular provision in the Constitution.   Most of these Acts have since either expired or 
been repealed;  only five were still in force in 1991.   (Rydon 1991:61-62.) 
 
Some major public functions not included in the list of matters with respect to which the 
federal parliament is empowered to make laws are the promotion of agriculture,  the 
provision of education,  and the regulation of local government.   These are therefore 
matters falling within the residuary legislative (and executive) competence of the states. 
 
Compared to some of the other states included in the sample of states surveyed in this 
chapter – Belgium and Germany being prime examples – the assignment of 
responsibilities for public functions in the Australian constitutional scheme is readily 
accessible and straightforward.   Although the list of matters entrusted to the federal 
parliament is a long and poorly organised one,  there can be little uncertainty as to the 
extent of the legislative powers of the federal parliament.   As indicated above,  any law 
operative in a state relating to a matter in the particular category which is inconsistent 
with a federal law,  will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.   There is no onus on 
the federal parliament to satisfy any criterion or set of criteria in exercising its legislative 
powers with respect to matters falling within its legislative competence. 
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4.3 Belgium 
 
A key feature of the Belgium Constitution (hereinafter referred to in this section as “the 
Constitution”) is the dualistic ordering of the state into both communities 
(gemeenschappen) and regions (gewesten) (Constitution: article 1).   The communities 
recognised in the Constitution are not local concentrations of citizens but constitutionally 
acknowledged population groups,  although in practice the population groups do tend to 
be concentrated in certain regions and municipalities.   There are three such 
communities,  viz the Flemish Community,  the French Community,  and the German-
speaking Community (Belgium Constitution: article 2).   There are also three regions,  viz 
the Flemish Region,  the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region (Belgium 
Constitution: article 3).   The fact that the communities are mentioned first in the 
Constitution is probably indicative of the fundamental importance which the Constitution 
- as borne out in subsequent articles - attaches to the three communities in matters of 
the state,  of government,  and of administration. 
 
The Constitution proceeds to stipulate (article 4) that the country encompasses four 
language territories (taalgebieden),  viz the Dutch language territory,  the French 
language territory,  the bilingual (Dutch / French) territory of Brussels-Capital,  and the 
German language territory.  The Dutch speaking and French speaking communities 
make up the bulk of the Belgian population,  with German speakers constituting a 
relatively small minority.   Senelle (1990:12) puts the total population at 9,947 million of 
which 57,6% inhabit the Dutch language territory,  32,6% the French language territory,  
and 9,8% the bilingual Brussels-Capital territory.   Only 70 000 persons - less than 1% of 
the total population - were living in the German language territory at the time.   Every 
municipality (gemeente) of the country forms part of one of the language territories 
(Belgium Constitution: article 4). 
 
The boundaries of the four language territories are entrenched in the Constitution in a 
manner which requires substantial agreement between the two major language groups 
(Dutch and French) for any change to be effected.   A law sanctioning such change has 
to be adopted in the national parliament with a majority of votes of the members 
belonging to each language group in each of the two houses,  provided that the majority 
of the members of each language group is present,  and provided further that the total of 
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the “yes” votes cast in both language groups constitutes at least two thirds of the votes 
exercised (Belgium Constitution: article 4).   This special majority is required in 
numerous other places in the Constitution where the fundamental interests of the Dutch-
speaking and the French-speaking groups as the major “stakeholders” in the state are at 
issue - vide for example articles 5,  35,  39,  115,  121,  123,  127,  and 137. 
 
The boundaries of the regions and of the language territories correspond to a large 
degree,  but are not co-extensive.   There is an exact fit between the boundaries of the 
Brussels Region and the bilingual language territory of Brussels-Capital.   The outer 
boundaries of the Flemish Region follow those of the Dutch language territory,  but with 
the co-extensive Brussels Region and bilingual territory of Brussels-Capital excluded 
from both the Flemish Region and the Dutch language territory.   The Walloon Region 
includes both the French language territory and the German language territory within its 
boundaries.   The way in which the various boundaries are drawn is less confusing when 
presented graphically.   Senelle (1990:3) obligingly provides a “constitutional map” of the 
country,  which is appended to the thesis as annexure 2. 
 
The Flemish Region and the Walloon Region are each divided into five provinces,  which 
can be sub-divided by means of a law (Belgium Constitution: articles 5-6).   These 
subdivisions are presumably the municipalities as the very next article of the Constitution 
(article 7),  which deals with changes to borders,  refers inclusively to  the state,  the 
provinces,  and the municipalities:  “De grenzen van de Staat,  van de provincies en van 
de gemeenten kunnen niet worden gewijzigd of gecorrigeerd dan krachtens een wet”. 
 
The array of governments in Belgium encompasses the national,  the community,  the 
regional,  the provincial,  and the municipal authorities.   The Constitution provides for 
the setting up of legislative and associated executive bodies for respectively the national,  
the community,  and the regional authorities,  and specifies how these are to be elected 
or chosen,  and generally what their functions and powers will be - vide chapters I and III 
of title III of the Constitution,  dealing with the federal parliament and the federal 
executive government,  and chapter IV of title III,  dealing with the legislative and 
executive bodies of the communities and the regions.   The Constitution devotes a 
chapter (chapter VIII, title III) to provincial and municipal institutions,  but provides little 
by way of detail concerning their composition,  functions and powers,  stipulating that 
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such institutions are to be regulated by law.   The envisaged regulating law must ensure 
the application of certain principles,  which are set out in the Constitution.   Provision is 
made for the community or the regional councils to regulate the organisation and the 
exercise of administrative supervision for purposes of the implementation of a law 
adopted by special majority (vide supra).   (Belgium Constitution: article 162.) 
 
While the Constitution mandates separate sets of legislative and executive bodies for 
each community and each region,  it provides that the Council of the Flemish Community 
and the Council of the French Community,  and their executive governments,  may 
exercise the powers relating to respectively the Flemish and Walloon Regions.   Such an 
arrangement has to be sanctioned by a federal law adopted with a special majority 
(Belgium Constitution: article 137).   The special majority is the one already referred to 
supra,  and is obviously required in order to ensure that there is substantial consensus 
between the two major language groups regarding the amalgamation of authorities.   
The Flemish community has opted for such an amalgamated arrangement,  with the 
result that the Council of the Flemish Community (formally designated Vlaamse Raad ) 
and its executive government exercise both community and regional powers.   The 
French community and the Walloon Region are served by separate institutions of 
legislative and executive government. 
 
Against the foregoing brief description of the structure of government in Belgium,  the 
assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions can be examined. 
 
True to the professed federal character of the state,  the federal government is vested 
with competence only in relation to those matters which the Constitution,  or laws 
adopted in terms of the Constitution,  expressly assign to it.   The communities and the 
regions are vested with competence in relation to all remaining matters,  subject to the 
conditions and in the manner determined by federal law,  such a law having to be 
adopted with a special majority.   (Belgium Constitution: article 35.) 
 
The Constitution stipulates in article 38 that each community shall have the powers 
assigned to it by the Constitution or by laws adopted in terms of the Constitution.   The 
powers referred to are set out in articles 127 and 128 of the Constitution in respect of the 
Flemish Council and the Council of the French Community,  and in article 130 in respect 
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of the Council of the German speaking Community.   The powers assigned relate to the 
following matters: 
 
(a) cultural matters; 
(b) education,  excluding the determination of the commencement and the 
termination of compulsory schooling,  minimum conditions for the issuing of 
diplomas,  and pension matters; 
(c) co-operation between the communities as well as international co-operation with 
regard to cultural matters and education;  and 
(d) matters bound up with the well-being of individual persons (the so-called 
persoonsgebonden aangelegenheden). 
 
The Flemish Council and the Council of the French Community are authorised by the 
Constitution to regulate the use of languages with regard to specified matters in the 
Dutch language territory and the French language territory respectively,  with certain 
exclusions (Belgium Constitution: article 129). 
 
As to what constitutes cultural matters and persoonsgebonden matters respectively,  the 
Constitution stipulates that these are to be determined by federal law,  adopted in 
respect of both the Flemish community and the French community with a special 
majority (Belgium Constitution: articles 127-128, 130). 
 
Senelle (1990:64-65) provides details of matters which have been determined as cultural 
matters by federal law,  viz - 
 
(a) defence and promotion of the language; 
(b) promotion and training of researchers; 
(c) the fine arts; 
(d) the cultural heritage,  museums and other scientific institutions; 
(e) libraries,  record libraries and similar services; 
(f) radio and television broadcasting; 
(g) subsidies for the press; 
(h) youth policy; 
(i) continuing education and cultural promotion; 
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(j) physical education,  sports and open-air activities; 
(k) leisure and tourism; 
(l) pre-school education and day-care facilities; 
(m) post educational and para-scholastic training; 
(n) artistic training; 
(o) intellectual,  moral and social training; 
(p) social advancement courses;  and 
(q) occupational and vocational training,  with certain exceptions. 
 
There is no connotative definition of cultural matters - merely a list.   With the exception 
of occupational and vocational training,  no inclusive or exclusive stipulations or 
qualifications are attached to the cultural matters as listed.   It would seem therefore that 
cultural matters as a category fit relatively easily into the Belgian model of community 
self-government.   It is noteworthy that education is not shown as a cultural matter,  but 
listed separately;  however,  its separate treatment should probably be seen as an 
acknowledgement of its special importance rather than as a denial of its cultural nature. 
 
As regards persoonsgebonden matters,  there is again no connotative definition in 
federal law;  such matters also being determined denotatively (listed).   According to 
Senelle (1990:68-69) persoonsgebonden matters can be grouped under two headings,  
as follows: 
 
(a) Concerning health policy: 
 
?? the policy on health care dispensed in and outside hospitals and clinics,  with 
a number of important exceptions; 
?? health education and preventive medicine activities and services,  with the 
exception of prophylactic measures at national level. 
 
(b) Concerning personal aid: 
 
?? family policy; 
?? social assistance policy,  with substantial exceptions; 
?? policy for the reception and integration of immigrants; 
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?? policy on the handicapped,  including training,  rehabilitation and vocational 
retraining,  with certain exceptions; 
?? policy on the elderly,  with certain exceptions; 
?? care and protection of minors,  with a number of exceptions;  and 
?? social assistance to prisoners,  with a view to their social rehabilitation. 
 
Where matters are determined as persoonsgebonden but with certain exceptions,  the 
exceptions relate mainly to funding,  minimum allowances,  uniform or minimum national 
standards,  and the equitable dispensing of just treatment (Senelle 1990:68-69) - 
aspects which the federal legislators presumably regard as matters which can be dealt 
with effectively only at the national (federal) level of government.   The specification of 
numerous exceptions in assigning persoonsgebonden matters to the community 
councils is indicative of an assignment category relatively more problematic than the 
cultural matters category. 
 
As regards the regions,  the Constitution provides for the regional legislative and 
executive bodies to regulate those matters determined by federal law,  excluding matters 
assigned to the community authorities.   According to Senelle (1990:74-125) ten major 
divisions of regional competence have been identified in federal law,  viz - 
 
(a) town and country planning; 
(b) the environment; 
(c) rural development and nature conservation; 
(d) housing; 
(e) water policy; 
(f) economic matters; 
(g) energy policy; 
(h) subordinate matters; 
(i) employment policy;  and 
(j) public works and transport. 
 
Each major division consists of a number of stipulated matters - ranging from two to ten 
per division - with a total of 43 such matters (Senelle 1990:74-125). 
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As in the case of cultural and persoonsgebonden matters,  so also in the case of 
regional matters the form of definition is denotative;  no general (connotative) definition 
or distinguishing criterion,  or set of criteria,  as to what constitutes a regional matter,  is 
in evidence.   The formulation also does not follow any discernible pattern.   In some 
instances,  a matter is indicated by a single word or phrase;  in others a matter is 
specified in some detail.   In some instances,  the assignment of a matter is qualified by 
indicating which aspects are specifically included;  in others,  by indicating which aspects 
are specifically excluded;  in still others,  the assignment is made subject to compliance 
with national or European standards or national policy. 
 
As mentioned supra the Constitution requires that the law regulating provincial and 
municipal institutions must ensure the application of certain principles (Belgium 
Constitution: article 162).   Three of the stipulated principles have a bearing on the 
assignment of responsibilities and are quoted in full: 
 
“De wet verzekert de toepassing van de volgende beginselen: 
 
1. … 
2. de bevoegdheid van de provincieraden en van de gemeenteraden voor alles wat 
van provinciaal en gemeentelijk belang is,  behoudens goedkeuring van hun 
handelingen in de gevallen en op de wijse bij de wet bepaald; 
 3. de decentralisatie van bevoegdheden naar die provincialen en gemeentelijke 
instellingen; 
4. … 
5. … 
 6. het optreden van de toezichthoudende overheid of van de federale wetgevende 
macht om te beletten dat de wet wordt geschonden of het algemeen belang geskaad.” 
 
The regulating law in question has not been examined;  it presumably provides 
particulars of the matters to be dealt with by the provincial and municipal councils.   For 
present purposes it is sufficient to note that while there is a constitutional injunction 
requiring the decentralisation of powers to provinces and municipalities,  coupled to a 
somewhat tautological but unspecified requirement that the provinces and the 
municipalities deal with all matters of provincial or municipal interest,  the reservation of 
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certain powers of approval and of intervention to the higher authorities places the 
provinces and the municipalities in a subordinate position to such authorities.   To 
ascertain the exact nature and the extent of the responsibilities given to the provincial 
and local authorities for the performance of public functions would require further 
detailed research. 
 
The Constitution anticipates the possibility of conflicts of power and of interests arising 
within the system of government.   Title III,  chapter V of the Constitution stipulates how 
conflicts in three areas are to be prevented or dealt with:   firstly,  conflicts of 
competence between laws (federal government),  decrees (community and regional 
governments),  and rules (regional governments);  secondly,  conflicts of interest 
between legislative bodies;  and thirdly,  conflicts of interest between executive bodies.   
An arbitration court is established to resolve conflicts between laws,  decrees and rules,  
and to rule on laws, decrees and rules which transgress specified articles of the 
Constitution. 
 
The Constitution as such does not provide specifically for co-operation between the 
various authorities,  but special legislation has been adopted with a view to the 
promotion of intergovernmental co-operation (Senelle 1990:150-155).   The legislation in 
question provides for the state,  the communities and the regions to conclude co-
operation agreements on a voluntary basis relating in particular to the joint creation and 
management of common services and institutions,  the joint exercise of sole 
competences,  and the development of common initiatives.   Provision is also made for 
the cross-representation of the national authority,  the community authorities and the 
regional authorities on the decision-making and management bodies of national,  
community and regional institutions.   These provisions are significant in the context of 
the assignment of responsibilities to governments,  pointing to the apparent difficulty of 
achieving a mutually exclusive demarcation of competences between the various levels 
and spheres of government. 
 
In conclusion,  two features of the scheme for the assignment of responsibilities in 
Belgium need to be specially noted.   These are,  firstly,  the evident complexity of the 
scheme,  attributable in large part to the adoption of a dual basis of assignment - 
community / regional - and,  secondly,  the extent and the intensity of the recognition 
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given to cultural diversity - based essentially on language - in devising an acceptable 
system of government.   The two features would appear to be closely linked:  complexity 
in constitutional arrangements - and by implication in government and administration - is,  
judged on the Belgian model,  probably unavoidable if cultural diversity existing within 
the same state is to be accommodated meaningfully in the formal deployment of 
legislative and executive authority for the performance of public functions. 
 
 
4.4 Germany 
 
Germany is a federation at present consisting of sixteen states or Länder.   The 
Grundgesetz adopted in 1949 by the parliaments of a number of then existing Länder 
(FPIO 1989:3-4) serves as the country’s constitution (hereinafter referred to in this 
section as “the Basic Law”).   Although the Basic Law applies to all Länder which have 
formally acceded to it (Basic Law:  article 23),  it did not bring the Länder into existence;  
the Basic Law was in fact created by and made applicable to the Länder by the voluntary 
action of the Länder themselves,  and with the approval at the time of the country’s 
military governors (FPIO 1989:3-4).   As a consequence the Länder are regarded as 
having their own sovereignty which is not derived from the Federation (FPIO 1989:10).   
This perceived status of the Länder is borne out by the provisions of the Basic Law 
dealing with the organs of government of the Federal Republic.   Although the Basic Law 
deals comprehensively with the composition,  functions and powers of the federal 
legislative and executive authorities - the federal parliament (Bundestag),  the federal 
council (Bundesrat),  the federal president,  and the federal government - it has relatively 
little to say about Land authorities.   Its provisions in this connection are nevertheless 
noteworthy and are examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
The Basic Law stipulates that the constitutional order in the Länder shall conform to the 
principles of a republican,  democratic and social state governed by the rule of law 
(article 28(1)),  as well as to the basic rights guaranteed to the German people (article 
28(3)).   It refers in passing to lower tiers of government within the Länder,  viz the 
counties (Kreise) and the municipalities (Gemeinden),  in a stipulation which requires 
people to be represented by bodies chosen by “general,  direct,  free,  equal and secret 
elections” (article 28(1)).   The Basic Law then proceeds to guarantee to the 
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municipalities the right to regulate,  on their own responsibility,  all local affairs within the 
limits of the laws.   It is stipulated further that associations of municipalities also have the 
right of self-government according to the laws.   (Basic Law: article 28(2).)   For the rest 
the Basic Law is silent as to the nature and the composition of the institutions of 
government of a Land, or of the subordinate authorities within a Land.   In the 
government publication already referred to it is stated that each Land has an elected 
parliament,  a government elected by its parliament,  and its own administrative 
authorities.   Mention is made of the right of self-government enjoyed by the communes 
(municipalities) which,  it is stated,  is exercised primarily by the elected town council.   It 
is stated further that the counties - comprising several communes (municipalities) - also 
have elected parliaments and the right of self-government.   It is noted in the publication 
that the counties together with the communes (municipalities) constitute the lowest tier of 
government.   (FPIO 1989:11.) 
 
True to the professed federal character of the state,  the Basic Law confers residuary 
competence on the Länder.   Article 30 states that “ … Except as otherwise provided or 
permitted by this Basic Law,  the exercise of state powers and the discharge of state 
functions is a matter for the Länder”.   The federal authorities shall thus govern by 
exception,  so to speak.   This typically federal approach is reinforced by a stipulation 
that the Länder shall have the right to legislate in so far as the Basic Law does not 
confer legislative powers on the Federation (article 70(1)).   However,  as will be 
apparent on further examination of the Basic Law,  the overtly federal foundation of the 
state has not prevented the federal government from achieving a position of dominance 
in the legislative domain. 
 
For the assignment of legislative authority to the Federation and the Länder respectively,  
a relatively complex scheme is set out in the Basic Law.   Having placed residuary 
legislative authority with the Länder, the Basic Law then proceeds to establish three 
categories of matters in respect of which legislation can be adopted by the Federation 
and the Länder,  and to assign specific matters to each category.   The three categories 
are examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
In respect of certain matters the Federation has the exclusive power to legislate.  These 
matters are listed in article 73 of the Basic Law,  and comprise - 
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 (1) foreign affairs and defence,  including protection of the civilian population; 
(2) citizenship in the Federation; 
(3) freedom of movement,  passports,  immigration,  emigration and extradition; 
(4) currency,  money and coinage,  weights and measures,  and the determination of 
standards of time; 
(5) the unity of the customs and trading area,  treaties respecting commerce and 
navigation,  the free movement of goods,  and the exchange of goods and 
payments with foreign countries,  including customs and border protection; 
(6) air transport; 
 (6)(a) the operation of railways wholly or predominantly owned by the Federation 
(federal railways),  the construction,  maintenance and operation of tracks 
belonging to federal railways as well as the imposition of charges for the use of 
such tracks; 
(7) postal and telecommunication services; 
(8) the legal relations of persons employed by the Federation and federal 
corporations under public law; 
(9) industrial property rights,  copyrights and publishing; 
(10) co-operation between the Federation and the Länder concerning - 
(a) criminal police work, 
(b) protection of the free democratic basic order,  existence,  and security of 
the Federation or of a Land (protection of the constitution),  and 
(c) protection against activities within the federal territory which,  by the use 
of force or by the preparations for the use of force,  endanger the external 
interests of the Federal Republic of Germany,  as well as the 
establishment of a Federal Criminal Police Office and international action 
to combat crime;  and 
(11) statistics for federal purposes. 
 
The second category in the assignment scheme is one encompassing matters in respect 
of which the Federation and the Länder have concurrent powers to legislate.   These 
matters are listed in articles 74 and 74a of the Basic Law.   The list has been amended 
and expanded over the years;  in 2003 it comprised some 29 items.   It covers a wide 
array of public functions,  including civic matters,  the justice system,  social matters,  
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welfare matters,  and economic regulation and protection.   The full list is appended to 
the thesis as annexure 3. 
 
The third category in the assignment scheme encompasses matters in respect of which 
the Federation has the power to adopt what is referred to as “framework” legislation.   
Framework legislation may only in exceptional cases contain detailed and directly 
applicable regulations.   (Basic Law:  article 75(1)-(2).)   The intention presumably is that 
in respect of identified matters the Federation should not regulate in a detailed manner 
but restrict itself to the stipulation of principles and basic parameters,  leaving room for 
the Länder to adopt their own legislation regulating such matters in greater detail,  while 
remaining within the limits set by the framework law.   Should the Federation enact 
framework legislation,  the Länder are obligated to enact the required Land legislation 
within a reasonable period prescribed by law (Basic Law: article 75(3)).   By 2003 the 
following matters had been listed in the Basic Law (article 75(1)) as matters in respect of 
which the Federation could adopt framework legislation: 
 
(1) The legal relations of persons in the public service of the Länder,  municipalities 
or other corporate bodies under public law; 
(1)(a) the general principles respecting higher education; 
(2) the general legal relations of the press; 
(3) hunting,  nature conservation and landscape management; 
(4) land distribution,  regional planning and the management of water resources; 
(5) matters relating to the registration of residence or domicile and to identity cards;  
and 
(6) measures to prevent expatriation of German cultural assets. 
 
Of the three categories of matters in the German assignment scheme,  the category of 
concurrent powers would appear to be especially problematic,  and justifies closer 
examination.   With both the Federation and the Länder empowered to legislate on 
certain matters,  it is obviously necessary to have clarity as to the circumstances in and 
extent to which each can legislate in relation to such matters.   The Basic Law supplies 
this need by stipulating certain ground rules which are to apply in the exercise of powers 
of concurrent legislation.   These rules are as follows: 
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(a) The Länder have the competence to legislate in the area of concurrent legislation 
as long and in so far as the Federation has not made use of its legislative 
competence in that area (Basic Law: article 72(1)). 
 
(b) The Federation has the right to legislate in the area of concurrent legislation if 
and in so far as the establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout the 
federal territory,  or the maintenance of legal and economic unity in the national 
interest,  requires legislative regulation by the Federation (Basic Law: article 
72(2)). 
 
(c) Should the necessity for federal legislative regulation as envisaged by article 
72(2) no longer exist,  it can be determined by means of a federal law that such 
regulation can be replaced by Land legislation (Basic Law: article 72(3)). 
 
(c) Federal law takes precedence over Land law (Basic Law: article 31).   (This 
general constitutional injunction is presumably qualified by a requirement that the 
federal law must satisfy the test of constitutionality,  especially in regard to the 
exercise of concurrent powers.) 
 
The wording of article 72(2) of the Basic Law,  which limits the Federation’s right to 
legislate in the area of concurrent legislation – vide subparagraph (b) in the preceding 
paragraph – is an amended formulation introduced in October 1994 (Flanz 1995: ix, xi).   
The date of the amendment is significant as the German model of concurrent powers 
was applied in the drafting of South Africa’s 1993 Constitution – implemented on 27 April 
1994 – and largely retained in the drafting of the 1996 Constitution.   It is insightful to 
note how the limitation was worded at the time of the adoption of the 1993 Constitution 
in South Africa. 
 
Prior to its amendment in October 1994,  article 72(2) of the Basic Law provided that the 
Federation could legislate in the area of concurrent legislation where – 
 
(a) a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of individual Länder;  or 
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(b) regulation by a Land might prejudice the interests of other Länder or the country 
as a whole;  or 
(c) the maintenance of legal and economic unity,  especially uniform living conditions 
beyond the territory of any one Land,  calls for federal legislation. 
 
By the amendment of article 72(2) in October 1994 the limitations referred to in the 
foregoing subparagraphs (a) and (b) were dispensed with,  while the limitation referred 
to in subparagraph (c) was in essence retained.   On the face of it,  the amendment 
serves to further limit the role of the Federation in the area of concurrent legislation,  
although it would seem that the relatively wide formulations employed – “establishment 
of equivalent living conditions” and “maintenance of legal and economic unity” – still 
provide the Federation with considerable latitude for the adoption of legislation in the 
area in question. 
 
The Basic Law is unusual in the clear constitutional distinction it draws between the 
making of laws and the execution of laws.   Article 83 stipulates that the Länder shall 
implement federal legislation in their own right in so far as the Basic Law does not 
provide or permit otherwise.   Where the implementation of federal laws is left to the 
Länder,  provision is made for the federal government to issue general administrative 
rules and to conduct direct supervision through inspections carried out by designated 
commissioners (Basic Law: article 84).   The ordering of administration between the 
Federation and the Länder is typically federalist;  the federal government is competent to 
administer only those matters specifically assigned to it,  all other matters fall within the 
administrative competence of the Länder. 
 
Against the background of a complex assignment scheme,  the performance of public 
functions in Germany would appear to have resolved itself over the years into a situation 
in which,  broadly speaking,  the Federation determines policy  (makes laws) and the 
Länder execute policy (administer laws).   There are however substantial exceptions;  
the official publication already referred to identifies especially culture,  education,  and 
public safety as fields in which the Länder have considerable jurisdiction (FPIO 
1989:10).   The key factor in the general course of development would appear to have 
been the rise to dominance of the Federation in the area of concurrent legislation (Laufer 
1991:117).   It is to be noted in this respect that,  as pointed out supra,  the Federation 
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has first option to legislate in relation to matters falling within the concurrent powers 
category.   The Federation would appear to have exercised this option fully.   The 
Federation’s role has been strengthened by a decision of the Federal Constitutional 
Court that any question as to whether there is a need for federal regulation falls to be 
decided by the federal legislators (Laufer 1991:117).   It remains to be seen whether the 
amended article 72(2) of the Basic Law will substantially alter the legislative relationship 
between the Federation and the Länder. 
 
The concept of concurrent legislative powers is examined further in  chapters 6 and 7 of 
the thesis,  dealing respectively with the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions adopted in 
South Africa. 
 
As indicated supra,  no details are provided in the Basic Law as to the powers assigned 
to the local level of government,  made up of counties and municipalities.   A guaranteed 
right is given to the municipalities to regulate,  on their own responsibility,  all the affairs 
of the local community,  but the right is qualified by a requirement that such regulation is 
to take place within the limits of the laws (Basic Law: article 28(2)).   “Limits of the laws” 
is taken to refer to provisions and stipulations contained in laws of both the Federation 
and the Länder.   To ascertain exactly what powers are exercised by counties and 
municipalities in Germany it would be necessary to identify and peruse all relevant 
statutes of the Federation and the sixteen Länder. 
 
The Basic Law does not provide a general definition or criterion,  or set of criteria,  for 
determining which responsibilities properly belong with the Federation and the Länder 
respectively.   The provision made for concurrent legislative powers,  together with the 
stipulated rules for their exercise,  presents its own peculiar problems of interpretation 
and accessibility.   Throughout the Basic Law the matters concerning which laws can be 
made are listed denotatively and in no particular order.   Matters are identified mostly as 
nominal subjects – for example “foreign affairs”,  “defence”,  and “citizenship” – with only 
a few instances of the employment of function style formulations – for example 
“operation of railways”,  “registration of births,  deaths and marriages”,  and “promotion 
of agricultural production and forestry”. 
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4.5 Spain 
 
Spain is a hereditary monarchy with its system of government and administration 
arranged in three basic tiers,  viz national,  provincial and municipal (vide infra regarding 
the possible establishment of autonomous communities).   The Spain Constitution 
(hereinafter referred to in this section as “the Constitution”),  sets out comprehensively 
the functions and powers of the King (title II),  the Cortes Generales or national 
parliament (title III) and the national political executive (title IV).   The constitutional 
provisions concerning the provinces and the municipalities are,  by contrast,  notably 
sparse.   The Constitution stipulates (article 137) as a general principle - but rather 
vaguely - that the municipalities and the provinces “ … enjoy autonomy for the 
management of their respective interests”.   Chapter II of title VIII of the Constitution,  
under the heading “Concerning local administration”,  contains two articles dealing with 
the municipalities and the provinces respectively.   These are examined below. 
 
Article 140,  dealing with the municipalities,  stipulates that the municipalities shall enjoy 
“full juridical personality”;  that their government and administration is the responsibility 
of their own city governments which are made up of mayors and councilmen;  that the 
councilmen shall be elected by the residents;  and that the mayors shall be elected by 
either the councilmen or by the residents.   There is no indication in the Constitution of 
the public functions or aspects of public functions falling within the competence of the 
municipalities.   In the absence of such an indication it is assumed that municipal 
competences are established by laws and regulations emanating from the national level 
of government,  or possibly from the autonomous communities (vide infra),  with the 
residuary legislative competence vesting in the national parliament. 
 
Article 141 of the Constitution contains provisions relating to the provinces.   According 
to the available English translation of the article,  a province is “ … a local entity with its 
own juridical personality determined by the collection of municipalities and territorial 
division for the fulfilment of the activities of the State” (sic).   The article goes on to 
stipulate that the government and “autonomous” administration of the provinces shall be 
entrusted to “deputations or corporations” of a representative nature.   In other parts of 
the Constitution the terms “deputation” and “corporation” in relation to provincial 
government are used interchangeably (vide for example article 143.2).   In the absence 
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of any reference to an electoral process it would seem that the deputation or corporation 
of a province is a body nominated by the elected councils of the constituent 
municipalities.   It would seem further that the boundaries of the provinces are 
determined so as to be suitable for the rendering of state services on a regional basis - 
vide the reference supra to “ … territorial division for the fulfilment of the activities of the 
State”.   As in the case of the municipalities,  no detail is provided as to the specific 
competences of the provinces;  however,  there is a reference in article 142 to the 
functions which “the law” - presumably a national law or possibly decrees or regulations 
of the autonomous communities (vide infra) - attributes to the respective corporations.   
Again,  the deduction is made that the residuary legislative competence vests in the 
national parliament. 
 
In addition to the basic three-tiered structure of government the Constitution makes 
provision for adjacent provinces with common historical,  cultural,  and economic 
characteristics to accede to self-government by constituting themselves into an 
autonomous community (Spain Constitution: article 143.1).   The initiative to bring about 
an autonomous community is to be taken by the deputations of the provinces concerned 
and the constituent municipalities.   For an initiative to proceed it must enjoy the support 
of two-thirds of the municipalities in each of the provinces concerned,  and the 
supporting municipalities must represent the majority of the electorate in the province 
(Spain Constitution: article 143.2).   The next step is the drafting of a statute for the 
autonomous community,   a task to be taken in hand by an assembly consisting of the 
deputations of the provinces concerned and the deputies and senators elected to 
represent those provinces in the national parliament.   The draft of the statute is 
forwarded to the national parliament for enactment into law.   (Spain Constitution: article 
146.)   It is to be noted that provinces which satisfy the basic criteria for constituting 
themselves into an autonomous community,  are not obliged to do so;  it is an option 
which they may choose to exercise.   The principle at issue here,  is that of voluntarism. 
 
The Constitution lists 22 matters in respect of which an autonomous community may 
assume competence,  including the organisation of its institutions of self-government 
(Spain Constitution: article 148.1).   An extract of the article referred to is appended to 
the thesis as annexure 4.   The matters in question are listed in no particular order.   In 
some instances a function or activity is indicated,  as for example the “promotion of 
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sports and adequate utilisation of leisure”;  mostly,  however,  nominal subjects are 
listed,  as for example “public works”,  “railways and highways”,  and “ports of refuge”.   
There is no connotative definition of what properly constitutes a matter to be placed 
under the authority of an autonomous community,  or any criterion or set of criteria for 
identifying such a matter.   From the wording of article 148.1 - “The Autonomous 
Communities may (author’s emphasis) assume competences in the following  
matters: … “ - it is evident that an autonomous community is not legally obligated to 
assume competence in respect of all the matters listed;  the matters for which it will in 
fact assume competence will be as determined in its founding statute.   The list of 
matters contained in article 148.1 can therefore be said to constitute a menu of 
competences from which the founders of an autonomous community are at liberty to 
make a selection.   By implication the competences assigned to an autonomous 
community may differ from one such community to another.   From an assignment 
perspective the application of the principle of asymmetry is apparent. 
 
The Constitution goes on to provide that an autonomous community may,  after a period 
of five years has elapsed since its founding,  expand its competences.   The expansion 
of its competences is to be effected by the “reform” of its founding statute (Spain 
Constitution: article 148.2).   Having listed the matters in respect of which an 
autonomous community may initially assume competence (article 148.1),  the 
Constitution changes to a completely different style of drafting in dealing with the 
expansion of competences.   It lists the matters in respect of which the state has 
exclusive competence and then stipulates that matters not attributed expressly to the 
state may pertain to the autonomous communities by virtue of their respective statutes.   
Authority over matters not assumed by an autonomous community vests in the state.   
(Spain Constitution: articles 149.1, 149.3)   A copy of the list of matters falling within the 
exclusive competence of the state is appended to the thesis as annexure 5.   The 
defects noted in relation to the list of initial matters for which an autonomous community 
may assume competence - vide preceding paragraph - is again in evidence:   no 
particular order is discernible in the listing,  there is no consistency in the listing of 
matters as either functions or nominal subjects,  and there is no general definition or 
criterion or set of criteria for determining what rightly belongs with the various levels or 
spheres of government. 
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The Constitution provides for a “fast-tracking” process whereby an autonomous 
community can be established with the immediate assumption of competence for 
matters potentially assignable to such a community,  that is to say without waiting for a 
period of five years to elapse before competence regarding additional matters is 
assumed.   This requires the support of three-quarters (rather than two-thirds) of the 
municipalities of each province,  and ratification of the initiative by means of a 
referendum amongst the electorate of each province.   (Spain Constitution: article 
151.1.) 
 
From the perspective of the present study,  the general scheme adopted in the Spain 
Constitution for the assignment of responsibilities to the various levels and spheres of 
government can be criticised on two grounds.   Firstly,  virtually no indication is given of 
the matters to be dealt with by the provinces and the municipalities,  a shortcoming 
which tends to create the impression that these levels of government are considered to 
be of lesser importance.   The provincial and municipal competences are presumably 
contained in various laws and regulations of the national government (and possibly also 
of the autonomous communities) and,  this being the case,  it will be necessary to 
peruse all such laws and regulations in order to build a picture of the public functions,  or 
aspects of public functions,  which are to be performed by the provincial and municipal 
authorities respectively.   This is a situation which may tend to work against the 
achievement of a satisfactory degree of transparency and accountability in government 
and administration.   Secondly,  the basis on which the competences of the autonomous 
communities are to be determined,  and more especially the additional competences to 
which such communities can aspire,  tends to obfuscate rather than to clarify the division 
of responsibilities.   There is no indication of the specific matters for which an 
autonomous community can assume responsibility in addition to those appearing in the 
basic list,  but instead a list is provided of matters falling within the exclusive competence 
of the national state,  together with an indication that whatever has not been listed,  
could become the responsibility of an autonomous community through the amendment 
of its statute.   The employment of what could be called a mechanism of dual denotation 
- partly positive (matters included) and partly negative (matters excluded) - for purposes 
of determining the full scope of an autonomous community’s competences,  could be 
regarded as a convoluted way of proceeding where accessibility ought to be an 
important consideration.   A concomitant difficulty is the impossibility of ascertaining by 
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way of a perusal only of the Constitution what the full potential scope of the 
competences of an autonomous community is. 
 
 
4.6 United Kingdom 
 
Significant changes regarding the exercise of governmental powers at subnational level 
occurred in the United Kingdom in 1998 with the adoption of the Scotland Act 1998,  and 
the Government of Wales Act 1998.   Popularly referred to as “devolution” or “home rule” 
the arrangements set in place by the two Acts modified to a substantial degree the 
centralised form of government which had been in existence in the United Kingdom for 
centuries.   The changes introduced were more far reaching in the case of Scotland than 
in the case of Wales.   The Scotland Act 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the Scotland 
Act) established a parliament in Scotland with original legislative powers (Scotland Act: 
sections 1, 28).   In Wales the key new institution of government introduced was the 
Assembly which,  although an elected body,  will not exercise original legislative powers 
but act essentially as a subnational executive government,  exercising powers 
transferred to it by the national government (Government of Wales Act 1998: sections 
21-22). 
 
The developments regarding Wales are of limited relevance to the subject of the present 
study and are therefore not examined further. 
 
The Scotland Act set in place the Scottish Parliament to make laws for Scotland 
(sections 1(1), 27(1)),  and the Scottish Executive,  consisting of a first minister and 
other ministers (section 44) to perform those functions of a minister of the Crown (of the 
United Kingdom) which are conferred upon them in so far as they are “exercisable within 
devolved competence” (sections 52-53).   The Acts which originally constituted the 
United Kingdom - the Union with Scotland Act 1706 and the Union with England Act 
1707 - continue to have effect,  but subject to the Scotland Act (section 37). 
 
The assignment of legislative responsibilities to the Scottish Parliament is effected in the 
following manner:  The new parliament is empowered to make laws,  to be known as 
Acts of the Scottish Parliament,  but only to the extent of its legislative competence 
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(Scotland Act: sections 28(1), 29(1)).   A number of restrictions are placed on the 
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament (Scotland Act: section 29(2)),  and 
amongst these is a restriction on the making of laws in relation to “reserved matters”,  
such matters being reserved to the legislative competence of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom.   Reserved matters are grouped into two broad categories,  viz “general 
reservations” and “specific reservations”,  stipulated in parts I and II respectively of 
schedule 5 of the Act. 
 
The matters falling in the “general” category of reserved matters are as follows: 
 
 (a) Certain matters concerning the Crown and other constitutional features; 
(b) the registration and funding of political parties; 
(c) foreign affairs,  including international trade,  development assistance and co-
operation; 
(d) the civil service; 
(e) defence;  and 
(f) treason. 
 
A number of qualifications are attached to the general reservations made,  with the 
treatment of the subject complicated by the attachment of further qualifications to some 
of the primary qualifications (Scotland Act: schedule 5, part I),  making it difficult to 
establish to what extent certain matters falling in the “general” category are actually 
reserved or not reserved. 
 
The “specific” reservations encompass a host of matters grouped under 11 main heads 
and 67 sub-heads,  covering 25 pages of print (Scotland Act: schedule 5, part II).   The 
11 main heads are as follows: 
 
(a) Financial and economic matters; 
(b) home affairs; 
(c) trade and industry; 
(d) energy; 
(e) transport; 
(f) social security; 
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(g) regulation of the professions; 
(h) employment; 
(i) health and medicines; 
(j) media and culture;  and 
(k) miscellaneous. 
 
In describing the items under each sub-head of the 11 main heads of reserved matters 
various styles of presentation are employed,  for instance - 
 
(a) a short descriptive statement,  further elaborated by a concatenation of matters 
specifically included; 
(b) a short descriptive statement,  followed by an indication of exceptions (matters 
specifically excluded); 
(c) a short descriptive statement,  without an indication of any inclusions or 
exceptions; 
(d) no descriptive statement,  but a reference to existing Acts or parts of existing 
Acts; 
(e) a combination of the foregoing;  and 
(f) in some cases a repetition of the wording of the sub-head,  as in - 
“B11.  Extradition 
 
Extradition”. 
 
Despite the detail provided,  part II of schedule 5 presents a formidable challenge to the 
researcher wishing to establish the actual scope of the law-making powers of the 
Scottish Parliament.   The problem goes beyond the somewhat convoluted presentation 
and qualification of reserved matters.   The major difficulty lies in the fact that the Act 
does not stipulate what the Scottish Parliament may legislate on,  but instead what it 
may not legislate on.   The matters actually within the legislative competence of the 
Scottish Parliament presumably fall within the space surrounding and intervening 
between the 11 categories with their 67 sub-categories of matters reserved to the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom.   The exception to this essentially negative treatment 
of the subject is to be found in the exceptions indicated at places in the list of 
reservations,  where the statement of an exception to a reservation has the effect of 
  
119 
serving as a positive indication of a matter or aspect of a matter on which the Scottish 
Parliament may actually legislate.   (To illustrate,  using a hypothetical example:  You 
may not legislate on trees,  except oak trees;  therefore you may legislate on oak trees.)   
To ascertain the true extent of the legislative powers of the Scottish Parliament would 
require a systematic study going far beyond the provisions of the Scotland Act,  
encompassing the whole of the existing body of United Kingdom law,  as well as some 
speculative work concerning what could constitute appropriate areas for legislative 
intervention in a democratic society,  and which are not already covered by national 
legislation. 
 
On the face of it,  and somewhat surprisingly,  a “federal” model would seem to have 
been applied in the assignment of responsibilities between the national and the 
subnational level:   the matters in respect of which the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
may legislate have been specified (reserved),  leaving all unspecified matters within the 
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.   The residuary power thus seemingly 
resides in the subnational government.   However,  on closer examination of the 
Scotland Act it will be found that this is not the case.   Section 27(7) of the Act stipulates 
that the power given to the Scottish Parliament to make laws does not affect the power 
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to also make laws for Scotland.   The 
supremacy of the national parliament is therefore maintained,   and is all-inclusive.   In 
effect the Scottish Parliament is empowered to legislate by leave of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom,  leading to the conclusion that,  fundamentally,  residuary power 
continues to vest in the national legislature. 
 
 
4.7 Evaluation 
 
Based on the sample of five countries selected for examination,  there would appear to 
be a general consensus concerning certain public functions which must be performed at 
the highest level of government:  these are defence,  foreign affairs,  and public finance.   
For the rest there is no general uniformity evident as to the way in which the assignment 
of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government is dealt with in the constitutional 
arrangements of the five countries.   The general finding is that each country tends to 
assign responsibilities to subnational levels or spheres of government in its own peculiar 
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manner.   (There is a noteworthy degree of similarity between the German and South 
African assignment schemes in regard to the concept of concurrent powers,  but South 
Africa was not included in the present sample,  its approaches to the assignment of 
responsibilities being dealt with extensively in chapters 5,  6,  and 7 of the thesis.) 
 
The ways in which responsibilities are assigned in the various constitutional texts are 
generally remarkable for their complexity rather than their accessibility.   To obtain a full 
and accurate picture of the assignment of responsibilities in a country requires a 
concerted effort on the part of the researcher.   The following are some prime examples 
of the complexity evident in constitutional arrangements:   In the case of one of the 
countries studied - Belgium - a dual basis of division is applied,  viz cultural and regional-
hierarchical,  resulting in a complex matrix of authorities,  functions,  and powers.   The 
complexity can of course be ascribed in large part to the importance attached to the 
need to recognise in a meaningful manner the linguistic-cultural composition of the 
population,  and to provide for each group to govern itself to the greatest extent 
compatible with national unity.   Complexity would appear to be the price to pay for the 
differentiated arrangements.   The employment of the concept of concurrent powers - as 
found in the German constitution - coupled to rules for determining legislative primacy,  
may serve to facilitate the task of legal drafters,  but by its very nature does not serve to 
provide a clear,  unambiguous picture of where the legislative domains of the respective 
levels of government begin and end.   Concurrent powers may also tend to disguise the 
fact that in practice such powers will most likely be exercised predominantly by the 
national government.   Complexity in constitutional texts can be illustrated further by 
citing the use of negative denotation for purposes or ordering responsibilities between 
levels or spheres of government,  as encountered for instance in Spain and the United 
Kingdom.   The practice of stating not what a subnational government may legislate on 
but what is excluded from its legislative competence,  tends to work against a ready 
understanding of the extent of the subnational government’s actual legislative 
competence. 
 
Taxonomically,  the treatment of the assignment question is generally poor.   There is 
little by way of connotative definition to be found,  that is to say an indicative basis for 
determining the matters or classes of matters to be entrusted to the various levels or 
spheres of government within the state,  is generally lacking.   The preferred approach is 
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to provide lists of matters without any attempt to set up categories of related matters or 
to arrange matters in any particular order - not even alphabetically.   The language used 
in alluding to matters is lacking in precision and consistency.   References are mostly to 
nominal subjects (education,  health,  etc.) rather than to public functions per se 
(provision of education,  promotion of health,  etc.)   There is also little evidence of any 
systematic attempt to identify and define aspects or constituent parts of a public function 
(such as for example the formulation and adoption of legislation, the provision of 
services,  and control) and to indicate which aspect belongs with a particular level or 
sphere of government. 
 
Ideally - and admittedly an ideal situation may be difficult to obtain in practice - a 
country’s constitutional framework should clearly demarcate the respective domains of 
legislative and executive authority of each level or sphere of government.   The present 
research leads to the finding that in none of the countries studied,  such a 
comprehensive,  clear,  definitive demarcation of responsibilities has been achieved.   
The statutory provisions dealing with the assignment of responsibilities are often replete 
with exclusions and qualifications - generally tending  to assert the authority of the 
national government vis-a-vis subnational levels or spheres of government.   The 
difficulty of achieving a precise demarcation of responsibilities is formally recognised by 
constitutional stipulations providing for the resolution of domain disputes by the courts – 
for example in the cases of Australia,  Belgium and Germany. 
 
A common failing in regard to the assignment of responsibilities is evident in the case of 
local government,  where the constitutional provisions are notably sparse,  and local 
government is generally left to be regulated by laws enacted by higher levels or spheres 
of government.   On the assumption that to the ordinary citizens of a country the actions 
and omissions of their local government are particularly important in determining the 
quality of their lives,  the largely dismissive way in which the various constitutions treat 
the responsibilities of local government,  can be regarded as a major shortcoming.   It 
would not be unreasonable to argue that all levels or spheres of government that are 
formally (constitutionally) recognised in a country should,  by virtue of such recognition,  
be viewed and treated as essential cogs in the total system of government and 
administration,  and that their respective responsibilities should be set out with equal 
care in the constitutional framework.   A holistic approach to the assignment question,  
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covering the responsibilities of all levels or spheres of government,  and the 
interrelationships between assigned responsibilities,  would appear to be called for if a 
satisfactory and defensible assignment of responsibilities within a state is to be 
achieved. 
 
Although the research into the assignment schemes of other countries was of limited 
extent,  some observations can be made concerning the realisation in practice of federal 
and unitary models of state organisation.   In theory,  a federal model of state 
organisation is one in which certain specified functions and powers are assigned to the 
national government,  leaving all other functions and powers to be performed and 
exercised by the subnational governments,  including functions and powers in respect of 
possible fields of government intervention not yet identified (usually referred to as 
residuary powers).   A unitary model would employ the opposite approach to the 
deployment of functions and powers:  here the functions and powers of the subnational 
entities would be specified,  leaving all other functions and powers,  including residuary 
powers,  with the national government.   On the basis of the study undertaken,  and 
strictly from the perspective of the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government,  the classification of each of the five states as either a federation or a union 
would be problematical.   The possible exception is Australia,  which would appear to be 
essentially federal,  although the large number of matters assigned to the national 
government needs to be noted.   Frequently there is a specification of responsibilities in 
respect of both the national and the subnational levels or spheres of government,  with a 
substantial degree of linkage,  featuring many inclusions,  exclusions and qualifications.   
Each state’s arrangements would appear to be sui generis,  with both federal and unitary 
approaches discernible,  and such approaches mixed in various ways.   Unstudied 
references to (or formal declarations identifying) states as either federations or unions 
may not be borne out by the manner in which responsibilities are actually deployed 
amongst levels or spheres of government. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the research undertaken into the manner in which a sample of countries 
assign responsibilities for the performance of public functions has been reported on.   
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Throughout,  the study was based mainly on the founding statutory instruments – the 
constitutions of Australia,  Belgium,  Germany,  and Spain and,  in the case of the United 
Kingdom,  the Scotland Act 1998 – in which institutions of government are set up and 
functions and powers allocated to them.   The appropriate parts of these basic legal texts 
have been examined,  analysed,  described,  and commented on critically.   Some 
comment of experts was included,  but only where it was considered necessary in order 
to bring out certain features of an assignment scheme more fully or clearly than the 
particular constitution itself conveys. 
 
The overall picture which emerges from the study is that each country has adopted its 
own peculiar approach to the assignment of responsibilities.   The various assignment 
schemes generally display a marked degree of complexity while,  from a taxonomic 
perspective,  the treatment of the assignment question in legal texts leaves much to be 
desired.   In all five countries the perfunctory treatment accorded the local level or 
sphere of government in the constitutional domain is particularly notable,  and difficult to 
reconcile with the substantial impact which a local government can have on the quality of 
life of its community.   On the basis of the study,  it is necessary to proceed with caution 
in classifying a state as either a federation or a union;  more typically a country’s scheme 
for the assignment of responsibilities tends to evince both federal and unitary 
characteristics. 
 
Against the background provided in this chapter of assignment schemes operative in a 
selection of other countries,  the assignment of public function responsibilities in South 
Africa can be attended to,  commencing with a historical overview;  this is presented in 
the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5:  ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA:  
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the assignment of 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels or spheres of 
government in South Africa,  from the time of the establishment of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910 up to the implementation of the first fully inclusive,  democratic constitution 
in 1994.   The history to be dealt with is a relatively complex one,  with the explanation of 
the complexity to be found largely in the differentiated treatment of the various 
population groups in South Africa prior to 1994.   The chapter commences by noting the 
racially and ideologically determined background to the institution and development of 
governmental structures in South Africa.   It proceeds to an examination of the forms and 
salient features of governments instituted during the review period,  distinguishing 
between what is regarded as the core system of government and certain racially focused 
supplementary systems which emerged from about the middle of the last century.   The 
chapter then examines the way in which responsibilities were assigned to levels or 
spheres of government during the review period.   This is followed by a general 
evaluation of the assignment of responsibilities prior to 1994.   Finally,  a conclusion is 
drawn regarding the research. 
 
 
5.2 Background 
 
The South African state was brought into being in 1910 in terms of section 4 of the South 
Africa Act 1909,  an Act passed by the British Parliament and assented to by the British 
monarch (Wiechers 1985:199-200).   The Act (hereinafter referred to as the 1909 
Constitution) provided for the unification of four British colonies,  viz the Cape of Good 
Hope,  Natal,  the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony,  into the Union of South 
Africa.   On the establishment of the Union the aforementioned colonies became the 
provinces of the Union,  with retention of their boundaries and names,  except in the 
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case of the Orange River Colony which was renamed the Orange Free State.   The 
combined territory of the former colonies constituted the territory of the new state.   
(1909 Constitution: sections 4, 6.) 
 
From the outset the new state could at best be seen as a partial democracy,  qualified as 
to the participation of various racially defined groups of citizens in the parliamentary 
system of government.   The 1909 Constitution stipulated that Parliament may by law 
prescribe the qualifications of voters,  with a proviso in respect of the province of the 
Cape of Good Hope,  viz that persons eligible to vote under the laws of the former 
colony,  could not be disqualified on grounds of race or colour unless the Bill purporting 
to do so be passed by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament 
(section 35(1)).   The Constitution also prohibited the disenfranchisement of any person 
registered to vote in any province by reason only of a disqualification based on race or 
colour (section 35(2)). 
 
Significantly,  the 1909 Constitution did not extend the right to vote to those persons who 
at the time of the establishment of the Union were excluded from the franchise on the 
grounds of race or colour.    In effect,  Black,  Coloured and Indian persons were 
disqualified from voting in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.   Black persons 
could vote in the Cape of Good Hope and Natal,  but the qualification requirements were 
such as to severely restrict their numbers (Cloete 1992:31, 225; Wiechers 1985:299).   
In 1935 there were,  according to Cloete (1992:225),  10 628 Black persons registered 
as voters in the Cape of Good Hope and one in Natal.   Coloured and Indian persons 
could vote in the Cape of Good Hope and Natal,  provided that in the case of Indian 
persons in Natal,  they had gained the right to vote prior to 1896 (Cloete 1992:225).   
Over the years a number of legislative measures were adopted which had the effect - as 
far as elections to Parliament were concerned - of disenfranchising persons who were 
not members of the White population group (Cloete 1992:32-33).   By 1970,  as a result 
of the unfolding of the apartheid policy,  all population groups other than the White group 
had been formally disqualified from participating in parliamentary elections (Cloete 
1992:32-33; Wiechers 1985:299-300). 
 
Synoptically stated,  the position in South Africa prior to 1994 was that only citizens of 
European extraction - who by 1950 had been designated formally as “Whites” 
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(Population Registration Act 30 of 1950) - could be said to have enjoyed an entitlement 
to full democratic participation in the South African system of government,  on the basis 
of the right to vote in parliamentary elections,  to be elected to Parliament and,  in the 
final analysis,  to determine the political make-up of the national government.   The other 
population groups - designated formally by or in terms of the Population Registration Act 
30 of 1950 as “Blacks”,  “Coloureds” and “Indians” respectively - were largely denied 
participation through successive constitutional dispensations together with the restrictive 
functioning of laws governing the franchise.   (Cloete 1992:31-33; Wiechers 1985:299-
300.)   Their constitutional situation was,  however,  not a static one;  the period from 
about the middle of the previous century up to the dawning of the democratic era in 1994 
was marked by a series of attempts to accommodate them constitutionally in various 
ways,  as described inter alia by Basson and Viljoen (1988: chapter 8).   The complexity 
in the structure and functioning of government which resulted from these attempts at 
accommodation is evident from the South African statute book and the published works 
of constitutional law and public administration experts (Basson & Viljoen 1988; Cloete 
1992; Wiechers 1985). 
 
 
5.3 Governmental systems 
 
The period from 1910 to 1994 can,  in the author’s view,  be characterised broadly as 
one in which there was a core system of government in place throughout,  patently 
focused on maintaining control of government by the White population group,  around 
which in the course of time a number of supplementary,  essentially subordinate systems 
for the Black,  Coloured and Indian population groups came to be established.   This 
distinction between a core system and supplementary systems provides a useful means 
of ordering the material to be presented in the following sections. 
 
5.3.1 Core system of government 
 
The core system of government is taken to consist of three levels or spheres of 
government - national,  provincial and local - as instituted by the 1909 Constitution.   
Although a number of structural and functional changes were effected over the years,  
this core system of government has remained in place since the establishment of the 
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South African state in 1910 and up to the present day.   The three levels or spheres of 
government are reviewed seriatim in the following paragraphs,  the review covering the 
period from 1910 up to the implementation of the first fully democratic constitution in 
1994. 
 
5.3.1.1   National government 
 
The 1909 Constitution established a national parliament for the Union consisting of the 
King (or a governor general as his representative),  a senate and a house of assembly 
(section 19).   Parliament was given full power (author’s emphasis) to make laws for the 
peace,  order and good government of the Union (1909 Constitution: section 59).   By 
implication - and this was confirmed by other provisions of the 1909 Constitution - the 
legislative and executive authority of all subnational governments was subordinated to 
that of the national parliament.   Parliament could at any time adopt legislation on any 
matter,  including a matter falling in a category for which responsibility was assigned by 
or in terms of law to a subnational level of government. 
 
As far as the executive arm of national government was concerned, the 1909 
Constitution - in contrast to more recent drafting practice (as evidenced in the 
constitutions adopted in 1993 and 1996) - did not define executive authority or specify its 
content.   The 1909 Constitution employed the expression “executive government” and 
vested the particular competence in the King,  to be administered by the monarch 
himself or by a governor general acting as his representative (section 8).   In practice,  
and throughout the currency of the 1909 Constitution,  the executive authority was 
indeed exercised formally by the Governor General.   Provision was made for an 
executive council to advise the Governor General,  as well as ministers to administer the 
departments of state of the Union,  such ministers also to serve as members of the 
Executive Council (1909 Constitution: sections 12,14).   Although the 1909 Constitution 
did not mention a cabinet,  the convention of a cabinet as an executive body,  consisting 
of a prime minister and other ministers,  which was at that time well established in the 
United Kingdom and its colonies,  was followed on the implementation of the 
Constitution.   To make possible the discharge of executive governmental 
responsibilities,  provision was made in the 1909 Constitution for a public service,  which 
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was to be deployed at both the national and the provincial levels  of government 
(sections 140-141). 
 
The period between 1910 and 1994,  when the first fully inclusive democratic constitution 
was implemented,  was marked by a number of major developments within the 
constitutional domain of the country which impacted upon the core system of 
government.   It lies beyond the scope of the thesis to deal with these developments in 
detail,  but it is appropriate that some of the most important developments be noted: 
 
(a) South Africa,  which until then had in various ways been subject to the legislative 
and executive authority of the United Kingdom (Wiechers 1985:201-205),  was in 
1931 recognised as a sovereign state under the British Crown by the British 
parliament,  with the adoption of the Statute of Westminster.   The essential 
provisions of the Statute of Westminster were incorporated into South African law 
by the Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934 (Wiechers 1985:129).   South Africa 
continued to be a member of the British Commonwealth. 
  
 (b) Thirty years later South Africa,  by the adoption of the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 32 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 1961 Constitution) 
became an independent republic,  following a referendum which was held in 
1960 (Basson & Viljoen 1988:38).   The government-of-the-day applied for the 
country to remain a member of the Commonwealth,  but in the face of opposition 
by other member states to the country’s continued membership,  the application 
was withdrawn,  South Africa thus leaving the Commonwealth (Wiechers 
1985:133). 
 
(c) The 1970’s marked the commencement of a process of serious reflection in 
government circles about constitutional change in South Africa - for the first time 
since the establishment of the Union in 1910,  according to Wiechers (1985:218).   
At the beginning of 1981 the Senate,  which had functioned as the second 
chamber of the national parliament for 61 years,  was abolished by an 
amendment of the 1961 Constitution effected by section 13 of the Republic of 
South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act 101 of 1980.   The same Act 
(section 34) made provision for a President’s Council,  an advisory body 
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appointed by the State President,  and whose members could be drawn from the 
White,  Coloured,  Indian,  and Chinese population groups.   One of the main 
tasks given to the President’s Council was to advise on a new constitutional 
dispensation for the country.   (Wiechers 1985:244-245.) 
 
(d) Based inter alia on suggestions emanating from the President’s Council (Basson 
& Viljoen 1988:38) a new constitution was drafted and adopted by Parliament as 
the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 (hereinafter referred to 
as the 1983 Constitution).   Following a referendum amongst the White electorate 
to test its acceptability,  the new constitution was implemented in 1984 (Basson & 
Viljoen 1988:38).   The 1983 Constitution provided for regulation by the White,  
Coloured and Indian population groups of their respective “own affairs”,  coupled 
to their joint involvement in the regulation of the “general affairs” of the country as 
a whole (sections 14-15, read with sections 19, 30-31).   The new Constitution 
also made it possible for members of the Coloured and Indian legislatures to be 
appointed by the President as ministers in the national cabinet,  which was 
charged with the executive government of general affairs (1983 Constitution: 
section 20(d)).   The Black population group was not included in the so-called 
“tricameral” system instituted by the 1983 Constitution;  it was excluded from the 
definition of “population group” for purposes of the application of the “own affairs” 
concept.   The administration of the affairs of this population group was 
subsumed under the constitutional construct of “general affairs”.   (1983 
Constitution: section 100(1) read with sections 14-15.) 
 
Prior to the advent of the tricameral system of government in 1984,  the constitutional 
developments noted above seem to have had little effect on the functions and powers of 
government at the national level.   A parliament based essentially on the White 
population group,  remained the country’s sovereign legislative body,  empowered to 
control as it saw fit,  the national life of all South Africans,  irrespective of the population 
group to which they belonged.   This was the outcome of a form of state founded on 
parliamentary sovereignty as opposed to one founded on constitutional sovereignty.   
The abolition of the Senate in 1981 changed the structure of legislative government at 
the national level but in no way detracted from the national parliament’s sovereign 
competence.   As far as executive government was concerned,  a single national 
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executive government or cabinet – rooted in and responsible to the national parliament – 
was in place from 1910 to 1984,  and directed the government and administration of the 
country as a whole. 
 
The 1983 Constitution changed the basic structure of the core system of government 
significantly.   The unicameral parliament was replaced by one with three houses - for 
the Coloured,  Indian and White population groups respectively.   Each house was to 
look after the “own affairs” of its particular population group and to join with the other two 
houses in the control of the country’s “general affairs”.   Four executive governments 
thus came into existence:  a ministers’ council or cabinet for each of the three population 
groups,  and a national cabinet for the nation as a whole. 
 
The fact that it was to prove extremely difficult to precisely and completely distinguish 
“own affairs” from “general affairs” in practical organisational terms (Commission for 
Administration:1984-1990),  did not detract from the historical significance in the South 
African context of moving from a single political executive and a single legislature at the 
national level of government to a multiplicity of such bodies.   It is common cause that 
the tri-cameral system of government was a failure,  probably doomed from the outset by 
the exclusion of the Black population group,  and in general by the apartheid ideology 
perceived as being inherent in the own affairs concept.   Nevertheless,  it can be said 
that the tri-cameral system did serve to accord a substantial measure of direct 
participation in the core system of government to population groups other than the White 
group,  while still excluding the Black population group. 
 
5.3.1.2    Provincial government 
 
The 1909 Constitution,  in establishing the Union of South Africa,  made provision for a 
system of subnational government which was to operate in the four provinces of the 
Union (1909 Constitution: chapter V).   The key elements,  in respect of each province,  
were an administrator appointed by the Governor General-in-Council,  a provincial 
council elected by the enfranchised citizens of the province,  and an executive 
committee elected by the provincial council.   (1909 Constitution: sections 68, 70-71, 78.) 
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The provincial councils were mandated constitutionally to function as legislative bodies 
for the respective provinces,  with the power to make ordinances in relation to specified 
classes of subjects.   Thirteen such classes of subjects were identified,  including an 
open ended class to provide for the addition of subjects by means of national legislation.   
(1909 Constitution: section 85.)   An ordinance properly passed and assented to (see 
below) would have the force of law within the province concerned (1909 Constitution: 
section 91).   In accordance with the stipulated sovereignty of Parliament in legislative 
matters - as noted in section 5.3.1.1 supra - the 1909 Constitution placed a limiting 
qualification on the exercise of legislative authority by the provinces:  any ordinance 
made by a provincial council would have effect as long and as far only as it was not 
repugnant to any Act of Parliament (section 86).   A provincial council could therefore not 
make an ordinance contrary to an existing law of Parliament;  and were Parliament to 
make a law countermanding an existing provincial ordinance,  such ordinance would 
immediately be rendered null and void.   As a further safeguard to ensure the primacy of 
national government,  the 1909 Constitution required every ordinance passed by a 
provincial council to be assented to by the Governor General-in-Council (section 90). 
 
As far as the executive arm of government at provincial level was concerned,  the 1909 
Constitution stipulated a “chief executive officer” for each province,  to be appointed by 
the Governor General-in-Council,  and to be styled the administrator of the province 
(section 68).   The provincial council of a province was required by the Constitution to 
elect four persons to form,  together with the administrator and under his chairmanship,  
the executive committee of the province.   The Constitution stipulated that an executive 
committee “ … shall on behalf of the provincial council carry on the administration of 
provincial affairs”.   (1909 Constitution: sections 78, 80.) 
 
The provincial government structure established by the 1909 Constitution continued in 
essentially unchanged form until 1986.   In that year,  the four provincial councils were 
abolished by the Provincial Government Act 69 of 1986.   Each province retained an 
executive committee,  consisting of the administrator and a number of other persons 
appointed by the State President (Provincial Government Act 69 of 1986: section 7(1)).   
The Act stipulated expressly that the administrator together with the other members of 
the executive committee would constitute the executive authority of the province (Act 69 
of 1986: section 7(2)).   No racial qualification or disqualification was laid down as to the 
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persons who could be appointed to an executive committee,  opening the way for the 
appointment of persons of all population groups.   The Act stipulated only that the State 
President should as far as practicable give preference to persons resident in the 
province (Act 69 of 1986: section 7(3)).   With the disappearance of the provincial 
councils the legislative authority of a province passed to the administrator,  who was  
required to exercise this authority by means of proclamation,  subject to certain provisos 
(Act 69 of 1986: section 14(2)). 
 
The abolition of the provincial councils in 1986 constituted a fundamental change in the 
system of provincial government as it had existed in South Africa for 76 years.   Although 
the Provincial Government Act 69 of 1986 required any proclamation by an administrator 
with legislative effect to be approved by a standing committee of Parliament (section 
14(2)),  such a committee could hardly be regarded as a credible substitute for a directly 
elected provincial legislature focused on the affairs of its province.   Indeed,  the 
approval of essentially provincial legislation by committees of Parliament could be seen 
as being tantamount to the centralisation of legislative authority,  a view also expressed 
by Basson and Viljoen (1988:292).   The abolition of the provincial councils removed the 
representative,  albeit non-inclusive,  base of provincial government.   In fairness it could 
be said that in the light of increasing demands for constitutional change in the country,  
the modified system for the provinces was not intended to last indefinitely,  but on the 
face of it was designed to serve as an interim arrangement until an universally 
acceptable constitutional dispensation could be set in place – as indeed occurred some 
eight years later in 1994. 
 
5.3.1.3    Local government 
 
As a founding statute recognising three levels of government,  the 1909 Constitution had 
notably little to say about the powers of the third,  or local level of government.   The 
1909 Constitution provided for the continuation of “all powers,  authorities,  and 
functions” of local authorities existing at the establishment of the Union (section 93).   
The matter of local government was dealt with further by a provision which assigned to 
provincial councils the power to make ordinances concerning “municipal institutions,  
divisional councils,  and other local institutions of a similar nature” (1909 Constitution: 
section 85(vi)).   At the time of the establishment of the Union,  local government was 
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firmly established in all four colonies (Cloete 1976:9-11) and it was clearly the intention 
of the National Convention 1908-1909,  which drafted the Constitution,  that the existing 
systems in each of the colonies should be maintained in the new state,  with control 
vested in the respective provincial governments.   According to Cloete (1992:188) the 
four systems of local government were all based on the Cape model,  which had 
originally been set in place by the Municipal Ordinance (Cape) 9 of 1836,  but had each 
developed its own characteristics.   However,  the four systems all had certain features 
in common,  viz elected councils,  control of the local authorities by a higher level of 
government,  and the requirement that citizens had to pay for the goods and services 
provided by the local authorities (Cloete 1992:188). 
 
The divisional councils specifically mentioned in the 1909 Constitution were peculiar to 
the Cape Colony,  which became the Cape Province.   In terms of legislation dating back 
to 1855,  the whole of the territory of the Province was divided into divisions,  and each 
division placed under the jurisdiction of an elected divisional council (Cloete1976:167).   
Broadly speaking,  a divisional council was responsible for the provision,  maintenance 
and control of stipulated categories of roads,  for the control of certain activities in rural 
areas,  and the provision of municipal type services in residential localities which had not 
yet developed to the point where a municipality with concomitant local government 
institutions could be established (Cloete 1976:169; Divisional Council Ordinance (Cape) 
18 of 1976). 
 
For a long time after the establishment of the Union,  local government in South Africa 
was dominated by the White population group.   Although the demarcated municipalities 
were populated to varying degrees by members of all population groups,  town and city 
councils consisted generally of councils elected by the White population group.   The 
policy of separate development espoused by the government which came to power in 
1948 had a notable effect on local government.   The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950,  
which divided the population into racially based groups,  provided for the setting up of 
defined areas for occupation by the various groups,  and provided further for the 
institution of a governing body for any group area (other than an area occupied by the 
White population group),  such governing body to function under the supervision of a 
designated (White) – author’s insertion - local authority (Act 41 of 1950: sections 2, 3, 6).   
From that point onward developments in local government regarding the Coloured and 
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Indian population groups were directed by successive versions of the Group Areas Act 
and associated provincial ordinances (Cloete 1992:194-195).   In respect of the Black 
population group,  developments were guided by a series of national statutes,  building 
on the advisory boards for Black residential areas introduced by the Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 (Cloete 1992:197-200). 
 
It is evident from a reading of Cloete (1992:189-200) that the course of development was 
a complex one with variation between the provinces as well as marked differences 
regarding the Black population group,  on the one hand,  and the Coloured and Indian 
population groups,  on the other.   It is beyond the scope of this limited overview to 
examine these developments in detail,  and a brief synopsis based on Cloete’s work 
referred to above,  must suffice.   Generally speaking,  a particular area would initially be 
accorded participation in the White based local authority by means of an advisory 
committee,  to be followed later by some form of management committee performing 
both an advisory function and stipulated executive and supervisory functions on behalf of 
the parent local authority,  to be followed still later by a separate and fully mandated 
local authority for the area in question.   In 1971 the administration of urban areas 
residentially occupied by Blacks was removed from the competence of the provincial 
councils and the White controlled local authorities and made a direct responsibility of the 
national government (Bantu Affairs Administration Act 45 of 1971). 
 
The development process as sketched did in fact lead to the establishment of a number 
of fully fledged local authorities for the Black,  Coloured,  and Indian population groups.   
By 1991,  with the separate development epoch rapidly drawing to a close,   there were,  
according to Cloete’s tally,  one municipal council (for Coloureds) in the Cape Province,  
four town councils and two town boards (for Indians) in Natal,  and 33 city councils and 
98 town councils (for Blacks) within all provinces (Cloete 1992:196-197, 200). 
 
A noteworthy,  additional form of local government emerged in South Africa in 1985 with 
the adoption of the Regional Services Councils Act 109 of 1985.   The councils instituted 
were charged with the delivery of services - essentially of an infra-structural or bulk 
nature - on a regional basis,  which could best be provided through joint action of the 
local bodies variously representing the different population groups in the respective 
regions (Regional Services Councils Act 109 of 1985: section 3(1)(b), schedule 2).   In 
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accordance with the governmental framework instituted by the 1983 Constitution,  
services identified as suitable for provision on a regional basis in terms of the Act were 
those that could be seen as “general affairs”.   The councils were constituted by 
members from all population groups nominated by the local bodies represented on the 
councils (Act 109 of 1985: section 6),  and were given substantial decision-making 
powers,  similar to those of local authorities,  except the power to levy rates on 
immovable property (Act 109 of 1985: section 4).   They were assigned a dedicated 
revenue base in the form of a regional service levy imposed on employers and a 
regional establishment levy imposed on vendors in the respective regions (Act 109 of 
1985: section 12).   The councils are not without importance in the constitutional history 
of the country:  they constituted a meaningful step towards integrated,  co-operative and 
inclusive government,  albeit restricted to the local sphere of government. 
 
The process of integration at local government level was accelerated,  and provided with 
incontrovertible legitimacy,  by the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993,  which 
came into effect in 1994 shortly before the implementation of the country’s first fully 
democratic constitution.   The Act provided for the setting in place of an array of 
transitional local government structures to serve all parts of the country,  viz the 
metropolitan areas,  the other urbanised but non-metropolitan areas,  and the rural 
areas.   This interim phase of democratic government in the local sphere had still to be 
completed at the time of the implementation of the 1996 Constitution in April 1997. 
 
5.3.2 Supplementary systems of government 
 
The evolution of governmental systems in South Africa since about the middle of the 
previous century was marked by the implementation over time of an array of racially 
based systems supplementary to the core system dominated since 1910 by the White 
population group.   This general development was driven essentially by the policy of 
apartheid (later renamed separate development) of the National Party government which 
came to power in 1948.   In the broadest sense separate development envisaged that 
specified (racially based) population groups,  other than the White group,  should be 
accommodated constitutionally by the gradual introduction of forms of self-determination 
supposedly appropriate to each group which,  in the case of the Black group,  could 
even culminate in national states independent of South Africa.   The supplementary 
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systems are reviewed below,  commencing with those instituted for the Black population 
group. 
 
5.3.2.1    Black population group 
 
On the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910,  Blacks were to all intents 
and purposes excluded from meaningful participation in the core system of government,  
although the 1909 Constitution did protect the then existing voting rights of Black people 
in two of the erstwhile colonies,  viz the Cape of Good Hope and Natal (section 36).   
However,  the qualification requirements were such that only a limited number of Black 
persons in the two colonies were able to vote (Cloete 1992:225; Wiechers 1985:299).   
Cloete (1992:225) notes that in 1935,  25 years after the establishment of the Union,  
there were 10 628 Black persons registered as voters in the Cape Province and one in 
Natal.   In 1936 Blacks in the Cape Province were placed on a separate voter’s roll and 
given the right to elect three Whites to represent them in the House of Assembly and two 
to represent them in the Provincial Council.   At the same time provision was also made 
for the indirect representation of the country’s Black people in the Senate 
(Representation of Blacks Act 12 of 1936: sections 6-8).   The representation of Black 
people in the two houses of Parliament was abolished in 1959 by the repeal of the 
Representation of Blacks Act 12 of 1936 by the Promotion of Black Self-government Act 
46 of 1959. 
 
The total exclusion of Blacks from the core system of government should be seen in the 
context of the policy of the government which had come to power in 1948.   In terms of 
the apartheid policy,  the Black,  Coloured and Indian population groups were required to 
develop – also in constitutional and governmental terms - along paths distinct from that 
of the White population group,  which group effectively controlled the core system of 
government.   In the case of Blacks the application of separate development was no 
doubt motivated by its proponents to a large extent by the fact that Blacks had 
historically come to inhabit distinct and substantial territories within the borders of South 
Africa,  such territories having been demarcated and set aside for their occupation by 
legislation passed in 1913 and 1936 (Black Land Act 27 of 1913; Development Trust and 
Land Act 18 of 1936). 
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The first major step towards a dedicated system of government for Blacks was taken 
with the adoption of the Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951.  The Act made provision for a 
hierarchy of governmental forms to be instituted in areas of the country demarcated for 
settlement by Blacks,  consisting of tribal authorities at the lowest level,  regional 
authorities at an intermediate level,  and territorial authorities at the highest level.   The 
Act did not initially apply to the area of the country known as the Transkei,  which had 
been served since 1931 by a body known as the United Transkeian General Council.   
The Act was,  however,  made applicable to the Transkei in 1956 by proclamation of the 
Governor General,  with the General Council being replaced by the Transkei Territorial 
Authority.   (Basson & Viljoen 1988:309-311.) 
 
The process of self-government for Blacks was taken further by the adoption of the 
Promotion of Black Self-government Act 46 of 1959.   Eight Black nations (or national 
units) were formally recognised by the Act,  each linked to a particular geographic area 
or territory regarded as a particular nation’s homeland.   The Act carried forward the 
process towards self-government based on the scheme of territorial authorities provided 
for in the Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951 referred to above (Cloete 1992:227).   Implicit 
in the provisions of the Promotion of Black Self-government Act 46 of 1959 was the 
acceptance by the government-of-the-day that the Black homelands could eventually 
attain to fully independent statehood,  that is to say outside the territorial borders of 
South Africa (Wiechers 1985:438). 
 
The Transkei Territorial Authority,  established in 1956,  was the first such authority to be 
instituted in terms of the Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951.   A further eight territorial 
authorities were established between 1961 and 1977 (Cloete 1992:227).   Instituted at 
the highest level of the hierarchy of authorities,  a territorial authority displayed the key 
features of a system of government,  including a deliberative body elected or selected 
from among the members of the regional authorities,  an executive council,  and a 
number of administrative institutions (departments) to perform public functions like 
justice,  agriculture,  works,  and education (Cloete 1992:226-228). 
 
The next major phase in the development of Black governments commenced in 1963 
with the adoption by Parliament of the Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 1963.   In terms of 
the Act the Transkei became a self-governing national state within the territorial borders 
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of South Africa.   The Transkei Constitution was a fully elaborated one,  providing inter 
alia for a national flag,  a national anthem,  a legislative assembly,  a political executive 
body,  a public service commission,  and public service departments.   However,  
Transkei remained subject to the South African head of state,  who had to assent to all 
bills passed by the legislative assembly before they could become law.   The degree of 
authority granted to the new self-governing state was,  in the author’s view,  nonetheless 
substantial,  as is evidenced by the list of subjects in respect of which laws could be 
made - to the exclusion of Parliament - and further by the power to amend or repeal,  in 
so far as it concerned the Transkei and citizens of the Transkei,  Acts of the Republic of 
South Africa dealing with the assigned subjects.   (Basson & Viljoen 1988:312-313; 
Cloete 1992:228.) 
 
Eight years after the Transkei became a self-governing territory,  the South African 
Parliament passed the National States Constitution Act 21 of 1971,  subsequently 
retitled the Self-governing Territories Constitution Act (National States Constitution 
Amendment Act 111 of 1990: section 5).   The Act was essentially an enabling measure 
in terms of which the other homelands could achieve self-governing status on a par with 
that of Transkei.   From 1972 to 1984 a further nine homelands achieved self-
government in terms of Act 21 of 1971,  viz Bophuthatswana,  Ciskei,  Lebowa,  Venda,  
Qwaqwa,  KwaZulu,  Gazankulu,  KwaNdebele,  and Kangwane (Cloete 1992:230). 
 
By the 1970’s it was established government policy that a self-governing territory could 
advance constitutionally to full independence as a state separate from the Republic of 
South Africa,  and that such territories would,  indeed,  be encouraged to opt for 
independence.   At the request of the government of the Transkei the South African 
Parliament in 1976 adopted legislation enabling the self-governing territory to become an 
independent state (Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976).   The Transkeian Legislative 
Assembly thereupon adopted the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act 1976, and the 
Transkei became an independent state in the same year.   The self-governing territories 
of Bophuthatswana,  Venda and Ciskei followed suit in 1977,  1979 and 1981 
respectively (Vorster,  Wiechers & Van Vuuren 1985:99,169,221).   None of the 
remaining six self-governing territories opted for independence,  these territories 
retaining their self-governing status right up to the time of the implementation of the 1993 
Constitution in April 1994.   The independence granted to Transkei,  Bophuthatswana,  
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Venda and Ciskei was,  because of the rejection in principle of the apartheid policy,  not 
recognised by the international community,  which continued to regard these territories,  
together with their governmental institutions,  as part and parcel of South Africa (Cloete 
1992:231). 
 
5.3.2.2    Coloured population group 
 
The development of governmental institutions for the Coloured population group needs 
to be seen in the light of the fact that,  unlike the Black population group,  they disposed 
of no territory or territories which could be regarded as constituting a “homeland” for 
them. 
 
On the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 Coloureds resident in the 
Cape Colony and in Natal retained the voting rights that they possessed at that stage.   
They were,  however,  excluded from the franchise in the new provinces of the Orange 
Free State and Transvaal.   In the Cape Province,  where the Coloured population was 
concentrated,  the qualification requirements for voters were such as to inhibit in practice 
the number of Coloureds able to vote (Wiechers 1985:299).   In 1956 Coloureds were 
removed from the common voters’ roll by the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 
of 1951,  and placed on a separate voters’ roll for the election of four Whites to represent 
them in Parliament and two in the Cape Provincial Council.   Thirteen years later,  in 
1969,  even this limited right of representation (by proxy) in the national and one 
provincial legislature was taken from them upon the establishment of the Coloured 
Representative Council in terms of the Coloured Representative Council Act 49 of 1964. 
 
At the national level of government,  the first separate institution for Coloureds with some 
bearing on government,  was the Advisory Coloured Council established in 1943.   This 
was not a governmental or even a statutory body,  but an advisory body instituted by 
cabinet decision and consisting of nominated members.   It was apparently not a 
success and was dissolved in 1950.   (Wiechers 1985:429.)   Concomitant with the 
removal of Coloureds from the common voters’ roll in 1956,  provision was made in the 
Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951 for a partially elected national Board 
for Coloured Affairs with the assigned function of advising the Government concerning 
Coloured affairs (Act 46 of 1951: section 14(1)).   According to Basson and Viljoen 
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(1988:322) the Board,  which existed from 1959 to 1969,  inspired little confidence 
among the Coloured people.   It was abolished upon the establishment of the Coloured 
Representative Council in 1969. 
 
The Coloured Representative Council,  provided for in the Coloured Representative 
Council Act 49 of 1964,  and instituted by proclamation of the State President on 1 July 
1969 (Wiechers 1985:430),  was the first body resembling a government which was 
established specifically for the Coloured population group.   The majority of the members 
of the Council were elected,  and the Council was accorded legislative and executive 
powers concerning a number of substantial matters,  in addition to an advisory function.   
The Council was,  however,  subjected to stringent limitations in the performance of its 
assigned functions by the provisions of the Act.   All bills had to be approved by the 
minister in the national government responsible for Coloured affairs prior to their 
introduction in Council (section 21(2)),  and no legislation of the Council would have the 
force of law if it was repugnant to an Act of Parliament (section 25(1)).   The minister 
already referred to controlled the Council’s budget (section 22(2)).   In the course of its 
existence very little legislation of note was adopted by the Council (Wiechers 1985:431). 
 
Because of its inherent shortcomings the Council was not able to establish itself as a 
credible institution of government in the eyes of the Coloured population group and,  
almost inevitably,  was dissolved in 1980 (Wiechers 1985:432).   Coloured people had to 
wait for the 1983 Constitution and the tri-cameral structure set in place by it (vide section 
5.3.1.1 supra),  to attain a measure of meaningful - if still problematical – participation in 
the government of the country. 
 
5.3.2.3    Indian population group 
 
Of the four major population groups the Indians have the shortest history in South Africa,  
having arrived in the country for the first time in about 1860 (Cloete 1992:33).   As in the 
case of the Coloureds,  no territory within the borders of South Africa could be claimed 
by the Indians as an area of traditional settlement or a homeland.   With the advent of 
the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 areas within the urban areas controlled by White 
municipal councils were demarcated for occupation by members of the Indian population 
group.   Developments concerning the Indians in the sphere of local government,  which 
  
141 
followed a path similar to that of the Coloureds,  have already been dealt with (vide 
section 5.3.1.3 supra). 
 
Following the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910,  and up to the 
implementation of the tri-cameral parliament in 1984,  the Indian population group to all 
intents and purposes did not participate in the system of parliamentary government 
(Basson & Viljoen 1988:322).   Attempts were,  however,  made to give them a voice in 
certain matters of specific concern to them. 
 
In 1961 Indians were for the first time accepted officially as a permanent part of the 
South African population,  followed three years later,  in 1964,  by the institution of an 
advisory body designated the National Indian Council,  consisting of appointed members 
(Cloete 1992:33).   The Council was replaced by the South African Indian Council 
instituted in terms of the South African Indian Council Act 31 of 1968. 
 
Initially the South African Indian Council was also an appointed body;  however,  
amending legislation adopted in 1972 and 1978 (South African Indian Council 
amendment Acts 67 of 1972 and 83 of 1978) had the effect inter alia of enlarging the 
Council and also transforming it into a largely elected body.   From 1978 until its abolition 
in terms of the 1983 Constitution the Council consisted of 40 elected and five appointed 
members (Act 83 of 1978: section 1).   Although provision was made for an executive 
committee since the inception of the Council (Act 31 of 1968: section 10),  its role as an 
executive body was initially couched in vague terms (Act 31 of 1968: section 10(6)),  and 
later restricted to the exercise of powers delegated to it by the responsible minister or 
the executive committee of a province,  and then only in specified functional areas such 
as education and community welfare (section 10A inserted in Act 31 of 1968 by Act 67 of 
1972).   The Council had no legislative competence and could at no stage be seen as a 
credible form of government for or by Indians.   The Council was mainly an advisory 
body,  functioning also as a link between the national government and the Indian 
population.   (Wiechers 1985:434-435.) 
 
With the adoption of the 1983 Constitution which provided for a tri-cameral parliament 
with separate houses for the White,  Coloured and Indian population groups,  it became 
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possible for Indians to participate directly in the government of the country for the first 
time. 
 
 
5.4 Assignment of responsibilities 
 
For purposes of surveying the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government in the period covered by this historical overview it is convenient to follow the 
same ordering structure employed in section 5.3 supra.   The findings of the research 
are thus presented under sub-headings dealing respectively with the core and 
supplementary systems of government,  in that order. 
 
5.4.1 Core system of government 
 
A basic pattern for the assignment of responsibilities within the core system of 
government was laid down by the 1909 Constitution,  in terms of which the South African 
state was established.   This pattern in essence remained in place until the 
implementation of the 1983 Constitution in 1984.   It was not changed in any substantial 
way by the Constitution which was implemented in 1961,  and in terms of which the 
country’s constitutional status was changed from a monarchy to a republic (vide section 
5.3.1 supra).   The Constitution adopted in 1983,  however,  did bring about substantial 
changes.   The overview presented in this section focuses firstly on the scheme of 
assignment introduced by the 1909 Constitution,  and which continued under the 1961 
Constitution,  and then on the arrangements set in place by the 1983 Constitution. 
 
5.4.1.1    1909 and 1961 Constitutions 
 
Section 85 of the 1909 Constitution identified thirteen “classes of subjects” 
encompassing matters in relation to which a provincial council could,  subject to the 
provisions of the Act and the consent of the Governor General-in-Council,  make 
ordinances.   The classes of subjects identified were as follows: 
 
(i) Direct taxation within the province in order to raise a revenue for provincial 
purposes; 
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(ii) the borrowing of money on the sole credit of the province with the consent of the 
Governor General-in-Council and in accordance with regulations to be framed by 
Parliament; 
(iii) education,  other than higher education,  for a period of five years and thereafter 
until Parliament otherwise provides; 
(iv) agriculture to the extent and subject to the conditions to be defined by 
Parliament; 
(v) the establishment,  maintenance,  and management of hospitals and charitable 
institutions; 
(vi) municipal institutions,  divisional councils,  and other local institutions of a similar 
nature; 
(vii) local works and undertakings within the province other than railways and 
harbours and other than such works as extend beyond the borders of the 
province,  and subject to the power of Parliament to declare any work a national 
work and to provide for its construction by arrangement with the provincial 
council or otherwise; 
(viii) roads,  outspans,  ponts,  and bridges,  other than bridges connecting two 
provinces; 
(ix) markets and pounds; 
(x) fish and game preservation; 
(xi) the imposition of punishment by fine,  penalty,  or imprisonment for enforcing any 
law or any ordinance of the province made in relation to any matter coming within 
any of the classes of subjects enumerated; 
(xii) generally all matters which,  in the opinion of the Governor General-in-Council,  
are of a merely local or private nature in the province;  and 
(xiii) all other subjects in respect of which Parliament shall by any law delegate the 
power of making ordinances to the provincial council. 
 
By implication any “class of subject” not assigned to the provinces by the 1909 
Constitution was one in respect of which Parliament had the sole right to legislate.   This 
statement should be read in conjunction with section 59 of the 1909 Constitution which 
gave Parliament the “ … full power to make laws for the peace,  order,  and good 
government of the Union”.   Put in other words,  the residuary legislative power of the 
state was vested in Parliament. 
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The 1909 Constitution did not stipulate any general criterion or rule to be applied in 
determining the matters on which a provincial council could legislate.   Research into the 
proceedings of the South African National Convention,  which sat between October 1908 
and May 1909,  and which produced the draft bill which was subsequently enacted by 
the British Parliament as the South Africa Act 1909,  also provided no indication of a 
criterion or rule to be applied,  or of any attempt to develop such a criterion or rule.   The 
minutes of proceedings of the Convention show that in the course of a few days a series 
of motions regarding classes of subjects to be assigned to the provinces were put to 
plenary sessions of the Convention and,  after discussion,  either rejected or adopted,  
with or without amendment.   The actual discussions which took place were not minuted.   
After the list of classes of subjects had been largely completed,  the matter was 
submitted to a committee of the Convention for finalisation (National Convention:90).   
The committee’s recommendations as to classes of subjects, which did not differ much 
from those which the Convention had already agreed to,  were thereafter accepted by 
the Convention in plenary session with a single addition (National Convention:112-113).   
No record was kept of the proceedings of the particular committee or of any other 
committee appointed by the Convention (National Convention:vii-viii). 
 
It was clearly the intention of the National Convention that the stipulation regarding 
provincial legislative powers to be included in the Constitution should serve as a basic,  
initial statement of such powers,  to which additional powers could be added as and 
when necessary.   Section 85(xiii) provided expressly for provincial councils to make 
ordinances on “ … all other subjects in respect of which Parliament shall by any law 
delegate the power of making ordinances to the provincial council”.   Parliament availed 
itself of this provision for the first time in 1913 with the adoption of the Financial 
Relations Act 10 of 1913.   The Act identified twelve additional matters in a schedule to 
the Act which could,  with the concurrence of the executive committee of a province,  be 
entrusted to the province by the Governor General.   The Act was amended and 
substituted on a number of occasions,  ultimately being substituted by the Financial 
Relations Act 65 of 1976.   The corresponding schedule of Act 65 of 1976 had at that 
stage been expanded to 24 matters which could be entrusted to a province by the 
national executive authority.   A copy of the schedule is appended to the thesis as 
annexure 6.   In addition to the matters assigned to the provinces in terms of financial 
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relations legislation,  matters were also entrusted to the provinces by other national 
legislation dealing with certain functional fields,  public health being a prime example. 
 
The approach followed in drafting what was to become section 85 of the 1909 
Constitution can be typified as a denotative one,  that is to say a class of subject was 
identified as a discrete item and included with other such items in a list of classes of 
subjects in respect of which legislative power was assigned.   The only suggestion of a 
connotative approach,  in which a class of subject would be defined in terms of generic 
attributes or features,  is to be found in section 85(xii) of the 1909 Constitution in which 
reference is made to “matters of a merely local or private nature” in a province.   This 
was patently a rather vague stipulation,  requiring interpretation as to what is of a 
“merely local or private nature”.   The denotative approach was also followed in respect 
of the assignment of additional matters to the provinces in terms of the financial relations 
legislation referred to in the previous paragraph.   At no stage was a definition or set of 
criteria provided for determining the matters,  or categories of matters,  or classes of 
subjects which properly belonged with the provinces. 
 
From a technical perspective,  it is to be noted that no particular order was followed or 
created in the listing of classes of subjects in section 85 of the 1909 Constitution.   As far 
as style of presentation is concerned,  a functional approach was followed in some 
instances in the wording of items - as in for example “the borrowing of money … “,  “the 
establishment,  maintenance,  and management of hospitals … “,  and “the imposition of 
punishment by fine,  etc”.   In the majority of instances,  however,  a nominal subject 
rather than a function was listed,  as in “direct taxation”,  “education”,  and “agriculture”.   
The style of presentation followed in the compilation of the list of additional matters 
entrusted to the provinces in terms of the financial relations legislation (vide annexure 6 
of the thesis) is notable for the extent to which items are worded in functional mode - for 
example “the preservation of fauna and flora”,  the “distribution of poor relief”,  and the 
“establishment and administration of townships”.   However,  also in this list nominal 
subjects rather than functions are listed in a number of instances,  for example “irrigation 
schemes”,  “land settlement schemes”,  and “drive-in theatres”.   Again,  no particular 
order or structure is discernible in the compilation of the list. 
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The 1961 Constitution,  which replaced the 1909 Constitution,  did not depart materially 
from the provisions of the earlier constitution dealing with the legislative powers of the 
provinces.   The expression “Governor General-in-Council” was replaced by the 
expression “State President”;  the provision relating to municipal institutions,  divisional 
councils and other similar local institutions was extended to include certain specified 
institutions;   the powers relating to education were further restricted by the exclusion of 
what was referred to as “Bantu education”;  and the powers relating to fish and game 
preservation were made subject to certain provisions of the Sea Fisheries Act 10 of 
1940.   Generally viewed,  the package of basic provincial powers determined in 1909,  
even including the specific formulations employed,  was retained on the country 
becoming a republic 51 years later.   (1961 Constitution: section 84(1).)   What also 
remained in place were the powers in relation to matters assigned to the provinces in 
terms of the financial relations legislation already referred to,  as well as powers 
delegated to the provinces in terms of other national legislation. 
 
As a founding document recognising three levels of government,  the 1909 Constitution  
had notably little to say about the powers of the third or local level of government.   The 
matter of local government was dealt with by assigning to the provincial councils the 
power to make ordinances concerning “municipal institutions,  divisional councils,  and 
other local institutions of a similar nature” (1909 Constitution: section 85(vi)).   
Presumably this formulation was intended – and,  indeed,  was so understood by the 
new provincial governments – to include the determination of the legislative and 
associated executive powers to be exercised by the local authorities instituted in a 
province.   Cloete records that since 1910 each of the four provincial councils adopted a 
series of ordinances to regulate municipal government and administration within its area 
of jurisdiction.   The usual approach followed was to adopt from time to time a general 
ordinance on local government,  supplemented where necessary by ordinances dealing 
with specific aspects of local government and administration.   The legislative powers of 
local authorities were not unqualified:  in each province the bylaws adopted by municipal 
councils were subject to the approval of the provincial administrator.   The adoption of 
the 1961 Constitution did not change the situation in regard to local government in any 
material way.   (Cloete 1976:12.) 
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The ordinances regulating local government in each of the provinces stipulated the 
matters for which municipal councils would be responsible.   A largely uniform pattern 
emerged across the four provinces.   Cloete (1976:155-164) identifies the following as 
major “functional activities” of the country’s municipal authorities:   Streets, sidewalks 
and drainage;  cemeteries and crematoria;  parks and recreation facilities;  water supply;  
electricity supply;  abattoirs;  rubbish and night soil removal (also sewage);  health 
services;  conservation of the environment;  community development;  housing and slum 
clearance;  town and city planning;  and the licensing of businesses.   In addition to the 
responsibilities which were assigned to local authorities in terms of provincial 
ordinances,  certain responsibilities were also assigned to them over the years by Acts 
of Parliament.   In terms of both the 1909 and the 1961 Constitutions Parliament was the 
sovereign legislative authority of the country (1909 Constitution: section 59; 1961 
Constitution: section 59(1)),  and thus empowered to assign responsibilities to local 
governments as it saw fit.   An early example of a national law assigning responsibilities 
to local governments is the Public Health Act 36 of 1919;  other examples of such 
legislation are the Slums Act 53 of 1934,  the Air Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965,  
and the Housing Act 4 of 1966. 
 
 The responsibilities which came to be vested in the country’s local authorities were 
evidently such as could best be attended to at a local level.   For the most part the 
responsibilities in question were directed at ordering and developing the physical 
environment in demarcated local areas,  and at providing the services essential to 
promoting a satisfactory quality of life for the inhabitants of such areas.   However,  in 
the context of the present thesis,  it is important to note that many of the activities in 
which municipal authorities were and continue to be involved,  form part of broader 
public functions in the performance of which other levels or spheres of government are 
also substantially involved,  for instance water provision,  electricity supply,  public 
health,  environmental conservation,  housing,  and physical planning.   This 
phenomenon gives rise to the complex question of which aspect or part of a public 
function ought to be performed at or in each of the various levels or spheres of 
government.   This question is taken up in chapter 9 of the thesis. 
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5.4.1.2   1983 Constitution 
 
 In the context of the general question of the assignment of responsibilities to 
governments,  the 1983 Constitution,  which brought the tri-cameral parliament into 
being,  is of considerable interest,  albeit of little enduring significance.   The key to the 
new scheme of government was the distinction drawn between so-called “own affairs” 
and “general affairs” (1983 Constitution: sections 14-15). 
 
 The 1983 Constitution defined “own affairs” in dual fashion,  both connotatively and 
denotatively.   Section 14(1) of the Constitution stipulated that “ … (M)atters which 
specially or differentially affect a population group in relation to the maintenance of its 
identity and the upholding and furtherance of its way of life,  culture,  traditions and 
customs,  are,  subject to the provisions of section 16,  own affairs in relation to such 
population group”.   Thus the drafters of the 1983 Constitution set out what was meant 
(connoted) by own affairs,  the definition being worded in such a way as to provide a 
general test which could be applied in deciding whether or not any particular matter was 
an own affair of a population group.   Section 14(2) of the 1983 Constitution supplied an 
additional,  denotative,  definition by stipulating that “ … (M)atters coming within the 
classes of subjects described in Schedule 1 are,  subject to the provisions of section 16,  
own affairs in relation to each population group”.   The schedule referred to consisted of 
a list of 14 classes of subjects.   As the list is quite voluminous it is not quoted here but 
appended to the thesis as annexure 7.   Section 16,  which is referred to in both section 
14(1) and  section 14(2) of the 1983 Constitution,  stipulated certain requirements which 
had to be satisfied when questions on own or general affairs were decided by the State 
President.   As for the definition of general affairs,  the Constitution drafters employed a 
negative approach,  the text stipulating simply that “ … (M)atters which are not own 
affairs of a population group in terms of section 14 are general affairs” (1983 
Constitution: section 15). 
 
 No particular order (not even alphabetical) is discernible in the compilation of the list of 
subjects making up schedule 1 of the 1983 Constitution (vide annexure 7 of the thesis).  
From a perusal of the schedule it is apparent that a considerable degree of difficulty was 
encountered in demarcating the classes of subjects encompassing matters which 
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constituted own affairs of  a population group.   Generally speaking,  complete public 
functions - that is functions encompassing the whole of social welfare,  education,  
health,  etc. - were not specified;  what was specified in the schedule were aspects or 
subdivisions of public functions.   In some instances accuracy of circumscription was 
sought by specifically including or excluding an aspect of a matter.   In other instances,  
matters or aspects of matters were included in the list subject to the provisions of 
applicable general laws.   The somewhat convoluted formulations appearing in the 
schedule provide significant evidence of the conceptual difficulties to be overcome in 
seeking to specify constitutionally the responsibilities of discrete governments focused 
on supplying the needs of different population groups within a single state territory. 
 
Realistically viewed,  the degree of socio-economic integration of population groups 
which had taken place in South Africa by 1983 was in the author’s opinion such as to 
make it virtually impossible to achieve a neat and credible compartmentalisation of the 
activities of government into own and general affairs.   Glaring examples of activities 
which could not be compartmentalised readily are tertiary education,  museums and 
libraries,  hospitals and clinics,  local government,  agriculture,  and water supply.   Yet 
all these matters were listed in the applicable schedule of the 1983 Constitution as own 
affairs,  albeit with various qualifications.   It is not surprising that it took a number of 
years to give effect to the 1983 Constitution in organisational terms.   In the annual 
report of the Commission for Administration for 1989 (five years after the formal 
implementation of the 1983 Constitution) reference is made to the finalisation of 
investigations into the establishment of control over local government as an own affair 
(Commission for Administration 1989:42).   As late as 1993 the Commission’s annual 
report lists a project concerning the rationalisation of certain own and general affairs 
functions as one of the most important projects that received attention during the year 
(Commission for Administration 1993j:21).   The reorganisation process required by the 
1983 Constitution was eventually overtaken by the political forces driving the country 
towards a fully democratic system of government. 
 
As far as the powers of provincial councils were concerned,  the 1983 Constitution had a 
marked effect.   The matters in respect of which provincial councils were empowered to 
make ordinances - stipulated in section 84(1) of the 1961 Constitution - together with the 
additional matters entrusted to the provinces in terms of other legislation,  were retained,  
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but not in respect of matters declared to be own affairs of the Coloured,  Indian and 
White population groups (1983 Constitution: schedule 2, part 1, paragraph A.2(h)).   In 
effect,  provincial affairs became general affairs.   The provinces’ responsibilities in 
relation to the Black population group,  which was excluded from the own affairs 
construct,  were maintained - for example hospitals and clinics.   Some major public 
functions which were affected by the allocation of governmental responsibilities between 
own and general affairs by the 1983 Constitution were education,  health,  local 
government,  and community development. 
 
The matters left in the hands of the provinces on the adoption of the 1983 Constitution 
remained essentially unchanged when the provincial councils were abolished in terms of 
the Provincial Government Act 69 of 1986.   What changed was the way in which the 
provincial legislative and executive authority in relation to such matters was to be 
exercised,  a matter already dealt with in section 5.3.1.2 supra. 
 
As far as local government was concerned,  the functions to be performed by local 
authorities,  whether in terms of provincial ordinances or national laws,  were not 
changed by the 1983 Constitution per se.   What did change was the controlling 
framework within which local authorities were required to operate,  encompassing from 
that point on the three own affairs administrations,  a national department with an overall 
responsibility for local government in the country (general affair),  and the provincial 
administrations,  who continued to have a responsibility for local government in relation 
to the Black population group,  and were required in certain instances to act as agents 
for the own affairs administrations.   The complexity in government and administration 
attendant upon the attempts at constitutional accommodation of the various population 
groups has already been remarked on (vide section 5.2 supra). 
 
The regional services councils which were instituted during the currency of the 1983 
Constitution (vide section 5.3.1.3 supra),  had as their essential brief the joint exercise 
and carrying out of powers and duties in relation to certain functions on behalf of local 
bodies in specified areas (Regional Services Councils Act 109 of 1985:  preamble).   The 
councils were given the same powers as other local authorities,  with the exception of 
the power to levy rates on immovable property (Act 109 of 1985: section 4(1)).   The 
  
151 
councils’ revenue was to come from two types of levy imposed in terms of section 12 of 
the Act. 
 
The functions for which a regional services council would be responsible were those 
identified as regional functions by the appropriate provincial administrator from a list 
contained in schedule 2 of the Regional Services Councils Act 109 of 1985.   The list is 
appended to the thesis as annexure 8.   It contains 22 items,  the first 21 covering 
virtually the whole gamut of local government services,  and the last item constituting an 
open category with the designation “other regional functions”.   The items are not 
classified in any way or arranged in any particular order.   A few are worded as public 
functions - for example “bulk supply of water” - but most are stated simply as nominal 
subjects - for example “libraries”. 
 
5.4.2 Supplementary systems of government 
 
The assignment of responsibilities under the supplementary systems of government 
developed and introduced for the Black,  Coloured,  and Indian population groups are 
examined seriatim below. 
 
5.4.2.1    Black population group 
 
The development of governmental institutions for the Black population group in the so-
called homelands has been sketched in section 5.3.2.1 supra.   As far as the assignment 
of responsibilities is concerned,  the provisions of the Self-governing Territories 
Constitution Act 21 of 1971 (initially designated as the National States Constitution Act) 
are particularly noteworthy.   However,  in examining this legislation it needs to be borne 
in mind that self-government as provided for in the Act was intended as the penultimate 
phase in a process of development which was to culminate in independent statehood,  
and that the process as such was rejected in many quarters. 
 
In determining the responsibilities of a self-governing territory the Self-governing 
Territories Constitution Act 21 of 1971 employed a dual ordering mechanism which 
provided for both specific stipulation (section 3(1)) and specific exclusion (section 4).   
Matters specifically assigned to the legislative assembly of a self-governing territory 
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were listed in a schedule to the Act (schedule 1).   Matters excluded from the powers of 
a legislative assembly were set out in section 4 of the Act,  viz the following: 
 
(a) military organisation; 
(b) manufacture of arms,  ammunition or explosives; 
(c) diplomatic and consular matters; 
(d) control of a “Police Force of the Republic” charged with the maintenance of 
peace and order and the preservation of internal security; 
(e) postal,  telegraph,  telephone,  radio,  and television services; 
(f) railways,  harbours,  national roads and civil aviation; 
(g) immigration; 
(h) currency,  banking and related matters; 
(i) customs and excise;  and 
(j) amendment,  repeal or substitution of the Act itself. 
 
Schedule 1 of the Self-governing Territories Constitution Act 21 of 1971 was amended 
on numerous occasions between 1972 and 1992 by amending legislation as well as,  
since 1979,  by proclamation of the State President,  following the insertion of a section 
in the Act (section 37A) giving the State President the power to do so.   At the time of the 
repeal of the Act by the 1993 Constitution,  schedule 1 of the Act consisted of 74 items 
spread over 4½  pages of relatively fine print.   An abbreviated version of the schedule is 
appended to the thesis as annexure 9.   There is no obvious structure or order to the 
long list of matters - not even alphabetical - although some grouping of related items is 
discernible,  for example those in relation to welfare services and agriculture 
respectively.   Some items are worded in functional style - for example item 1 
(“administration and control of departments”) and item 4 (“establishment,  maintenance,  
etc.,  of clinics”) - while others are rendered as nominal subjects - for example item 8 
(“nature conservation”) and item 11 (“markets and pounds”).   Some items are stated 
succinctly in a few words,  while others are presented as lengthy descriptions,  with 
numerous qualifying phrases regarding the inclusion or exclusion of aspects,  or 
stipulating provisos.   All in all,  the technical treatment of the matter leaves much to be 
desired. 
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Notwithstanding its technical shortcomings,  the assignment of responsibilities by the 
Self-governing Territories Constitution Act 21 of 1971 is noteworthy in a historical 
context.   The Act can be said to have applied an essentially federal approach in 
reserving a relatively limited number of matters to the national government and 
assigning virtually all other matters to the particular subnational sphere of government.   
The degree to which powers were devolved to the self-governing territories is further 
evident from certain concomitant provisions of the Act,  as amended,  which - 
 
(a) enabled the legislative assembly of such a territory to amend or repeal any law,  
including any Act of Parliament,  dealing with a scheduled matter (section 
3(1)(b)); 
 
(b) stipulated that a law made by a legislative assembly would apply also to citizens 
of the self-governing territory who were resident outside its borders but within the 
Republic of South Africa (section 3(1)(c));  and 
 
(c) generally excluded Acts of Parliament dealing with a scheduled matter from 
application in the area of a self-governing territory or in relation to a citizen of 
such a territory (section 3(3)). 
 
As a subnational category of government,  self-governing territories were charged with 
responsibilities far in excess of those assigned to provincial administrations up to 1994 
or,  indeed,  to provincial governments under the present Constitution.   Although all bills 
passed by the legislative assembly of a self-governing territory had to be assented to by 
the South African head of state before they could become law (Act 21 of 1971: section 
3(2)),  the scale of the assignment of responsibilities was nonetheless impressive.   As 
suggested above,  this finding needs to be qualified by noting the underlying motive,  viz 
the realisation of the apartheid policy of the government-of-the-day. 
 
5.4.2.2    Coloured population group 
 
Institutions established prior to 1984 - when the 1983 Constitution was implemented - 
with the specific purpose of attending to the needs of the Coloured population group,  
have been noted in section 5.3.2.2 supra.   The Advisory Coloured Council,  established 
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in 1943,  and the Council for Coloured Affairs,  established in 1959,  were both bodies 
appointed by a minister in the national cabinet and were instituted to advise the national 
government on Coloured affairs.   They were not governmental bodies and are therefore 
not fully germane to the present study which is focused on the assignment of 
responsibilities to levels or spheres of government (vide section 3.3.3 of the thesis for an 
analysis,  clarification and definition of the concept “government”). 
 
The Coloured Representative Council instituted in 1969 in terms of the Coloured 
Representative Council Act 49 of 1964,  which was for the greater part an elected body,  
did bear some resemblance to a government.   In addition to the Council being assigned 
an advisory and consultative function,  provision was made for the Council and its 
executive committee to exercise legislative and executive powers in relation to certain 
specified matters affecting the Coloured population group,  viz finance,  local 
government,  education,  community welfare and pensions,  and rural areas and 
settlements for Coloureds (Act 49 of 1964: sections 17(6)(a), 21(1)).   However,  as 
indicated in section 5.3.2.2 supra,  the Council’s powers were strictly circumscribed by 
its founding Act,  and as a result its impact as a form of government was slight.   The 
assignment of responsibilities to the Council for the performance of public functions was 
clearly of a tenuous nature,  limiting its value as an object of study for purposes of the 
thesis. 
 
5.4.2.3    Indian population group 
 
The two institutions of note focused on the Indian population group in the period prior to 
1984,  when the Indian community was accommodated in the tri-cameral Parliament in 
terms of the 1983 Constitution,  have been described in section 5.3.2.3 supra.   The 
National Indian Council was a purely advisory body and the South African Indian 
Council,  which replaced it in 1968,  little more.   The Council had no legislative power 
and although its executive committee could perform specified executive functions under 
delegation of the responsible minister or the executive committee of a province,  it 
clearly had no original responsibility in a constitutional sense for the performance of 
public functions.   The relevance of its activities for purposes of the thesis is therefore 
slight. 
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5.5 Evaluation 
 
An evaluation of the merits of systems of government operative in South Africa between 
1910 and 1994,   when the first fully democratic constitution was implemented,  is a 
matter essentially for political scientists and constitutional lawyers.   For the student of 
Public Administration,  systems of government are largely a given,  a starting point for 
the study of administrative structures and processes which emanate from particular 
systems of government.   Central to the present study are public functions - as defined in 
section 3.3.3 of the thesis - for the performance of which political bodies are responsible 
- and ultimately accountable to the citizenry - but which also constitute the activities and,  
indeed,  the raison d’être of government departments and other public institutions.   In 
this evaluation of what has gone before the focus is therefore on the manner of 
deployment of public functions amongst levels or spheres of government rather than on 
the systems of government per se. 
 
Given the importance and the far-reaching implications of the way in which responsibility 
for the performance of public functions is deployed within the state,  it is appropriate that 
such deployment should be regulated in the constitution or other founding law of the 
state.   This has been the case in South Africa since its creation as a state in 1910,  but 
the manner in which the assignment of responsibilities was effected constitutionally 
needs to be examined and assessed.   Commencing with the 1909 Constitution,  the 
assignment of responsibilities to subnational governments could at best be described as 
desultory.   While certain “classes of subjects” falling within the legislative authority of the 
provinces were specified in the 1909 Constitution,  a substantial void was left as to other 
matters which Parliament in its discretion could decide to entrust to the provinces 
(section 85).   Parliament exercised its powers in this connection by means of the 
adoption from time to time of financial relations legislation as well as other legislation 
dealing with specific public functions.   Quite soon a situation was reached in which the 
number of matters entrusted to the provinces by subsequent Acts of Parliament 
exceeded the number specified in the Constitution.   The explanation for this 
phenomenon is most likely to be found in the fact that the majority of the participants in 
the National Convention favoured a union above a federation (Kriek 1992b:135-147).   
The main implication of this choice was that the central government would be a strong 
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and clearly superior one,  with the provincial governments fulfilling a supplementary and 
subordinate role.   Parliament would be the highest legislative authority in the land,  fully 
capable of regulating as it saw fit the activities of the subnational governments at the 
provincial and local levels.   Nevertheless,  the incomplete assignment of responsibilities 
by the Constitution per se must be regarded as a substantial shortcoming.   Anyone 
wishing to ascertain exactly how responsibilities were deployed amongst the national,  
provincial and local levels of government would of necessity have to look much wider 
than the Constitution itself;  indeed,  he or she would have to embark on quite 
substantial research.   The Constitutions of 1961 and of 1983 did not address this 
shortcoming but,  indeed,  perpetuated it. 
 
In identifying matters to be dealt with by subnational governments the Constitutions of 
1909,  1961 and 1983 and other relevant statutes for the most part employed a 
mechanism of denotative definition.   Matters,  or subjects,  or classes of subjects - such 
are the terminological variations encountered in the formal language of the legal texts - 
for which subnational governments were to be responsible,  were simply denoted as 
items and incorporated in a list.   With one major exception,  no connotative definition of 
the type of matters which properly belong with a particular level or sphere of 
government,  or a criterion or set of criteria which could be applied in identifying such 
matters,  is to be found.   The major exception occurs in the 1983 Constitution,  in which 
a connotative definition regarding that which comprises the own affairs of a population 
group is provided (section 14(1)).   However,  even in this instance certain specific 
subjects which the lawgiver regarded as own affairs were denotatively listed in a 
schedule to the 1983 Constitution (schedule 1).   While the assignment of responsibilities 
by means of listing in statutes,  or schedules to statutes,  may be a legally acceptable 
way of doing so,  it can hardly be seen as a satisfactory way of regulating the functional 
relationships between levels or spheres of government.   There would appear to be a 
need to proceed in such an important matter from an appropriate definition,  or 
fundamentum  divisionis,  or body of principles,  or set of criteria - or a combination of 
such aids - on the basis of which determinations can be made as to the matters to be 
entrusted to each level or sphere of government. 
 
From a Public Administration perspective,  the period covered by the overview presents 
a picture of an extensive,  changing and ongoing division of responsibilities.   Within the 
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core system of government (vide sections 5.3.1 and 5.4.1 supra) substantial structures 
of government and administration came into existence and operated for many years at 
the provincial and local levels of government.   The division of responsibilities between 
the general and own affairs spheres of government under the 1983 Constitution was 
also substantial,  leading to the establishment of relatively large own affairs 
administrations.   As far as the supplementary systems of government were concerned 
(vide sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2 supra),  developments in relation to the Black population 
group especially (vide sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.4.2.1 supra),  led to the assignment of a 
notably wide spectrum of responsibilities to the self-governing territories,  and the 
concomitant development of large administrative structures.   Clearly,  a substantial and 
diverse array of government structures and forms came into existence,  and were 
utilised extensively for the deployment of responsibilities. 
 
The assignment or responsibilities which took place during the period under review,  can 
be typified as a form of decentralisation of government and administration and,  as 
indicated above,  the decentralisation was substantial.   However,  whether and to what 
extent an actual devolution of state authority took place,  is an entirely different question.   
Throughout the period under review the primary authority to govern continued to reside 
in the national parliament.   Parliament was at liberty to substitute and amend the 
particular parts of the Constitution at will or,  by the adoption of other legislation,  to 
substantially increase or diminish the number of matters entrusted to the provincial and 
local governments,  or to alter the parameters of matters so entrusted.   One of the 
outstanding features of the period in question is therefore the maintenance - in the 
formal constitutional sense - of strong centralised control over the structures and 
activities of the state.   This situation did not,  however,  inhibit the deployment of a 
plurality of governments and a magnitude of executive administrative institutions 
throughout the country. 
 
Another outstanding feature of the period covered by the overview is the degree of 
structural and functional complexity which resulted from the various adjustments and 
innovations which were effected in the machinery of the state.   To illustrate:  
Immediately prior to the implementation of the first democratic constitution in 1994 there 
were in South Africa fifteen discrete executive administrations (one central,  four 
provincial,  six in the self-governing territories,  and four in the “independent states”);  
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consisting of some 195 departments (Robson 1996:59-60).   The complexity in 
government and administration,  with the attendant proliferation of public institutions,  
can be attributed for the most part to the application of the policy of separate 
development with its stated goal of achieving some form of constitutional 
accommodation for the Black,  Coloured and Indian population groups without 
compromising the position of the White population group.   Whatever the causes of 
governmental complexity and institutional proliferation,  however,  the attendant potential 
for inefficiencies and wastage in supplying the needs of the public are matters of valid 
concern to all who wish to see sound,  accountable public administration. 
 
A major shortcoming in efforts of the past to set out the basic structures of government,  
and to stipulate the responsibilities of each level or sphere,  was the treatment accorded 
to local government.   The 1909 Constitution had no section,  not to mention a chapter,  
dealing specifically with local government.   Indeed,  a reference to local government is 
to be found only in that part of the 1909 Constitution dealing with the provinces,  where it 
was stipulated inter alia that “municipal institutions,  divisional councils,  and other local 
institutions of a similar nature”,  constituted one class of subjects in relation to which a 
provincial council would be competent to make ordinances (section 85(vi)).   By contrast,  
the 1909 Constitution contained 27 sections dealing with the structures and powers of 
the provinces,  and certain miscellaneous matters pertaining to the provinces (sections 
68-94).   The 1909 Constitution’s treatment of local government can justifiably be 
described as dismissive - on the face of it not much importance was attached to this tier 
of government.   This “constitutional attitude” towards local government was maintained 
with the adoption of the 1961 and the 1983 Constitutions.   For a long time therefore - 
from the establishment of the South African state in 1910 right up to the implementation 
of the first democratic constitution in 1994 - local government was in the author’s view 
not accorded due recognition as a level or sphere of government,  being relegated to a 
Cinderella position in the state household.   The neglectful treatment of local government 
in successive constitutions over a period of 84 years is astonishing in view of the 
obvious and immediate importance to the population at large of the typical services 
provided by the country’s local authorities. 
 
The constitutions of the past and other Acts of Parliament assigning responsibilities to 
levels and spheres of government leave much to be desired as far as the technical 
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aspects of presentation are concerned.   The following shortcomings are to be noted 
especially: 
 
(a) Taxonomically assessed,  there is invariably no particular order,  structure or 
grouping of items to be discerned in the compilation of lists of matters (or 
subjects or classes of subjects),  whether in the main texts of statutes or in the 
schedules to Acts.   The lists are no more than that - lists - generally notable for 
their lack of order and,  in a number of instances,  for their length.   Prime 
examples of lengthy,  jumbled lists are to be found in schedule 2 of the Financial 
Relations Act 65 of 1976 as well as in schedule 1 of the Self-governing 
Territories Constitution Act 21 of 1971 (appended to the thesis as annexures 6 
and 9 respectively). 
 
(b) From a stylistic perspective,  two alternative styles of presentation are invariably 
employed.   In some instances matters are presented in functional mode,  for 
example “the preservation of fauna and flora”,  while in others,  matters are 
indicated as nominal subjects,  for example “markets and pounds”.   The 
importance of consistently employing a functional mode of description in 
stipulating the responsibilities of levels or spheres of government is argued in 
chapter 9 of the thesis. 
 
(c) As far as the employment of language is concerned,  it is notable that In the 
same list,  matters are sometimes described succinctly - in less than,  say,  10 
words - and sometimes by way of lengthy,  verbose statements,  compare for 
example item 10 (“establishment and administration of townships”) and item 14 
(“town planning”) of schedule 2 of the Financial Relations Act 65 of 1976 
(annexure 6 of the thesis).   In some instances a matter is presented by way of a 
straightforward statement,  as in “the establishment,  maintenance,  and 
management of hospitals and charitable institutions” (1909 Constitution: section 
85(v)),  whilst in other instances various qualifying mechanisms are employed,  
typically by stipulating inclusions,  exclusions,  and provisos,  as for example in 
item 2 (“education”) and item 6 (“local government”) in schedule 1 of the 1983 
Constitution (annexure 7 of the thesis). 
 
  
160 
Considering the inherent importance of the assignment question for achieving orderly 
government and administration,  it could reasonably have been expected that a greater 
measure of sophistication and consistency would have developed over the years in the 
technical treatment of the matter in constitutions and other statutes.   This did not 
happen. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Against a background of government and administration influenced substantially by 
ideological considerations based on race,  this chapter has endeavoured to provide an 
overview of the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government since 
the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 up to the time of the 
implementation of the first fully democratic constitution in 1994.   Developments 
concerning the core system of government,  and certain racially focused supplementary 
systems of government which came into existence during the period in question,  have 
been traced and the principal features of the various systems noted.   The assignment of 
responsibilities to governments was obviously an integral part of the evolution of the 
governmental system as a whole.   The assignments made have been examined in 
context,  and commented on critically.   The chapter then proceeded to provide an 
evaluation of the assignment of responsibilities over the period under review.   The 
evaluation has been done from a Public Administration perspective,  focusing broadly on 
constitutional and technical aspects,  without taking a position on the underlying 
ideological motives of past governments. 
 
A question which arises is that of the extent to which it could be said that the approaches  
to the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government adopted in the 
past have been scientific,  or have moved in a scientific direction.   It has been 
suggested elsewhere (Robson 1998a:37) that an approach to the ordering of public 
functions,  as a basis for the assignment of legislative and executive powers,  could be 
followed which would be systematic and logical and which may come to be accepted as 
scientific.   A scientific approach in the particular field would be one which satisfied 
certain criteria including,  in the view of the author,  the development of a general 
definition and classification of public functions,  the clarification of fundamental 
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assumptions and key concepts,  the identification of assignment principles,  the 
development of precise terminology,  and the development of a reliable and accessible 
methodology for ordering a multitude of public functions into a single,  internally 
consistent whole.   Tested against such criteria,  the way in which the assignment of 
responsibilities to governments for the performance of public functions was done in the 
past,  can hardly be said to have been scientific.   This is not to say that the assignment 
of responsibilities was done in an arbitrary manner - obviously every assignment 
decision received due consideration at the time.  However, the assignment scheme 
operative at any particular juncture was accomplished through pragmatic and ad hoc 
endeavours - in which ideological considerations patently played a substantial part - 
rather than by the application of what could be regarded as a scientific approach.    
 
The historical overview has not encompassed the arrangements set in place by the 1993 
and 1996 Constitutions;  these are to be dealt with in the following two chapters of the 
thesis,  commencing with the 1993 Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 6:  ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES:  1993 CONSTITUTION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The 1993 Constitution was operative from April 1994 to February 1996,  a period of 
slightly less than two years.   It was a transitional or interim constitution and for that 
reason one may be tempted to regard it as being of less importance than the 1996 
Constitution which followed it,  and which has now become established as the founding 
law of the country.   Again,  unlike the 1996 Constitution,  the 1993 Constitution was not 
adopted by a democratically elected Parliament fully representative of all South Africans.   
However,  it would be a mistake to play down the importance of the 1993 Constitution.   
Indeed,  from a scientific point of view the 1993 Constitution was particularly significant,  
for a number of reasons.   The Constitution represented a complete break with the 
country’s chequered and persistently undemocratic constitutional past.   It included a 
comprehensive set of constitutional principles which determined the key features not 
only of the constitutional structure which it set in place but also of the constitution which 
was to follow it.   The resemblance of the 1996 Constitution to its precursor is 
unmistakable;  the later constitution refined and elaborated an existing structure;  it did 
not create a new one.   As far as the allocation of powers to the various levels of 
government is concerned,  the die was largely cast by the 1993 Constitution,  not only by 
way of the constitutional principles which it prescribed,  but also in its textual provisions 
dealing with the particular subject. 
 
This chapter provides at the outset a brief overview of the Multiparty Negotiating Process 
which culminated in the 1993 Constitution,  and then proceeds to deal with the set of 
constitutional principles which were such an important feature of the negotiations.   The 
proposals of the then Commission for Administration regarding the allocation of functions 
and powers to the central and regional levels of government,  a project in which the 
author was closely involved,  is included as a discrete section of the chapter.   A 
systematic description of the general scheme for the assignment of responsibilities to the 
levels of government instituted by the 1993 Constitution is provided,  followed by a 
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section which focuses on the way in which specific public functions were treated by the 
Constitution.   The chapter culminates in a critical examination of the assignment of 
responsibilities by the Constitution,  and ends with the drawing of a general conclusion 
on this part of the research. 
      
                    
6.2 Negotiation of a new constitution 
 
The negotiation,  drafting and adoption of the country’s first democratic constitution took 
place over a period of roughly four years.   The major milestones in this process are 
noted below,  followed by a brief look at the organisational arrangements for negotiation,  
and comment on the drafting process,  with particular emphasis on the formulation of 
constitutional principles and the development of proposals regarding the allocation of 
powers and functions to levels of government. 
   
6.2.1 Milestones 
 
Former President F W de Klerk’s address at the opening of the South African Parliament 
on 2 February 1990 is generally regarded as the first step in a remarkable process which 
led four years later to the implementation of the country’s first democratic constitution on 
27 April 1994.   De Klerk put it to the assembled members of what was to be the last 
“apartheid” parliament,  that he envisaged the development of a totally new and just 
constitutional dispensation,  as well as the recognition and protection of those 
fundamental human rights which generally form the basis of Western democracies.   
(Venter 1994:211.) 
 
Following the unbanning of the African National Congress and various other 
organisations fundamentally opposed to the then existing constitutional dispensation – a 
major development announced by De Klerk in his opening address - a negotiating 
process was initiated,  which unfolded by way of a number of historic events. 
 
During the period May 1990 to February 1991 three bilateral agreements were 
concluded between the Government and the African National Congress aimed at 
preparing the climate for negotiation.   In September 1991 the National Peace Accord 
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was signed by representatives of then existing governments and various non-
governmental organisations.   After a preparatory meeting at the end of November 1991,  
the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (which became known as CODESA I) met 
over two days in December 1991.   A declaration of intent was adopted and five working 
groups instituted with the brief of formulating draft agreements on various aspects of a 
transition to a democratic dispensation.   CODESA II was convened in May 1992,  but 
failed to make any further progress,  due to the main actors not being able to find 
common ground on certain issues.   Negotiations resumed in May 1993,  under the title 
“Multiparty Negotiating Process” (MPNP),  using the earlier CODESA documentation as 
its starting point.   Seven months later the MPNP had finished its work,  having finalised 
the details of a new constitution,  as well as peripheral legislation,  procedures and 
structures related to the transition to a new dispensation.   (Venter 1994:212-213.)          
 
Parliament adopted the new constitution on 22 December 1993.   Amendments were 
adopted at further sessions of Parliament during the period February to April 1994.   The 
1993 Constitution came into effect on 27 April 1994. 
  
6.2.2 Organisational arrangements 
 
The basic structure of the Multiparty Negotiating Process consisted of the following five 
components: 
 
?? Plenary meetings; 
?? the Negotiating Forum; 
?? the Negotiating Council; 
?? the Planning Committee;  and 
?? seven technical committees (NA 1993a:5). 
 
The plenary meetings were constituted by the leaders of the participating parties and the 
purpose of these meetings was to confirm any agreements reached by the negotiating 
bodies.   The Negotiating Forum,  consisting of delegates and advisers representing the 
participating parties,  had two functions,  viz (a) to receive and confirm (with or without 
amendments) reports and proposals from the Negotiating Council;  and (b) to instruct the 
Negotiating Council and supervise its work.   The Negotiating Forum ceased to exist in 
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July 1993 and it would appear that the Negotiating Council thereafter submitted its 
reports directly to the plenary meetings via a steering committee.   (NA 1993a:6-7.)   The 
Negotiating Council and its Planning Committee were the key components of the 
negotiating process (NA 1993a:5, 10).   The Council consisted of two delegates (of 
which one had to be a woman) and two advisers nominated by each of the twenty-six 
participating parties.   The Council established seven technical committees to assist it in 
its work,  including one to deal with constitutional issues.   The Planning Committee was 
essentially a facilitating body entrusted by the Council with the responsibility of 
managing and co-ordinating the work of the technical committees.   (NA 1993a:8-10.)      
 
For purposes of the present study,  the work of the Technical Committee on 
Constitutional Issues (whose brief included the formulation of constitutional principles 
and the development of proposals concerning the assignment of responsibilities to the 
provinces),  was of particular importance,  and was consequently subjected to thorough 
research. 
    
6.2.3 Drafting process 
 
The drafting of what was to become the 1993 Constitution,  and which was referred to 
during the negotiations as the “transitional” constitution,  was done by the Technical 
Committee on Constitutional Issues.   The Committee consisted exclusively of lawyers 
who,  judging from the names appearing in the official records,  were all eminent people 
in the field,  with most of them being established experts in constitutional law.   The 
Committee met frequently during the period May to November 1993;  however,  only 
three sets of minutes of its meetings are available in the National Archives Repository – 
those for the meetings held on 10,  12 and 13 May 1993.   It could not be established 
whether the Committee ceased to minute its proceedings,  concentrating its efforts on 
the compilation of reports,  or whether the minutes of the other meetings were lost.   The 
Committee produced 27 reports,  copies of which are available in the Repository.    
 
Reading through the Committee’s reports it is evident that the Committee was at pains 
not to become involved in the negotiations per se but to confine itself to its brief of 
developing technically acceptable proposals and draft texts for consideration by the 
Negotiating Council.   From its reports it is evident that the Committee worked closely 
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with the Council,  reviewing and adjusting its documents in line with Council debates and 
decisions,  keeping before the Council issues which had to be resolved,  asking for 
clarification of Council viewpoints and instructions where necessary,  and indicating to 
the Council when essentially political decisions were called for.   The general picture 
which emerges from a reading of the reports is of a complicated drafting process 
proceeding methodically and purposefully.           
 
The two aspects of the Committee’s work which are of particular relevance to the 
present study are the formulation  of constitutional principles and the development of the 
constitutional framework or scheme for the allocation of powers to the three levels of 
government.   These two aspects are examined in the following sections. 
 
6.2.3.1    Constitutional principles 
  
The Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues obviously attached great importance 
to the compilation of a set of constitutional principles and to getting these adopted by the 
Negotiating Council.   Its very first report contains a substantial section on constitutional 
principles (NA 1993b: section 5).   Subsequently the Committee dealt with the 
constitutional principles in six of its reports (NA 1993c; NA 1993d; NA 1993f; NA 1993n; 
NA 1993p; NA 1993r),  and in addition issued three supplementary reports on the 
constitutional principles (NA 1993g; NA 1993h; NA 1993j).   The first comprehensive set 
of constitutional principles was presented by the Committee in its third report dated 27 
May 1993,  the set consisting of 23 principles,  of which 14 were of a general nature and 
nine dealt specifically with the allocation of powers to the various levels of government 
(NA 1993d).   With some reformulation,  editing and elaboration all these principles were 
absorbed eventually into the final set of principles accommodated in schedule 4 of the 
1993 Constitution.   As an integral part of the drafting process the initial set of principles 
was added to and refined over a period of approximately six months,  in the light of the 
debates in the Negotiating Council and also on the initiative of the Committee.   By the 
time of the Committee’s 26th report,  dated 15 November 1993,  the constitutional 
principles numbered 32 and were close in number and formulation to the final set of 34 
principles eventually enacted into the 1993 Constitution as its schedule 4 (NA 1993t). 
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Of the 34 constitutional principles contained in schedule 4 of the 1993 Constitution,  
eleven are particularly relevant to the present study (these are identified and examined 
in section 6.3.2 infra).   For purposes of the study an insightful exercise has been that of 
checking to what extent the relevant constitutional principles had already been 
incorporated in the first comprehensive set of principles presented to the Negotiating 
Council by the Technical Committee as early as May 1993.   It was found that with the 
exception of two principles,  all the constitutional principles in question had already found 
a place in the initial set.   Of course,  allowance has to be made for a degree of 
reformulation and editing as well as some elaboration of the principles between the time 
of their first presentation and their enactment into law.   The main changes are noted 
below. 
 
Constitutional principle I was elaborated by requiring the envisaged democratic system 
of government to be committed to achieving equality between men and woman and 
people of all races.   Additional components were added to constitutional principle XVIII 
as originally formulated,  the most important of which for present purposes was a 
stipulation that the powers and functions of the provinces as defined in the “final” 
constitution would not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those 
provided for in the “transitional” constitution.   The original formulation of what was finally 
adopted as constitutional principle XVIII provided that the powers and functions of the 
local level of government  should also be defined in the constitution;  this requirement 
was omitted from the final formulation.   Significantly,  constitutional principle XIX which,  
as originally formulated,  provided that the powers and functions of the national and 
provincial levels of government “may” include exclusive and concurrent powers,  in its 
final formulation replaced the permissive “may” with an imperative “shall”.   Constitutional 
principle XX in its final formulation added a number of aspects which were to be borne in 
mind in the allocation of powers to levels of government,  viz financial viability,  effective 
public administration,  the need for and the promotion of national unity and legitimate 
(sic) provincial autonomy,  and cultural diversity. 
 
The two constitutional principles relevant to the study which are not to be found in the 
original set,  are XXIV,  which stipulates that provision must be made for a framework of 
local government powers,  functions and structures in the constitution,  and XXXIV,  
which provides for the possibility of constitutional provision being made for a “notion” of 
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the right to self-determination by any community sharing a common cultural and 
language heritage. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that as early as May 1993,  the basis 
for the assignment of responsibilities to levels of government,  as captured in  certain 
constitutional principles,  had substantially been determined.   The date is important:  it 
precedes by more than a month the receipt by the Technical Committee of proposals 
emanating from the Commission of Administration regarding the allocation of powers to 
the various levels of government in a new constitutional dispensation (vide section 6.4 
infra).   What is noteworthy in this connection is that the Commission had based its input 
largely on its own interpretation of the subsidiarity principle,  a principle which did not 
find its way into the set of constitutional principles,  and also the fact that the 
Commission did not employ the mechanism of concurrent powers in developing its 
proposals. 
 
6.2.3.2    Allocation of powers 
 
It is evident from a perusal of the Technical Committee’s reports that the Committee 
consciously steered clear of adopting any particular model  for the allocation of powers  
and functions to the national and subnational levels of government,  for example a 
“unitary” or a “federal” model.   At an early stage of its work,  the Committee commented 
on federal versus unitary states,  on decentralisation,  and on confederation,  as well as 
on the notions of concurrent powers,  residual powers,  and the asymmetrical allocation 
of powers (NA 1993c:4-8).   However,  from the start the Committee seems to have been 
guided only by the general consensus which had emerged amongst the negotiating 
parties of a constitutional distribution of the powers of government amongst 
democratically elected national,  regional and local governments (NA 1993c:3-4).   For 
the rest,  the research has led to a general finding that the Committee took the line of 
developing in a pragmatic way a workable allocation framework which it considered to 
be suitable for and acceptable in the South African situation.   Such an open-minded 
approach,  bolstered by impressive legal expertise,  and bearing in mind the highly 
charged political environment in which the Committee had to do its work,  is hardly to be 
faulted. 
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The Committee’s fourth report,  dated 3 June 1993,  contained a suggested list of 
“functional areas” in respect of which provinces could be entrusted with powers during 
what the Committee saw as the transitional period.   The list contained 21 items,  
ranging from “agriculture”,  through “education”,  “local government”,  and “transport”,  to 
“welfare”.   (NA 1993e:6-7.)   No indication was provided in the report  as to the rationale 
for selecting the particular items,  and no minutes are available for consultation on this 
point.   Significantly, the Committee pointed out that the allocation of specific elements of 
the particular functional areas to the provinces “and other levels of government” would 
require expertise in the field of public administration,  and that the detailed allocation 
should be done at the time of the drafting of the “final” constitution (NA 1993e:7). 
 
In the first draft outline of the “transitional” constitution,  presented by the Committee on 
21 July 1993,  the number of functional areas earmarked for the exercise of legislative 
authority by the provinces had grown to 24 (NA 1993i).   The draft contained a section – 
section 6(1) – stipulating that the national executive,  after consultation with each 
provincial executive,  and receipt of a recommendation by the envisaged Commission on 
Provincial Government,  would determine the extent of the legislative and executive 
competence of each province (within the listed functional areas).   The national 
executive’s determination of competences would have to be approved by the constitution 
making body (to be set up by the “transitional” constitution) before promulgation by the 
President.   Provision was also made – in section 6(4) – for a provincial executive to 
decline an authorised power,  thus introducing a semblance of an asymmetrical 
approach to the allocation of powers. 
 
From its commentary on its first draft outline of the “transitional” constitution it is evident 
that the Committee took the view that the allocation of powers in that constitution would 
be of an interim nature,  and that the allocation of powers was a matter which could only 
be settled in the “final” constitution.   The Committee surmised that the envisaged 
constitution making body could decide on an allocation of powers which would be 
different to that made under the constitution for the transitional period.   The Committee 
expressed the view that in the circumstances it would be appropriate for the provinces to 
have concurrent rather than exclusive powers,  and that there should be consultation 
and co-operation between the national government and the provincial governments 
concerning the exercise and implementation of such powers.   (NA 1993k:14-18.)   The 
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Committee was evidently not attuned to achieving a definitive division or separation of 
powers by means of the “transitional” constitution.       
 
Some two weeks later,  the Committee had adopted a new stance regarding the 
allocation of powers to the provinces.   In section 118(1) of the Committee’s second draft 
outline of the “transitional” constitution,  provision was made for exclusive legislative 
competence for the provinces in 15 functional areas.   In terms of section 118(3) of the 
draft,  Parliament was barred from legislating on matters in the listed functional areas 
unless it was necessary to do so in certain circumstances.   Four categories of 
circumstances in which Parliament could adopt legislation which would take precedence 
over provincial legislation were set out,  these being closely related to the requirements 
which were ultimately to be adopted as constitutional principle XXI,  which stipulates the 
criteria to be applied in the allocation of powers to the national and the provincial 
governments respectively.   In addition to their “exclusive” competence,  the provinces 
were also given “full legislative competence” in relation to 12 functional areas,  while 
Parliament was given concurrent legislative competence in regard to the same 12 
functional areas – vide section 118(4) of the second draft outline of the “transitional” 
constitution.   In an apparent endeavour to protect the provinces against unjustified 
interference by Parliament,  a section (section 118(7)) was included to the effect that 
Parliament could not exercise its aforesaid legislative powers – under either section 
118(3) or section 118(4) - so as to encroach upon the geographical,  functional or 
institutional integrity of a province,  or in a manner which would deprive a provincial 
government substantially of any of its concurrent competences.   (NA 1993l.)   It seems 
fair to comment that with Parliament given the power to also legislate,  albeit 
conditionally,  in regard to matters in the exclusive category,   exclusivity in provincial 
competence had become a relative concept.   It would perhaps have been more logical 
to make do with a single category,  viz that of concurrent national and provincial 
competences,  with the exercise of such competences being made subject to certain 
provisos.   This is precisely what was done when the 1993 Constitution was eventually 
adopted. 
 
The third draft outline of the Constitution,  presented by the Technical Committee to the 
Negotiating Council on 20 August 1993,  retained in essence the scheme for the 
allocation of powers as set out in draft section 118 referred to above,  except for some 
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changes in the wording of the parliamentary “overrides” contained in subsection 118(3) 
(NA 1993m:38-41). 
 
By the time of the presentation of the Committee’s eighteenth report to the Negotiating 
Council on 3 November 1993,  section 118 of the draft constitution had undergone 
marked changes (NA 1993o:9-11).   No motivation for the changes is provided in the 
report,  but research into the submissions received by the Committee showed that the 
new formulation followed closely the wording of a draft section 118 formulated in bilateral 
discussions between the South African Government and the African National Congress,  
and which had been submitted to the Committee six days earlier,  on 28 October 1993 
(NA 1993v).   The reformulated section gave a provincial legislature concurrent 
competence with Parliament with regard to specified functional areas.   The two lists of 
functional areas which had previously been determined as areas in which provincial 
legislative competence would apply (“exclusive” and “full”),  had been replaced by a 
single list of functional areas earmarked for concurrent competence,  with the combined 
list of functional areas being reduced from 27 to 20.   Ten of the previously designated 
functional areas (five in the “exclusive” list and five in the “full” list) had been left out,  
and three new functional areas added.   The mechanism of parliamentary overrides,  
which had been introduced in the second daft outline of the constitution,  was retained 
and would apply to all the listed functional areas.   The overriding power of Parliament 
would continue to be a qualified one:  an Act of Parliament would prevail over a 
provincial law inconsistent therewith but only to the extent that one or more of five 
criteria applied,  including for example the Act’s dealing with a matter that could not be 
regulated effectively by provincial legislation,  or dealing with a matter that required to be 
regulated or co-ordinated by uniform norms or standards. 
 
Subsequent to 3 November 1993 the emerging draft of the constitution stayed with the 
mechanism of concurrent powers for the national and the provincial governments.   No 
new provision was made for exclusive competences for the provinces.   The draft section 
dealing with provincial powers – which was to become section 126 of the 1993 
Constitution – showed little change between its wording as supported by the Technical 
Committee on 3 November 1993 and its wording as incorporated into the “transitional” 
constitution adopted by Parliament in December 1993.   Two months or so later the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 1994,  changed the 
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formulation of section 126,  but only as to form,  not substance.   The term “concurrent 
competence” was dropped,  and the revised text stipulated separately that a provincial 
legislature and Parliament would be competent to make laws with regard to matters 
falling within a single list of functional areas.   In addition,  the wording of the introductory 
phrase to the subparagraphs setting out the parliamentary overrides was swung around 
so as to provide that a provincial law would prevail over an Act of Parliament,  except 
where one or more of the stipulated criteria applied.   Although indicating a heightened 
appreciation of the role to be performed by a provincial legislature,  the change was 
cosmetic rather than substantial. 
 
As regards local government,  the Technical Committee in its thirteenth report,  dated 16 
September 1993,  identified a number of constitutional principles which it considered to 
be relevant to the local government level.   The Committee then proceeded to present a 
first draft chapter on local government.   On the subject of powers and functions,  a key 
feature of the Committee’s proposals was that the powers and functions of local 
government were to be provided for by law – in other words they were not to be set out 
in the Constitution.   (NA 1993n.)   The initial draft formulations on local government 
were elaborated in the Committee’s twentieth report,  dated 4 November 1993 (NA 
1993q),  and finalised in its twenty-fifth report,  dated 15 November 1993 (NA 1993s)   
The formulations contained in the latter report were very close to those incorporated 
ultimately in chapter 10 of the 1993 Constitution.   Three noteworthy draft provisions did 
not survive the negotiating process:  these were (1) a provision granting access to the 
Constitutional Court in the event of an encroachment or threatened encroachment of a 
local government’s competences (NA 1993n:3);  (2) a  proviso that the future powers 
and functions of a local government would not be less than those existing at the time of 
the commencement of the Constitution (NA 1993q:2);  and (3) a provision that the 
powers and functions of a local government would be changed only after consultation 
with the local government concerned (NA 1993s:15).   It would seem that the Committee 
had in view a somewhat stronger position for local government than that which the 
negotiating parties were ultimately prepared to allow.                             
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6.3 Review of the constitutional principles 
 
The constitutional principles which were appended to the 1993 Constitution as schedule 
4 are of particular importance in the constitutional development of South Africa.   This is 
so in general terms,  but also specifically in relation to the powers of the subnational 
governments,  a subject addressed or alluded to in many of the principles.  Clearly,  the 
constitutional principles are deserving of close examination for purposes of the present 
thesis.   Before embarking on such an examination it is necessary to dwell for a moment 
on their origin as well as on their role in the constitutional development of the country. 
 
6.3.1 Origin and role 
 
The 1993 Constitution laid the groundwork for the so-called “final” Constitution and did 
this by specifying a comprehensive set of principles with which the final Constitution had 
to comply.   To ensure such compliance the 1993 Constitution stipulated that a new text 
to be passed by the Constitutional Assembly would not be of force and effect unless the 
Constitutional Court certified that all its provisions complied with the principles which had 
been laid down.   The principles were developed during the process of negotiation as a 
matter of priority and it would appear that substantial agreement on their content 
preceded the drafting of the constitutional text.   The principles have been described as 
an innovative feature and it has been pointed out that the principles,  which were 
designed to bind a future parliament,  also served as a guideline in the formulation of the 
provisions of the 1993 Constitution.   (Venter 1994:213-214.)   Haysom (2001:44) opines 
that the pre-eminent concern of the constitutional principles was the nature and extent of 
the powers of the provinces and the degree of autonomy to be devolved on them. 
 
The constitutional principles dealing with the allocation of powers or the assignment of 
responsibilities in effect constituted a directive framework to guide the realisation of the 
particular aspect of the new state.   Nothing quite like this had been attempted before.   
As pointed out in the historical overview in chapter 5,  earlier efforts in South Africa at 
ordering the responsibilities of the respective levels or spheres of government had 
generally not been underpinned by clearly stated or readily discernible theoretical 
concepts,  but had instead occurred in an evolutionary or ideologically driven fashion.   A 
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possible exception is to be found in the 1983 Constitution which introduced the  
theoretical construct – strongly rejected by the majority of the population – of own affairs 
(in respect of certain population groups) and general affairs,  as a basis for the 
assignment of responsibilities.  
 
6.3.2 Examination 
 
Of the 34 constitutional principles which were adopted,  eleven are regarded as being 
relevant to the subject of the present study:  these are numbers I,  VI,  XVI,  XVIII,  XIX,  
XX,  XXI,  XXII, XXIII,  XXIV,  and XXXIV.   The principles indicated are contained in 
annexure 10 of the thesis and examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
Constitutional principle I requires that one sovereign state be established,  with a 
common South African citizenship,  and a system of government committed to achieving 
equality between men and women and people of all races.   It is fundamentally important 
for the assignment of responsibilities.   The principle in essence calls for national unity 
and wholeness and fair treatment for all.   Its implications for the assignment of 
responsibilities are clear:  No matter how responsibilities may be divided,  shared or 
allocated between levels or spheres of government,  such division,  sharing or allocation 
may not detract from the essential oneness of the state as experienced by its citizens.   
It could be argued that the best way to realise principle I would be to have a single 
government exercising all powers or discharging all responsibilities in relation to public 
functions.   But numerous other constitutional principles also have to be adhered to;  and 
taken together the set of constitutional principles effectively prohibited the establishment 
of a monolithic system of government (vide following discussion).       
 
Constitutional principle VI prescribes a separation of powers between the legislature,  
the executive and the judiciary,  and further specifies that there shall be appropriate 
checks and balances to ensure accountability,  responsiveness and openness.   The 
inclusion of this principle constitutes recognition of the trias politica doctrine,  which 
postulates a horizontal division of powers between the major arms of government within 
the state.   As the present thesis is focused on the vertical division of powers and 
responsibilities,  the horizontal division is not dealt with. 
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Constitutional principle XVI calls for government to be structured at national,  provincial 
and local levels.   This injunction mandates the application to South Africa of a three-
tiered model of government,  as found in many countries of the world (vide Blaustein and 
Flanz 1971).   It is a directive of fundamental importance,  serving to determine the basic 
structure of government and public administration in the country.   Adoption of a multi-
tiered model implies the distribution of responsibilities for the performance of public 
functions amongst the various levels of government within the state – otherwise there 
would be no reason for the adoption of such a model.   In a constitutional context it could 
be argued that a multi-tiered structure implies inter alia that each level of government will 
be given both a substantive as well as a distinctive role to fulfil in relation to public 
functions.   The alternative would be an arbitrary and probably conflicting assignment of 
responsibilities,   which could hardly be reconciled with the expected orderliness of a 
constitutional dispensation. 
 
Constitutional principle XVIII,  which consists of five parts,  is aimed at placing the 
responsibilities of the provinces on a firm (constitutional) footing,  and protecting the 
provinces against the possibility of an overly power conscious central government acting 
in a way which would have the effect of undermining the constitutionally decreed position 
of the provinces.   The following “guarantees” bearing on functional responsibilities are 
built into the principle: 
 
(a) The powers and functions of the national government and the provincial 
governments respectively shall be defined in the Constitution; 
(b) the powers and functions of the provinces,  as defined in the Constitution,  shall 
not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in the 1993 
Constitution; 
(c) amendments to the Constitution which alter inter alia the powers and functions of 
the provinces will require approval by a special majority of the provincial legislatures or,  
alternatively,  if there is such a chamber,  a two-thirds majority of a chamber of 
Parliament composed of provincial representatives.   If only certain provinces are 
effected,  the approval of their legislatures will also be required;  and 
(d) provision is to be made for obtaining the views of a provincial legislature 
concerning all constitutional amendments regarding inter alia its powers and functions. 
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Constitutional principle XIX is a specification to be complied with by constitution drafters.    
It stipulates that the powers and functions of the national and provincial levels of 
government shall include both exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to 
perform functions for other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis.   
What the latter requirement seems to anticipate is that a neat,  mutually exclusive 
assignment of responsibilities to three levels of government may not be readily 
achievable,  and that provision should therefore be made for flexibility in determining in 
practice what each level of government will be responsible for. 
 
Constitutional principle XX is also essentially a specification,  and one of comprehensive 
scope.   It requires that each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate 
legislative and executive powers and functions that will enable each level to function 
effectively.   It incorporates two criteria which are to be applied in the allocation of 
powers between different levels of government,  viz the allocation is to be conducive to 
financial viability at each level of government,  and also to effective public administration.   
The basis of allocation should in addition recognise the need for and promote national 
unity and legitimate provincial autonomy;  it should also acknowledge cultural diversity.    
 
Constitutional principle XXI takes the form of a set of criteria to be applied in the 
allocation of powers to the national and the provincial governments respectively.   These 
criteria are examined below: 
 
Criterion 1:  This is a basic general directive stipulating – somewhat obviously – that the 
level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the quality and 
rendering of services,  shall be the level responsible and accountable for the quality and 
rendering of services.   Perhaps it would be fair to add that effectiveness has an 
established place within the science of Public Administration as a normative guideline to 
be followed by public institutions in discharging their responsibilities. 
 
Criterion 2:  This criterion is important in the context of the present study as it stipulates 
the circumstances in which the national government shall be empowered to intervene in 
or override the actions of subordinate authorities,  viz where it is necessary (a) to 
maintain essential national standards;  or (b) to establish minimum standards;  or (c) to 
maintain economic unity;  or (d) to maintain national security;  or (e) to prevent 
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unreasonable action by one province which will be prejudicial to the interests of another 
province or of the country as a whole.    
 
Criterion 3:  This criterion encompasses those circumstances in which it is essential for 
the country “ … to speak with one voice,  or act as a single entity – in particular in 
relation to other states … “,  and assigns the responsibility to the national government.    
 
Criterion 4:  This criterion encompasses the objective of uniformity,  stressing that where 
uniformity “ … across the nation … “ is required in the performance of a function the 
responsibility should be assigned predominantly,  or even wholly,  to the national 
government.   The validity of the criterion would appear to be self-evident.   This criterion 
would appear to be closely related to the maintenance of generally applicable standards 
as encompassed by criterion 2. 
 
Criterion 5:  The focus here is again on economic unity,  an objective already captured in 
criterion 2. 
 
Criterion 6:  This criterion is really a stipulation or specification,  couched in rather vague 
terms,  of powers which provincial governments are to have,  either exclusively or 
concurrently with the national government. 
 
Criterion 7:  The question of “mutual co-operation” between the national government and 
the provincial governments is encompassed by this criterion,  with specific reference to 
the allocation of concurrent powers.   Powers are to be allocated concurrently where 
mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or where it is required to guarantee equality 
of opportunity or access to a government service.   Co-operation between governments 
can generally be regarded in a positive light;  however,  it is possible that too much 
emphasis on co-operation could tend to lessen the importance of achieving a clear 
demarcation of functional responsibilities in the first place. 
 
Criterion 8:  This criterion is a stipulation concerning the allocation of powers ancillary to 
the primary powers allocated to the national and provincial governments respectively.   It 
is of little interest in dealing with the assignment question as such.                           
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Constitutional principle XXII has as its objective the protection of the provinces against 
undue interference by the national government and would appear to be closely related to 
principle XVIII.   It stipulates that the national government shall not exercise its powers 
(exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical,  functional or 
institutional integrity of the provinces.   It is in essence a guarantee given to the 
provinces and does not have a bearing on the assignment of responsibilities per se.   
However,  it does serve to support the implication inherent in principle XVI (vide supra),  
viz that the distribution of responsibilities amongst the levels of government is to be done 
in an orderly and accountable way.   It is noteworthy that the prohibition placed on 
interference by the national government does not extend to the affairs of local 
government. 
 
Constitutional principle XXIII requires that in the event of a dispute arising concerning 
the legislative powers allocated concurrently to the national government and the 
provincial governments,  which cannot be resolved by a court on a construction of the 
Constitution,  precedence shall be given to the legislative powers of the national 
government.   In essence the principle is aimed at avoiding a deadlock in the 
government of the country and lays down a rule to be followed should such a situation 
threaten.   This injunction as to legislative precedence confirms the vesting of residuary 
power in the national government. 
 
Constitutional principle XXIV requires a framework for local government powers,  
functions and structures to be set out in the Constitution,  while the detail is to be 
regulated in parliamentary statutes or in provincial legislation or in both.   It is essentially 
a specification with which constitution drafters are to comply and not a principle as such. 
 
Constitutional principle XXXIV takes a tack fundamentally different to that of the other 
constitutional principles already dealt with above – which all address the assignment 
question on a territorial,  vertical basis – by providing for self-determination by a 
community sharing a common cultural and language heritage,  provided there is proven 
support within a community for such self-determination.   The provision is formulated in 
passive or,  at best,  neutral terms:  cultural self-determination as a “notion” is not 
precluded but also not propounded – in stark contrast to the situation in a country such 
as Belgium where it lies at the heart of the constitutional dispensation.   Of particular 
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interest is the provision that self-determination by a qualifying community need not 
necessarily be exercised in a defined territorial entity within the Republic;  it could also 
be exercised “ … in any other recognised way”.         
 
6.3.3 Analysis and critique 
 
It is noticeable that the constitutional principles examined and commented on in the 
previous section,  are not formulated as principles per se.   The collection of statements 
could be described more accurately as a set of specifications to be complied with in the 
drafting of a constitution for South Africa.   To say that “ … government shall be 
structured at national,  provincial and local levels” (principle XVI),  or that “ … The 
boundaries of the provinces shall be the same as those established in terms of this 
Constitution” (principle XVIII-3),  or that “ … the powers of the … levels of government 
shall include exclusive and concurrent powers” (principle XIX),  is not to state a principle,  
but rather to formulate a specification which is to be complied with in the drafting 
process.   The specifications frequently appear in the form  of criteria which have to be 
applied (especially principle XXI),  but also include the odd guarantee,  rule or condition 
– vide principles XXII,  XXIII and XXIV-2 respectively.   However,  on closer examination 
of the formulations a number of actual principles are to be discerned,  or would appear to 
suggest their presence.   Before identifying these,  it is useful to pause for a moment at 
what the term “principle “ could be taken to connote in the process of drafting a 
constitution. 
 
A dictionary of philosophy (Runes 1962) defines the term “principle” as follows, “A 
fundamental cause or universal truth;  that which is inherent in anything”.   The same 
source gives the origin of the term as the Latin word principe,  from principium,  meaning 
“a beginning”.   The quoted definition and the Latin word from which the term is derived,  
are appropriate for present purposes.   Applied to the drafting of a constitution,  the word 
“principle” (now functioning as a term) would be used in an acceptable way if it was 
employed to denote certain fundamental points of departure (beginnings) which can be 
adopted as being true,  and which by extension have the attributes of being valuable and 
trustworthy.   In other words,  a principle should point the way towards producing a 
“good” constitution,  or one which would be seen to be good by a community which has 
generally come to embrace Western democratic values. The identification of principles 
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relevant to the assignment of functions and powers to levels of government which would 
appear to be inherent in the specifications bearing on the assignment question is 
essayed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Constitutional principle I,  with its emphasis on one sovereign state,  a common 
citizenship,  and a system of government committed to achieving equality amongst all,  
suggests that the underlying principle on which it is based is that of national integrity,  
oneness or unity.   In determining the allocation of powers – or the assignment of 
responsibilities – to levels of government within the state,  national unity would appear to 
be a valid and strongly directive principle to apply.   Acceptance of the principle for 
application to the structures of government would require that the allocation of powers or 
the assignment of responsibilities be done in a way which would promote amongst 
members of the community a sense of national unity,  of them all being accommodated,  
protected and nurtured within a single constitutional entity. 
 
The principle of national unity is also to be found nestling in some of the other 
specifications making up those constitutional principles which have particular relevance 
to the subject of the thesis.   Constitutional principle XXI,  which prescribes a number of 
criteria to be applied in the allocation of powers,  identifies amongst such criteria the 
maintenance of essential national standards,  the maintenance of national security,  and 
the prevention of unreasonable action by a province which would be prejudicial to the 
interests of another province or of the country as a whole (XXI-2).   These objectives 
(ideals) can all be related to the establishment and maintenance of national unity.   The 
same finding applies to constitutional principle XXI-3,  which requires that,  when 
necessary,  South Africa should “speak with one voice”,  as well as constitutional 
principle XXI-4,  which speaks of “uniformity across the nation”. 
 
Closely allied to the principle of national unity – indeed it could be seen as an aspect of 
that principle – is that of economic unity.   The principle is identified clearly in 
constitutional principle XXI-2,  which gives to the national government a role to be 
fulfilled inter alia where it is necessary for the “maintenance of economic unity”.   The 
principle is also discernible in constitutional principle XXI-5,  which refers to the 
determination of national economic policies,  the promotion of interprovincial commerce,  
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and the protection of the common market,  and which calls for preference to be given to 
the national government in the allocation of powers to deal with such matters. 
 
In addition to the principle of economic unity,  the principle of equality is also to be found 
tucked away in constitutional principle XXI-2.   Equality is referred to in passing in 
constitutional principle I.   The references in principle XXI-2 to the maintenance of 
essential national standards and the establishment of minimum standards for the 
rendering of services,  seem to suggest that all members of the community should be 
treated equally,  at least as far as the involvement of the state in their lives is concerned.   
Equality is also the principle underlying the guarantees as to equality of opportunity and 
access to government services referred to in constitutional principle XXI-7 (vide infra).   
Whether a system of government per se is capable of ensuring equality amongst its 
citizens is debatable;  but the principle of equality could be understood to imply an 
assignment of responsibilities which will at least seek to ensure equality of governmental 
treatment of all South Africans.      
 
A principle not presented as such but discernible in some of the constitutional principles,  
is that of provincial autonomy.   Constitutional principle XVIII-4 lays down a rule requiring 
special majorities in the appropriate legislative bodies for any amendments of the 
Constitution which alters the powers,  boundaries,  functions,  or institutions of 
provinces.    If the amendment concerns specific provinces only,  it is to be approved by 
the legislatures of such provinces.   Constitutional principle XVIII-5 specifies that 
provision shall be made for obtaining the views of a provincial legislature concerning all 
constitutional amendments which affect its powers,  boundaries and functions.   
Constitutional principle XIX stipulates inter alia that the powers of the provincial level of 
government shall include both exclusive and concurrent powers.   The specification of 
exclusive powers can be regarded as a manifestation of the principle of provincial 
autonomy.   Constitutional principle XX refers to provincial autonomy by name,  
specifying that the allocation of powers shall recognise the need for and promote inter 
alia provincial autonomy.   Constitutional principle XXII places a restriction on the 
exercise by the national government of its powers by requiring that the exercise of such 
powers,  whether exclusive or concurrent,  shall not encroach upon the geographical,  
functional or institutional integrity of the provinces.   Clearly,  provincial autonomy is 
inherent in these specifications governing the allocation of powers.   It is,  however,  
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accommodated in formulations which allow wide scope to constitution makers for 
deciding on the degree of provincial autonomy which is to be established. 
 
Constitutional principle VI which prescribes the horizontal separation of fundamental 
powers within the state,  is clearly a manifestation of the trias politica doctrine usually 
associated with the name of Montesquieu.   The principle underlying the doctrine – and 
the particular specification in which it is manifested – could be identified perhaps as the 
principle of non-concentration (of state powers);  however,  it is not directly relevant to 
the present study,  which is focused on the vertical separation of powers within the state. 
 
Constitutional principle XXI-7 emphasises the need for mutual co-operation between the 
national and the provincial governments where it “ … is essential or desirable or where it 
is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service”.   
The principle at issue here could be identified as the principle of co-operation (between 
levels of government).   Considered in context,  the principle conforms to the 
understanding within the particular context of the concept “principle” as indicated above,  
viz as a generally accepted point of departure for writing a constitution. 
 
Finally,  the principle of self-determination can be extracted from the set of constitutional 
principles bearing on the assignment of responsibilities within the governmental structure 
of the country.   Constitutional principle XXXIV provides for self-determination by a  
community sharing a common cultural and language heritage,  by allowing constitutional 
provision to be made for self-determination by any such community.   The constitutional 
principle is formulated in passive mode;  self-determination is not actively promoted.   
Self-determination is also implied in constitutional principle XX,  which requires the 
allocation of powers between different levels of government to be done on a basis which 
inter alia acknowledges cultural diversity.   It is to be noted that constitutional principle 
XX refers to levels of government,  while constitutional principle XXXIV provides for self-
determination to be accommodated “ … in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any 
other recognised way”.   This formulation would seem to admit of self-determination also 
within a sphere of government focused on a community not necessarily concentrated in 
a specific territorial entity (region).   As the term “self-determination” could also be 
applied in a broad sense in defining a nation-state’s relations with the rest of the 
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international community,   it is in need of appropriate qualification in the present context.   
It is proposed to use the qualified term “cultural self-determination”. 
 
In summary,  although the constitutional principles analysed in this section are 
formulated generally as a set of specifications to be complied with by constitution 
makers rather than as principles per se,  a number of principles with relevance for the 
assignment of responsibilities to levels of government are nevertheless to be discerned 
in the formulations.   These are – 
 
?? the principle of national unity; 
?? the principle of economic unity; 
?? the principle of equality; 
?? the principle of provincial autonomy; 
?? the principle of co-operation;  and  
?? the principle of cultural self-determination. 
 
Conspicuous by its absence is the principle of subsidiarity,  which is defined and 
discussed in section 3.3.3 of the thesis. 
 
A critical examination of the assignment of responsibilities under the 1993 Constitution 
would necessarily include an evaluation of the manner in and extent to which the 
aforementioned principles were applied.   Such a critical examination is contained in 
section 6.6 infra. 
 
 
6.4 Input of the Commission for Administration 
 
This section of the chapter deals with proposals which were developed by the  
Commission for Administration in 1993 concerning the allocation of functions and 
powers to the central and regional levels of government and which were submitted to the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process.   The information provided is taken mainly from copies of 
documents forming part of the author’s personal records covering the period in question.   
The appropriate official file of the erstwhile Office of the Commission for Administration is 
No 10/17/B. 
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The Commission for Administration was a statutory body appointed by the State 
President in terms of the Commission for Administration Act 65 of 1984.   The 
Commission was charged,  generally,  with a directive and oversight role in relation to 
the public service and certain other public institutions.   The Commission at the time 
consisted of a Chairman and one other Commissioner (the author),  and was supported 
in its work by a substantial and diverse staff complement,  including inter alia persons 
qualified and experienced in the field of government organisation.   One of the major 
responsibilities of the Commission was to make recommendations to government 
concerning the establishment or abolition of public service departments,  as well as in 
regard to the functions they were to perform (Public Service Act 111 of 1984: section 
3(2)(a)). 
 
6.4.1 Development of the Commission’s input 
 
The South African Cabinet took a decision in November 1992 requiring of the 
Commission to develop proposals concerning the allocation of government functions 
(owerheidswerksaamhede) in a new governmental dispensation.   A document shows 
that such proposals were considered to be of particular importance in the process of 
designing a new governmental structure for the country,  and specifically for purposes of 
drafting a new constitution.   (Commission for Administration 1993g.)   The Cabinet 
decision was taken at a point in time more or less halfway between the termination in 
failure of CODESA II and the resumption of multi-party negotiations in May 1993 (vide 
section 6.2.1 supra).   
 
On the basis of preparatory work done by the Commission and its professional staff,  the 
Commission in February 1993,  still some months before the commencement of the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process in May 1993,  launched a major programme of 
organisation development work under a programme title “Rasionalisasie van 
owerheidsorganisasies” (“Rationalisation of government organisations”).   The 
programme approved by the Commission was comprehensively specified as to its 
purpose and execution,  with the programme document consisting of a main text of 
seven pages and eight annexures.   The programme was to be carried out by the 
Commission’s staff,  under the supervision of the Commission,  and with the co-
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operation of government departments.   (Commission for Administration 1993a.)   By 
mutual agreement between the author and the Chairman of the Commission,  the author 
assumed responsibility for the direction and oversight of the programme. 
 
A key aspect of the programme for purposes of the present study was the development 
of what the Commission referred to as “blueprints” for all the major functions,  such as 
agriculture,  health,  and welfare.   The programme provided precise guidelines for the 
researching and compilation of a blueprint (vide following section).   For each main 
function a senior official on the staff of the Commission was designated as the project 
manager for that function.   The Commission attached importance to the experience and 
insights of career officials in the various departments who were involved in the actual 
performance of a function,  and the programme provided for such experience and 
insights to be utilised fully in developing a view on the future deployment of the function.   
The directors general of the departments involved in the performance of a particular 
function were requested to assign a member or members of their management teams 
with whom the responsible project manager in the Commission’s Office could liaise with 
regard to the deployment of the function.   A properly compiled and verified draft 
blueprint for a main function was to be submitted to the Commission for consideration.   
The Commission would then consult as necessary with affected directors general and 
ministers regarding aspects of the blueprint,  after which it would be finalised as the 
Commission’s view concerning the deployment of the particular main function in a future 
governmental dispensation.   (Commission for Administration 1993a.)    
 
By means of a concerted effort by the Commission and its staff,  assisted by a great 
many people in government departments,  between 25 and 30 main function blueprints 
were generated over a period of roughly four months from February to June 1993,  and 
provisionally finalised by the Commission towards the end of June 1993.   At this time a 
request was received from the Constitutional Development Service (a then existing 
government department) to supply the Service as a matter of urgency with proposals 
concerning the allocation of functions and powers in a new constitutional dispensation 
with a view to utilisation in the ongoing constitution negotiating process.   In response,   
the Commission on 25 June 1993 furnished the Service with a working document which 
could be used for the stated purpose.   Copies of the document were at the same time 
furnished to all members of the Cabinet.   (Commission for Administration 1993i.)   The 
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Commission regarded the working document as a provisional input as it was at that 
stage still engaged in the refinement of its proposals.   The Commission did not regard 
the suggestions contained in the document as formal (statutory) recommendations.   
 
According to a document in the National Archives Repository the Commission’s working 
document was submitted to the Multiparty Negotiating Process on 28 June 1993 by an 
entity identified as the South African Government Office:  World Trade Centre,  as a 
submission of the South African Government.   In accordance with a decision of the 
Cabinet,  the document had no marking or annotation identifying it with the Commission 
and the covering letter makes the point that being a working document,  it does not 
necessarily reflect the final position of the Government.   It goes on to say that that the 
document is submitted in view of a remark in the fourth report of the Technical 
Committee on Constitutional Issues to the effect that the allocation of specific elements 
of what the Committee was by then referring to as “functional areas” to provinces and 
other levels of government requires expertise in the field of public administration.   The 
letter ends with a specific request that the working document be transmitted to the 
Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues for its consideration.   (NA 1993u.) 
 
The author’s personal records show that following the submission of its working 
document,  the Commission was involved in discussions on the government side 
concerning the functions and powers of the future central and regional governments,  
and also made inputs concerning formulations which could go into the draft of the new 
constitution.   However,  the Commission at no stage had any direct interaction 
concerning the assignment question with the Technical Committee on Constitutional 
Issues,  which was the component within the Multiparty Negotiating Process charged 
with the formulation of provisions to be included in the new constitution. 
  
The documents held in the National Archives Repository provide no indication as to what 
transpired regarding the particular submission by the South African Government already 
referred to,  and which actually constituted a substantial contribution by the Commission 
to the negotiating process.   In the absence of minutes (vide the first paragraph of 
section 6.2.3 supra) – there is no record available showing that the Technical Committee 
on Constitutional Issues considered the submission and if it did,  what decision it took 
concerning the document.   It is also not known whether the Committee was made 
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aware or became aware of the origin of the document,  or of the programme of 
development work on which it was based.   What the record does show is that some 3 ½  
weeks previously the Committee in its fourth report had adopted a list of “functional 
areas” in respect of which the provinces could be entrusted with powers,  and that 
despite some variations in approach during the drafting process as to how exactly the 
respective powers of the national and provincial governments were to be linked to 
functional areas,  the Committee by early November 1993 had settled on a list of 
functional areas in respect of which the national and provincial governments would have 
concurrent powers,  with associated “rules” governing the exercise of such powers.   
This result of the negotiating process was in essence to be incorporated in the 1993 
Constitution as its section  126.   What the record also shows is that the final position of 
the Technical Committee on national and provincial powers corresponded markedly with 
a combined input of the South African Government and the ANC following bilateral 
discussions.   (Vide discussion of the drafting process which culminated in the particular 
section of the 1993 Constitution in section 6.2.3.2 supra .)                                        
  
The conclusion to be reached is that a substantial programme of participatory research 
conducted at the time – which is described in more detail in the following section – did 
not in the event have any noticeable effect on the final drafting of the particular part of 
the 1993 Constitution.   As an endeavour to contribute significantly to the drafting of the 
particular part of the 1993 Constitution,  the Commission’s rationalisation programme 
came to nought.   The development work,  which was thoroughly planned and carefully 
done,  is nevertheless considered by the author to have value when viewed from a 
developing scientific perspective within the Public Administration domain.   The main 
features of the exercise are described in the following section.     
 
6.4.2 Features of the development work   
 
The Commission’s rationalisation programme was planned so as to fit the circumstances 
of the time,  and aimed at providing a well-founded base for moving governmental 
structures into a new constitutional order.   Some of the most important features built into 
the programme,  with particular emphasis on the development of function blueprints,  are 
noted below. 
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The programme was a distinctly purposeful one,  its purpose being stated as follows 
(translated from Afrikaans):  To promote,  in close consultation with the Government and 
in harmony with the constitutional development process,  an accountable redeployment 
of government functions,  and to realise such redeployment in practice.   (The reference 
to “government functions” was to a large extent a reference to public functions as 
defined and treated in this thesis.)   To facilitate achievement of the stated purpose 
particular attention was paid to programme management.   The respective roles of the 
Commission and its professional staff were spelt out;  each main function was assigned 
to a senior member of the professional staff as his responsibility;   directors general and 
designated members of their management teams were involved in the programme;  and 
provision was made for consultation as necessary by the Commission with directors 
general and members of the Cabinet.   (Commission for Administration 1993a.) 
 
A number of policy directives were included in the programme.   In line with the 
philosophical guideline of political supremacy recognised within the discipline of Public 
Administration ( vide for instance Cloete 1994:64-69),  the programme was to be 
directed by the Government’s views and objectives regarding a future governmental 
dispensation.   However,  the development work was also to be done in harmony with 
the constitutional development process.   The programme was to be a comprehensive 
one,  covering all the main government functions,  in respect of each of which a blueprint 
was to be developed and cleared at various levels,  spelling out in detail how the 
function ought to be deployed over three levels of government.   Emphasis was placed 
on the full and effective utilisation of the experience and insights of senior career officials 
who were directly involved in the performance of a function.   Also emphasised was the 
correct and consistent use of terminology,  with key terms being identified and defined.   
(Commission for Administration 1993a.) 
 
The blueprint was conceived of as an innovative administrative instrument,  designed to 
address directly and precisely the question of which functions or aspects of functions 
should be assigned to the respective levels of government in an envisaged three-tiered 
governmental structure.   A blueprint would in essence constitute a proposal concerning 
the deployment of a main function in a new dispensation.   In the Commission’s view a 
blueprint could be utilised as an objective input from an apolitical body  for purposes of 
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deliberation (including negotiation) concerning the functions and powers of governments 
in a new dispensation. 
 
The analytical work required in the development of a blueprint was driven by two 
principles,  viz the subsidiarity principle,  and what was referred to as the competency 
principle (bevoegdheidsbeginsel) (Commission for Administration 1993f: annexure B:3-
4).   The Commission identified the two principles on the basis of its understanding of the 
Government’s views and objectives regarding a future governmental dispensation.   The 
identification of these principles took place before the commencement of the Multiparty 
Negotiating Process in May 1993.   It was the Commission’s understanding that the 
Government was in favour of an essentially federal system;  the application of the trias 
politica doctrine concerning the horizontal separation of governmental powers;  three 
levels of government;  the demarcation of a geographic area of jurisdiction for each 
government to be instituted;  maximum devolution of governmental decision-making;  
and the greatest degree of financial self-sufficiency and fiscal independence for regional 
and local governments.   (Commission for Administration 1993f: annexue B:1-3.) 
 
The subsidiarity principle was taken by the Commission to postulate that a government 
programme or activity should not be assigned to a higher level of government if it could 
be carried out or performed  satisfactorily at a lower level of government.   The 
Commission held the view that this was the organising principle par excellence which 
should be applied if the objective was to involve communities effectively in the processes 
of government and administration.   For purposes of applying the principle the following 
criteria were adopted: 
 
?? Is there a substantial reason why a government at a lower level cannot perform the 
particular activity? 
?? Will allocation of the activity to a lower level of government be prejudicial to the 
mutual interests of or harmonious relations between governments at that level? 
?? Is there any substantial reason to believe that allocation of an activity to a lower level 
of government would be prejudicial to the state as a whole? 
(Commission for Administration 1993f: annexure B:3-4.) 
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The competency principle introduced by the Commission postulated that where an 
activity or a power to decide or dispose of a matter had been assigned to a government 
at a lower level,  any government at a higher level should be precluded from intervening 
in the performance of the activity or the exercise of the assigned power.   Regarding this 
principle the Commission was in favour of a constitutional provision to the effect that an 
activity or a power assigned to a government should be alienable only with the 
agreement of that government,  or by means of a special legislative procedure requiring 
a substantial majority vote in favour of alienation.   (Commission for Administration 
1993f: annexure B:4.) 
 
In an endeavour to ensure that its analysts adhered to the two principles adopted for the 
development of blueprints,  and went about their work in a methodical way,  the 
Commission directed that a certain approach be followed.   This approach,  which came 
to be known as the “bottom to top approach”,  required of project staff to commence their 
analysis of a main function at the lowest level of government,  and to proceed from there 
to the higher levels.   As a first step a determination had to be made of the activities 
making up the particular function which could be allocated to the lowest level of 
government.   If all the activities making up the function could be placed at the lowest 
level,  it was logically not necessary to involve the next higher level of government in the 
performance of the function.   If it was not possible to exclude the higher level of 
government,  only those activities – accurately described – which necessarily (for 
substantial reason) had to be performed at the higher level,  were to be assigned to the 
higher level.   A determination of the activities to be performed at the lowest level of 
government having been made,  the analysis could then be focused on the intermediate 
or regional level and ultimately proceed to the national level of government.   
(Commission for Administration 1993f: annexure B:5.) 
 
The guidelines to analysts anticipated that the analysis of a function could lead to a 
finding that – 
 
?? a function could be assigned completely (that is to say including all the activities 
making up the function) to a single level of government;  or 
?? a function could be performed for the greatest part at one level of government,  but 
that certain activities needed to be performed at a higher level;  or 
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?? a function was constituted in a way which required each level of government to be 
involved in the performance of certain (defined) aspects of the function. 
 
A key objective was that should an activity be assigned to a higher level of government,  
the assignment should be defensible on rational grounds,  in other words a substantial 
reason for the assignment should be capable of being advanced.   (Commission for 
Administration 1993b:5-6.) 
 
Apart from the identification of principles to be applied and an analytical approach to be 
followed,  the development of blueprints was also based on the identification and 
definition of key terms.   Eleven such terms were identified,  viz “activity”,  “blueprint”,  
“deconcentration”,  “delegation”,  “decentralisation”,  “devolution”,  “function”,  “major 
function”,  “government”,  “power”,  and “subsidiarity”.   (Commission for Administration 
1993d:  List of terms for inclusion in annexure E of the rationalisation programme 
document.)   The list of terms as originally defined in Afrikaans,  with English translations 
now added,  is contained in annexure 11 of the thesis.   Some of these terms have been 
incorporated in the conceptual framework of the present study (vide section 3.3.3 of the 
thesis) and also absorbed into the proposed theoretical model presented in chapter 9 of 
the thesis. 
 
The blueprint format employed in the development work was a relatively sophisticated 
instrument,  with the following main features: 
 
?? It was focused on providing a concise,  accessible picture of the activities making up 
a function which were appropriate to the respective levels of government in a three-
tiered governmental structure. 
 
?? In line with the “bottom to top” approach,  the activities to be performed at each level 
of government were set out in distinct sections in ascending order from the local level 
through the regional to the central level of government. 
 
?? The section dealing with local government contained three subsections with the 
headings “Service provision”,  “Legislation”,  and “Co-ordination”.   Under the 
heading “Service provision” detail was to be provided of all key activities to be 
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performed by a municipal department involved in the performance of the particular 
function at that level.   The heading “Legislation” was further sub-divided,  requiring 
an indication of the legislative powers to be exercised by municipal governments in 
two categories,  viz (1) legislation to be adopted within the parameters set by a law of 
a higher government,  and (2) legislation to be adopted by a municipal council in its 
own right.   Under the heading “Co-ordination”,  the blueprint required an indication of 
matters in respect of which local governments,  in performing their activities in 
relation to a particular function,  were required to act in a mutually co-ordinated way,  
either with the involvement of the regional government,  or without such involvement. 
 
?? The section of the blueprint document dealing with the regional level of government,  
followed the same pattern as that of the section dealing with the local level,  but with 
appropriate adjustments to reflect the relation of the regional level to the national and 
the local levels in respect of legislation and co-ordination.   In respect of the regional 
level of government an additional subsection was provided under the heading 
“Administrative control”.   In this subsection information was to be provided 
concerning the exercise by a regional government of administrative control over local 
governments within its area of jurisdiction.   The mechanism of administrative control 
was refined into four categories,  viz (1) prescriptive direction of specified actions,  
(2) receipt of reports and returns,  (3) performance of inspections,  and (4) decision 
of individual cases. 
 
?? The final section of the blueprint document,  focused on the central government 
level,  followed the same pattern as that of the section dealing with regional 
government,  but with the wording adjusted appropriately to reflect the relation of the 
central level of government to the regional and local levels. 
 
(Commission for Administration 1993e; 1993f: annexure G.) 
 
The blueprint format employed was such as to encourage thorough data collection and 
rigorous analysis.   In addition guidelines were provided to analysts concerning the 
development of blueprints (Commission for Administration 1993f: annexure G).   It could 
be said that the blueprint concept,  properly applied,  would produce a scenario of the 
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possible deployment of a main function which would be deserving of serious 
consideration. 
 
According to the author’s recollection blueprints were developed for between 25 and 30 
main functions – the exact number cannot be established at his stage.   However,  there 
is documentary proof of the blueprinting of at least 23 main functions,  these being the 
number of functions covered in the Commission’s document which was submitted to the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process and to which reference has been made supra.   The 
functions addressed in the document were as follows: 
 
Agriculture Local government 
Civic affairs and migration Manpower 
Correctional services Mining and minerals 
Education Police services 
Energy regulation Provision of roads 
Environment affairs Regional development 
Finance Social welfare 
Forestry Trade and industrial promotion 
Health services Transport affairs 
Housing and urban development Water supply 
Justice Works 
Land surveying and deeds registration. 
(NA 1993u.) 
 
The document referred to in the preceding paragraph dealt essentially with the regional 
and central levels of government,  although it did contain some references to activities 
which could be entrusted to local governments.   The document contained suggestions 
relating to each of the 23 main functions listed above with regard to the following: 
 
?? The key activities to be performed by the staff of regional and central government 
departments respectively; 
?? aspects in respect of which regional governments could be given the authority to 
adopt legislation within parameters set by legislation of the central level of 
government;  and 
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?? aspects in respect of which regional governments could,  and the central government 
would be empowered to adopt legislation in their own right. 
(NA 1993u.) 
 
6.4.3 Assessment 
 
The development work on which the Commission’s contribution to the negotiating 
process was based,  was not planned consciously as a scientific research project which 
would meet all the requirements which research projects generally are expected to 
satisfy.   The work was nevertheless carefully planned and then performed in a 
controlled manner.   The project evinced certain features which,  taken together,  had the 
potential to produce function blueprints which would have a substantial degree of 
precision and possible acceptability,  including the following:  a clear statement of the 
purpose of the project;  a prescribed methodology;  an identification of specific principles 
to be applied;  a particular analytical approach;  an identification and definition of key 
terms;  an insistence on the participation of experienced non-political practitioners 
involved in the performance of a function;  and the specification of a results format which 
was designed to have practical utility.   Notwithstanding the present research finding that 
the development of blueprints had no discernible influence on the allocation of functions 
and powers by the 1993 Constitution,  the particular programme of work could be of 
continuing academic interest and may have some claim to recognition from a scientific 
perspective.    
       
      
6.5 General scheme for the assignment of responsibilities 
 
The 1993 Constitution set in place a three-tiered governmental structure:  national,  
provincial and local.   The associated scheme for the assignment of responsibilities to 
the three levels of government is examined below,  focusing on each level of 
government in turn,  followed by sections dealing with interventions in the affairs of the 
subordinate governments and the protection of the powers of the provinces with regard 
to public functions. 
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6.5.1 National government 
 
Section 37 of the Constitution stipulated that the legislative authority of the Republic 
would,  subject to the Constitution,  vest in Parliament.   Section 75 contained a 
companion provision regarding executive authority,  namely that the executive authority  
of the Republic with regard to all matters falling within the legislative competence of 
Parliament,  would vest in the President.   It is to be noted that in the Constitution 
executive authority was linked to and,  indeed,  followed legislative authority;  from which 
it can be deduced that the authority to make laws was acknowledged as the primary 
authority within the system of government.   This vesting of primary authority would 
seem to be true not only of South Africa and its 1993 Constitution,  but of virtually all 
countries in which a system of representative democracy is to be found.   A deduction to 
be made from section 37 of the Constitution is that to the extent that the authority to 
make laws was not assigned to any other legislature,  such authority would be exercised 
by the national legislature.   In established constitutional and federal parlance the 
residual authority (or power) of the state was vested in the national government.   
Whatever the subnational governments were not specifically empowered to do,  the 
national government could do – subject of course to the Constitution.   In the preferred 
terminology of the thesis,  the residual responsibility to perform public functions was 
assigned by the Constitution to the national government.            
  
In addition to the competence to legislate on any matter not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution,  the national government in its legislative capacity was empowered by 
section 126(2A) to also make laws with regard to matters assigned to the provinces (vide 
following section). 
 
6.5.2 Provincial government 
 
Section 126(1) of the Constitution gave to provincial legislatures the competence to 
make laws with regard to all matters within a number of “functional areas” specified in 
schedule 6 of the Constitution.   A matching executive competence was accorded 
provinces by section 144(2).   Twenty-nine functional areas of legislative competence 
were itemised in the schedule referred to,  as substituted by section 14 of the 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 3 of 1994.   The 
provincial legislative competence was,  however,  not to be exercised to the exclusion of 
the national legislature.   On the contrary,  Parliament was given a specific competence 
to also make laws on matters falling within the functional areas listed in schedule 6 of the 
Constitution (section 126 (2A)).   Thus both Parliament and a provincial legislature could 
make a law dealing with the same matter.   This obviously raised the question of 
legislative prevalence:  should both Parliament and a provincial legislature exercise their 
law-making competence in regard to a specific matter,  whose law would prevail and 
when would it prevail?   The Constitution regulated this question by introducing a rule 
which was to be applied in determining prevalence. 
 
Section 126(3) of the Constitution stipulated that the provincial law would prevail,  except 
in so far as – 
 
 “(a) the Act of Parliament deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by 
provincial legislation; 
(b) the Act of Parliament deals with a matter that,  to be performed (sic – perform a 
matter?) effectively,  requires to be regulated or co-ordinated by uniform norms 
and standards that apply generally throughout the Republic; 
(c) the Act of Parliament is necessary to set minimum standards across the nation 
for the rendering of public services; 
(d) the Act of Parliament is necessary for the maintenance of economic unity,  the 
protection of the environment,  the promotion of interprovincial commerce,  the 
protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods,  services,  
capital or labour,  or the maintenance of national security;  or 
(e) the provincial law materially prejudices the economic,  health or security interests 
of another province or the country as a whole,  or impedes the implementation of 
national economic policies.” 
 
To prevail,  an Act of Parliament had to apply uniformly in all parts of the Republic 
(section 126(4)). 
 
Although the Constitution – as quoted above –stated as a general point of departure 
that within the area of concurrent powers of the national and provincial governments,  a 
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provincial law would prevail,  the exceptions  stipulated in section 126(3) are obviously 
all important.   Indeed,  the wide scope provided for deciding that an Act of Parliament 
would prevail over a provincial law,  thus effectively narrowing the scope for provincial 
legislation,  is particularly to be noted.   The Constitution did not state specifically who 
should decide when an Act of Parliament would prevail,  but from another part of the 
Constitution it would appear that if necessary recourse could be had to the 
Constitutional Court for such decisions.   Section 98(2)(e) provided that the Court would 
have jurisdiction over all matters relating to the interpretation,  protection and 
enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution,  including “ … any dispute of a 
constitutional nature between organs of state at any level of government”. 
 
The mechanism of concurrent powers in relation to the legislative powers of the national 
and the provincial legislatures,  as stipulated in section 126 of the Constitution,  will be 
examined critically in a following section of this chapter.   Suffice it to say that the 
particular provisions of the Constitution did not constitute a division of legislative 
authority,  in the sense of allocating some matters to the provincial legislatures and 
some to Parliament,  or of allocating some matters to the provincial legislatures and 
leaving all other matters to Parliament,  or vice versa.   Not a single matter was 
stipulated as one in respect of which a provincial legislature could legislate 
autonomously. 
 
While the primary responsibilities assigned to the provinces by the Constitution are to 
be found in their stipulated legislative competence (section 126(1) read with schedule 
6),  their potential array of responsibilities was not limited to the matters on which they 
could make laws.   Their executive responsibilities went further:  in addition to the 
matters over which they had made laws they were also given executive authority in 
respect of matters assigned to them under the transitional arrangements incorporated 
into the Constitution (section 235),  or in terms of any other law,  as well as matters 
delegated to them by or under any law (section 144).   The assignment scheme was 
therefore only partially determined by section 126(1) – read with schedule 6 - of the 
Constitution.   To ascertain the full extent of the responsibilities to be exercised by the 
provinces one would have to survey the executive assignments made in terms of the 
transitional arrangements or by or under any other law,  as well as the responsibilities 
delegated formally to the provinces. 
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6.5.3 Local government 
 
One of the matters on which both Parliament and the provincial legislatures could make 
laws was local government (section 126(1), section 126(2A), schedule 6).   This 
competence was to be exercised subject to the provisions of chapter 10 of the 
Constitution (schedule 6).   The particular chapter,  which was devoted entirely to local 
government,  was particularly eloquent on the subject of the status of the third tier of 
government.   It stipulated that local government would be autonomous and,  within 
prescribed legal limits,  entitled to regulate its own affairs (section 174(3)).   It went on to 
stipulate a limiting requirement in regard to actions by Parliament or a provincial 
legislature,  viz that any such action would “ … not encroach on the powers,  functions 
and structures of a local government to such an extent as to compromise the 
fundamental status,  purpose and character of local government” (section 174(4)).   
However,  the hard reality as to the envisaged status of local government emerged in 
the very next section of the Constitution,  which stipulated that the powers,  functions 
and structures of local government would be determined by law of a  competent 
authority (section 175(1)).   A “competent authority” would be either Parliament or the 
appropriate provincial legislature (section 126(1), section 126(2A), schedule 6).   The 
Constitution did give an indication of the type of services to be rendered by local 
government by requiring a local government,  to the extent determined by any 
applicable law (of a competent authority),  to make provision for access by all persons 
residing within its area of jurisdiction to water,  sanitation,  transportation facilities,  
electricity,  primary health services,  education (sic),  housing and security within a safe 
and healthy environment (section 175(3)).   
 
In terms of powers to perform public functions,  it is clear that no original such powers 
were earmarked by the Constitution for exercise by local governments.   A local 
government could do nothing that it was not specifically permitted to do by either an Act 
of Parliament or a provincial law.   It addition,  whatever a local government was given 
to do,  it was required to do – it could not neglect or refuse to carry out the law of a 
higher level authority,  and it was by no means clear whether it would have recourse to 
an independent arbiter (Constitutional Court?) should it experience a law as onerous or 
perceive it as militating against its own objectives.   However,  the Constitution did 
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require that local governments,  including organised local government,  be given a 
reasonable opportunity to make representations regarding proposed legislation (section 
174(5)).   A local government was given the power to make bylaws,  but these could not 
be inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament or a provincial law (section 
175(4)).        
 
6.5.4 Intervention in the affairs of subnational governments 
 
The 1993 Constitution did not make specific provision for intervention,  whether through 
legislation or executive action,  by the national government in the legally authorised 
affairs of a provincial government,  or by a provincial government in the legally 
authorised affairs of a local government within its area of jurisdiction.   Such intervention 
could of course become necessary should a subordinate government fail to discharge,  
or  be  incapable of discharging its assigned responsibilities.   It is considered necessary 
to note the lack of provisions for intervention by a higher level government in view of the 
inclusion of such provisions in the 1996 (“final”) Constitution. 
 
6.5.5 Protection of assigned powers 
 
The powers given to the provinces,  as well as the exercise or performance by them of 
their assigned powers or functions,  were protected against easy amendment or 
cancellation by certain provisions of the Constitution.   Any Bill seeking to amend the 
legislative or executive powers of the provinces,  as stipulated in sections 126 and 144 
of the Constitution respectively,  was required to be passed by both the House of 
Assembly and the Senate by a majority of at least two-thirds of all the members of each 
House.   The legislative and executive competences of a particular province could not be 
amended without the consent of the provincial legislature.   (Section 62(2).)   A Bill 
affecting the exercise or performance of the powers or functions of the provinces could 
not be adopted by Parliament unless it was passed separately by both Houses.   Should 
the Bill affect the exercise or performance of the powers or functions of a particular 
province or provinces only,  it also had to be approved by a majority of the senators of 
the province or provinces in question in the Senate.   (Section 61.)          
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6.6 Treatment of specific public functions 
 
The 1993 Constitution fixed responsibility for the performance of specific public 
functions in two places,  viz section 126,  which set out the legislative competence of 
the provinces,  and chapter 14,  which dealt with the defence and policing functions.   
These two groupings of functions are examined seriatim below.   It should be borne in 
mind that the term “public function” is used with the definition provided in chapter 3 of 
the thesis,  viz a complex,  logically inclusive composite of activities undertaken by one 
or more government departments,  or other public institutions,  and which is directed at 
the satisfaction of a particular need of the community,  or part of the community.   Only 
those sets of activities which are focused directly on the satisfaction of community 
needs are included within the purview of the thesis.   Functions performed by 
government departments or other public institutions which are essentially of an enabling 
or controlling nature,  and which impact indirectly on community need satisfaction,  are   
excluded from the scope of the present study.   Prime examples of such functions which 
are dealt with in the Constitution are the financing of government programmes,  the 
control of expenditure,  the administration of the public service,  and the auditing 
function. 
 
6.6.1 Public functions assigned to the provinces 
 
The key information as to the public functions which were assigned to the provinces as 
their responsibility is to be found in schedule 6 of the Constitution,  read with section 
126(1) which refers to the schedule.   Indeed,  schedule 6 lies at the heart of the 
constitutional structure set in place by the 1993 Constitution.   It served as the base on 
which the broad structure of government and public administration of the new South 
Africa was built.   Read with section 126(1) it essentially demarcated the powers of the 
provinces,  a core question focused on by the Multiparty Negotiating Process.   In view 
of its importance at the time,  schedule 6 requires close examination.   The main 
features of the schedule were as follows: 
 
??   The schedule consisted of 29 items,  arranged alphabetically from “agriculture” to 
“welfare services”. 
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??   The items making up the schedule were designated as “functional areas” by section 
126(1) of the Constitution.   Section 126(1) made it clear that the legislative authority 
of the provinces consisted of the competence to make laws with regard to all matters 
which fell within the functional areas listed in the schedule.  
 
??   Linguistically viewed,  the 29 items listed in the schedule as “functional areas” all 
have the appearance of subjects,  in the ordinary dictionary sense of the word,  
including “agriculture”,  “consumer protection”,  “indigenous law and customary law”,  
“provincial public media”,  “soil conservation”,  and “welfare services”. 
 
??   Although the schedule purported,  in the wording of its heading,  to reflect the 
legislative competence of the provinces,  this claim was only partially valid in view of 
the fact that the national Parliament was competent to also make laws regarding 
matters falling within the listed functional areas (section 126(2A) of the Constitution).   
A correct  heading would have read,  “Functional areas of concurrent legislative 
competence of Parliament and the provincial legislatures”. 
 
??   Eight of the 29 functional areas listed have qualifications attached to them,  the 
qualifications being of three types.   Firstly,  there is the exclusion of certain parts of 
a functional area,  specifically in the case of airports,  education at all levels,  and 
nature conservation.   Secondly,  there is the limitation of a functional area to the 
provincial sphere,  specifically in the case of language policy,  provincial public 
media,  and provincial sport and recreation.   Thirdly,  there is the subjection of law 
making in a functional area to specified parts of the Constitution,  as in the case of 
language policy,  local government,  and police. 
 
??   In stark contrast to the Constitutional treatment of the public functions related to 
defence and policing,  where the aspects (or sub-functions) making up the functions 
are spelt out in detail (vide following section) the schedule withholds virtually all 
constituent detail of the 29 functional areas with which it is concerned.            
 
The shortcomings of schedule 6 as a key element of the 1993 Constitution will be 
examined as part of the general critique of the assignment of responsibilities by the 
Constitution in section 6.7 infra.  
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6.6.2 Defence and policing 
 
Defence was not mentioned in schedule 6 of the Constitution,  in which the concurrent 
legislative competences of the national and provincial governments were listed – this 
public function was clearly seen as the responsibility of the national government.   A 
part of chapter 14 of the Constitution (sections 224-228) was devoted to the National 
Defence Force,  providing for its establishment,  command and control,  its membership,  
and its accountability,  and setting out its functions.   The Defence Force could be 
employed – 
 
?? for service in defence of the Republic,  for the protection of its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; 
?? for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with 
regard to international bodies and other states; 
?? for service in the preservation of life,  health or property; 
?? for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services; 
?? for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the 
South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the Police 
Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own;  and 
?? for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic 
upliftment (section 227(1)). 
 
Although the Constitution spoke of services to be rendered by the Defence Force,  this 
was but another way of stipulating various aspects (or sub-functions) making up a major 
public function.   In “function language” one could say that the function was conceived 
as consisting inter alia of defending the Republic,  protecting its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity,  and complying with (stipulated) obligations.   What is noteworthy is 
the completeness and clarity with which the Constitution set out what was to be or could 
be done by the national government under the rubric of “defence”.                   
 
As regards policing,  schedule 6 contained an entry reading “ … Police – subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 14”.   The provisions in question (vide especially sections 214 to 
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220) created a dual functional relationship between the national and the provincial 
governments with regard to police matters,  with the following key features: 
 
?? The South African Police Service was to be established and regulated by an Act of 
Parliament (section 214) but a provincial legislature could also pass laws related to 
the Service,  provided that such laws did not conflict with national legislation (section 
217(3) and (4)). 
 
?? Although the Service would be a single entity,  political executive oversight was to be 
exercised at both national and provincial levels.   The national Minister would be 
“responsible for the Service” (section 216(1)),  while in each province a member of 
the executive council would be charged with “responsibility for the performance 
(author’s emphasis) by the Service in or in regard to that province” of certain 
stipulated functions (section 217(1), section 219(1)). 
 
?? A National Commissioner (of Police) was to be appointed by the President (section 
216(2)(a)).   The National Commissioner would in turn appoint a provincial 
commissioner in each province,  subject to the approval of the particular member of 
the executive council.   The National Commissioner was to exercise “executive 
command” of the Service (section 216(2)(b)),  but subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution dealing with provincial policing responsibilities (section 219(1)),  and the 
directions of the minister charged with responsibility for the Service – vide supra.                                  
 
?? A detailed exposition was given of the responsibilities of the National Commissioner 
and of the provincial commissioners respectively (section 218(1), section 219).   At 
the risk of over-simplification,  the provinces – through their provincial commissioners 
– were made responsible for day-to-day policing activities,  such as the investigation 
and prevention of crime and the maintenance of public order,  while the national 
police component was required to take responsibility for the maintenance of a sound 
police service,  the training of its members,  and various specialised police services,  
including the preservation of the internal security of the country,  the recording and 
provision of intelligence data,  the keeping of criminal records and statistics,  and the 
provision of forensic laboratory services. 
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For purposes of the thesis,  the setting out of the respective functional responsibilities 
for policing at the national and provincial levels of government is particularly significant.   
Indeed,  it constituted the only serious attempt by the constitution makers to effect a 
detailed separation of responsibilities regarding a public function between the national 
and provincial levels of government.  
           
                
6.7 Critical examination of the assignment of responsibilities 
 
Three focal points have been selected for a critical examination of the assignment of 
responsibilities in terms of the 1993 Constitution,  viz certain conceptual and technical 
aspects,  the realisation of assignment principles,  and the substance of the 
assignments.   These aspects are dealt with seriatim in the following paragraphs,  
followed by a brief comment on intergovernmental relations,  and a synopsis. 
   
6.7.1 Conceptual and technical aspects 
 
The term “public function” is evidently one of considerable importance in the practice of 
public administration,  as well as in the scientific study of this area of societal activity 
(vide the analysis and definition of the term in section 3.3.3 of the thesis).   The term,  or 
more precisely the concept which it represents,  is no less important in the disciplines of 
Constitutional Law and Political Science,  irrespective of the terminology which may be 
peculiar to these disciplines.   The importance of the term lies in the fact that its meaning 
is located in nothing less than what the multitude of public institutions in the country are 
required to do in accomplishing the respective purposes for which they have been 
established,  viz in their activities,  at both the political executive and the administrative 
levels.   Although the term is defined in a particular way in the thesis (vide section 3.3.3) 
the concept is not new.   Public functions as defined,  are as old as the establishment of 
public institutions,  certainly in South Africa.   One of the tasks given to the Public 
Service Commission by the Public Service Act 27 of 1923,  was to make 
recommendations concerning the functions of departments,  that is to say concerning 
what they should do.   Although the Public Service Commission is no longer charged 
with this responsibility,  the term “function” (and the associated concept) has been 
retained in the legal framework for the administration of the public service (vide sections 
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3(2)(a)(i) and 3(3)(b) of the Public Service Act 1994,  as amended).   In examining the 
assignment of responsibilities by the 1993 Constitution,  it is appropriate and necessary 
to note how the Constitution dealt with a key concept in public administration. 
 
The Constitution did not employ the term “public function” but it did use the term 
“function” with a conceptually equivalent meaning in one of its chapters,  viz chapter 14,  
which dealt with the Police Service and the National Defence Force.   The Constitution 
also used the term in other senses,  as for example in referring to the functions of the 
President (sections 75 and 82(1)),  of the executive deputy presidents (section 84(5)),  of 
ministers (section 90),  of the Judicial Service Commission (section 105(2)),  of the 
Public Protector (section 112(1)),  of the Human Rights Commission (section 116(1)),  
and of provincial premiers (sections 144(1) and 147(1)).   For present purposes,  
however,  the focus is on the activities (programmes) carried out by public institutions for 
the satisfaction of community needs – vide definition of the term “public function’ in 
section 3.3.3 of the thesis. 
 
To return to chapter 14 of the Constitution:  The functions of the Police Service were 
clearly set out in section 215,  including for example the prevention of crime and the 
maintenance of law and order.   In addition there were correct,  passing references in 
other sections of the chapter to the functions to be performed by the Service,  for 
example in sections 217(3) and 217 (4).   In setting out what the National Defence Force 
was required to do,  a different terminology and style of drafting was employed.   
Although the heading of section 227 read “Functions of the National Defence Force” we 
are told in section 227(1) that the Defence Force could be employed to provide six 
specified services.   The language used was appropriate to the term “service”;  so for 
example it was stipulated that the Defence Force could be employed inter alia “ … for 
service in defence of the Republic,  for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity” (section 227(1)(a)).   If “function language” had been employed,  the text would 
have read “ … to defend the Republic in the protection of its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity”.   It is not clear why different formulations were used in dealing with two major 
public functions within the scope of a single chapter.   However,  this is not the end of 
the conceptual inconsistency to be found in chapter 14. 
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Section 218(1) provided a list of the responsibilities,  consisting of 14 items,  to be 
discharged by the National Police Commissioner.   As could be expected a number of 
the responsibilities were of a managerial nature,  for instance the maintenance of an 
impartial,  accountable,  transparent and efficient police service (section 218(1)(a)),  and 
the training of members of the Service (section 218(1)(g)).   Interspersed with the 
managerial  responsibilities were “responsibilities” which have the unmistakable look of 
public functions,  for example the preservation of the internal security of the Republic 
(section 218(1)(c)),  and the investigation and prevention of organised crime (section 
218(1)(d)).   The first of these,  the preservation of the internal security of the Republic,  
was a repetition in words of what had already been indicated (correctly) as a policing 
function in section 215.   A similar mixing of managerial responsibilities and public 
functions was to be found in section 219 of the Constitution in which the responsibilities 
of the provincial commissioners were set out. 
 
The haphazard,  undefined,  inconsistent and confusing use of terms like “function”,  
“service”,  and “responsibility” in the Constitution in dealing with two major public 
functions of crucial importance to the community,  is not acceptable.   The purposeful 
advancement of the practice and study of public administration – certainly also in relation 
to the policing and defence functions – requires the clarification of concepts as well as 
the definition and consistent use of the associated terminology (vide section 3.3.3 of the 
thesis where the terms “public function” and “responsibility” are inter alia analysed and 
defined).   Perhaps it is time that that the ubiquitous term “service” also be given a 
definite meaning or standardised set of meanings for purposes of the practice and study 
of public administration.   
 
The term “function”,  which was used in dealing with the Police Service and the National 
Defence Force in chapter 14,  in some places correctly,  was not used in chapter 9,  
which was focused on provincial government.   In setting out the legislative competence 
of the provinces the Constitution spoke not of functions but of “matters” falling within 
“functional areas” (vide section 6.6.1 supra).   At a conceptual level a functional area,  as 
specified in schedule 6 of the Constitution,  is not a function,  and specifically not a 
public function.   A public function as defined in the thesis is essentially an action,  an 
activity or set of activities – it is something which is done.   One cannot “do” agriculture 
or welfare services,  to mention just two of the functional areas listed in schedule 6 of the 
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Constitution.   In public administration one could promote agriculture or render welfare 
services,  and also regulate agriculture or welfare services.   As indicated in section 
6.6.1 supra a functional area as listed in schedule 6 has the appearance of a subject.   It 
is not something which can de done,  but something which – as indicated by the Concise 
Oxford dictionary - can be discussed or described or represented,  or which could be 
treated of or dealt with,  or which,  as in the present instance,  could also serve as a 
collective noun.   Although a functional area,  linked as it is to the making of laws,  has 
an obvious connection to a public function as defined in the thesis,  it is not a public 
function per se.         
 
It could not be ascertained from the records of the Multiparty Negotiating Process,  why 
the particular terminology was used in drafting what was to be enacted as section 126(1) 
of the 1993 Constitution,  or why different terminology was used in dealing with 
concurrent legislative competences in chapter 9 of the Constitution compared to that 
used in dealing with the police and defence functions in chapter 14.   It is possible that 
the drafters were focused primarily on producing a formulation which would be amenable 
to legal interpretation.   It is probably true to say that any law,  to make sense,  must deal 
with a matter,  or a number of matters,  or an aspect of a matter.   The drafters of the 
Constitution may have found it a workable approach to focus on matters and to 
demarcate the matters a province could make laws on by identifying a number of subject 
matter areas,  for which the term “functional areas” was found to be appropriate.   A 
further and closely associated explanation is probably to be found in the decision to 
adopt the mechanism of concurrent powers.   Having opted for an assignment scheme in 
which both Parliament and a provincial legislature could make laws regarding the same 
matters in specified subject matter areas,  combined with rules to decide,  when 
necessary,  whose law would prevail in certain circumstances,  it was presumably no 
longer necessary to spell out the exact scope and limits of provincial competence,  an 
endeavour which would have necessitated the employment of more precise terminology. 
         
Schedule 6 of the Constitution which listed the functional areas encompassing matters in 
respect of which the provincial legislatures would be competent to make laws,  is open to 
criticism at a technical level on a number of grounds.   The first has already been alluded 
to above,  viz a functional area is not a public function,  and the listing of functional areas 
provided no certainty as to the public functions or aspects of public functions provincial 
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legislatures could legislate about.   It could be argued that the schedule as designed was 
acceptable for purposes of accommodating the mechanism of concurrent powers 
incorporated in the Constitution,  but the fact of the matter is that the schedule (vide its 
heading) purported to reflect the legislative competence of the provinces – which it did 
not,  at least not with any degree of precision.   In respect of three of the functional 
areas,  viz “airports”,  “education”,  and “nature conservation”,  certain parts of the 
functional area were excluded,  for instance university and technicon education in the 
case of education.   Why certain of the functional areas had exclusions attached to them 
and not others,  is not clear.   Surely parts of other major functional areas like 
“agriculture”,  “environment”,  “health services”,  “housing”,  “public transport”,  and 
“welfare services” should also have been reserved to the national government?   A 
further,  similar ground for criticism is that provisos (“subject to” qualifications) were 
attached to three of the functional areas,  viz “language policy and the regulation of the 
use of official languages within a province”,  “local government”,  and “police”,  but not in 
respect of other functional areas,  in respect of which such provisos could no doubt also 
have been stipulated.   Finally,  schedule 6 could be criticised on the ground that a 
citizen wishing to know what the legislative competences of the provinces were,  could  
have been misled by the schedule into thinking that such competences were vastly more 
extensive than what was actually provided for in the Constitution.                      
 
6.7.2 Realisation of assignment principles 
 
At the end of section 6.3.3 supra a number of assignment principles inherent in the 
formulation of constitutional principles making up schedule 4 of the 1993 Constitution 
were identified as being relevant in relation to the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions to levels of government.   The identified principles are as 
follows: 
 
?? The principle of national unity; 
?? the principle of economic unity; 
?? the principle of equality; 
?? the principle of provincial autonomy;  
?? the principle of co-operation;  and  
?? the principle of cultural self-determination. 
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In this section of the thesis the extent to which the aforementioned principles were 
realised in the drafting of the text of the Constitution is examined. 
 
The principle of national unity was fully realised in the text of the Constitution;  in fact it 
was assured by the way in which functions and powers were allocated to the respective 
levels of government.   The Constitution did not provide for a division of powers between 
the various levels of government.   No matters were identified in respect of which the 
provinces could exercise exclusive powers.   They were afforded concurrent powers in 
respect of matters falling within specified functional areas,  but the exercise of these 
powers was made subject to an overriding power which could be exercised by the 
national government in certain circumstances.   The circumstances in which national 
overriding legislation would be justified,  as set out in section 126(3) of the Constitution 
(vide also section 6.5.2 supra) – were such as to place the national government in the 
position to effectively ensure the maintenance of national unity.   No original powers 
were given to the local level of government and no threat to national unity could 
therefore have emerged from that quarter. 
 
In accordance with the principle of economic unity,  the Constitution reserved basic 
responsibilities like the control of the currency and the banking system to the national 
government.   Although a number of functional areas in respect of which the provinces 
were given concurrent legislative powers had a direct bearing on the economy - 
including for example agriculture,  consumer protection,  the environment,  housing,  
public transport,  trade and industrial promotion,  and urban and rural development - all 
of these were subject to the national override provisions contained in section 126(3) of 
the Constitution.   Section 126(3)(d) is especially relevant,  referring as it did to the 
maintenance of economic unity,  the promotion of interprovincial commerce,  and the 
protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods,  services,  capital,  
and labour.   In addition,  section 126(3)(e) effectively ruled out any provincial law which 
would materially prejudice the economic interests of another province or of the country 
as a whole,  or would impede the implementation of national economic policies.   While 
provision was made for a provincial legislature to raise certain taxes and to impose 
surcharges on national taxes (section 156),  and for a province to raise loans for capital 
expenditure (section 157(1)(b)),  both powers were made subject to Acts to be passed 
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by the national legislature.   The maintenance of economic unity was assured by the 
1993 Constitution. 
 
Apart from the prominence accorded to equality as a basic value in the fundamental 
rights enshrined in chapter 3 of the Constitution,  the Constitution also contained 
provisions calculated to ensure that in the development and implementation of 
government programmes there would be equality of treatment for all affected by such 
programmes.   The national override provisions to which reference has already been 
made,  placed a premium on uniform norms and standards that were to apply generally 
throughout the Republic (section 126(3)(b)),  and on the setting of minimum standards 
for the rendering of public services (section 126(3)(d)).   In addition the Constitution was 
written so as to rule out inequality in the treatment of people.   Section 4(1) provided that 
any law or act inconsistent with its provisions,  which would include the constitutional 
principles,  would be of no force and effect.   By means of section 4(2) the Constitution 
bound all legislative,  executive and judicial organs of state at all levels of government.    
All these requirements have important implications for the assignment of responsibilities 
to governments. 
 
The principle of provincial autonomy was realised in the text of the Constitution only to a 
limited extent.   The true measure of a government’s autonomy is the extent to which it 
may adopt laws to regulate its affairs to the exclusion of the involvement of any other 
government.   The provinces were not granted exclusive legislative authority in regard to 
any matter – in direct contradiction of constitutional principle XIX which specified the 
granting of such powers in addition to concurrent powers.   However,  the Constitution 
did provide some protection to the provinces in regard to their powers and functions by 
providing that a Bill affecting provincial powers and functions had to be passed 
separately by both Houses of Parliament,  and that a Bill affecting the powers and 
functions of a particular province or provinces had to be approved also by a majority of 
the senators of the province or provinces in question (section 61). 
 
As regards the principle of co-operation,  the text of the Constitution did not contain 
provisions stipulating what co-operation between the levels of government – specifically 
concerning the performance of public functions – was to entail,  or how it was to be 
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achieved.   This was in marked contrast to the Constitution which was to follow in 1996,   
which included a separate chapter on co-operative government. 
 
The principle of cultural self-determination achieved embodiment in the 1993 
Constitution,  although not initially and only in a token manner,  with the insertion of 
chapter 11A by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 
1994.   The additional chapter provided for the establishment of a Volkstaat Council,  
which was conceived of as a constitutional mechanism by means of which proponents of 
the idea of a Volkstaat could pursue the establishment of such an entity.   No actual 
provision was made for legislative or executive institutions which would be culturally 
based, and no indication given of the public functions which could possibly be assigned 
to such bodies as their responsibility.   However,  it is fair to say that the Constitution,  as 
amended,  held out the possibility that a culturally focused sphere of government could 
be built into the broad governmental framework. 
 
In summary,  only three of the six principles singled out for examination,  viz the principle 
of national unity,  the principle of economic unity,  and the principle of equality,  could be 
said to have been fully realised in the governmental dispensation set in place by the 
1993 Constitution.   The principle of provincial autonomy did not find substantial 
embodiment in the structures of government;  the principle of co-operation was not made 
manifest in the text of the Constitution;  and the principle of cultural self-determination 
received no more than passive and conditional acknowledgement.                                     
  
6.7.3 Substance 
 
It is necessary to focus also on the substance of the allocation of functions and powers 
to the various levels of government by the Constitution. 
 
Anyone embarking on a reading of the Constitution with a view to establishing exactly 
what responsibilities were allocated to the provincial and local levels of government,  is 
bound to experience a degree of epistemic frustration.   There is less of a problem in 
ascertaining the functions and powers allowed to the national level of government.   
Although the Constitution did not say that the residuary powers of legislative and 
executive government were vested in the national government,  it did stipulate that the 
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legislative authority of the Republic vested in (the national) Parliament,  which had the 
power to make laws for the Republic (section 37),  and proceeded to stipulate that the 
executive authority of the Republic with regard to all matters falling within the legislative 
competence of Parliament,  vested in the President (section 75).   By implication,  any 
public function not specifically allocated to a level of government as its responsibility – as 
for example foreign affairs or the control of the currency – would be the responsibility of 
the national government.   The Constitution spelt out in considerable detail the national 
government’s responsibilities in regard to two major public functions,  viz defence and 
policing (Constitution: chapter 14).   In addition the national government was given a 
concurrent competence with the provincial governments in regard to matters falling 
within specified “functional areas” (section 126(2A) read with schedule 6).   In effect,  the 
constitutional competence of the national government extended to all public functions 
required to be performed in the Republic,  albeit subject to the observance of certain 
“rules” in regard to the exercise of powers in the concurrent category. 
 
As regards the provincial level of government,  the Constitution did not provide a clear 
and unambiguous picture of what the responsibilities of the provincial governments 
would be.   The legislative competence of the provinces was subsumed in a category of 
concurrent powers to be exercised by the national and the provincial governments.   
Although provision was made in the constitutional principles (constitutional principle XIX) 
for the allocation of exclusive powers to the provinces in addition to concurrent powers,  
there was no carry through of this specification into the text of the Constitution.   No 
public function,  or aspect of a public function,  could thus be performed by a provincial 
government as an original right,  that is to say to the complete exclusion of the national 
government.   As regards the substance of a province’s legislative competences in terms 
of the mechanism of concurrent powers,  a careful reading of the particular part of the 
Constitution (section 126 read with schedule 6) will show that the provinces were 
afforded no more than a potential to make laws concerning certain demarcated matters.   
This potential was materially affected by the countervailing power of the national 
government to make laws regarding the same matters (section 126(2A)).   Then again,  
the “rules” of the concurrent powers game have to be noted.   Although the Constitution 
stipulated that a provincial law would prevail over a national law,  it would not prevail 
when one or more of five sets of circumstances,  also stipulated in the Constitution,  
obtained (section 126(3)).   These sets of circumstances provided the grounds on which 
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national legislation would override provincial legislation.   The sets of circumstances 
were formulated so widely that the scope for national legislation in the concurrent 
powers category was substantially increased and that for provincial legislation 
substantially decreased.   Concurrent powers were clearly not intended to be equal.   It 
requires little imagination to envision a situation in which the national level of 
government would dominate the legislative scene;  a situation which appears to have 
arisen in South Africa (Pottie 2001:42-43).   It would be fair comment to say that in the 
significant area of legislative powers – the primary locus of governmental power - the 
Constitution provided only a limited amount of substance to the provinces.                                    
 
As far as executive government is concerned,  the situation of the provinces was 
markedly different.   The Constitution provided ample scope for the provinces to play a 
substantial role in the rendering of services to their communities.   Even in instances 
where a public function was regulated by an Act of Parliament,  the law could entrust the 
actual rendering of a service to the provinces.   This was certainly the situation on the 
ground following the implementation of the Constitution,  with the provinces being made 
responsible for the provision of major services,  especially in the fields of education,  
health,  and welfare,  and acquiring extensive administrative structures in the process.   
The Constitution provided specifically that in addition to matters governed by its own 
legislation,  a province could also be given executive authority in respect of matters 
assigned to it by or under any law,  as well as matters delegated to it by or under any 
law (section 144(2)).   In contrast to a strictly circumscribed and problematical role in the 
legislative field the provinces,  under the 1993 Constitution,  could be and were charged 
with substantial executive responsibilities. 
 
Finally, the position in regard to local government needs to be noted.   The Constitution 
did not allocate any original functions and powers to the local level of government.   The 
functions and powers of local government were to be determined by law of a competent 
authority (section 175(1)),  a competent authority being either Parliament or the 
appropriate provincial legislature (section 126(1), section 126 (2A), schedule 6).   A 
bylaw of a local government could not be inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament or a provincial law (section 175(4)).   The actual substance of the 
responsibilities to be discharged by local governments was therefore not to be found in 
the Constitution as such,  although the Constitution did require local governments to 
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“make provision for access” by persons residing within its area of jurisdiction to certain 
services (section 175(3)).   The Constitution was not particularly noteworthy for its 
treatment of or regard for local government as the level of government which in many 
ways has the most direct effect on the quality of life enjoyed by the residents of a 
particular locality. 
 
6.7.4 Intergovernmental relations 
 
As indicated in section 6.5.4 supra,  the Constitution did not make provision for 
intervention by a higher level government in the affairs of a lower level government.   
The lack of such a provision can be seen as a shortcoming of the Constitution,  given the 
stage of development of the country and the real prospect that a subnational  
government could fail to discharge or be incapable of discharging its assigned 
responsibilities.   A commendable feature of the Constitution was the protection afforded 
the provinces – as noted in section 6.5.5 supra – against easy amendment of the powers 
given to them in the Constitution,  as well as the easy adoption of legislation by 
Parliament affecting the exercise or performance of their powers or functions.    
 
6.7.5 Synopsis 
 
Evaluation of a state of affairs requires a standard against which an assessment can be 
made.   In the present instance,  an operational standard is discoverable by noting the 
implications of the decision by the negotiating parties to establish a three-tiered 
governmental structure.   To be credible such a structure would need to evince an 
allocation or assignment of responsibilities appropriate to each level of government,  
combined with whatever intergovernmental arrangements may be considered necessary 
to promote the efficient functioning of the whole.   It goes without saying that such 
allocation and arrangements should be presented with sufficient clarity.   The key 
question to be posed therefore is whether,  and how well,  the 1993 Constitution 
succeeded in establishing a credible and clear-cut deployment of responsibilities over 
the three levels of government which it instituted. 
 
On critical examination of the assignment scheme embodied in the 1993 (“interim”) 
Constitution,  various difficulties are evident at a conceptual and technical level.   In 
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addition,  it is apparent that the assignment principles inherent in the constitutional 
principles were realised in the constitutional text with varying degrees of conviction.   But 
it was the substance of the assignment scheme which constituted the major problem,  
specifically with regard to the competences of the subnational levels of government.    
 
Despite a specification in the constitutional principles that provincial governments should 
also be allocated exclusive powers,  this did not materialise in the constitutional text as 
finally adopted.   The power ordering mechanism which was adopted,  viz that of 
concurrent powers,  is an inherently problematic one,  as is evidenced by comments 
contained in the literature surveyed as part of the present research – vide Laufer (1991),  
De Villiers (1996),  Robson (1998a),  Pottie (2001),  and Levy and Tapscott (2001).   In 
the author’s own experience the mechanism of concurrent powers fails to provide 
certainty as to which level of government is responsible for what;  tends to place the 
weight of legislative power regarding matters in the concurrent category with the national 
government;  tends correspondingly to inhibit the provinces in the exercise of their 
legislative powers;  and leads to a situation in which responsibilities are determined at a 
political executive level rather than in the Constitution itself.   It is also the author’s view 
that the concurrent powers mechanism does little to promote an understanding of the 
Constitution amongst the public at large. 
 
The alternative to concurrent powers would have been an assignment scheme,   
embodied in the Constitution,  in which the respective powers of the national and the 
provincial governments were clearly specified.   This was the approach advocated by the 
Commission for Administration,  but one which did not find favour with the participants in 
the negotiating process.   The reason for the rejection of the specified powers approach 
could not be found in the archives of the Multiparty Negotiating Process.   However,  an 
author close to the process has noted that,  faced with the task of compiling exhaustive 
lists of national and provincial powers respectively,  or finding a way of expressing the 
interests of both levels of government in a multitude of functional areas,  the constitution 
makers opted for the latter approach,  which led to the adoption of the concurrent 
powers mechanism (Haysom 2001:47-48).   On reflection,  the decision to emerge from 
the negotiating process may have been justified under the circumstances.   It has to be 
borne in mind that the negotiating parties were operating under extreme pressures of 
time,  that a decision had been taken at a relatively early stage that the constitution to be 
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produced would be a transitional one,  that the final resolution of the allocation of powers 
question was not crucial to the setting in place of a fully democratic constitution,  and 
that in any case there were international precedents for the allocation of concurrent 
powers.   Nevertheless,  no real division of power between the national and the 
provincial levels of government was achieved. 
 
Apart from the difficulties inherent in the mechanism of concurrent powers and the failure 
to give effect to constitutional principle XIX (exclusive powers),  the constitutional 
treatment of the provinces as regards powers and functions also needs to be weighed 
against a number of other constitutional principles,  viz XVI (government to be structured 
at three levels),  XVIII (powers and functions of provinces to be defined in the 
constitution),  XX (provinces to have appropriate and adequate legislative and executive 
powers;  allocation of powers to recognise the need for and promote legitimate provincial 
autonomy and to acknowledge cultural diversity),  XXI-6 (provinces to be empowered to 
deal with the socio-economic and cultural needs and the general well-being of their 
inhabitants),  and XXII (no encroachment by the national government on the functional 
integrity of the provinces).   The question may well be asked to what extent the 
Constitution in allocating powers and functions to the provinces satisfied all these 
requirements. 
 
The local level of government was neglected – this despite the apparent emphasis 
placed on the importance of local government in section 174 of the Constitution.   This 
part of the Constitution provided inter alia that local government would be “autonomous”,  
that it would be “entitled to regulate its affairs” (albeit within the limits prescribed by or 
under law),  and that Parliament or a provincial legislature could not encroach on the 
powers,  functions and structure of a local government to such an extent as to “ … 
compromise the fundamental status,  purpose and character of local government”.   One 
may have expected that a convincing way in which to accomplish these fine objectives 
would have been to allocate appropriate,  original powers to local governments to enable 
(empower?) them to truly regulate their own affairs.   This the Constitution did not do.   
Under the Constitution local governments could do nothing that was not given to them to 
do by laws passed at a higher level of government. 
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The Constitution was far less problematical from the viewpoint of executive government 
and administration.   The Constitution was written in a way which allowed more than 
enough scope for political executive bodies and their supporting departments at the 
subnational levels of government to take responsibility for a vast number of programmes 
aimed at supplying the needs of their communities.   However,  their activities were to 
take place largely within a policy and legal framework  determined at the national level of 
government.    
 
The Constitution did not,  in the author’s opinion,  succeed in achieving a substantial,  
sufficiently informative,  easily accessible,  and readily explicable deployment of 
responsibilities over the three levels of government which it instituted.   It needs to be 
stated that this is a finding arrived at largely from a rational and technical perspective;  it 
is possible that the political and practical realities of the time did not allow for the 
allocation of greater or more precisely defined responsibilities to the provincial and local 
levels of government.                
 
                
6.8 Conclusion 
 
The development of South Africa’s first democratic constitution necessarily implied a 
comprehensive de novo exercise in constitution writing.   During the multi-party 
negotiations consensus was reached that constitution making would take place in two 
phases,  viz the setting in place of a transitional constitution which would serve to move 
the country onto a democratic footing for the first time in its history,  followed by the 
adoption of a “final” constitution which was to be written by a constitution making body 
truly representative of the people,  and to be adopted by a Parliament elected 
democratically in terms of the transitional constitution.   An outstanding feature of the 
constitution making process was the compilation and adoption by the negotiating parties 
of a comprehensive set of constitutional principles which were to direct the drafting of the 
“final” constitution,  but which were then also applied in the drafting of the transitional 
constitution. 
 
One of the most important matters to be addressed in the multi-party negotiations was 
the powers and functions to be exercised and performed by the provincial governments 
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which were to be instituted as the second tier of a three-tiered governmental structure.   
The importance of this matter is borne out by the fact that eleven of the thirty-four 
constitutional principles had to do with the allocation of powers and functions to 
governments.   Although the constitutional principles were formulated essentially as 
specifications to which a future constitution had to conform,  they nevertheless 
encompassed a number of important assignment principles. 
 
On the basis of three key facets of the assignment of responsibilities by the Constitution,  
viz conceptual and technical aspects,  the realisation of relevant assignment principles,  
and the substance of the assigned powers,  the conclusion to be reached is that the 
Constitution did not succeed in achieving a satisfactory deployment of responsibilities.   
Criticism of the assignment scheme has to be tempered by the realisation that it was 
after all a transitional constitution,  one that could not realistically have been expected to 
provide full and final answers in a highly contentious area of government and 
administration.   It is therefore necessary to look next at the answers provided by the 
1996 (“final”) Constitution – this is the focus of the ensuing chapter of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 7:  ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES:  1996 CONSTITUTION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The 1996 Constitution built on the structure and elaborated the content of the 1993 
Constitution.   It represented the finalisation of a constitutional development process,  
marked initially by the setting in place of an interim constitution,  which ushered in a fully 
democratic system of government,  and at the same time made provision for a “final” 
constitution to be written by the democratically elected representatives of the people.   
The Constitution differs from its forerunner,  but not radically so,  due mainly to the 
directive influence of the set of constitutional principles adopted by the Multiparty 
Negotiating Process.   In a sense,  the constitution which the country now has is the 
1993 Constitution grown to full maturity. 
 
It is appropriate to structure this chapter in basically the same way as the preceding 
chapter,  which focused on the 1993 Constitution.   The sections dealing with the making 
of the Constitution,  the general scheme for the assignment of responsibilities,  the 
treatment of specific public functions,  and the critical examination of the assignment of 
responsibilities,  correspond closely to the arrangement used in chapter 6.   However,  it 
was considered necessary to include two additional sections,  viz one dealing with the 
certification of the constitutional text by the Constitutional Court,  and one dealing with 
co-operative government.   The role played by the Constitutional Court has direct 
relevance for the study as the powers and functions of the provinces was a key issue 
addressed by the Court in the two certification judgements.   The idea of co-operative 
government,  already to be found in the constitutional principles adopted by the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process,  came to fruition fully in the 1996 Constitution,  with a 
chapter being devoted entirely to co-operative government. 
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7.2 Making of the Constitution 
 
The 1993 Constitution,  variously regarded as an interim or transitional constitution,  
contained comprehensive provisions with regard to the drafting and adoption of a new 
constitutional text for the country and its promulgation (1993 Constitution: chapter 5).   
As regards the drafting,  this was to be done by the Constitutional Assembly,  consisting 
of the National Assembly and the Senate,  sitting jointly (section 68(1) and (2)).   The 
Constitutional Assembly was given the competence to appoint committees of its 
members,  as well as any commissions,  technical committees and other advisory bodies 
to assist it in the performance of its functions (section 72(1)).   The Constitution went on 
to stipulate that the Constitutional Assembly had to appoint an independent panel of 
constitutional experts to assist it in its work (section 72(2)). 
 
The Executive Director of the Constitutional Assembly at the time has provided a 
concise record of the structuring and functioning of the Constitutional Assembly.   A 
Constitutional Committee,  consisting of 44 members,  was instituted and became the 
most important decision-making structure.   To further facilitate matters,  the 
Constitutional Committee established a subcommittee of 20 members,  with the 
membership varying according to the issue at hand.   There was also a management 
committee,  made up of 12 members,  which dealt with matters of process rather than 
substance,  and had the key task of ensuring that the constitution writing process 
remained on schedule.    The detailed work was assigned to six so-called theme 
committees,  each consisting of 30 members and managed by a chairperson and a core 
group of seven to eight members.   The main function of the theme committees was to 
ensure inclusivity by receiving views and submissions from interested parties and 
persons,  followed by the submission of reports for debate in the Constitutional 
Committee.   Each theme committee was supported by a technical committee of 
specialists and experts.   (Ebrahim 1998:180-182.)   The foregoing brief summary 
illustrates the scale of the arrangements set in place for producing the “final” constitution. 
 
The theme committee with special relevance to the subject of the thesis,   was Theme 
Committee 3,  which was assigned the task of dealing with the relationship between 
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levels of government.   It was mandated to deliberate with regard to constitutional 
principles XVI,  XVII,  and XXIV – 
 
??   the nature and status of the provincial system and local government; 
??   national and provincial executive and legislative competences; 
??   intergovernmental relations; 
??   local government;  and  
??   financial and fiscal relations. 
(Ebrahim 1998:184.) 
 
The Theme Committee held 50 meetings between September 1994 and August 1995,  
and processed 471 submissions from political parties,  government departments,  
organisations and individuals (Ebrahim 1998:338-339).   A final report by the Theme 
Committee per se could not be traced in the National Archives Repository.   There is a 
final report by the technical advisors to the Committee dated 5 September 1995.   This 
consists of a comparative schedule of political party submissions concerning various 
aspects of intergovernmental relations but does not deal with legislative and executive 
competences of the spheres of government.   (NA 1995.) 
 
Of particular relevance to the present study is the inclusion in the constitutional text,  as 
passed by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May 1996,  of a category of exclusive 
provincial legislative competences related to functional areas.   This evidently occurred 
at a very late stage.   A draft constitutional text dated 29 April 1996 – nine days before 
the final text was formally passed by the Constitutional Assembly – did not stipulate 
functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence (NA 1996a).   However,  
one day later – on 30 April 1996 – in a memorandum addressed to the members of the 
Constitutional Committee with the heading “Provincial exclusive legislative competences,  
schedule 4,  schedule 5,  local government”,  the Executive Director of the Constitutional 
Assembly submitted to the Committee “copies of drafts tabled before and being 
discussed in the multilateral”.   These drafts included an amended schedule 4 
(concurrent powers),  a new schedule 5 (exclusive provincial powers),  and amended 
text formulations to accommodate the exclusive provincial powers.   The draft provisions 
show a marked similarity to the provisions finally incorporated in the constitutional text 
passed by the Constitutional Assembly eight days later.   (NA 1996b.) 
  
222 
 
The directive role of the constitutional principles which were adopted in the course of the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process was acknowledged fully in the 1993 Constitution.   
Section 71 stipulated that the “final” constitutional text had to comply with the 
constitutional principles,  and that the text to be passed by the Constitutional Assembly,  
or any of its provisions,  would not be of any force or effect unless the Constitutional 
Court had certified that all the provisions of the text complied with the constitutional 
principles.   In the context of the thesis it is important to bear in mind that a number of 
the constitutional principles had a direct bearing on the assignment of responsibilities to 
subnational levels of government,  especially the provinces,  including one which 
stipulated that the powers and functions of the provinces as defined in the new text could 
not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in the “interim” 
Constitution (1993 Constitution: schedule 4: constitutional principle XVIII.2).   This latter 
requirement was to form the focal point of the certification process conducted in the 
Constitutional Court – vide ensuing section. 
 
 
7.3 Certification of the constitutional text by the Constitutional Court 
 
The 1993 Constitution – or the interim Constitution as it is widely referred to – contained 
extensive  provisions regarding the making of a new constitution and its adoption (1993 
Constitution: chapter 5),  including a stipulation that the text had to be certified by the 
Constitutional Court as complying with the constitutional principles (section 71(2)).   The 
Court’s decision on compliance would be final and binding (section 71(3)).   The Court’s 
role in the adoption of a new constitutional text,  with specific reference to the subject 
matter of the thesis,  can be examined conveniently by perusing in turn the Court’s first 
and second certification judgements. 
 
7.3.1 First certification judgement 
 
The Court adopted the procedure of allowing both written and oral representations and 
objections concerning the draft new constitutional text submitted to it.   Notices of 
objection,  written representations,  and oral argument were submitted by or on behalf of 
five political parties;  in addition,  objections were lodged by or on behalf of a further 84 
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bodies or individuals.   The political parties,  the Constitutional Assembly,  and 27 other 
bodies or persons were afforded a right of audience.   Hearings took place during July 
1996 and the Court delivered its judgement in September 1996.   (CC 1996a: para. 22-
25.) 
 
Having examined the constitutional text in the light of the constitutional principles the 
Court found that it was unable to certify that all the provisions of the text complied with 
the constitutional principles.   A major part of the grounds on which the Court refused to 
certify the text had to do with the allocation of powers and functions to the provinces.   In 
this respect,  the key obstacle in the way of certification of the text was constitutional 
principle XVIII.2,  which reads as follows: 
 
“The powers and functions of the provinces defined in the Constitution,  including the 
competence of a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its province,  shall not 
be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in this 
Constitution.” 
 
In assessing the constitutional text against the requirements of constitutional principle 
XVIII.2 the Court had to make a comparison between the provisions of the new text and 
those of the 1993 Constitution as they relate to the powers and functions of the 
provinces.   To be able to do this the Court found it necessary to identify and analyse a 
number of factors which affect the powers and functions of the provinces.   (CC 1996a: 
par. 446.)   In addition to comparing the lists of functional areas of provincial legislative 
competence contained in schedules 4 an 5 of the text with the list of such functional 
areas contained in schedule 6 of the 1993 Constitution,  the Court also compared the 
two constitutional texts with regard to numerous other matters,  including the 
representation of collective provincial interests in the national sphere of government,  the 
power to make provincial constitutions,  the financial and fiscal powers of the provinces,  
provincial public protectors,  provincial service commissions,  traditional leadership,  
provincial executive powers,  the power of the national government to intervene in 
provincial affairs and to override provincial legislation,  and the power of an individual 
province to resist national legislation which affects it specifically (CC 1996a: para. 447-
468). 
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Having given a weight to each of the factors which it analysed the Court came to the 
conclusion that the powers and functions of the provinces in terms of the new 
constitutional text were less than and inferior to the powers and functions which the 
provinces enjoyed under the 1993 Constitution (CC 1996a: par.471).   The Court then 
had to come to a finding regarding the question whether the powers and functions of the 
provinces in the new constitutional text were substantially less than or substantially 
inferior to those allocated in the 1993 Constitution.   The Court stated that this was the 
most difficult of all the questions it had been required to address in the certification 
proceedings.   (CC 1996a: par. 472.) 
 
In moving to a final conclusion the Court identified and dealt with the following factors as 
key considerations: 
 
??   Possible differences in the collective powers of the provinces,  in fiscal and financial 
powers,  and in their powers concerning the adoption of provincial constitutions:  The 
Court found no measurable difference in the collective powers of the provinces 
resulting from the replacement of the Senate by the National Council of Provinces.   
It also found no material change in respect of the fiscal and financial powers of the 
provinces,  or in their powers in respect of the adoption of provincial constitutions 
(CC 1996a: par.474). 
 
?? The extent of provincial legislative competence as reflected in schedules 4 and 5 of 
the new constitutional text,  including local government matters which were made 
subject to monitoring by the provinces:  The Court found the list of provincial 
competences to be extensive and noted the significance of the competences,  
including as they did numerous important functional areas (CC1996a: para. 475-
476). 
 
?? The loss or curtailment of powers in respect of functional areas:  The Court noted 
that none of the functional areas set out in schedule 6 of the 1993 Constitution had 
been excluded,  although in some instances the extent of the powers had been 
curtailed.   The Court in this connection emphasised particularly policing,  education,  
local government,  and traditional leadership (CC 1996a: par. 477).   The Court 
expressed the view that the curtailment of the particular aspects of provincial powers 
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would not be sufficient in themselves to lead to the conclusion that the powers of the 
provinces were substantially less than or substantially inferior to the powers vested in 
them by the 1993 Constitution (CC 1996a: para. 478-479). 
 
What ultimately swayed the Court in finding that constitutional principle XVIII.2 had not 
been complied with,  were the powers given to the national government by section 146 
of the new constitutional text in relation to the mechanism of concurrent powers.   The 
Court reasoned that a presumption in favour of national legislation which had been 
approved by the National Council of Provinces (section 146(4) of the text),  and an 
alteration made in the scope for national overrides to succeed (section 146(2)(b)),  gave 
added strength to national legislation in the concurrent category,  and weakened 
correspondingly the position of the provinces should there be a conflict with competing 
provincial legislation.   (CC1996a: par 480.) 
 
The Court proceeded to find that,  taken together,  the combined weight of the 
curtailment of powers which the Court had identified,  and the altered override provisions 
in favour of national legislation,  were sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the powers 
and functions allocated to the provinces in terms of the new constitutional text were 
substantially less than and inferior to the powers and functions of the provinces as 
stipulated in the 1993 Constitution (CC1996a: para. 481-482). 
 
It is relevant for purposes of the study to also note the Court’s finding in regard to 
constitutional principle XX.   This principle requires inter alia that each level of 
government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and 
functions that will enable each to function effectively.   The three criteria to be satisfied 
are appropriateness,  adequacy,  and effectiveness.   It would seem that the setting of 
this requirement is the closest the constitutional principles came to acknowledging the 
need for an allocation rationale,  or in other words a directive or normative basis for 
deciding – within a tiered governmental structure – who should do what.    
 
Unfortunately,  the Court did not devote much attention to the lead requirement of 
constitutional principle XX.   In its judgement the Court referred to the basic criteria set in 
the principle but moved on immediately to the issue of legitimate provincial autonomy,  
which was identified in the principle as an important objective to be striven for in the 
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allocation of powers.   The Court opined that argument advanced on behalf of objectors 
to the new constitutional text was “ … not really that the powers of the provinces are not 
appropriate or adequate but rather that their legitimate autonomy has not been promoted 
...”.   (CC1996a: par.236.)   Evidently the Court adopted the debatable view that the topic 
of legitimate provincial autonomy subsumes the question of whether the powers of the 
provinces are appropriate or adequate for their effective functioning.   The Court 
proceeded to devote half a chapter of its judgement (chapter V, part B) to an analysis 
and discussion of a number of aspects bearing on the question of legitimate provincial 
autonomy,  but without attempting to assess whether the public functions or aspects of 
public functions assigned to the provinces as their responsibility were appropriate and 
adequate so as to enable them to function effectively.   Even where the Court dealt with 
specific public functions,  such as policing and education,  its purpose was to point to 
differences between the constitutional texts and not to assess appropriateness or 
adequacy (CC1996a: para. 391-401, 448, 477- 478).   The Court did deal fully with local 
government issues (CC1996a: chapter VI; chapter VII, part E),  but local government is 
not a public function like the promotion of health or the provision of education;  it is more 
correctly regarded as a sphere of government encompassing a number of public 
functions as defined for purposes of the thesis (vide section 3.3.3).   In context,  the term 
“local government” connotes the direction and control over municipal affairs which is to 
be exercised by the national and provincial spheres of government respectively.                     
 
7.3.2 Second certification judgement 
 
With the Constitutional Court having declined to certify the new constitutional text,  the 
Constitutional Assembly reconvened and in October 1996 passed an amended text 
which addressed the grounds for non-certification set out in the first certification 
judgement.   The amended text was duly submitted to the Court for certification,  and this 
time the Court found that all the provisions of the amended text complied with the 
constitutional principles.   For purposes of the thesis the Court’s testing of the amended 
text against the stipulations of constitutional principle XVIII.2,  which requires that the 
powers and functions or the provinces shall not be substantially less than or substantially 
inferior to those provided for in the 1993 Constitution,  is particularly relevant. 
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Regarding the particular constitutional principle the Court had,  in its first judgement,  
expressed concern particularly regarding the curtailment of provincial powers with regard 
to policing,  education,  local government,  and traditional leadership.   But the deciding 
factor in the Court’s view,  which caused the new constitutional text to fail the test of 
constitutional principle XVIII.2,  was to be found in the provisions of section 146,  which 
dealt with the exercise of concurrent powers.   There were two obstacles to certification,  
viz the introduction of a specified presumption in favour of national legislation,  and a 
widening of the scope for the exercise of overrides by the national government in the 
area of concurrent powers.   (CC1996b: par. 147.) 
 
In its second judgement,  the Court dealt first with the difficulties posed by section 146 of 
the new text with regard to the exercise of concurrent powers.   It declared itself satisfied 
that these difficulties had been surmounted.   The objectionable presumption provision in 
favour of national legislation had been eliminated,  while the textual language dealing 
with national overrides had been altered in a way which the Court found to be 
acceptable.   (CC1996b: para. 145 – 160.) 
 
The Court then proceeded to a reconsideration of the four functional areas in which in 
the Court’s view,  as expressed in the first certification judgement,  the powers of the 
provinces had been curtailed.   It found as follows: 
 
??   Provincial policing powers:  Although the powers of the provinces as provided for in 
the 1993 Constitution had not been completely restored,  the amended text had,  in 
the Court’s view,  vested a significantly greater degree of power and control in the 
provinces compared to the new constitutional text (CC1996b: para. 162 – 169). 
 
??   Tertiary education:  The curtailment of powers in regard to tertiary education had 
been perpetuated in the amended text (CC1996b: par.170). 
 
??   Local government:  The powers and functions of the provinces in regard to local 
government as set out in the amended text were effectively the same as those which 
they enjoyed in terms of the new text,  but were still less than the powers which the 
provinces enjoyed in terms of the 1993 Constitution (CC1996b: para. 171 – 175). 
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??   Traditional leadership:  The amended text had effected no change in the provisions 
of the new text in the particular functional area (CC1996b: par. 176).   
 
The Court then found it necessary to examine some of the other sections of the 
amended text in order to determine whether “in the context of the totality of provincial 
power”,  the powers and functions of the provinces could be said to be substantially less 
than or substantially inferior to the powers which they enjoyed in terms of the 1993 
Constitution.   The Court looked at the provisions regarding the National Council of 
Provinces,  the Public Service Commission,  provincial constitutions,  and labour 
relations,  and also considered certain objections which had been submitted to it.   (CC 
1996b: para. 178 – 201.)   Ultimately,  the Court came to the conclusion that the powers 
and functions of the provinces in terms of the amended text were still less than or inferior 
to those accorded them in the 1993 Constitution,  but not substantially so (CC 1996b: 
par.204).   For purposes of the present study it is noteworthy that it was the amended 
provisions relating to provincial policing powers and the override powers of the national 
government which in particular played a material role in bringing the court to a 
conclusion different to that in the first certification judgement (CC 1996b: par.204(d)). 
 
7.3.3 Comment 
 
With a few exceptions as noted in the preceding sections dealing with the Court’s two 
certification judgements,  the Court did not analyse the responsibilities assigned to the 
provinces or the municipalities for the performance of public functions.   The Court for 
the most part accepted the “functional areas” and “matters” as listed in the relevant 
schedules of the constitutional texts at face value.   The general question of whether 
each level or sphere of government had been given appropriate and adequate legislative 
and executive powers which would enable each to function effectively,  as required by 
constitutional principle XX,  was apparently not considered by the Court to be one 
requiring in-depth examination by it.   In fairness it should be noted that 
“appropriateness”,  “adequacy” and “effectiveness” in relation to the allocation of 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions are criteria which would be 
extremely difficult to apply in a single exercise to all of the multitude of public functions,  
and aspects of public functions,  especially considering the time constraints within which 
the Court had to fulfil its certification task.   Such an exercise may well have been 
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considered to be one extending far beyond the Court’s specific brief in regard to the 
constitutional text.   Then again,  the fundamental question concerning which level or 
sphere of government should do what,  is essentially a policy question – one which 
requires resolution at a political level.   If this premise is accepted,  it could be argued 
that the determination of an appropriate and adequate assignment of responsibilities is a 
task for the elected representatives of the people,  and provided there had been a proper 
application of minds,  it was not for the Court to pass judgement on the assignment 
scheme as such,  or to attempt to examine the assignment of each and every public 
function,  or aspect of a public function,  in detail. 
 
In order to ascertain whether the shortcomings in the two certification judgements 
pointed out in the preceding paragraph were noted also by other commentators on the 
judgements,  a search was done for contemporary articles in law journals or chapters in 
law yearbooks which specifically address the certification judgements.   Six such 
contributions were found,  viz those of Carpenter (1996),  Chaskalson and Fick (1996),  
Landman (1996),  Butler (1997),  Cowan and Fick (1997),  and Malherbe (1997).   
Generally,  these authors provide a brief overview of the certification action and then 
proceed to deal with those aspects of the judgements which particularly attracted their 
attention.   However,  none of them addresses either of the two shortcomings identified 
supra by this author,  viz that the Court did not,  generally speaking,  deal in an analytical 
way with the assignment of the full array of public function responsibilities,  or endeavour 
to assess whether – as required by constitutional principle XX – each level of 
government had been given appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers 
which would enable it to function effectively. 
 
Also of interest to the present study is the important role which the provisions relating to 
the so-called national overrides played in the Court’s evaluations of the new and the 
amended constitutional texts against the requirements of constitutional principle XVIII.2,  
which stipulates that the powers and functions of the provinces should not be 
substantially less than or substantially inferior to those accorded the provinces in the 
1993 Constitution.   If the amended text had not removed the Court’s reservations on 
this score,  it is probable that the Court,  even if for no other reason,  would have 
declined to certify also the amended text.   The Court’s concern regarding the override 
provisions in the constitutional texts submitted to it,  is understandable considering the 
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large number of functional areas which were included in the concurrent category of 
legislative powers.   However,  it should be borne in mind that overriding powers are 
relevant only if the assignment scheme provides for the exercise of concurrent powers 
by the national and the provincial spheres of government.   An assignment scheme does 
not necessarily have to include a mechanism of concurrent powers,  with a concomitant 
– and inherently contentious – set of “rules” to govern the prevalence of a law of one 
legislature over a similar law of another.        
    
 
7.4 General scheme for the assignment of responsibilities 
 
The 1996 Constitution retained the three-tiered governmental structure set in place by 
the 1993 Constitution,  with the notable change that the term “level” used in referring to 
subnational governments in the earlier Constitution was replaced by the term “sphere”.   
The general scheme for the assignment of responsibilities to the national,  provincial and 
local spheres of government is examined below. 
 
It is to be noted that the Constitution provides a neat,  summary statement of the vesting 
of legislative authority in the various spheres of government in the country,  viz in 
Parliament in the national sphere,  in the provincial legislatures in the provincial sphere,  
and in the municipal councils in the local sphere (section 43).   The Constitution – 
somewhat disappointingly - does not provide a corresponding summary statement of the 
vesting of executive authority,  but stipulates the executive authority of the three spheres 
of government separately (vide sections 85 (national),  125 (provincial),  and 156(1) 
(municipal)). 
 
7.4.1 National sphere of government 
 
Section 44(1) of the Constitution sets out the powers of Parliament to amend the 
Constitution and to adopt legislation concerning other matters.   Parliament’s authority to 
legislate on matters in the specified concurrent categories is retained,  and the residuary 
legislative authority remains with it (section 44(1)).   The powers of the two houses of 
Parliament,  the National Assembly and the National Council of the Provinces,  are 
differentiated according to the distinct role which each is required to play in the 
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legislative process.   The roles of the two houses do not require detailed examination in 
the present context where the focus is on the powers of the respective spheres of 
government and not on elucidating the functioning of the bicameral national Parliament.  
 
Where the earlier Constitution allocated to Parliament an all encompassing power to 
make laws for the Republic,  including matters in respect of which the provincial 
legislatures were given concurrent powers,  Parliament’s power is restricted in a 
qualified manner in the 1996 Constitution.   The restriction is necessary because of the 
allocation to the provincial legislatures (vide infra) of exclusive powers in regard to 
certain matters.   Parliament – specifically the National Assembly – is now empowered to 
make a law in regard to any matter,  including a matter within a functional area of 
concurrent provincial competence,  but excluding a matter within a functional area of 
exclusive provincial competence (section 44(1)(a)(iii)).   The exclusion of Parliament 
from the last mentioned category of matters is,  however,  not absolute,  but conditional.   
Parliament may intervene in regard to an excluded matter,  provided that certain 
procedures are followed,  in circumstances when it is necessary – 
 
?? to maintain national security; 
?? to maintain economic unity; 
?? to maintain essential national standards; 
?? to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services;  or 
?? to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the 
interests of another province or of the country as a whole (section 44(2)). 
 
The Constitution confers on the National Assembly the power to assign any of its 
legislative powers,  excluding the power to amend the Constitution,  to any legislative 
body in another sphere of government (section 44(1)(a)(iii)).   Such assignments were 
not possible under the 1993 Constitution. 
 
The direct linking of the national executive authority to the legislative competence of 
Parliament,  a characteristic of the 1993 Constitution (section 75),  has not been retained 
in the 1996 Constitution,  but the effect of the relevant new provisions is virtually the 
same.   The executive authority of the Republic still vests in the President (section 
85(1)),  but to understand the link with the country’s legislative authority,  one needs to 
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examine the immediately following subsection which stipulates how the President,  
together with the other members of the Cabinet,  is to exercise the executive authority.   
This is to be done by – 
 
?? implementing national legislation except where the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament provides otherwise; 
?? developing and implementing national policy; 
?? co-ordinating the functions of state departments and administrations; 
?? preparing and initiating (national ) legislation;  and 
?? performing any other executive function provided for in the Constitution or in national 
legislation (section 85(2)). 
 
In short,  the link between executive and legislative actions in the national sphere of 
government is retained,  but a more elaborate statement of what the executive authority 
entails,  is provided. 
 
7.4.2 Provincial sphere of government 
 
The provincial responsibilities for the performance of public functions are to be found in 
section 104 of the Constitution which sets out the legislative authority of the provinces,  
and in section 125 which deals with their executive authority. 
 
 A provincial legislature is empowered to pass legislation with regard to any matter within 
a functional area listed in either schedule 4 or 5 of the Constitution (section 104(1)(b)).   
Schedule 4 lists the functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence,  while schedule 5 lists the functional areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence.   In both schedules the functional areas are grouped in two parts 
– indicated as “A” and “B” – with part B in each case consisting of stipulated local 
government matters,  and with the assignments in that part limited to the extent set out 
in section 155(6)(a) and (b) of the Constitution (vide infra).   The treatment of the specific 
public functions assigned to the legislative authority of the provinces is examined in 
section 7.4 infra. 
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The outstanding difference between the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions as regards the 
legislative competence of the provinces,  is the assignment of exclusive competence in 
regard to matters in a number of functional areas.   The earlier constitution did not grant 
any exclusive competence to the provinces.   However,  as already indicated in the 
discussion above of the national responsibilities,  the exclusive competence given to the 
provinces is a qualified one:  the national Parliament can,  in certain circumstances,  
intervene and pass legislation with regard to a matter falling within the exclusive 
category. 
 
The mechanism of concurrent national and provincial powers which,  in dealing with the 
1993 Constitution in chapter 6 of the thesis,  was found to be problematical,  has been 
retained in the 1996 Constitution.   There is a change in the style of formulation,  but the 
actual changes are technical rather than substantial.   While under the earlier 
constitution a provincial law in the concurrent category would prevail except in so far as 
an Act of Parliament was necessary for certain specified reasons (1993 Constitution: 
section 126(3)),  the 1996 Constitution accords prevalence to the national law provided 
certain specified conditions are met (section 146(2)).   Essentially,  the grounds on which 
national legislation will prevail over provincial legislation  - the so-called “national 
overrides” – are the same in both constitutions.   However,  the later constitution 
includes an additional overriding ground,  viz where the national legislation is necessary 
to promote equality of opportunity or equality of access to government services (section 
146(2)(c)(v)). 
                          
Although there is a good deal of conceptual similarity between the circumstances in 
which Parliament may intervene in the functional areas of “exclusive” provincial 
competence (section 44(2) of the Constitution),  on the one hand,  and the conditions to 
be met in order for national legislation to prevail over provincial legislation in the 
concurrent category (section 146(2)),  on the other,  the scope for intervention in 
exclusively provincial affairs is decidedly narrower than the range of conditions which 
would permit national legislation to prevail in the concurrent category.   It would seem,  
therefore,  as if the introduction of an exclusive category constitutes a meaningful 
expansion of provincial legislative authority.    
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As far as the executive authority of the provinces is concerned,  the Constitution deals 
with the matter in a manner similar to that employed in relation to the national sphere of 
government.   Section 125(1) stipulates that the executive authority of a province is 
vested in its premier,  while section 125(2) sets out the ways in which the premier,  
together with the other members of the executive council,  is to exercise this authority,  
viz by – 
 
?? implementing provincial legislation in the province; 
?? implementing all national legislation within the functional areas listed in schedules 4 
and 5 of the Constitution,  except where the Constitution or an Act of Parliament 
provides otherwise; 
?? administering in the province other national legislation,  the administration of which 
has been assigned to the provincial executive in terms of an Act of Parliament; 
?? developing and implementing provincial policy; 
?? co-ordinating the functions of the provincial administration and its departments; 
?? preparing and initiating provincial legislation;  and 
?? performing any other function assigned to the provincial executive in terms of the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
 
Although there is a close correspondence between the exercise of the legislative and the 
executive authority in a province,  it is apparent that a province’s executive 
responsibilities can extend substantially beyond the area encompassed by its law-
making authority – this was also the case under the 1993 Constitution.   There is a 
presumption in favour of a provincial executive administering national legislation within 
the functional areas listed in schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution,  while provision is 
also made for the administration on statutory assignment of other national legislation.   In 
addition provision is made for a provincial executive to perform any other function 
assigned to it in terms of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.   Such assignments 
could typically include an assignment by a member of the national Cabinet of a power or 
function that is to be exercised by him or her to a member of a provincial executive,  
provided certain conditions are satisfied (section 99 of the Constitution).   All this 
flexibility built into the Constitution,  which presumably is not without certain advantages,  
presents its own technical problem:  anyone wishing to ascertain the precise scope of 
the executive responsibilities of a particular province,  or of all provinces together,  would 
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have a hard time of it,  and be forced to undertake a substantial amount of detailed 
research. 
 
7.4.3 Local sphere of government 
 
Moving on to the local sphere of government,  the Constitution evinces an approach 
noticeably different to that followed in relation to the national and provincial spheres.   
There is a single section (156) dealing with both the legislative and executive powers of 
a municipality.   Significantly the primary emphasis is on executive government,  with 
section 156(1) stipulating that a municipality has executive authority in respect of,  and 
the right to administer (sic – surely executive authority implies the “right to administer”),  
the local government matters listed in part B of schedule 4 and part B of schedule 5 of 
the Constitution,  as well as any other matters assigned to it by national and provincial 
legislation.   Only in the following subsection (156(2)) does the Constitution address the 
legislative authority of local governments by stipulating that a municipality may make and 
administer bylaws for the effective administration of the matters which it “has the right to 
administer”.   The reversal of the normal order appropriate to the assignment of 
responsibilities is clearly evident:  first, a right to administer certain matters is given,  
followed by an empowerment to make laws (“bylaws”) to facilitate the administration. 
 
The potential scope of the executive responsibilities of local government is expanded by 
section 156(4) of the Constitution which obligates the national and the responsible 
provincial government to assign to a municipality,  by agreement and subject to any 
conditions which may be set,  the administration of a matter within a functional area 
listed in part A of schedule 4 and part A of schedule 5 of the Constitution,  which 
necessarily relates to local government,  in instances where certain criteria can be 
satisfied:  the matter must be one which can be administered most effectively locally,  
and the municipality must have the capacity to administer the matter.   The Constitution 
also permits a member of the national executive or of a provincial executive to assign 
any statutory power or function that is to be exercised or performed by him or her to a 
municipal council,  subject to certain conditions being satisfied (sections 99, 126).   The 
problem of establishing precisely what the extent of local governmental responsibilities 
is,  a difficulty already pointed out above in relation to the national and provincial spheres 
of government,  is again evident. 
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A marked improvement in the Constitution,  compared to the 1993 Constitution,  is the 
listing – in part B of schedule 4 and part B of schedule 5 – of the matters which typically 
should be the responsibility of the local sphere of government.   The earlier constitution 
did not stipulate which public functions were to be performed by local governments.   In 
a somewhat unfortunate drafting approach the makers of the 1996 Constitution saw fit to 
accommodate information concerning local government matters in schedules dealing 
primarily with the legislative competences of the national and provincial governments.   A 
separate schedule indicating the functional areas of local government competence 
would have been more appropriate,  and could have served as further confirmation of 
the importance of local government in the constitutional scheme of things. 
 
7.4.4 Intervention in the affairs of subnational governments 
 
As pointed out supra,  the national sphere of government is empowered to intervene with 
regard to a matter falling within a functional area of exclusive provincial competence as 
reflected in schedule 5 of the Constitution.   Parliament may,  when necessary – 
necessity being determined by Parliament itself – pass legislation with regard to such a 
matter in order to maintain national security,  economic unity,  or essential national 
standards,  or to establish minimum standards for the rendering of services,  or to 
prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of 
another province or of the country as a whole.   The “exclusivity” of  provincial 
competence is therefore a qualified concept. 
 
In addition to legislative intervention by the national government in the affairs of a 
province,  the Constitution also provides for executive intervention.   When a province 
cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or other 
legislation,  the national executive may take “… any appropriate steps to ensure 
fulfilment of that obligation”.   Such steps could include issuing a directive to the 
provincial executive,  or the national executive taking over responsibility for the particular 
obligation in the province to the extent necessary to ensure that the same objectives 
which apply in respect of legislative intervention – vide supra – are realised.    (Section 
100(1).) 
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As regards the local sphere of government,  both the national government and the 
responsible provincial government are empowered by the Constitution to intervene in the 
affairs of a municipality under certain circumstances.   The possible interventions are as 
follows: 
 
?? Should a municipality not be able to or neglect to fulfil an executive obligation in 
terms of legislation (which would include both national and provincial legislation),  the 
provincial executive may take steps to ensure fulfilment of the obligation,  on a basis 
similar to that which applies to executive intervention by the national government in 
the affairs of a province (section 139(1)). 
 
?? Each provincial government must by legislative “or other means” provide for the 
monitoring and support of local government in the province,  and promote the 
development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform their 
functions and manage their affairs (section 155(6)).   While this type of intervention 
would appear to have a mainly positive objective,  the connotation of control inherent 
in the term “monitoring”,  could possibly lead to such an action being experienced by 
a local government as intrusive. 
 
?? The national government,  without detracting from its comprehensive legislative 
authority in terms of the Constitution,  and the provincial governments have the 
legislative and executive authority to – as the Constitution puts it – “see to the 
effective performance by the municipalities” of their assigned public functions as 
reflected in part B of schedule 4 (concurrent national and provincial competence) and 
part B of schedule 5 (exclusive provincial competence).   The Constitution directs 
that this oversight authority of the national and provincial governments is to be 
exercised by regulating the exercise by the municipalities of their executive authority.   
(Section 155(7).)   The executive authority of municipalities encompasses those 
matters referred to in the B parts of schedules 4 and 5,  as well as any other matter 
assigned to a municipality by national or provincial legislation (section 156(1)). 
 
The provision made in the Constitution for intervention by one sphere of government in 
the affairs of another sphere provides a significant perspective on the country’s 
assignment scheme.   Although the assignment of responsibilities to each sphere of 
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government is for the most part discernible in the Constitution - a degree of vagueness 
remains in respect of responsibilities which could be assigned or delegated by one 
sphere of government to another – the assignments are not absolute or precisely 
demarcated.   Instead,  the responsibilities of the three spheres of government are 
woven into an integrated and varied fabric of governmental authority,  in which a 
hierarchical relationship between the three spheres is clearly evident.   At the highest 
level,  the national government is vested with authority to ensure proper performance of 
assigned public functions by the provincial and the local governments.   At an 
intermediate level,  a provincial government is vested with authority to ensure the proper 
discharge by the municipalities within the province of their assigned responsibilities. 
 
7.4.5 Protection of assigned powers 
 
The oversight and controlling authority which the Constitution accords the “higher” 
sphere governments in relation to the “lower” sphere governments,  is balanced by 
comprehensive measures in the Constitution which are designed to protect the 
subnational governments against interventions which are over-hasty or ill-considered. 
 
In the bicameral parliamentary structure the National Council of Provinces represents 
the provinces with the object of ensuring that provincial interests are properly taken into 
account within the national sphere of government.   The Council does this mainly by 
participating in the national legislative process,  as well as by providing a national forum 
for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces.   (Section 42(4).)   The detail of 
the composition and functioning of the Council does not require explication for purposes 
of the thesis,  except for a brief examination of its participation in the national legislative 
process.   Three categories of Bills are processed nationally,  viz those amending the 
Constitution,  ordinary Bills which do not affect the provinces,  and ordinary Bills which 
do affect them (sections 74, 75 and 76 respectively).   The Council has a role to play in 
relation to the passage of all three categories of Bills,  but it is its role with regard to the 
first and the third categories mentioned which is of relevance to the question of the 
powers and functions of the provinces.            
 
Any Bill amending the Constitution which alters the powers and functions of the 
provinces,  has to be passed also by the Council,  and with a supporting vote of at least 
  
239 
six of the provinces (section 74(3)).   Before such a Bill is introduced in the National 
Assembly particulars of the Bill must be provided to the provincial legislatures for their 
views (section 74(5)(b)).   If the proposed amendment is not an amendment which 
affects the provinces,  particulars of the Bill must nevertheless be submitted to the 
Council for a public debate (section 74(5)(c)).   If a Bill which alters powers and functions 
concerns only a specific province or provinces,  the Council may not pass the Bill unless 
it has been approved by the legislature or legislatures of the province or provinces 
concerned (section 74(8)). 
 
According to the Constitution (sections 76(3)and (4)),  Bills falling within the category of 
ordinary Bills affecting the provinces,  are those dealing with matters within the functional 
areas listed in schedule 4 of the Constitution (concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence),  as well as a miscellany of other classes of matters,  subjects,  
and bodies regulated in various parts of the Constitution.   These are as follows: 
 
?? The conferring of authority on provincial delegations to the National Council of 
Provinces(section 65(2)); 
?? organised local government (section 163); 
?? the Public Protector (section 182); 
?? the promotion of the values and principles of public administration (section 195(3)); 
?? the appointment of persons in the public service on “policy considerations” (section 
195(4)); 
?? the Public Service Commission (section 196); 
?? the public service (section 197); 
?? the intervention by Parliament with regard to a matter falling within a functional area 
listed in schedule 5 of the Constitution (exclusive provincial legislative competence) 
(section 44(2)); 
?? the Financial and Fiscal Commission (section 220(3));  and  
?? matters affecting the financial interests of the provincial sphere of government 
(chapter 13).     
 
Of particular interest for present purposes is a Bill which deals with a matter falling within 
a functional area of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence (schedule 
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4 of the Constitution),  and one which provides for intervention by Parliament in a 
functional area of exclusive provincial legislative competence (section 44(2)). 
 
The legislative process for ordinary Bills affecting the provinces as set out in sections 
76(1) and 76(2) of the Constitution,  is an elaborate and complicated one,  which differs 
according to whether the Bill is introduced in the National Assembly or in the National 
Council of Provinces.   Any Bill may be introduced in the Assembly while only specified 
categories of Bills may be introduced in the Council (section 73(1) and (3)).   A Bill 
dealing with a matter falling within a functional area of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence,  may be introduced in the Council.   Should such a Bill be 
introduced in and passed by the Council,  it has then to be referred to the Assembly,  
and the Constitution spells out in detail its further processing,  depending on whether the 
Assembly passes the Bill,  passes an amended Bill,  or rejects the Bill.   The processing 
steps include the referral where appropriate of the Bill to a mediation committee of the 
two Houses.   (Section 76(2).)   The detail of the legislative process need not be 
described here;  suffice it to say that for a Bill introduced in the Council to become law it 
must,  either in its original or amended form,  or in a version agreed to in the mediation 
committee,  be passed by the Assembly,  in effect given the Assembly an ultimate right 
of veto. 
 
A Bill providing for intervention by Parliament in a functional area of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence must be introduced in the Assembly and, if passed,  be referred 
to the Council.   The further processing of such a Bill is again spelt out in detail in the 
Constitution,  including referral where appropriate to a mediation committee of the two 
Houses.   The enactment of the Bill into law is not dependent on its being passed by the 
Council.   The Council may amend or reject the Bill,  or in the mediation committee argue 
for an amended version of the Bill,  but ultimately cannot prevent its passage into law.   
Provided the Bill is passed with a majority of at least two-thirds of its members,  the 
Assembly can ensure that the Bill becomes law notwithstanding the opposition or 
reservations of the Council (section 76(1)(e), (i), and (j)).   The Council does not have a 
veto right over a Bill passed by the Assembly. 
 
The essence of the rather complicated processes touched upon above,  can be 
summarised as follows: 
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?? A power or function assigned to the provinces by the Constitution can be altered only 
if the amending Bill is passed also by the National Council of Provinces,  with a 
supporting vote of at least six provinces.   It follows that schedule 4 of the 
Constitution,  which lists the functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence,  can only be amended with the strong support of the Council. 
 
?? A Bill affecting a matter within a functional area of concurrent legislative competence,  
which has been introduced in the National Assembly,  has to be referred to the 
Council which,  although it cannot veto the enactment of the Bill into law,  can 
oppose it and exert influence on the legislative process by causing the Bill to be 
amended,  or moving the Assembly not to proceed with it,  or requiring the Assembly 
to pass the Bill with a two-thirds majority.   However,  such a Bill when introduced in 
the Council can be vetoed by the Assembly. 
 
?? A Bill providing for intervention by Parliament in a functional area of exclusive 
provincial competence,  and which has to be introduced in the Assembly,  can be 
dealt with by the Council in the same manner as described above in relation to a Bill 
dealing with a matter falling within a functional area of concurrent legislative 
competence. 
 
In short,  although the Constitution does not effect an absolute division of functions and 
powers between the national and the provincial spheres of government,  it does provide 
institutional and procedural safeguards which are intended to function in a way which 
could help to ensure that any encroachment on the provincial domain takes place only 
after proper consideration and after the provinces have had an opportunity to express 
their views.  
 
In addition to protection regarding legislation affecting them,  the provinces also enjoy 
protection,  via the National Council of Provinces,  in the area of executive government.   
Should the national executive intervene in the administration of a province by taking the 
steps permitted it in terms of section 100(1) of the Constitution,  the intervention must be 
reported to the Council and be approved by the Council within a stipulated period of 
time,  failing which the intervention must end.   Should the Council approve the 
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intervention,  it must review it regularly and make any appropriate recommendations to 
the national executive.   (Section 100(2).)   Evidently the Council is in a relatively 
stronger position to protect provincial interests in the executive domain than in the 
legislative area. 
 
As regards local government,  the position is that a municipality is in a less protected 
position in relation to the national and provincial governments than a provincial 
government is in relation to the national government.   This is true particularly in the 
legislative domain.  A noticeably weak form of protection,  if one can refer to it as such,  
is afforded by the Constitutional requirement that draft national and provincial legislation 
that effects inter alia the powers and functions of local government must be published for 
public comment,  in a manner which affords organised local government and particular 
municipalities an opportunity to make representations with regard to the draft legislation. 
 
In the executive domain,  a municipality in respect of which the provincial executive has 
taken steps in terms of the interventionary powers permitted by section 139(1) of the 
Constitution,  is entitled to protection similar to that enjoyed by a provincial government 
in relation to such action taken against it by the national executive.   In the case of a 
municipality,  the intervention must be approved by both the Cabinet member 
responsible for local government and the National Council of Provinces,  within 
stipulated time periods,  failing which the intervention must end.   Again,  the Council is 
required,  if it approves of the intervention,  to review the intervention regularly and,  in 
this instance,  to make any appropriate recommendations to the provincial executive.   
(Section 139(2).)   A municipality is not afforded any protection by the Constitution 
against the national or provincial government when either of these take steps to “see to 
the effective performance” by the municipality of its functions,  by regulating the exercise 
of its executive authority (section 155(7)).   The Constitution does not elaborate on how 
the regulation of the exercise by a municipality of its executive authority is to be done.                  
 
 
7.5 Treatment of specific public functions 
 
The 1996 Constitution deals with specific public functions in a number of places – 
 
  
243 
?? in sections 44 and 146,  read with schedule 4,  concerning functional areas of 
concurrent national and provincial legislative competence; 
?? in section 104,  read with schedules 4 and 5,  concerning functional areas of 
concurrent and exclusive legislative competence of the provinces; 
?? in section 156,  read with schedules 4 and 5,  concerning the executive and 
legislative authority of municipalities;  and 
?? in chapter 11,  concerning security functions. 
 
Only public functions which are focused directly on the needs of the community are 
covered by the thesis;  activities making up functions which are of an enabling or 
controlling nature but which do not impact directly on community need satisfaction are,  
despite being dealt with by the Constitution,  not of interest for present purposes – vide 
comment in the introductory paragraph of section 6.6 of the thesis.   In the following 
sections public functions which are assigned to the provinces and the municipalities 
respectively,  and those public functions which constitute the security services of the 
country,  are examined seriatim.   
 
7.5.1 Public functions assigned to the provinces 
 
In the 1993 Constitution information with regard to the public functions assigned to the 
provinces was provided in schedule 6 of the Constitution,  under the heading “Legislative 
competence of the provinces”.   This heading was not entirely accurate as the national 
government was given the authority to also pass legislation with regard to any matter 
covered by the “provincial “ schedule.   As pointed out in section 6.6.1 of the thesis,  a 
correct heading would have read “Functional areas of concurrent legislative competence 
of Parliament and the provincial legislatures”.   The reference in the 1993 Constitution 
was to “functional areas” which,  as pointed out in section 6.7.1 of the thesis,  are not the 
same entities as public functions,  although there is an obvious connection to public 
functions. 
 
The term “functional area” is again employed in the 1996 Constitution for setting out the 
scope of the legislative competence of the provinces.   The specific functional areas are 
listed in schedules 4 and 5,  dealing with the concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence and the exclusive provincial legislative competence respectively.   
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Each of these schedules has a part B in which a number of local government matters 
are listed and which are dealt with in the next section.   Schedules 4 and 5 are examined 
below with the focus on provincial powers. 
 
Part A of schedule 4 lists 33 functional areas,  compared to 29 such areas reflected in 
the corresponding schedule (schedule 6) of the 1993 Constitution.   The functional areas 
indicated in the earlier constitution – ranging from “agriculture” to “welfare services” have 
for the greater part been retained,  with some modification of formulation.   However, 
four functional areas – “abattoirs’,  “markets and pounds”,  “sport and recreation”,  and 
the provincial aspect of “roads” (to which traffic has been added) – are now listed in 
schedule 5,  which stipulates the functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative 
competence.   Nine new functional areas have been added to the concurrent list 
(schedule 4),  viz “administration of indigenous forests”,  “disaster management”, 
“pollution control”,  “population development”,  “property transfer fees” (sic:  this can 
hardly pass as a functional area),  “provincial public enterprises”,  “public works”,  
“vehicle licensing” (sic:  as before),  and “industrial promotion”.   The latter functional 
area has been separated from “trade”,  which is retained in the list. 
 
Arguably the most important change between the earlier and the current schedule of 
concurrent legislative competences is the omission of local government as a “functional 
area” from the current schedule.   (As pointed out in the final paragraph of section 7.3.1 
supra,  local government is more correctly regarded as a sphere of government.)   In 
terms of the 1993 Constitution both the national and the provincial legislatures could 
pass legislation with regard to local government,  subject to the provisions of chapter 10 
of the Constitution,  which dealt specifically with local government.   Legislation 
regarding the ordering of local government beyond the basic categorisation provided by 
the Constitution (section 155(1)),  as well as that concerning the general structuring and 
functioning of local government,  is now the preserve of the national legislature. 
 
The linguistic-technical features of the present list of functional areas in the concurrent 
category are generally the same as those of its precursor (vide section 6.6.1.of the 
thesis).   The items listed continue to have the appearance of subjects,  in the common 
usage sense of the word.   Some of the items are qualified by excluding certain parts of 
the functional area,  or by limiting the functional area to the provincial sphere,  or by 
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subjecting lawmaking in the functional area to a specified part of the Constitution.   In 
contrast to the defence and policing functions,  where the Constitution stipulates the 
respective objects of the functions,  no indication is given in schedule 4 of the objects or 
content of the public functions subsumed under the various functional areas,  other of 
course than the degree of meaning inherent in the designation of a functional area 
(“agriculture”,  “education”,  etc.).   The same treatment of functional areas was evident 
in the 1993 Constitution.   A notable improvement on the earlier constitution is to be 
found in the heading of schedule 4,  which states correctly that it deals with functional 
areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence.   Schedule 6 of the 
1993 Constitution,  while having essentially the same focus,  indicated inaccurately that 
it dealt with the legislative competence of the provinces. 
 
In contrast to the 1993 Constitution,  which did not assign any exclusive competence to 
the provinces,  the 1996 Constitution provides for the exercise by the provinces of 
exclusive legislative competence with regard to a number of specified functional areas 
(section 104(1)(b)(ii) read with schedule 5).   It needs to be borne in mind that although 
schedule 5 purports to deal with exclusive provincial legislative competences,  the 
exclusivity is not absolute.   As pointed out in section 4 supra, Parliament can intervene 
in such a functional area when necessary in order to accomplish specified objectives 
(section 44(2)).   Schedule 5 lists twelve functional areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence,  viz “abattoirs”,  “ambulance services”,  “archives other than 
national archives”,  “libraries other than national libraries”,  “liquor licences”,  “museums 
other than national museums”,  “provincial planning”,  “provincial cultural matters”,  
“provincial recreation and amenities”,  “provincial sport”,  “provincial roads and traffic”,  
and “veterinary services,  excluding regulation of the profession”.   The style of 
presentation is the same as that employed for schedule 4 – vide supra.   Four of the 
twelve functional areas – “archives”,  “libraries”,  “museums”,  and “veterinary services” - 
have a qualification attached to them,  consisting of the exclusion of certain parts of the 
functional area.   So for instance,  provinces have exclusive legislative competence with 
regard to archives,  other than national archives,  and libraries,  other than national 
libraries.   In respect of five other functional areas in the list the same sort of qualification 
is stipulated but in another way,  by attaching the prefix “provincial” – thus “provincial 
planning”,  “provincial cultural matters”,  “provincial recreation and amenities”,  
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“provincial sport”,  and “provincial roads and traffic”.   The reason for this variation in 
presentation is not apparent. 
   
7.5.2 Public functions assigned to the municipalities 
 
As regards the local sphere of government,  the 1996 Constitution indicates quite 
comprehensively the scope of what are referred to as “local government matters”.   In 
the preferred language of the thesis,  the matters listed could be identified as public 
functions,  or aspects of public functions,  to be performed by local governments.   The 
list of matters is split between schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution,  in each case being 
accommodated in part B of the particular schedule.   The full lists are as follows: 
 
Local government matters listed in part B of schedule 4 
 
Air pollution 
Building regulations 
Child care facilities 
Electricity and gas reticulation 
Firefighting services 
Local tourism 
Municipal airports 
Municipal planning 
Municipal health services 
Municipal public transport 
Municipal public works only in respect of the needs of municipalities in the discharge of 
their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to them under the 
Constitution or any other law 
Pontoons,  ferries,  jetties,  piers and harbours,  excluding the regulation of international 
and national shipping and matters related thereto 
Stormwater management systems in built-up areas 
Trading regulations 
Water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic 
waste-water and sewage disposal systems. 
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Local government matters listed in part Part B of schedule 5 
 
Beaches and amusement facilities 
Billboards and the display of advertisements in public places 
Cemeteries,  funeral parlours and crematoria 
Cleansing 
Control of public nuisances 
Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public 
Facilities for the accommodation,  care and burial of animals 
Fencing and fences 
Licensing of dogs 
Licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public 
Local amenities 
Local sport facilities 
Markets 
Municipal abattoirs 
Municipal parks and recreation 
Municipal roads 
Noise pollution 
Pounds 
Public places 
Refuse removal,  refuse dumps and solid waste disposal 
Street trading 
Street lighting 
Traffic and parking. 
 
There are thus some local government matters which fall under the concurrent 
legislative competences of the national and provincial governments,  and some which 
fall under the exclusive legislative competence of the provinces,  exclusivity being 
qualified as indicated before. 
 
It is to be noted that the 38 local government matters of which the Constitution speaks,  
are not listed in an own schedule of the Constitution,  but in schedules focused on the 
legislative competence of the national and provincial spheres of government.   Indeed,  
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the two schedules do not deal with the legislative competence of local governments at 
all:  the purpose of the B parts of the schedules is to indicate the local government 
matters in respect of which the national and the provincial governments have legislative 
competence,  either concurrently (schedule 4) or exclusively (schedule 5).   The extent 
of the legislative competence of the national and provincial spheres of government in 
relation to the municipal sphere is regulated by section 155(6)(a) and (7) of the 
Constitution,  which deals with the monitoring and support of local government,  the 
promotion of the development of local government capacity,  and the regulation of the 
exercise by municipalities of their executive authority.   Essentially,  the local 
government matters listed in part B of schedule 4 are matters subject to control by either 
the national or the provincial governments,  while the matters listed in part B of schedule 
5 are subject to the “exclusive” control of the provincial governments. 
 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution,  which is devoted to local government,  does not identify 
any local government matters other than those set out in the B parts of schedules 4 an 
5.   Section 156(1)(a),  which stipulates the executive authority of a municipality,  links 
this to the two lists of local government matters contained in schedules 4 and 5,  while 
section 156(2) provides that a municipality may make bylaws with regard to such 
matters. 
 
Although the Constitution switches from “functional areas” to “matters” in identifying 
public functions to be performed in the local sphere of government,  the lists are 
presented in a manner similar to the lists of functional areas in respect of which the 
national and the provincial spheres have competence.   Each list is an alphabetical 
arrangement of subjects (“air pollution”,  “building regulations”,  “child care facilities”,  
and so on).   Some matters are qualified by the word “municipal” – thus “municipal 
airports” and “municipal planning” – while others are not,  as in the examples quoted in 
the preceding sentence.   As all the matters are from the outset identified as local 
government matters,  the reason for the selective employment of the word “municipal” is 
not clear.   One of the listed matters in part B of schedule 4 is qualified by the exclusion 
of certain aspects,  while two are limited as to scope.   None of the matters listed in part 
B of schedule 5 is qualified in any way. 
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By providing comprehensive lists of matters which belong in the local sphere of 
government,  the present Constitution represents a substantial advance on the 1993 
Constitution,  which did not.   The reason for the grouping of local government matters in 
two lists,  each linked to peculiar oversight arrangements,  is not given in the 
Constitution.   It is reasonable to assume that the matters included in part B of schedule 
4 (concurrent national and provincial competence) were considered by the drafters of the 
Constitution to carry greater weight,  or to have wider implications,  or possibly to be 
inherently more contentious,  than the matters listed in part B of schedule 5 (exclusive 
provincial competence).  
 
7.5.3 Public security functions     
 
The 1993 Constitution contained a chapter (chapter 14) dealing with two major security 
functions,  viz policing and defence.   In the 1996 Constitution security matters are dealt 
with in chapter 11,  with the chapter expanded to encompass all national security 
services,  consisting of a single defence force,  a single police service,  and any 
intelligence services established in terms of the Constitution (section 199(1)).   The 
national security function is clearly intended to be a centralised one – the Constitution 
states specifically that national security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the 
national executive (section 198(d)).      
 
In contrast to the quite extensive treatment accorded the defence and policing functions 
in the 1993 Constitution the treatment of these functions in the present Constitution is 
notably more concise.   The defence function is to be performed centrally,  while the 
policing function requires substantial involvement of the provinces for its performance,  
thus making it relatively more significant for purposes of the thesis. 
 
Where the earlier constitution set out in considerable detail the functions to be performed 
by the defence force - referring to the functions as “services” - the 1996 Constitution 
simply states the primary object of the defence force,  viz “to defend and protect the 
Republic,  its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and 
the principles of international law regulating the use of force” (section 200(2)).   A 
significant innovation is the requirement that a civilian secretariat for defence must be 
established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet member 
  
250 
responsible for defence (section 204).   Immediately below the political executive level,  
there is thus a functional dichotomy,  with the military part of the function being balanced 
by a civilian arm at the same organisational level.   The purpose of the arrangement is 
presumably to promote the fullest possible  public accountability in the performance of a 
function which by its very nature has the potential for possible abuse and 
maladministration.   However,  for purposes of the thesis it needs only to be noted that 
the defence of the Republic and its people is established as the responsibility of the 
national government,  to the exclusion of the other spheres of government. 
 
As regards the police service,  chapter 11 requires the service to be structured to 
function in the national,  provincial and,  where appropriate,  the local spheres of 
government (section 205(1)).   In contrast to defence,  which is clearly a responsibility of 
the national government,  the Constitution requires a deployment of responsibility for the 
policing function across the national and provincial spheres of government,  and 
envisages that the deployment of responsibility could be extended also to the local 
sphere.   National legislation must establish the powers and functions of the police 
service,  taking into account the requirements of the provinces (section 205(2)).   (No 
mention is made of the requirements of the municipalities.)   In contrast to the defence 
function,  in respect of which the Constitution identifies a “primary” object – vide supra – 
the Constitution identifies a plurality of objects for the police service,  viz to prevent,  
combat and investigate crime,  to maintain public order,  to protect and secure the 
inhabitants of the Republic and their property,  and to uphold and enforce the law 
(section 205(3)).   The stated “objects” could all be seen as sub-functions or aspects of 
the policing function. 
 
The Constitution has little to say about the possible responsibilities of municipalities in 
regard to the policing function,  the text going no further than stipulating that national 
legislation must provide a framework for the establishment,  powers,  functions and 
control of municipal police services (section 206(7)). 
 
As far as the provinces are concerned,  the Constitution actually uses the term 
“responsible(-ity)” – one of the key terms of the thesis – in dealing with the role to be 
fulfilled by a provincial executive in relation to the policing function.   The Constitution 
stipulates that a provincial executive is responsible for the policing functions vested in it 
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by the Constitution itself,  assigned to it in terms of national legislation,  and allocated to 
it in the national policing policy (section 206(4)).   It is the first of these three categories 
of functions which is of particular interest  to the present study from a substance 
perspective,  as presumably national legislation and the national policing policy cannot 
go substantially beyond that which the Constitution empowers the provinces to do.   But 
what exactly are the functions which are vested in the provinces by the Constitution,  
and to which reference is made in section 206(4) and again in section 206(5)?   
According to the last mentioned section the functions are those set out in section 206(3).   
However,  the section to which reference is made does not use the term “function”;  it 
states that each province is entitled – 
 
??   to monitor police conduct; 
??   to oversee the effectiveness and efficacy of the police service,  including receiving 
reports on the police service; 
??   to promote good relations between the police and the community; 
??   to assess the effectiveness of visible policing;  and  
??   to liaise with the Cabinet member responsible for policing with respect to crime and 
policing in the province (section 206(3)). 
 
To say that a province is “entitled” to do certain things regarding policing would seem to 
grant it a role significantly different to what that role would be if it was given the right to 
do those things,  or even made responsible for the particular matters.   Being entitled to 
engage in a certain activity,  even if it is a constitutional entitlement,  does not 
necessarily obligate a province to engage in the activity,  but means rather that it may do 
so,  and to the extent that it wishes to do so.   With a noteworthy substitution of 
concepts,  the Constitution proceeds in section 206(5) to refer to the activities that a 
province is entitled to engage in,  as “functions”.   This section stipulates that in order to 
“perform the functions set out in subsection (3)”,  a province may investigate complaints 
and make recommendations to the Cabinet member responsible for policing. 
 
To be permitted to investigate complaints would seem to constitute a right.   Chapter 11 
also confers certain other rights with regard to policing on a province,  to be exercised by 
either the provincial executive or the provincial legislature,  viz the right - 
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??   to be consulted by the Cabinet member responsible for policing before he or she 
determines national policing policy,  and to determine the policing needs and 
priorities of the province which the Cabinet member has to take into account in 
determining policy (section 206(1)); 
??   to participate in a committee consisting of the Cabinet member and the members of 
the provincial executive councils “responsible” for policing with a view to ensuring 
effective co-ordination of the police service and effective co-operation among the 
spheres of government (section 206(8)); 
??   to require the provincial commissioner of police to appear before the provincial 
legislature or any of its committees to answer questions (section 206(9)); 
??   to be consulted in the appointment of a provincial commissioner (section 207(3)); 
??   to receive an annual report from the provincial commissioner (section 207(5));  and 
??   to institute,  where the provincial commissioner has lost the confidence of the 
provincial executive,  appropriate proceedings for the removal or transfer of,  or 
disciplinary action against the commissioner,  in accordance with national legislation 
(section 207(6)).   (The power to remove,  transfer or discipline a provincial 
commissioner vests in the National Commissioner.)   
 
Essentially and significantly,  the Constitution does not divide the policing function of the 
country between the national and the provincial spheres of government.   The provinces 
are not given responsibility for the performance of a substantive part of the total function.   
There is in any case a single police service for the country as a whole (section 199(1)),  
controlled and managed by the National Commissioner of Police (section 207(2)),  who 
is appointed by the President (section 207(1)).   What the Constitution does do,  is to 
allow the provinces a say in the performance of this major public function,  leaving it to 
each province to decide how actively it will exercise the essentially consultative and 
monitoring rights which have been identified above.   It is possible that a provincial 
government may influence the performance of the policing function in its province in a 
meaningful way,  but the basic responsibility for the performance of the function is with 
the national government.         
 
As in the case of the defence force – vide supra – and presumably in the light of broadly 
similar considerations,  the Constitution provides for the establishment of a civilian 
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secretariat for the police service,  which is to function under the direction of the Cabinet 
member responsible for policing (section 208). 
 
Moving on to the third branch of the security services,  intelligence,  the Constitution 
provides for the establishment of one or more intelligence services by the President,  
and only by him,  in terms of national legislation (section 209(1)).   National legislation 
must regulate the objects,  powers and functions of the intelligence services,  including 
any intelligence division of the defence force or the police service (section 210).   In 
resonance with the provision made for civilian secretariats for the defence force and the 
police service,  the Constitution requires “civilian monitoring” of the activities of all 
intelligence services by an inspector appointed by the President and approved by the 
National Assembly with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of its members (section 
210(b)).   Intelligence as a public function is clearly a centralised one,  a conclusion 
borne out by the fact that the National Council of Provinces is given no say in the 
appointment of the inspector of intelligence services.    
 
 
7.6 Co-operative government 
 
An important and significant innovation in drafting the 1996 Constitution was the 
inclusion of a chapter (chapter 3) on co-operative government.   The chapter in its lead 
statement declares government in the Republic to be “ … constituted as national,  
provincial and local spheres or government which are distinctive,  interdependent and 
interrelated” (section 40(1)).   All spheres of government are then required to observe 
and adhere to certain principles,  and to conduct their activities within certain parameters 
provided in the chapter (section 40(2)).  
 
Of the principles and parameters provided in section 41(1) the following are particularly 
relevant to the assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions: 
 
?? All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must respect 
the powers and functions of government in every other sphere (section 41(1)(e)). 
?? No power or function may be assumed other than those conferred in terms of the 
Constitution (section 41(1)(f)). 
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?? Powers and functions may not be exercised in a manner which encroaches on the 
geographical,  functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere 
(section 41(1)(g)). 
?? Spheres of government and organs of state are to co-operate with one another “in 
mutual trust and good faith”,  inter alia by co-ordinating their actions and legislation 
and by avoiding legal proceedings against one another (section 41(1)(h)(iv) and (vi)). 
 
As regards the avoidance of legal proceedings,  chapter 3 goes on to stipulate that an 
organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable 
effort to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that 
purpose,  and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve 
the dispute (section 41(3)). 
 
Haysom (2001:52) expresses the view that the Constitutional Assembly attempted to 
resolve the questions of legalism and complexity inherent in the assignment of functions 
and powers by inter alia placing greater emphasis on co-operative government.   Murray 
(2001:81) remarks in similar vein that the Constitution is sensitive to the complex needs 
of what she describes as the highly integrated system which has been adopted in South 
Africa,  and which in her view requires governments to act in partnership rather than in 
competition with one another.   Malherbe (2001:262-263) points out that the Constitution 
gives effect  to co-operative government in various ways:  Governments participate on a 
limited basis in decision-making in other spheres;  governments in the different spheres 
are obliged to assist one another;  governments may delegate powers to governments in 
other spheres,  and so facilitate co-operation;  and,  under narrowly defined 
circumstances,  the national government may intervene in local affairs. 
 
Malherbe (2001:275) goes on to refer to positions with regard to co-operative 
government taken by the Constitutional Court in jurisdictional judgements delivered by it,  
viz that the only reasonable way in which concurrent powers can be implemented is 
through co-operation;  that intergovernmental co-operation is implicit in any system 
where powers have been allocated concurrently to different levels of government;  that 
even the powers of intervention of the national Parliament and the national government 
in exclusively provincial affairs must be exercised subject to the principle of co-operative 
government;  and that co-operation is of particular importance in the field of concurrent 
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lawmaking and implementation of laws.   Steytler (2001:248) identifies three elements in 
an emerging vision of the Court with regard to co-operative government,  viz a unitary 
emphasis,  with an acknowledgement of the paramount position occupied by the national 
government;  the adoption of a non-competitive style of federalism;  and an acceptance 
that political processes are central to the achievement of co-operative government.   He,  
however,  cautions against over-emphasis of a process based system of co-operative 
government,  which in his view holds the danger that decision-making may become 
entangled at the closed political executive level,  a state of affairs which can be to the 
detriment of transparency and accountability to electorates (Steytler 2001:254). 
 
From a Public Administration perspective,  it is abundantly clear that the drafters of the 
Constitution had in mind that the powers and functions of the various spheres of 
government should be a constitutionally determined matter,  and that each sphere of 
government,  with its particular organs of state,  should respect the assignment of 
responsibilities,  and co-operate with one another in discharging their respective 
responsibilities.   At the same time there is an acknowledgement to be read between the 
lines that the separation or division of powers and functions between spheres of 
government may not always be amenable to clear demarcation,  and that disputes can 
arise in this connection.   Should this happen,  the parties involved in a dispute are 
required,  in the spirit of co-operative government,  to make every effort to resolve the 
matter short of instituting legal proceeding against one another.   It is difficult to find fault 
with the sentiments concerning co-operative government contained in chapter 3 of the 
Constitution,  but the opinion can be ventured that co-operative government ought not to 
be seen as a means of remedying inherent defects and shortcomings in the assignment 
of responsibilities to spheres of government.   The accuracy and precision with which 
responsibilities are assigned by the Constitution, and the possibility of disputes arising in 
this area,  would appear to stand in an inverse relationship to each other.   The opinion 
expressed is elaborated in a note on intergovernmental relations in section 7.7.4 infra. 
 
 
7.7 Critical examination of the assignment of responsibilities 
 
In the preceding chapter of the thesis the assignment of responsibilities under the 1993 
Constitution was examined under three headings,  viz “conceptual and technical 
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aspects”,  “realisation of relevant constitutional principles”,  and “substance”.   These 
headings can also serve for the critique to be presented below. 
 
7.7.1 Conceptual and technical aspects 
 
The confusing and inconsistent use of terms and concepts which was identified as a 
problem and discussed in section 6.7.1 of the thesis in relation to the 1993 Constitution,  
has been perpetuated in the 1996 Constitution.   The critique contained in section 6.7.1 
is not repeated here.  Suffice it to say that that terms like “function”,  “responsibility”,  
“service”,  “functional area”,  and “matter”,  which are employed in setting out the 
responsibilities of the various spheres of government,  have not been defined or used in 
a consistent,  systematically interlinked manner.   This is a basic shortcoming of both 
recent constitutions,  and one which needs to be addressed if a more scientific approach 
to the assignment question is to be established.   An observation to be made is that 
while the term “function” is used in both constitutions,  the drafters of the texts have 
somehow succeeded in largely avoiding its use in referring to what public institutions are 
established to do,  viz their activities or programmes of work.   There is also a continuing 
inconsistency in the employment of qualifications relating to exclusions,  limitations, and 
provisos in setting out what the various spheres of government are permitted to do.   The 
use of the prefixes “provincial” and “municipal” in referring to some – but not all – 
functional areas or matters in respect of which competences have been bestowed on 
provincial and municipal governments respectively,  is puzzling,  and would appear to be 
unnecessary. 
 
The literature reviewed as part of the research (vide section 2.6 of the thesis) did not 
contain criticisms regarding the conceptual and technical aspects of constitution drafting 
similar to those expressed in the preceding paragraph;  it is surmised that this is a 
largely unexplored field.   One publication which was consulted (Senelle 1990) does 
contain suggestions regarding the use of language in referring to the competences of the 
national and subnational levels of authority,  but these formulations are more appropriate 
to the field of Constitutional Law and do not have utility for purposes of the present 
study,  which are directed inter alia at achieving a better understanding and more 
precise description of public functions.   The author is strongly of the opinion that clarity 
and consistency in the employment of key concepts,  accompanied by the necessary 
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technical sophistication in constitution drafting,  are essential prerequisites in any 
endeavour to place the assignment of responsibilities on a more scientific footing;  this 
matter is taken further in chapter 9 of the thesis. 
 
The orderly structuring of a constitutional dispensation would dictate that the public 
functions,  or aspects of public functions,  assigned to all spheres of government should 
be specified.   The Constitution is commendable for doing so,  in contrast to the 1993 
Constitution which did not specify the public functions to be performed by the 
municipalities.   However,  the manner in which the Constitution sets out local 
government matters,  viz by listing such matters in schedules dealing with national and 
provincial legislative competences,  does not constitute due acknowledgement of this 
important sphere of government,  and is unacceptable.   It would have been a simple 
matter to append an additional schedule to the Constitution setting out the legislative 
competence of the municipalities.   The unfortunate impression is created that the 
primary object of the constitution makers was to differentiate in relation to specified local 
government matters the oversight to be exercised by the national and the provincial 
authorities respectively.   On the subject of local government competences,  it is also not 
clear why the pattern of setting out,  first, the legislative competence of a sphere of 
government,  to which the executive competence is then linked – the pattern followed in 
regard to the national and the provincial spheres – was not followed through to the 
municipal sphere.   The continuing use of the term “bylaw”  - with its add-on connotation 
– in referring to the legislation of one of three “distinctive” (Constitution: section 40(1)) 
spheres of government,  also needs to be questioned.   The term “municipal legislation” 
would be more appropriate and accurate and its introduction,  apart from being generally 
welcomed by those in local government,  could contribute to more effective government 
in that sphere by possibly stimulating greater interest in legislative actions.   Criticism 
and suggestions similar to the foregoing have not been encountered in local publications 
reviewed as part of the research.   As to the enhanced status of local government,  there 
can be little doubt.   De Visser (2002:223) refers to a judgement of the Constitutional 
Court containing the statement that “local government is no longer a public body 
exercising delegated powers.   Its council is a deliberative legislative assembly with 
legislative and executive powers recognised in the Constitution itself”. 
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From a conceptual and technical point of view the ingenuity of the Constitution,  but also  
its complexity,  in dealing with public functions is to be noted.   These aspects have been 
dealt with previously in an article published by the author (Robson 1998a) and the 
salient points are summarised below. 
 
The ingenuity of the Constitution lies in the way in which it provides legal certainty as to 
the powers and functions of the key role-players in government.   It indicates clearly who 
can make laws and who can apply them.   Where concurrent powers are assigned it 
provides a comprehensive set of rules for determining whose legislation will prevail in 
cases of conflict and in what circumstances.   On the face of it,  all possible eventualities 
have been foreseen,  and the appropriate steps for dealing with eventualities spelt out.    
The Constitution’s provisions regarding functions and powers are,  however,  also highly 
complex.   To ascertain what the Constitution has to say about public functions requires 
concerted effort and a substantial expenditure of time;  the provisions in question are not 
readily accessible or easily comprehensible.   Not only the ordinary citizen,  but even an 
experienced legislator,  administrator or scholar would find it an exacting task to acquire 
a full understanding of the powers of the various spheres of government in relation to 
specific public functions.   In the article referred to,  it was suggested that the difficulty in 
obtaining a clear picture of the responsibilities of the various spheres of government 
arose from the legal perspective from which the relevant parts of the Constitution were 
written.   The focus was on the establishment and assignment of formal legal 
competences with reference to powers and functions in a scheme built for the greater 
part around the mechanism of concurrent powers.   This gave rise to a constitution 
replete with provisos,  cross references,  prescribed procedures,  adjudication criteria,  
and oversight mandates.   Finally,  the point was made that the inaccessibility of the 
particular parts of the Constitution to ordinary members of the public was not conducive 
to the proper exercise by them of their democratic rights (in giving direction to 
government in the various spheres).   (Robson 1998a: 34-36.) 
 
7.7.2 Realisation of assignment principles 
 
As reported in section 6.3.3 of the thesis an analysis of the constitutional principles – 
which in the author’s view generally take the form of specifications rather than principles 
per se - showed that there were a number of principles inherent in the particular 
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formulations which were relevant to the assignment of responsibilities to levels of 
government.   These were the principles of national unity,  of economic unity,  of 
equality,  of provincial autonomy,  of co-operation,  and of cultural self-determination.   
On examination of the text of the 1993 Constitution it was found that – 
 
??   the principles of national unity,  of economic unity,  and of equality had been fully 
realised in the 1993 Constitution; 
??   the principle of provincial autonomy did not find substantial embodiment in the 
structures of government; 
??   the principle of co-operation was not made manifest in the Constitution;  and 
??   the principle of cultural self-determination received no more than passive and 
conditional acknowledgement. 
 
The 1996 Constitution shows a substantial advance in regard to the realisation of the 
particular set of assignment principles.   As was the case with the earlier constitution the 
principles of national unity,  of economic unity,  and of equality are fully realised in the 
1996 Constitution.   In addition,  there has been considerable progress with regard to the 
realisation of the principles of provincial autonomy and of co-operation. 
 
The glaring omission in the 1993 Constitution to assign any exclusive powers to the 
provinces – as required by constitutional principle XIX - has been rectified,  with the 
Constitution now making express provision for exclusive provincial competence with 
regard to a substantial number of functional areas (section 104(1); schedule 5).   The 
fact that Parliament may,  when it is necessary to achieve certain specified objectives,  
pass intervening legislation with regard to matters in the provincial exclusive category 
(section 44(2)),  qualifies the exclusivity of the competence,  but does not neutralise it.   
Parliament may intervene,  but only to achieve a specified objective,  which is clearly 
related to the maintenance of the national interest.   In the category of concurrent 
legislative competence,  a greater number of functional areas have been opened to 
legislative activity by the provinces.   Compared to its predecessor,  the Constitution 
provides more fully for the protection of provincial powers,  principally through the 
institution of the National Council of Provinces,  and the prescribed role it is required to 
perform (vide section 7.4.5 supra)     In short,  provincial autonomy with regard to the 
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performance of public functions,  although still limited and circumscribed in many 
respects,  would appear to have been strengthened in relative terms. 
 
From a position of not having been made manifest in the text of the 1993 Constitution,  
the principle of co-operation has in the new constitution not only been fully realised,  but 
has become a cornerstone of the constitutional dispensation.   Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution is devoted in its entirety to co-operative government.   All spheres of 
government are enjoined to observe and adhere to the principles of co-operative 
government and intergovernmental relations and to conduct their activities within the 
parameters which are set out in the chapter (section 40(2)).   A number of these 
principles are directly relevant to the performance of public functions,  and are referred 
to briefly in section 7.6 supra.   Essentially,  the Constitution requires of all spheres of 
government to respect one another’s powers and functions,  not to assume powers and 
functions and,  in the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions,  
not to encroach on one another’s geographical,  functional,  or institutional integrity.   
They are specifically enjoined to co-operate with one another by co-ordinating their 
actions and legislation and by avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
 
In is noteworthy that the chapter on co-operative government occupies a place in the 
Constitution immediately after the chapters containing the founding provisions (chapter 
1) and the Bill of Rights (chapter 2).   The message conveyed by the chapter’s 
placement would seen to be that concerning the individual,  the constitutional 
dispensation is based on human rights,  and that concerning the functioning of 
government,  it is based on co-operation. 
 
The principle of cultural self-determination was embodied in the 1993 Constitution by 
means of a provision authorising the establishment of a Volkstaat Council.   The Council 
was envisaged as a mechanism to enable proponents of the idea of a Volkstaat to 
constitutionally pursue the establishment of such a Volkstaat.   (Section 184A(1), section 
184B(1).)   The Volkstaat provision was dispensed with in the drafting of the new 
constitution.   The Constitution now,  under a heading “Self-determination”,  contains a 
provision which follows closely the wording of constitutional principle XXXIV.   The 
possibility of cultural self-determination is held out not only to the proponents of a 
Volkstaat,  but to any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage.   
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(Section 235.)   By thus widening the scope for cultural self-determination,  the 
Constitution can be said to give greater recognition to the principle than was the case 
with the earlier constitution.   However,  the observation made in respect of the 1993 
Constitution,  viz that the principle had received no more than passive and conditional 
acknowledgement,  is considered to be still valid. 
 
As far as could be ascertained from the literature review (vide section 2.6 of the thesis),  
the extraction of principles specifically related to the assignment of public function 
responsibilities from the set of 34 constitutional principles developed in the course of the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process,  is not something which has attracted the interest of any 
other researcher. 
 
7.7.3 Substance 
 
As was the case with the 1993 Constitution,  so also with the 1996 Constitution it is a 
well nigh impossible task to obtain a complete and accurate picture of the actual 
substance of the public function responsibilities to be discharged by the various spheres 
of government.   The problem can be addressed conveniently by focusing seriatim on 
the national and the provincial spheres of government,  the local sphere of government,  
and the provision made in the Constitution for the assignment and delegation of powers 
and functions between the spheres of government. 
 
7.7.3.1    National and provincial spheres of government 
 
The centrepiece of the assignment of powers to the national and the provincial spheres 
of government is the mechanism of concurrent powers,  introduced by the 1993 
Constitution and perpetuated in the present Constitution.   As will be apparent from 
observations and comments referred to below,  the mechanism of concurrent powers 
has,  generally,  not been well received.   This being the case,  one may well ask why it 
was adopted in the first place.   Haysom (2001:46-48) reports that the drafters of the 
Constitution were faced with a choice:  they either had to attempt to compile exhaustive 
lists of national and provincial powers respectively,  or find a way of expressing the 
interests of both the national and the provincial spheres of government in a multitude of 
functional areas.   They opted for the latter approach,  and adopted concurrent powers 
  
262 
as the appropriate mechanism for regulating the powers of the national and the 
provincial spheres of government.   Concurrent powers is by no means a new concept:  
it features prominently in the Basic Law of Germany (vide section 4.4 of the thesis),  a 
constitution which reportedly influenced the South African constitution making process to 
a substantial degree (Steytler 2001:241; Haysom 2001:46-47).   Forty plus years ago a 
writer on federalism put forward the view that concurrent powers in relation to some 
matters may be unavoidable,  inter alia because of a perceived difficulty of allocating 
matters exclusively to one level of government (Wheare 1963:75-80).   Haysom 
(2001:50) remarks interestingly that the constitutional principles do not mesh properly 
with the approach,  particularly as regards concurrent powers,  which was eventually 
followed in the drafting of both the “interim” (1993) and the “final” (1996) Constitution. 
 
De Villiers (1996:6-7, 9, 37) is outspoken in his criticism of concurrent powers.   He 
emphasises the importance of the Constitution providing as much legal certainty as 
possible as to which level of government is responsible for a particular function.   In his 
view concurrent powers cause confusion in this connection and encourage the 
conclusion of intergovernmental agreements,  which in turn reduce transparency and 
increase public uncertainty.   De Villiers goes on to argue that such agreements have no 
constitutional basis,  which means the constitutionality of regulations and proclamations 
arising from them could be challenged.   He nonetheless holds the view that no 
constitution can provide an exact allocation of every single public function,  a 
circumstance which gives rise to the need for co-operation amongst the national 
government and the provincial governments. 
 
Levy and Tapscott (2001:2) are not as outspokenly critical of the mechanism of 
concurrent powers as De Villiers,  but point out that five years after the adoption of the 
1996 Constitution there was still uncertainty over the precise responsibilities of the 
different levels of the administrative echelon,  particularly in the area of concurrent 
responsibilities.   They also express the view that due to the ambiguities of concurrent 
responsibilities it is not always clear whether the provinces are merely the implementers 
of national policy,  or whether they can truly shape their own identities (Levy & Tapscott 
2001:6). 
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However well-intentioned the allocation of concurrent powers to levels or spheres of 
government may be,  the mechanism seems to have the effect of making the national 
government dominant in the legislative domain.   Laufer (1991:91-94) finds in respect of 
Germany that despite the Basic Law presumption regarding the primary legislative 
competence of the Länder the Federation plays the dominant role with respect to 
legislation,  with the Länder parliaments – as legislative organs – reduced largely to 
inactivity.   In his overview of the first six years of provincial government in South Africa 
under the new constitutional dispensation,  Pottie (2001) comes to a similar conclusion.   
He reasons that the short duration of provincial legislative sessions,  the limited amount 
of legislation passed,  and the largely technical nature of the legislation adopted,  is 
indicative of the relatively narrow scope of provincial powers under the Constitution.   
Another writer on the situation in South Africa remarks that,  generally,  the provinces 
accept that the national government will dominate in legislative matters.  She notes the 
small amount of provincial legislation,  even in the areas of concurrent legislation,  and 
observes that national legislation governs the particular matters.   (Murray 2001:68-69.)   
These findings are confirmed by Steytler (2001:244). 
 
It needs to be noted that the Constitutional Court,  the arbiter of jurisdictional disputes 
between organs of state in the national and provincial spheres of government (1996 
Constitution: section 167(4)(a)),  does not appear to find any difficulty inherent in the 
Constitution when it is called upon to decide issues regarding concurrent powers which 
come before it.   On the basis of judgements of the Court reported and commented on 
inter alia by Malherbe (2001:271, 274) it would appear that the Court evinces a certain 
understanding as to the proper functioning of the mechanism of concurrent powers,  viz 
that the provinces are not obliged to follow national policies as laid down in national 
legislation;  that the constitutional provisions for the resolution of conflicts between laws 
do not inhibit either sphere in the exercise of its legislative powers;  that concurrency in 
legislative powers presupposes co-operation between the national and the provincial 
governments;  and that in the area of concurrent legislative powers there is no 
presumption in favour of either the national or the provincial legislatures.   It would seem 
to the author that the Court holds the view that the two spheres are equal as far as the 
exercise of concurrent powers go,  that each is in a position to play a full role with regard 
to the particular powers,  and that if a conflict between laws should arise,  the 
Constitution provides adequately for the resolution of any conflict.   Malherbe (2001:275) 
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observes that the Court places particular emphasis on co-operative government as a 
means for avoiding jurisdictional disputes. 
 
Steytler (2001:247-248) also remarks on the emphasis placed by the constitutional Court 
on co-operative government,  specifically in relation to the exercise of concurrent 
legislative powers.   He refers to a statement by the Court that the Constitution does not 
embody “competitive federalism” but “co-operative government” (Steyler 2001:253).   
Steytler is nevertheless critical of the Court in its handling of jurisdictional disputes.   He 
maintains that the introduction of concurrent powers has been marked by a drift towards 
centralisation in government,  and that the Court has not arrested this drift;  further that 
in adjudicating competition between the spheres of government,  the Court has been 
unable to find in favour of the provinces in any meaningful way.   He also expresses 
concern over the emphasis placed on political processes (as a facet of co-operative 
government) in dealing with issues of concurrency,  which in his view (echoing De 
Villiers – vide supra) could result in key decisions on legislation being taken at political 
executive level.   (Steytler 2001:246, 254.) 
 
For purposes of evaluating the substance of the public function responsibilities assigned 
to the national and the provincial spheres of government respectively,  it is not 
necessary to take the examination of the concurrent powers mechanism any further.   
The key question to be answered is,  “Do the constitutional provisions regarding 
concurrent legislative powers (sections 44(1) and 104(1) read with schedule 4 of the 
Constitution) provide substantial clarity as to the public function responsibilities to be 
discharged by the national and the provincial governments respectively?”.   From a 
Public Administration point of view,  the answer is “No”.   What has emerged from the 
research with some clarity is that the substance scale,  as far as concurrent powers are 
concerned,  has come down rather heavily in favour of the national government. 
 
Moving on to the question of exclusive provincial legislative powers,  the 1996 
Constitution differs markedly from its predecessor in providing such powers to the 
provinces in respect of certain functional areas (section 104(1)(b)(ii) read with schedule 
5).   This is obviously an important increase in the powers of the provinces,  although it 
should be mentioned that such powers were required all along by constitutional principle 
XIX.   Cowan and Fick (1997:8) regard the development as a significant one for the 
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country’s “system of federalism” – viewed in a constitutional law context – noting that a 
definite restriction had been placed on the (previously pervasive) legislative powers of 
Parliament.   However,  the exclusivity of the particular competence is qualified by 
section 44(2) of the Constitution which empowers Parliament to intervene by passing 
legislation with regard to an “excluded” matter when considered necessary to maintain 
national security,  to maintain economic unity,  to maintain essential national standards,  
to establish minimum standards for the rendering of services,  or to prevent 
unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another 
province or of the country as a whole. 
 
Clearly,  the assignment of an exclusive legislative competence to the provinces 
represents a significant increase in the substance of provincial powers,  and serves to 
create a better balance of powers between the national and provincial spheres of 
government.   The extent of the increase is,  however,  indeterminate given the fact that 
Parliament can intervene legislatively with regard to a matter in an excluded functional 
area when considered necessary in the national interest.   Time alone will tell to what 
extent provinces will use - or wish to use,  or be able to use - their “exclusive” legislative 
competence.   The scope for Parliament to intervene is noticeably wide,  focused as it is 
on considerations of national security,  the wide compass of economic unity,  the 
maintenance of standards,  the setting of minimum standards,  and the prevention of 
unreasonable action by a province.   As pointed out supra in dealing with concurrent 
legislative powers,  the provinces have been relatively inactive in the legislative domain;  
it is possible that they may,  as in the case of concurrent powers,  be inhibited also in the 
exercise of their legislative powers in the exclusive powers category. 
 
Again,  it is not possible to ascertain on a reading of the Constitution what in practical 
(public administration) terms the provinces may or may not do in relation to the 
functional areas listed in schedule 5 of the Constitution.   Determining the actual 
substance of assigned powers remains a difficult quest.   Strictly speaking,  the 
observation made in regard to the 1993 Constitution that no division of powers between 
the national and the provincial spheres of government has been effected,  remains valid. 
  
266 
 
7.7.3.2    Local sphere of government 
 
The provisions of the Constitution dealing with the executive and legislative powers of 
the municipalities are noticeably convoluted,  presenting a substantial challenge to 
whoever would essay an elucidation of the actual substance of municipal powers. 
 
In terms of section 156(1) of the Constitution a municipality  “has executive authority in 
respect of,  and has the right to administer matters listed in part B of schedule 4 and part 
B of schedule 5 “ of the Constitution,  and any other matter assigned to it by  national or 
provincial legislation.   Schedules 4 and 5 deal respectively with the  concurrent 
legislative competence of the national and provincial legislatures,  and the exclusive 
legislative competence of the provincial legislatures.   To the executive authority of the 
municipalities is added a legislative authority by section 156(2) which stipulates that a 
municipality may make and administer bylaws for the effective administration of the 
matters which it has the right to administer.   The impression created is that a 
municipality’s legislative authority “comes second” to its executive authority,  and that its 
executive authority is the primary locus of its powers.   It is certainly municipal executive 
authority which is the focus of the oversight role to be fulfilled by the national and 
provincial governments with regard to local government. 
 
Section 155(7) of the Constitution gives to the national and the provincial governments 
the legislative and executive authority to “see to” the effective performance by 
municipalities of their listed functions,  by regulating the exercise by municipalities of 
their executive authority.   What does all this mean in terms of the extent to which a 
municipality is free to deal with the matters listed in part B of schedule 4 and part B of 
schedule 5 of the Constitution?   De Visser (2002) has addressed the matter and 
provided some answers in his article dealing with the powers of local government under 
the current constitutional dispensation. 
 
De Visser (2002:224) points out that the municipalities have both original (or primary) 
and assigned (or secondary) powers.   The original powers are those referred to in 
section 156(1)(a) read with section 156(2) of the Constitution,  and which relate to the 
matters listed in the B parts of schedules 4 and 5.   The assigned powers relate to other 
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matters assigned to a municipality by national or provincial legislation,  referred to in 
section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution.   For purposes of the present examination it is the 
original powers of local government which are of particular interest.  De Visser 
(2002:225-236) devotes the greater part of his analysis to the legislative powers of the 
national and provincial governments in relation to these original powers of local 
government.   In his analysis he focuses separately on local government matters listed in 
part B of schedule 4 (concurrent national and provincial legislative competence) and 
matters listed in part B of schedule 5 (exclusive provincial competence) of the 
Constitution. 
 
The main conclusions which De Visser comes to,  can be summarised as follows: 
 
?? In respect of schedule 4B matters national and provincial governments have 
regulatory powers over such matters,  but their powers cannot be exercised 
prescriptively with regard to the “core” of the matters,  and are limited to the setting of 
a legal framework,  which includes minimum standards and monitoring (De Visser 
2002:231); 
?? in respect of schedule 5B matters a provincial government has regulatory powers 
over such matters,  but the powers cannot be exercised prescriptively with regard to 
the “core” of the matters,  and are limited to the setting of a legal framework,  which 
includes minimum standards and monitoring (De Visser 2002:232);  and 
?? in respect of schedule 5B matters the national government’s powers are not as wide 
as those of the provincial governments;  it has regulatory powers over schedule 5B 
matters,  but restricted to the grounds stipulated in section 44(2) of the Constitution 
(which provides for legislative intervention by Parliament with regard to a matter 
falling within a functional area of exclusive provincial competence (schedule 5)),  and 
to the necessity requirement included in the provision (De Visser:2002:232). 
 
De Visser finds it necessary to provide a diagram to illustrate the regulatory powers of 
the national and the provincial governments with regard to local government matters.   
He does not elaborate on the concepts of “core” content (in relation to local government 
matters),  “framework”,  “minimum standards”,  and “monitoring” which he employs in 
presenting his findings. 
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In the author’s opinion De Visser has made a valuable contribution to the better 
understanding of the public function responsibilities of municipalities.   At the same time 
his article is eloquent on the complexity of the particular part of the national assignment 
scheme,  and serves to provide confirmation that it is not possible to ascertain from a 
reading of the Constitution which aspect of a listed local government matter is – or could 
be – the responsibility of the national,  provincial and local governments respectively.   
The same observation applies to matters which could be assigned to the municipalities 
by the national and provincial governments in terms of section 156(1)(b),  particulars of 
which are unknown until an assignment actually takes place. 
 
7.7.3.3    Assignment and delegation of powers to subnational governments 
 
The Constitution provides amply for the assignment and delegation of powers to 
subnational spheres of government.   The key provisions for assignment and delegation 
are as follows: 
 
?? The National Assembly may assign any of its legislative powers,  except the power to 
amend the Constitution,  to any legislative body in another sphere of government 
(section 44(1)(a)(iii)); 
?? a provincial legislature may assign any of its legislative powers to a municipal council 
in the province (section 104(1)(c)); 
?? a Cabinet member may assign any power or function that is to be exercised or 
performed by him or her in terms of an Act of Parliament to a member of a provincial 
executive council or to a municipal council,  subject to certain stipulated conditions 
being complied with (section 99); 
?? a member of the executive council of a province may assign any power or function 
that is to be exercised or performed by him or her in terms of an Act of Parliament or 
a provincial act,  to a municipal council,  subject to certain stipulated conditions being 
complied with (section 126); 
?? the national and the provincial governments must assign to a municipality,  by 
agreement and subject to conditions,  the administration of a matter listed in part A of 
schedule 4 (concurrent national and provincial legislative competence) and part A of 
schedule 5 (exclusive provincial competence) which necessarily relates to local 
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government,  if (a) the matter would most effectively be administered locally,  and (b) 
the municipality has the capacity to administer it (section 156(4));  and 
?? an executive organ of state may delegate any of its powers or functions to any other 
executive organ of state,  subject to conditions,  or exercise any power or perform 
any function for any other executive organ of state on an agency or delegation basis 
(section 238). 
 
It is difficult to imagine a greater degree of flexibility in the ordering of powers and 
functions by legislatures,  political executive bodies,  and executive organs of state 
(principally departments and administrations in the three spheres of government,  as per 
definition in section 239 of the Constitution) than that allowed by the South African 
Constitution.   Almost anything is possible with a view to  facilitating the functioning of 
the machinery of government.   The flexibility in the system is directly appropriate to the 
realisation of the notion of co-operative government,  which occupies such a prominent 
place in the Constitution.   Murray (2001:67) remarks on the “soft” responsibility 
boundaries between the spheres of government and observes that the Constitution 
requires the business of government to be conducted according to the principle of co-
operative government.   The provisions referred to above are clearly important as a 
means towards satisfying such a requirement.   However,  in trying to evaluate the 
substance of the responsibilities to be discharged by subnational governments – an 
important focus of the present study – the high degree of flexibility pertaining to the 
exercise and performance of legislative and executive powers and functions,  is a major 
problem.   The flexibility built into the Constitution,  while admirable in other respects,  
tends to mask rather than to clarify the actual responsibilities of the respective spheres 
of government.   To obtain an accurate picture of the substance of the responsibilities of 
the provincial and municipal spheres of government,  one would have to embark on 
detailed research into the assignments and delegations operative at a specific point in 
time.   It is apparent that also in this area of intergovernmental relations,  the 
Constitutional text has its limits as an aid in determining,  simply,  who does what. 
 
7.7.3.4    Comment 
 
The Constitution employs essentially four mechanisms for ordering the responsibilities of 
the spheres of government,  viz concurrent powers for the national and provincial 
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spheres,  qualified exclusive powers for the provincial sphere,  regulatory oversight by 
the national and provincial spheres over the local government sphere,  and ample 
provision for assignment and delegation of responsibilities between spheres of 
government.   The resulting substance of each sphere’s responsibilities is a function of 
the interaction of these mechanisms.   However,  while particular mechanisms can be 
examined,  described,  and evaluated,  it is not possible,  without embarking on a great 
deal of empirical research,  to obtain a reasonably accurate picture of the actual 
substance of the responsibilities which each sphere of government is called upon to 
discharge. 
 
In summary,  the Constitution does not set out clearly and unambiguously the actual 
substance of the legislative and executive powers to be exercised by the three spheres 
of government respectively.   In general,  it can be said that the primary power of the 
state,  viz the power to direct and oversee society by the making of laws,  is located 
predominantly with the national government,  while the legislative roles to be fulfilled by 
the subnational spheres of government are essentially supplementary ones.   As far as 
the exercise of executive authority is concerned,  the deployment of responsibilities for 
the provision of services and the carrying out of programmes seems to be such as to 
involve all three spheres in a substantial manner. 
 
7.7.4 A note on intergovernmental relations 
 
The Constitution (section 41(2)) stipulates that an Act of Parliament  must (a) establish 
or provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental 
relations,  and (b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate 
intergovernmental disputes.   The particular section is contained in chapter 3 of the 
Constitution,  which deals with co-operative government,  and the assumption can 
therefore be made that in constitutional terms intergovernmental relations is regarded as 
part and parcel of co-operative government.   The notion of co-operative government as 
required by the present Constitution has been examined briefly in section 7.6 supra.   An 
Act as envisaged in the Constitution has not yet been adopted.   It is considered 
necessary to comment briefly on the assignment of public function responsibilities to 
spheres of government in the context of intergovernmental relations. 
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In section 7.6 supra the opinion was expressed that co-operative government ought not 
to be seen as a means of remedying inherent defects and shortcomings in the 
assignment of responsibilities to spheres of government.   How does this tie in with the 
conduct of intergovernmental relations?   The author would argue that the need for 
intergovernmental relations arises from the fundamental (constitutional) decision to have 
a multi-tiered – or multi-sphered – system of government.   This decision having been 
taken,  it follows that each sphere of government will be required to participate 
appropriately in the total system of government and administration of the country.   Such 
participation is focused for the most part on the discharge of assigned public function 
responsibilities,  in other words on the provision of certain goods and services aimed at 
the satisfaction of community needs.   Inherent in this national “division of work” is the 
need to ensure that the combined efforts of all spheres of government contribute 
optimally to the advancement of the common good.   The author would suggest that 
intergovernmental relations is the means to achieving this end. 
 
As the research has shown,  there is no fixed,  universally endorsed way of deploying 
public function responsibilities.   However,  the manner in which responsibilities are 
deployed is likely to influence intergovernmental relations.   If the public functions,  or 
aspects of public functions,  for which each sphere of government will be responsible are 
determined in a thorough,  accountable,  and generally acceptable way,  and are 
accurately described,  it is reasonable to assume that intergovernmental relations will be 
influenced positively.   On the other hand,  if the assignments are done in a haphazard 
fashion,  or if there is a lack of clarity as to what each sphere of government may or may 
not do,  it must be expected that intergovernmental relations could be seriously 
hampered.   It would seem therefore that endeavours to build an effective system of 
intergovernmental relations should start by paying close and thorough attention to the 
assignment of public function responsibilities. 
 
7.7.5 Synopsis 
 
In the lead in to the synopsis of the corresponding critique of the 1993 Constitution (vide 
section 6.7.5 of the thesis) a key question was posed,  viz whether,  and how well,  that 
Constitution succeeded in establishing a credible and clear-cut deployment of 
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responsibilities over the three levels of government.   The same question can be asked 
in relation to the present Constitution,  and needs to be considered along similar lines. 
 
The problem inherent in the confusing and inconsistent use of terminology and concepts 
which was identified in relation to the earlier constitution,  remains,  and will have to be 
addressed if the assignment question is to be dealt with in a scientific way.   
Remarkably,  the drafters of both constitutional texts have succeeded in largely avoiding 
the use of the term “function” in one of its most widely established applications,  viz for 
referring to what public institutions are established to do,  in other words their activities 
or programmes of work. 
 
The 1996 Constitution is commendable for moving beyond the national and the 
provincial spheres of government by also setting out the public functions of the municipal 
sphere,  something which the 1993 Constitution failed to do.   However,  the manner in 
which the Constitution does so leaves much to be desired,  with emphasis being placed 
not on what belongs appropriately within the local sphere of government,  but on the 
apportionment of oversight responsibilities regarding local government to the national 
and provincial spheres respectively.   Local government would seem to deserve better,  
especially considering the constitutional declaration that the three spheres of 
government are “ . . . distinctive,  interdependent and interrelated” (1996 Constitution: 
section 40(1)).   A close reading of the constitutional provisions regarding the executive 
and legislative competences – presented in that (reversed) order – of local governments,  
together with the continued employment of the term “bylaw”,  tends to convey the 
impression that this sphere of government is intended to play a subordinate role,  
occupying itself to a large extent with the administration of laws adopted in the other 
spheres of government. 
 
The Constitution is notable for its ingenuity,  but also for its extreme complexity.   
Ingenuity is evident in the comprehensive legal framework which has been provided for 
setting about the performance of public functions,   but as is apparent from section 7.4 
supra,  the particular parts of the Constitution,  read as a whole,  are highly complex.   
Even an experienced legislator,  administrator or academic would find it an exacting task 
to ascertain exactly what the public function responsibilities of the various spheres of 
government are.   Two of the main reasons for the complexity would seem to be the 
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essentially legal perspective from which the particular provisions were written,  and the 
employment of the inherently problematic concurrent powers mechanism.   Had a Public 
Administration approach been applied,  it is possible that a more accessible deployment 
of powers and functions could have been achieved (vide chapter 9 of the thesis). 
 
The 1996 Constitution represents a substantial advance on the 1993 Constitution in 
regard to the realisation of the assignment principles which,  as part of the research,  
were extracted from the set of constitutional principles (largely drafting specifications) 
adopted as part of the Multiparty Negotiating Process in 1993,  viz the principles of 
national unity,  of economic unity,  of equality,  of provincial autonomy,  of co-operation,  
and of cultural self-determination.   The improvement is evident especially in regard to 
the principles of provincial autonomy and of co-operation. 
 
The unsatisfactory situation created by the 1993 Constitution in not providing a clear 
picture of the actual substance of the responsibilities to be discharged by the various 
spheres of government in the performance of public functions,  has been continued 
under the 1996 Constitution.   The reasons for this are mainly the essentially obfuscating 
nature of the mechanism of concurrent powers;  the power given to the national 
government to intervene in the provincial exclusive category of powers,  in so doing 
qualifying the “exclusivity” of the particular competence;  the limitation,  qualification and 
subordination of the executive and legislative roles to be fulfilled by local governments;  
and the various provisions for the assignment by means of executive or legislative action 
of responsibilities by “higher” spheres of government to “lower” spheres of government.   
The net result is that the actual responsibilities to be discharged by the various spheres 
of government cannot be ascertained accurately on a reading of the Constitution;  to 
obtain an accurate picture it would be necessary to undertake substantial research 
encompassing a vast number of laws and executive actions.   Broadly viewed,  it would 
seem that the primary (legislative) power of the state continues to reside predominantly 
in the national government,  with the provinces and the municipalities fulfilling essentially 
supplementary roles. 
 
Although the scheme for the assignment of responsibilities to levels of spheres of 
government introduced by the 1993 Constitution has been elaborated in certain respects 
– mainly through the better realisation of assignment principles,  the introduction of a 
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category of exclusive powers for the provinces,  and the listing of matters which belong 
in the municipal domain – the 1996 Constitution does not,  in the author’s opinion,  
succeed in establishing a credible and clear-cut deployment of responsibilities to the 
three spheres of government. 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
Because of the directive effect of the set of constitutional principles adopted during the 
Multiparty Negotiating Process in 1993,  the present Constitution is not really a new 
constitution,  but an elaboration and refinement of the 1993 Constitution.   This is 
certainly true of the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government,  
where elaboration is evident particularly with regard to the realisation of constitutionally 
based assignment principles,  the assignment of (qualified) exclusive powers to the 
provinces,  and in the provision of detail regarding matters appropriate to the municipal 
sphere of government.   However,  the centrepiece of the assignment scheme instituted 
by the earlier constitution, viz the provision of concurrent powers for the national and the 
provincial spheres of government,  with its shortcomings,  has been retained. 
 
The Constitution bears the imprimatur of the Constitutional Court,  the Court having 
found – after declining to certify the initial text – that all the provisions of the amended 
text submitted to it,  complied with all the constitutional principles.   As pointed out in 
section 7.3.3 supra,  a reservation can be expressed about the certification action with 
regard to the appropriateness and adequacy of the legislative and executive 
competences of the various spheres of government as required by constitutional 
principle XX. 
 
The thesis has up to this point – 
 
??   sought to orientate the study in scientific terms (chapter 2); 
??   set out and elucidated the design of the research project (chapter 3);  
??   dealt with the assignment of responsibilities in a sample of countries other than 
South Africa in order to contextualise the particular phenomenon over a wider front 
(chapter 4); 
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??   surveyed the South African experience with the assignment of responsibilities to 
levels or spheres of government from the inception of the South African state in 1910 
up to the implementation of the first democratic constitution in 1994 (chapter 5); 
??   analysed and evaluated the assignment of responsibilities in terms of the epoch-
making 1993 Constitution (chapter 6);  and  
??   provided a follow-up analysis and evaluation of the present (1996) Constitution. 
 
In chapter 2 of the thesis it was indicated that the purpose of the study was to make a 
research based contribution to the body of knowledge constituting Public Administration,  
specifically concerning the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government.    To round off the research reported on in the previous chapters,  it is 
appropriate to summarise,  analyse,  and interpret the findings.   Such a stocktaking is 
essayed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8:  SUMMARY,  ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH 
FINDINGS 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a consolidated summary as well as an analysis 
and interpretation of the research findings reported on in the preceding chapters of the 
thesis.   The objective is a dual one:  firstly,  to provide a critical overview of the 
assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions as a phenomenon 
in the system of government;  and secondly,  to evaluate the state of the assignment 
question in scientific terms.   The stated objective should be seen against the 
background of the particular problem which motivated the research project,  as well as 
within the context of the stated purpose pursued with the project. 
 
The problem underlying the research has been dealt with fully in section 2.3 of the 
thesis.   In a nutshell,  the problem is that an important matter,  with far-reaching 
implications for the government and administration of the country,  and virtually all other 
countries,  is patently under-researched,  with the result that a body of scientifically 
founded knowledge with regard to the assignment of responsibilities for the performance 
of public functions is not yet in evidence.   This finding is underscored by the paucity of 
analytic treatment of the public function responsibilities of levels or spheres of 
government in the literature of Public Administration,  as well as in the literature of 
related disciplines such as Political Science and Constitutional Law;  by the absence of a 
substantial research record;  and by the limited treatment accorded the question in 
academic curricula.   As regards the purpose of the study,  this is simply to address the 
identified problem in a systematic manner and,  in so doing,  to endeavour to make a 
research based contribution to the developing body of knowledge constituting Public 
Administration.       
 
The research findings are summarised in the following section.   This is followed by a 
section in which the findings are analysed and interpreted from a scientific perspective.   
The chapter culminates in a concluding statement concerning what has been learnt from 
the research.      
 
  
277 
 
8.2 Summary of research findings 
 
The findings under the major headings of the research project are summarised in the 
following paragraphs.   As all sources used have been acknowledged in the various 
chapters of the thesis,  this information is not repeated here.  
 
8.2.1 Literature review 
 
The literature review,  contained in section 2.6 of the thesis,  covered the local (South 
African) research record as well as published books and articles in two disciplines,  viz 
Public Administration and Constitutional Law,  and one specialised field of study,  viz 
federalism.   A conspectus of the literature examined is provided in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Regarding the South African research record,  no postgraduate dissertation or thesis 
dealing with the subject of the present study in a comprehensive way could be found.   
There is a doctoral thesis of 1993 dealing comprehensively with public functions but this 
is focused on the essential activities to be undertaken by government,  rather than being 
left to other sectors of society (Loxton 1993).   The Human Sciences Research Council 
has not undertaken research with a focus similar to the present study.   Although not to 
be found in the official research record,  presumably because no research report was 
published,  work done by the erstwhile Commission for Administration in 1993 is directly 
relevant to the subject of study.   This work is described,  examined and evaluated in 
section 6.4 of the thesis. 
 
As regards publications within the discipline of Public Administration,  it has been 
established that the assignment question does not figure as a major issue or as one 
enjoying substantial recognition as an integral part of the discipline.   However,  there 
are significant references in the literature to complexity and confusion regarding the 
respective responsibilities of national and subnational governments which tend to 
confirm the importance of the assignment question.   Relevant insights which were 
encountered in the literature survey are acknowledged at appropriate places in the 
thesis. 
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From a scientific point of view,  the sample of Public Administration literature which was 
perused did not produce evidence of an established,  defined body of knowledge dealing 
with the assignment of responsibilities.   The author is of the opinion that a contribution 
towards a more scientific ordering of public function responsibilities could be made from 
within the discipline of Public Administration,  and suggested as much in an article 
published in 1998 (Robson 1998a). 
 
A substantial number of books and journal articles by South African experts on 
constitutional law were examined as part of the literature review.   The conclusion 
reached is that writers in the particular field are intensely interested in the vertical 
separation of powers within a country’s governmental structure,  but in their own peculiar 
way.   Their interest would appear to lie essentially in the legal rules which govern the 
institution and functioning of legislative and executive institutions (including the 
assignment and exercise of power),  as well as in the role which judicial institutions have 
to play in this connection.   It is also evident that the constitutional lawyers’ attention is 
attracted whenever there is conflict or looming conflict in the exercise of assigned 
powers;  their professional response typically being to examine,  apply and interpret the 
Constitution and other law in such cases.   However,  as regards the actual content of 
the public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  for which the various levels or 
spheres of government have been made responsible,  they would appear to regard this 
as a given;  as something which presumably needs to be determined through an 
essentially political process. 
 
Of the three bodies of literature reviewed,  that on federalism was found to have 
relatively greater relevance and value for the present study.   More space has therefore 
been devoted in the thesis to reporting on and evaluating this part of the literature 
reviewed.   A significant development in the literature on federalism would appear to be 
a movement away from regarding states as being federations or not being federations,  
towards a more pragmatic view in which it is accepted that states tend to evince federal 
characteristics in varying degrees.   If this approach is accepted,  it has a fundamentally 
positive implication for dealing with the assignment question,  viz that the assignment of 
public function responsibilities to levels or spheres of government need not be tied to 
perceptions of the state as being or striving to be a federation or a union,  but can be 
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studied independently or such perceptions,  in other words that there is room for 
establishing the assignment question on its own,  objective (scientific) base.   This idea 
is taken further in chapter 9 of the thesis. 
 
Although writers on federalism are concerned essentially with the accommodation of 
political power within the state,  and such power is given form and substance in the 
responsibilities assigned to the national and subnational governments respectively,  it is 
evident from the literature that they are not focused on the critical consideration of the 
public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  which are or ought to be the 
responsibility of the various governments.   No evidence was found of a developed 
theory or model dealing with the deployment of public function responsibilities over 
levels or spheres of government. 
 
Despite the findings referred to in the preceding paragraph,  there are nevertheless a 
number of insights to be gleaned from the sample of the literature on federalism which 
has been perused which could be of value in the development of an assignment theory 
or model.   These are summarised below,  in no particular order and with a measure of 
interpretation by the author:   (The sources are acknowledged in section 2.6.4 of the 
thesis and are not referred to again here.) 
 
?? Consideration needs to be given to the technical aspects of listing the matters for 
which national and subnational governments respectively are responsible. 
?? Political,  social and economic factors could promote a desire in subnational units to 
be autonomous for certain purposes. 
?? Classifications of public functions have been proposed in the past and are in 
existence;  however,  these do not address the vertical separation of powers. 
?? Unity and diversity are not opposites;  unity should be contrasted with disunity and 
diversity with homogeneity. 
?? There is a recognised principle – the principle of subsidiarity – which addresses the 
vertical separation of powers directly. 
?? Another principle encountered in the literature with relevance to the assignment of 
responsibilities,  is that of exclusivity (in the exercise of powers once assigned). 
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?? Responsibility for a public function cannot always be assigned exclusively to a single 
level of sphere of government,  necessitating deployment over two or more levels or 
spheres. 
?? Recourse to the concurrent powers mechanism could be seen to be necessary 
because of a perceived difficulty of allocating a matter exclusively to one level of 
government. 
?? Generally,  the concurrent powers mechanism does not receive favourable comment.   
Concurrent powers cause confusion,  encourage the determination of responsibilities 
outside the constitution by political executives,  and lead to a situation in which the 
central government dominates the legislative domain. 
?? The intertwinement of responsibilities in a hierarchy of governments places a 
premium on intergovernmental relations,  especially regarding co-operation and co-
ordination. 
?? There is some evidence of an attempt to develop an appropriate “language” to deal 
with the assignment of powers and functions,  albeit with a constitutional law focus. 
?? In addition to the territorial stratification of responsibilities,  there are other bases on 
which states can be organised,  especially with a view to accommodating culturally 
distinct minorities. 
?? The location of the so-called residuary powers of government in a state is an 
important factor in determining the relative positions of power of the national and 
subnational levels of government. 
?? The question of symmetry versus asymmetry in relation to the assignment of 
responsibilities to subnational governments,  is an issue in the federalism debate.   
There would appear to be a natural tendency in states to favour the symmetrical 
allocation of powers.   However,  it may be advisable where subnational 
governments lack adequate capacity,  to assign responsibilities incrementally. 
?? Constitutions ought not to be over-written by listing public function responsibilities in 
too much detail. 
?? There is an argument to be made for not regarding the assignment of responsibilities 
as a once-off decision,  or binding political agreement,  but to see it as a matter 
which should proceed in an inductive or evolutionary manner. 
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It is conceivable that some or all of these insights from a sister discipline could serve to 
provide a useful backdrop against which a Public Administration approach to the 
assignment of responsibilities could be pursued. 
 
8.2.2 The assignment of responsibilities in other countries 
 
The countries included in the study (vide chapter 4 of the thesis) were Australia,  
Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  and the United Kingdom.   A recapitulation of the findings is 
provided in the following paragraphs.  
 
In all five countries,  responsibility for the performance of the public functions concerning 
defence,  foreign affairs,  and public finance is assigned to the highest level of 
government;  as regards other public functions,  there is no obvious uniformity evident as 
to the assignment of responsibilities to the various levels or spheres of government.   An 
outstanding feature of the assignment schemes mandated by the various constitutional 
texts is that of complexity,  with the resultant problem of accessibility encountered by 
anyone who wishes to know what each level or sphere of government is actually 
responsible for.   Some of the prime factors contributing to complexity are the dual basis 
of division of responsibilities (cultural and regional / hierarchical) as applied for instance 
in Belgium;  the assignment of concurrent legislative powers to the national and 
subnational levels of government as found in Germany;  and the employment of negative 
denotation in ordering responsibilities between levels of government as found in Spain 
and the United Kingdom.   This latter practice consists of excluding stipulated matters 
from the legislative competence of a level of government without specifying what it may 
actually legislate on. 
 
Taxonomically viewed,  the treatment of the assignment question is generally poor.   
With the exception of Belgium,  where a degree of connotative meaning is implicit in the 
concept of persoonsgebonde matters,  a fundamentum divisionis,  a defined assignment 
rule,  or a set of assignment criteria,  is generally lacking.   Matters for which 
governments are responsible are listed without categorisation and in no particular order;  
the language used in referring to matters lacks precision and consistency;  references 
are mostly to subjects (for example,  “education”) rather than public functions (for 
example,  “the provision of education”);  and there is little sign of an endeavour to deal 
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systematically or insightfully with the reality that many public functions are deployed over 
more than one level of government. 
 
The assignment schemes of the countries studied are focused generally on the national 
level of government and the level immediately below the national level.   Constitutional 
provisions concerning local government are sparse,  with local government generally 
being regulated by laws enacted by higher levels of government.   In view of the impact 
which local government can have on the quality of life of the citizenry,  the seemingly 
dismissive way in which the responsibilities of local government are treated can be 
regarded as a constitutional shortcoming of the countries in question. 
 
The present research has lead to the general conclusion that in none of the countries 
studied a clear,  comprehensive demarcation of governmental responsibilities has been 
achieved.   There is little evidence that the assignment question has been handled in a 
manner which could reasonably be described as scientific.  
 
As a “by-product” of the research conducted,  it has been found that any attempt to 
classify a state in absolute terms as either a union or a federation could be 
problematical;  there is ample evidence of states evincing both unitary and federal 
characteristics,  albeit mixed in various ways,  and irrespective of the distinguishing 
formal titles by which they are known as states.    
 
8.2.3 Assignment of responsibilities in South Africa prior to 1994 
 
The historical survey,  which is contained in chapter 5 of the thesis,  covers the period of 
84 years from the establishment of the South African state in 1910 up to the 
implementation of the first democratic constitution in 1994.   This period can be 
characterised as the pre-democratic era of government and administration in South 
Africa.   It was marked,  from the beginning,  by the recognition and formal establishment 
of the White population group as the dominant group in society and the state;  to be 
followed in later years by attempts of the governments-of-the-day to achieve an 
acceptable constitutional “accommodation” of the Black,  Coloured,  and Indian 
population groups,  but without compromising the dominant position of the White group.   
However,  the emphasis of the historical survey has not been on the political or 
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ideological aspects of the system of government which was in operation,  but on the 
ways in which responsibility for the performance of public functions were deployed 
amongst levels or spheres of government.   Some key findings of the survey are 
highlighted below. 
 
At the constitution drafting convention which preceded the establishment of the South 
African state,  a clear and conscious decision was taken to establish a union and not a 
federation (vide section 5.5 of the thesis).   This decision had a strong centralising effect 
on the assignment of responsibilities to levels of government,  and this centralisation of 
authority – or more accurately,  ultimate authority as well as residual authority – in the 
central government was to be an outstanding feature of the system of government for 
many decades.   In line with the orientation towards strong central control,  the 1909 
Constitution listed a relatively small number of “classes of subjects” in respect of which 
the provinces would have legislative authority,  but at the same time giving Parliament 
the authority to entrust in its discretion additional matters to the provinces through the 
adoption of ordinary legislation.   Over the years a great number of matters was so 
entrusted,   the list eventually exceeding in number the classes of subjects stipulated in 
the Constitution.   Centralised control was maintained by requiring all provincial 
legislation to be approved at national level and by ruling out any legislation repugnant to 
national legislation. 
 
The 1909 Constitution had virtually nothing to say about local government,  stipulating 
merely that “municipal institutions,  divisional councils,  and other institutions of a similar 
nature” constituted one class of subjects concerning which provinces could make 
ordinances.   This somewhat dismissive attitude towards local government evident in 
constitutional arrangements persisted throughout the period covered by the survey;  
indeed,  even the first democratic constitution implemented in 1994 was focused on two 
rather than three levels of government.   The Cinderella treatment of local government in 
the assignment of responsibilities,  remarkable in the light of the growth of towns and 
cities,  is by no means peculiar to South Africa (vide section 8.2.2 supra).  
 
Another outstanding feature of the period covered by the survey was the degree of 
structural and functional complexity in government which resulted from the racially based  
ideology and its associated policies and practices.   As an adjunct to what can be 
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regarded as the core system of government throughout the period dealt with,  
supplementary governmental structures,  taking different forms and driven by different 
time-tables,  came into existence,  each with its peculiar assignment of responsibilities.   
The deployment of governmental responsibilities in the country eventually presented a 
highly convoluted picture,  making even its description for purposes of the thesis a 
challenging task.   The research has shown that immediately prior to the implementation 
of the 1993 Constitution,  South Africa had fifteen discrete executive administrations 
(one central,  four provincial,  six for the so-called “self-governing territories”,  and four 
for the so-called “independent states” within the country’s internationally recognised 
borders);  eleven public services (one for the national and the provincial administrations,  
six for the self-governing territories,  and four for the independent states);  and over a 
hundred government departments.   And yet,  complexity in the deployment of 
governmental responsibilities is again not peculiar to South Africa;  a similar situation 
was found to exist in other countries (vide preceding section).                               
 
Not much is to be garnered from the historical survey as far as theory is concerned.   
Matters to be dealt with by subnational governments were as a rule indicated 
denotatively,  that is to say,  by listing.   With one exception there is no connotative type 
definition,  fundamentum divisionis,  body of principles,  or set of criteria to be applied in 
deciding which matters or public functions properly belong at or within a particular level 
or sphere of government.   The exception is to be found in the 1993 Constitution in which 
a connotative definition of what constitutes an “own affair” of a population group was 
provided. 
 
Taxonomically and technically viewed,  assignment shortcomings similar to those 
encountered in the study of a selection of other countries are also in evidence in South 
Africa’s constitutional past.   Lists of matters assigned are notable for their lack of order 
and,  in a number of instances,  for their length.   Two modes of presentation are 
invariably employed:  in some instances matters are indicated in functional mode (for 
example “the preservation of fauna and flora”);  in other instances matters are presented 
as nominal subjects (for example “markets and pounds”).   In the same list matters are in 
places described succinctly,  and in other places by way of lengthy,  verbose statements.   
Sometimes a matter is identified by means of a straightforward statement,  without 
qualification;  at other times qualifying mechanisms are employed,  typically by 
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stipulating certain inclusions,  exclusions,  or provisos.   Negative denotation (vide 
section 8.2.2 supra) was,  however,  not resorted to.   The  inescapable conclusion to be 
reached from the research is that in the past the assignment of responsibilities was done 
in a pragmatic and ad hoc manner – in which ideological considerations patently played 
a prominent role – and not by the application of what could be regarded as a scientific 
approach.   However,  it is to be noted that the lack of such an approach is also evident 
when looking at the assignment schemes of other countries. 
 
8.2.4 1993 Constitution 
 
The assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions in terms of the 
country’s first democratic constitution is dealt with fully in chapter 6 of the thesis.   The 
main findings are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
  
For purposes of the present study the 1993 Constitution is regarded as being relatively 
more important than the 1996 Constitution,  notwithstanding the fact that it was 
conceived of and designed as a transitional basic law,  and had a currency of slightly 
less than two years.   The main reason for its importance is to be found in the fact that it 
mandated a comprehensive set of constitutional principles which determined not only its 
own essential features but also those of the constitution that followed it.   The “final” 
(1996) Constitution elaborated an existing dispensation,  it did not create a new one. 
 
As far as the assignment of responsibilities is concerned,  the 1993 (“interim”) 
Constitution introduced a discernible theoretical foundation on which the assignment 
was to be based.   Again,  this is to be found in the set of constitutional principles,  with 
11 of the 34 principles dealing specifically with the respective powers of the national and 
provincial levels of government.   As part of the research the relevant principles were 
examined and analysed.   It was found that the principles had not been formulated as 
principles per se,  and that the particular formulations could be described more 
accurately as a set of specifications which was to be complied with in the drafting of a 
constitution for the country (vide section 6.3.3 of the thesis).   The specifications 
encompassed a number of criteria which had to be satisfied,  but also the odd 
guarantee,  rule,  and condition which was to be applied.   However,  even as 
formulated,  the constitutional principles have an obvious theoretical quality,  reflecting 
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as they do a systematic endeavour to “think about” or to “think through” what was to be 
done (allocation of functions and powers),  before actually doing it. 
 
On analysis a number of actual assignment principles were found to be present in the 
eleven formulations identified as being relevant to the study:  these are the principle of 
national unity,  the principle of economic unity,  the principle of equality,  the principle of 
provincial autonomy,  the principle of co-operation,  and the principle of cultural self-
determination.   There may be others,  but these six are clearly important in building a 
body of scientific knowledge concerning the assignment question. 
 
The 1993 Constitution was the result of a multiparty negotiating process of considerable 
magnitude,  in which a large number of interested parties,  bodies and individuals were 
involved,  and which attracted a substantial number of proposals and suggestions.   
Among these inputs was one by the erstwhile Commission for Administration,  which 
was based on a programme of development work with which the author was closely 
associated,  and which had as an objective the production of “blueprints” for the 
allocation of functions to levels of government.   The particular work included inter alia a 
clear statement of purpose,  a prescribed methodology,  an identification of certain 
principles,  a particular analytical approach,  an identification and definition of terms,  
participation by experienced non-political administrators,  and a specified results format 
which was designed to have practical utility.   Based on the present research,  the 
conclusion was reached that the Commission’s input had no discernible influence on the 
allocation of functions and powers in terms of the 1993 Constitution.   Notwithstanding 
this finding,  the Commission’s work may have some claim to recognition from a 
scientific point of view.   It is considered to have value for purposes of constructing a 
directive model for the assignment of responsibilities (vide ensuing chapter of the 
thesis). 
 
On critical examination,  the assignment of responsibilities by the 1993 Constitution was 
found to have numerous shortcomings. 
 
At a conceptual level,  the Constitution tended to obfuscate rather than to clarify and 
firmly establish “public function” as a key concept in determining the structure of 
government,  this despite the fact that public functions,  as defined in the thesis,  have 
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been recognised and regulated for many decades by public service law in South Africa.   
Technically speaking,  the term “functional area” employed by the Constitution was not 
an acceptable substitute for the term “public function” and,  coupled to the adoption of 
the concurrent powers mechanism,  failed to provide certainty as to the extent of the 
respective legislative powers of the national and provincial levels of government.   Also 
at a technical level there was an unexplained and patently arbitrary use of exclusions 
and provisos in describing functional areas.   Schedule 6,  which by its heading,  
purported to be a listing of the legislative competences of the provinces,  was in fact a 
listing of functional areas in respect of which the provinces and the national government 
would have concurrent powers. 
 
As for the realisation of assignment principles,  it was found on analysis that the principle 
of national unity and the principle of equality were fully realised in the Constitution,   and 
that the maintenance of economic unity,  as required by the corresponding principle,  
was indeed assured by the Constitution.   The principle of provincial autonomy was 
realised in the Constitution,  but only to a strictly limited extent.   In contrast to the later 
Constitution,  the principle of co-operation in the performance of public functions was not 
manifested clearly.   The principle of cultural self-determination received no more than 
passive and conditional acknowledgement. 
 
As regards the substance of the allocation of functions and powers,  the Constitution 
gave a clear indication of the extensive reach of the powers of the national government,  
also placing the residuary powers of government at that level.   The treatment of the 
provinces was,  however,  highly problematical,  with the legislative competence of the 
provinces subsumed in a category of concurrent powers exercisable by both the national 
and the provincial governments.   The sets of circumstances in which national legislation 
in the concurrent category would override conflicting provincial legislation were couched 
in such wide terms that the national government was placed in a position,  and inevitably 
came to dominate the legislative domain.   The situation regarding the provinces was 
aggravated by a failure to grant exclusive legislative powers regarding any matter to the 
provinces,  despite a stipulation in the constitutional principles requiring this to be done.   
The Constitution did not allocate any original functions or powers to the local level of 
government,  which is noteworthy considering the important role which local 
governments are expected to play in promoting the quality of life of their inhabitants,  but 
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not really surprising when looked at in the light of practices in other countries.   The 
Constitution was less problematical as far as executive government and administration 
were concerned,  with subnational governments being placed in the position to render 
extensive services to their communities,  albeit largely within a policy and legal 
framework determined at the national level of government. 
 
Considered in its entirety,  the Constitution did not achieve a substantial,  sufficiently 
informative, and readily accessible or explicable deployment of responsibilities over the 
three levels of government which it instituted.  
 
8.2.5 1996 Constitution 
 
The scheme for the assignment of responsibilities to spheres of government as 
elaborated in the so-called “final” Constitution,  is the subject matter of chapter 7 of the 
thesis.   The salient findings of the research into the Constitution are noted below. 
      
To become law the draft text of the 1996 Constitution had to be certified by the 
Constitutional Court to the effect that all the provisions of the text complied with the 
constitutional principles which had been embodied in the 1993 (“interim”) Constitution.   
The certification requirement and the relevant judgements of the Court have a particular 
relevance to the subject of the present study.   The Court in its first certification 
judgement rejected the initial text which had been submitted to it on the grounds that the 
text did not comply with constitutional principle XVIII.2,  which stipulated that the powers 
and functions of the provinces could not be substantially less than or substantially 
inferior to those provided in the 1993 Constitution.   The Court found that there had been 
a curtailment of provincial powers in some areas and that changes which had been 
made with regard to the exercise of concurrent powers had weakened the position of the 
provinces.   The amended text which was subsequently submitted to the Court 
addressed the problems identified by the Court.   In its second certification judgement 
the Court again found that the powers and functions of the provinces were less than 
those accorded them in the 1993 Constitution,  but not substantially so.   The amended 
text was thereupon certified as complying with all the constitutional principles. 
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One of the constitutional principles which the Court found had been complied with – 
constitutional principle XX – requires that each level of government shall have 
appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and functions that will enable 
each to function effectively.   Analysis of the certification judgements showed that the 
Court subsumed the particular requirement under the question of legitimate provincial 
autonomy,  the promotion of which is also required by constitutional principle XX.   The 
Court noted that the argument advanced on behalf of objectors to the text was not that 
the powers of the provinces were not appropriate or adequate but rather that their 
legitimate autonomy had not been promoted.   It would seem that in the absence of 
objections regarding the substance of the public function responsibilities assigned to the 
provinces,  the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the  complete set of 
assigned responsibilities in depth in order to make a finding as to their appropriateness 
or adequacy.   It is possible that the Court would have considered such an examination 
and determination to lie outside the scope of its brief,  or that the substance of the 
responsibilities given to the provinces was essentially a policy matter,  requiring a 
political decision by the Constitutional Assembly. 
 
Moving on to the features of the Constitution which are relevant to the study,  the 
confusing and inconsistent use of terms and concepts,  which was identified as a 
problem of the “interim” Constitution,  was perpetuated in the “final” Constitution.   It is 
remarkable that the term “function” was used in both constitutions but not in one of its 
best known applications within the domain of government and administration,  viz to 
refer to that which government departments and other public institutions are established 
to do.   Similarly,  the use of qualifications - encompassing exclusions,  limitations,  and 
provisos - in no discernible pattern and with no apparent consistency,  a shortcoming of 
the 1993 Constitution,  has been continued in the present Constitution.    
 
As a commendable improvement compared to its precursor,  the 1996 Constitution 
includes substantial listings of matters appropriate to the local sphere of government.   
However,  the manner of inclusion – by listing such matters in schedules dealing with 
national and provincial legislative competences - is unfortunate.   The order of setting 
our governmental competences – legislative,  followed by executive – is reversed in the 
case of local government,  while there is continuing use of the somewhat deprecating 
term “bylaw” in referring to municipal legislation.   Taken together,  these key features 
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create the impression that local government is intended to play a subordinate,  largely 
administrative role in relation to the national and provincial governments.            
 
In dealing with the functions and powers of the various spheres of government the 
Constitution is notable for its ingenuity.   It sets in place a comprehensive framework 
which provides a clear legal base for determining the powers and functions of the 
respective spheres of government,  together with rules for determining prevalence where 
there is conflicting legislation;  principles and directives for dealing with 
intergovernmental disputes;  and powers and procedures for intervening in the affairs of 
subnational governments where necessary.   This comprehensive legal framework 
comes at a price,  viz a high degree of complexity.   The provisions dealing with powers 
and functions are not  readily accessible or easily comprehensible,  making it an 
exacting task not only for the ordinary member of the public but also for professional 
people in politics and administration to acquire an understanding of the powers of the 
various spheres of government in relation to specific public functions.   The main cause 
of the complexity is probably the mechanism of concurrent powers which has been built 
into the Constitution. 
 
The Constitution shows an advance on the 1993 Constitution as far as the realisation of 
constitutional principles is concerned.   The principle of provincial autonomy is 
recognised more clearly with the identification of a substantial number of functional 
areas in respect of which the provinces are given exclusive legislative powers.   The 
exclusivity is qualified in that Parliament may intervene in a listed functional area,  but 
only when the intervention is clearly necessary in order to achieve a specified objective 
in the national interest.   Provincial autonomy is strengthened further by the 
constitutional provisions for the protection of provincial powers,  principally by means of 
the role to be fulfilled by the National Council of Provinces.   The greatest advance in 
comparison to the earlier constitution is,  however,  in the realisation of the principle of 
co-operation.   Co-operation is now a cornerstone of the constitutional dispensation,  
with a separate chapter (chapter 3) devoted to co-operative government.   All spheres of 
government are required inter alia to respect one another’s powers and functions and 
not to encroach on one another’s geographical,  functional or institutional integrity.   The 
principle of cultural self-determination continues to find expression in the Constitution,  
and in a more acceptable manner:  cultural self-determination is held out not only to the 
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proponents of a Volkstaat but to any community sharing a common cultural and 
language heritage. 
 
As was the case with the interim Constitution,  the actual substance of the 
responsibilities of the various spheres of government is not readily apparent.   The 
principal reasons for this continuing,  major shortcoming are as follows:  The 
employment of the mechanism of concurrent powers;  the vesting of powers of 
intervention in Parliament regarding functional areas of exclusive provincial competence;  
the placement of the legislative role of local government in a subservient position to its 
executive,  largely administrative role;  and the fact that the executive and legislative 
roles of the subordinate spheres of government are not co-determinate,  with a number 
of provisions making it possible for provincial and municipal governments to carry out 
programmes of work wider in scope than the functional areas or matters specifically 
assigned to them by the Constitution.   Generally speaking,  legislative authority is 
located predominantly with the national government,  while executive responsibilities are 
more evenly distributed over the three spheres of government. 
 
The Constitution lays an apparently sound foundation for intergovernmental relations,  
based on the idea of co-operative government as elaborated in chapter 3 of the 
Constitution.   However,  the Constitution’s shortcomings in setting out the actual scope 
of the powers and functions of the three spheres of government,  obviously presents a 
problem for the conduct of intergovernmental relations.   As a consequence – and it is a 
matter of some concern – it is to be expected that there will be a heavy dependence on 
the resolution of “turf disputes” at the political executive level or,  in other words,  by 
means which are essentially extra-Constitutional. 
 
Although the assignment scheme introduced by the 1993 Constitution has been 
elaborated and improved in certain respects,  notably through the better realisation of 
assignment principles,  the introduction of a category of exclusive powers for the 
provinces,  and the listing of matters which belong in the municipal domain,  the 
Constitution still cannot be said to have succeeded in establishing a credible and clear-
cut deployment of responsibilities over the three spheres of government. 
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8.3 Analysis and interpretation 
 
The stated purpose of the present study is to make a contribution to the body of 
knowledge which is Public Administration,  specifically with regard to the assignment of 
public function responsibilities to levels or spheres of government.   To be able to do 
this,  it is necessary to assess,  on the basis of the research which has been done,  the 
degree to which a scientific approach to the assignment question is already in evidence.   
Such an evaluation can best be done by putting in place a purpose-specific set of basic 
criteria as to what would constitute a scientific approach,  and then weighing the 
research findings against the criteria identified.   The larger question of what constitutes 
a science cannot,  within the framework and limits of the chapter,  be examined in detail;  
what is presented is no more than a rough guide for assessing a particular field of 
activity from a broadly scientific perspective – hence the reference to a purpose-specific 
set of criteria.   
 
8.3.1 Scientific requirements 
 
According to Mouton,  a science can be understood as a specific body of knowledge 
which has evolved over time.   In his view,  the building of such a body of knowledge  
arises from the engendering in a scientist – presumably either established or aspiring - 
of an epistemic (knowledge) interest in a particular phenomenon.   (Mouton 1996:9-11,  
13.)   For purposes of scientific enquiry the scientist objectifies some aspect of the social 
world by transforming a certain phenomenon into a cognitive object of study (Mouton 
1996:64).   Applied to Public Administration,  one could say that the cognitive object of 
study consists,  generally,  of the complex phenomenon of public institutions and their 
activities,  and that the prosecution of the study of this object through targeted research 
has resulted in the body of knowledge which is Public Administration (Wessels 
1999a:365;  Pauw 1999:9).   Wessels (1999a:377) emphasises that Public 
Administration is a developing science,  noting the fact that the reality which it studies 
does not remain the same.   Research into an aspect of public administration can be 
seen as an endeavour to contribute usefully to this developing body of knowledge. 
 
A science is made up of various components.   Writing about social sciences in general,  
Mouton (1996:14) mentions as examples factual and descriptive statements,  
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explanatory hypotheses,  theories,  laws and models,  various kinds of assumptions and 
postulates,  and usually implicitly held beliefs and values.   Although referred to as 
examples,  the components mentioned by Mouton would appear to constitute a quite 
comprehensive list.   It would seem that Mouton (1996:123) uses the term “postulate” as 
a preferred alternative to the term “principle”.   In another place this author refers to 
scientific knowledge as consisting of the body of propositions (factual statements,  
hypotheses,  models,  theories,  laws) which at a specific time is accepted by the 
scientific community as being valid and reasonably correct (Mouton 1996:13).   Wessels 
refers to what he calls the key contents of a science as a body of knowledge,  identifying 
in this connection own concepts,  definitions,  hypotheses,  models,  typologies,  
theories,  and paradigms.   Writing in 1999,  he interestingly poses the question whether 
Public Administration,  as a science,  has these components.   (Wessels 1999a:366.)   
Presumably one can ask the same question in respect of a postulated part of Public 
Administration,  the assignment of public function responsibilities to governments being 
a case in point. 
 
Having demarcated a phenomenon,  or set of phenomena,  for study,  the assumption 
can reasonably be made that the study will proceed by way of the observation of the 
object(s) of study and the recording of the observations.   It can be assumed further that 
to be useful scientifically,  a systematic approach to observation and recording will need 
to be followed.   A haphazardly collected hodge-podge of random observations can 
hardly serve any meaningful purpose.   Scientifically,  the answer lies in the development 
of a classification or typology reflecting key attributes of the object(s) of study.   
Classification is important in the development of any science but especially so in its early 
stages (Copi & Cohen 1990:451).   In his MA dissertation the author,  having considered 
various definitions at the time,  defined the term “classification” (noun) as “n logiese 
skema van denkekategorieë waarin essensiële ooreenkomste en verskille wat in ‘n stel 
objekte aanwesig is,  weerspieël word” (Robson 1978:12).   This definition is somewhat 
unsatisfactory in not bringing out an important dimension of classification,  viz that of 
hierarchy.   Copi and Cohen (1990:450) remark that classification involves not merely a 
single division of objects into separate groups but further subdivision into subgroups and 
subclasses.   An accountable classification will satisfy three basic criteria:  it must be 
comprehensive,  covering the whole body of objects demarcated for study;  it must be 
designed so that classes and subclasses are mutually exclusive;  and a single basis of 
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division (fundamentum divisionis) must apply throughout (Joseph 1906:103-105).   Copi 
and Cohen make the important point that  the same set of objects can be classified 
differently depending on the purpose or interest of the classifier,  and illustrate this with 
reference to the classification of the books in a library.   Different classifications will be 
compiled by a librarian (according to content or subject matter),  a bookbinder (according 
to binding methods),  and a bibliophile (according to age or relative rarity).   They go on 
to argue that one classification scheme is better than another to the extent that it is more 
fruitful in suggesting scientific laws and more helpful in the formulation of explanatory 
hypotheses.   (Copi & Cohen 1990:450.) 
 
The scientist seeks not only to observe and describe the phenomena forming the object 
of his study,  but also to understand and explain them (Copi & Cohen 1990:420; Mouton 
1996:46; Ball 2005:35).   Compiling an accountable classification scheme would 
constitute a substantial step in an endeavour to understand the targeted phenomena.   
However,  the scientist will strive to go beyond this stage by devising hypotheses,  
theories and laws which point out important regularities and relationships present within 
a set of phenomena,  and perhaps suggest that there are certain factors which underlie 
the regularities and relationships.   Clearly,  this is the more creative side of scientific 
activity (Copi & Cohen 1990:426). 
 
“Theory” is obviously a key term in science;  but it is also a ubiquitous one and needs to 
be clearly understood.   A dictionary of philosophy defines the term as “the hypothetical 
aspect of anything …An abstraction from practice” (Runes 1962:317).   Authors writing 
about the term emphasise the understanding and explaining functions of theories 
(Marais 1993:111-112, 116;  Hodge et al. 2003:18;  Mouton 1996:124;  Pauw 1999:9).   
The close relationship of the terms “theory”,  “hypothesis”,  and “law” in scientific 
discourse needs to be noted.   They all have an understanding or explaining function,  
and can be arranged in a logical hierarchy,  with the term “hypothesis” conveying a 
proposed explanation;  the term “theory” conveying a higher order explanation,  viz a 
hypothesis which has been well confirmed;  and the term “law” conveying the highest 
order of explanation,  viz one enjoying well nigh universal acceptance (Copi & Cohen 
1990:423).   The same authors, however,  consider the vocabulary of “hypothesis”,  
“theory”, and “law” to be unfortunate since,  in their view,  it tends to obscure the fact that 
all general propositions in science should be regarded as hypotheses,  never as dogmas 
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(Copi & Cohen 1990:423).   This view is supported by Mouton (1996:121) when he 
states that a hypothesis is a statement that makes a provisional or conjectural 
knowledge claim about the world.   There seems to be agreement amongst 
metascientists that no matter how many times a hypothesis (knowledge claim) is 
confirmed by observation,  it retains its provisional or conjectural nature.   It is 
noteworthy that in the discipline of logic,  classification  schemes are also regarded as 
hypotheses (Copi and Cohen 1990:  451).   However,  in general usage – also in 
scientific circles - the term “theory” enjoys a distinct popularity,  signifying inter alia 
something different or opposite in meaning to the term “practice” (Runes 1962:317;  
Pauw 1999:10).   The term is obviously a useful one in scientific discourse,  broad 
enough at a conceptual level to include the terms “hypothesis” and “law”,  but not ruling 
out the use of either of the other two terms where they are more appropriate.   In a social 
science like Public Administration there would at this stage of its development appear to 
be scope only for the employment of the terms “hypothesis” and “theory”;  given a 
constantly changing reality,  it is unlikely that a virtually irrefutable law can be postulated 
in relation to public institutions and their activities.   What seems to be key,  is that the 
hypothetical nature of all theory,  as knowledge claims about the world which could be 
found to be incorrect,  should constantly be borne in mind.     
 
For present purposes – the putting in place of an operational evaluation base or 
standard for assessing the “scientificness” of assignment schemes and practices relating 
to the public function responsibilities of governments – it is necessary to pause briefly at 
some of the other components of a science identified by Mouton and Wessels supra.   
These are models,  postulates and paradigms. 
 
Mouton differentiates models from theories on the basis of function:  while a theory has 
an explanatory function,  he ascribes to a model a heuristic function.   By “heuristic” he 
means a form of guiding,  which could be understood as uncovering or pointing towards 
the way in which certain phenomena function or operate.   Models,  he says,  serve as 
analogies and scientific metaphors for real life occurrences.   In a heuristic approach,  
the scientist reveals certain relationships relating to a phenomenon and systematises 
these into a model of how the phenomenon functions.   Mouton contrasts models with 
typologies – a term he seems to prefer to classifications – postulating that while a 
typology provides a static image of a phenomenon,  a model represents the dynamic 
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aspects of the phenomenon.   (Mouton 1996:196-198.)   While it could be argued that a 
model,  as described by Mouton,  is but another type of theory - seeking also to promote 
understanding of or to explain a phenomenon - Mouton’s views on models are valuable 
and amenable to fruitful application in Public Administration,  for example in depicting the 
dynamics of policy making. 
 
An important finding of the present study is that there are certain principles of 
assignment in evidence in the documentary record pertaining to recent constitutional 
developments in South Africa (vide section 6.3.3 of the thesis).   Mouton (1996:123) 
does not mention principles in his listing of the components of a science,  but does 
include assumptions and postulates.   He notes that postulates are usually general 
principles – this author’s emphasis - that are accepted as being applicable to all human 
behaviour,  and are hence regarded as being self-evidently true.   (Mouton 1996:123.)   
Runes (1962:250) defines the term principle as “a fundamental cause or universal truth;  
that which is inherent in anything”.   This definition has been used in the section of the 
thesis referred to above,  in which the constitutional principles adopted in South Africa 
are analysed and criticised.   As regards the term “postulate”,  Runes provides a specific 
Kantian meaning,  and for the rest refers the enquirer to his entry for “mathematics”,  
where the term is used in the sense of an unproved proposition (Runes 1962:244, 189).   
A German lexicon of basic philosophic concepts provides more clarity,  giving the 
meaning of the term as “eine zum Verständnis der Erfahrung geforderte,  grundsätzliche 
Annahme,  die aber nicht beweisbar ist” (Neuhäusler 1967:168).    Wessels (1999a:366) 
does not mention principles or postulates specifically in his listing of the contents of a 
science.   That the terms “postulate” and “principle” are close in meaning - as suggested 
by Mouton – can be confirmed by reference to a general dictionary.   The Shorter Oxford 
dictionary offers the following: 
 
“postulate” : A proposition demanded or claimed to be granted;  especially 
something claimed or assumed as a basis of reasoning,  discussion,  
or belief;  hence,  a fundamental condition or principle. 
 
“principle” : A fundamental truth or proposition,  on which many others depend;  a 
fundamental assumption forming the basis of a chain of reasoning. 
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For present purposes it would seem that one of these terms will suffice.   The preference 
is for the term “principle” because of its direct relevance to the study as indicated above. 
 
Moving on to paradigms - as an important element to look for in assessing the degree to 
which a scientific approach is in evidence in a particular practice or  
activity – Wessels (1999b:385) provides a brief but practically useful elucidation of the 
concept:   The term “paradigm”,  as it has become established in the scientific domain,  
was coined by Thomas Kuhn in 1962 in his work on scientific revolutions.   As 
interpreted by Mouton in an essay on Kuhn,  Kuhn’s necessary components of a 
paradigm can be stated to be (i) a commitment to a specific theory or law,  or set of 
theories or laws,  (ii) acceptance of a particular methodology and specific research 
techniques,  (iii) commitment to specific quasi-metaphysical assumptions and pre-
suppositions,  and (iv) certain assumptions made by scientists as scientists;  in short,  
therefore,  a paradigm can be said to be the accepted framework within which a given 
group of scientists normally work (Mouton 1993:55-57).   Wessels (1999b:384 et seq.) 
has employed the paradigm concept in examining and elaborating three macro-research 
methods prominent in the social sciences,  viz the quantitative paradigm,  the qualitative 
paradigm,  and the participatory action paradigm.   Against this brief background,  it is 
suggested that the presence or absence of a discernible paradigm ought to be included 
as a criterion for assessing the status of an activity as a scientific activity. 
 
Finally,  the way in which language is used – and especially the identification and 
definition of terms and concepts - would appear to be an important ingredient in putting 
together a set of evaluation criteria for present purposes.   Wessels (1999a:366) 
identifies own concepts and definitions as part of the key contents of a science.   As far 
as Public Administration is concerned,  it can be typified as an essentially conceptual 
science,  requiring for its proper study an understanding of the nature and function of 
concepts,  and ongoing efforts at identifying,  clarifying and defining its peculiar terms 
and concepts (vide in this connection section 3.3 of the thesis).   For proper discourse on 
Public Administration it is necessary to differentiate between three verbal tools,  viz 
“word”,  “concept”,  and “term”.   The correct use of these tools of the scientist’s trade 
has been touched upon in section 3.3.1 of the thesis.   It needs to be noted that 
definition occupies an important place within the discipline of Logic,  with its own 
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principles and rules.   Copi and Cohen (1990: chapter 4) devote a full chapter to 
definition in their introductory text on logic.                                        
 
In the light of the foregoing discussion,  it is proposed that the following criteria be 
applied for purposes of making a summary assessment of the extent to which the 
assignment of responsibilities for the performance of public functions by governments 
can be said to constitute a scientific endeavour: 
 
?? Viewed generally,  is there a distinct body of knowledge,  characterised by the types 
of components variously identified by Mouton and Wessels supra,  in existence,  and 
is there a group of people who possess this knowledge and are contributing to its 
increase? 
 
?? Has the object of study,  public functions,  been clearly identified and defined? 
 
?? Is there an established conceptual framework or standardised terminology,  properly 
defined,  which can serve to facilitate discourse on the assignment question? 
 
?? Are there established typologies or classifications of public functions for purposes 
specifically of the assignment of responsibilities for their performance to levels or 
spheres of government? 
 
?? Is there a paradigm discernible which applies specifically to the study of public 
functions,  or aspects of public functions,  as assigned to levels or spheres of 
government for performance? 
 
?? Given that true scientific endeavour consists not only in the observation,  description 
and classification of phenomena,  but also in a concerted effort to understand 
phenomena,    what propositions of an explanatory nature have been,  or can be put 
forward concerning the assignment of responsibilities,  whether in the form of 
postulates or principles,  models,  hypotheses or other forms of theory?   
 
In the following section the research findings are weighed against the aforementioned 
criteria.    
  
299 
 
8.3.2 Assessment 
 
No distinct body of knowledge in the sense discussed supra,  which exhibits a 
substantial number of the typically scientific components referred to,  has been 
encountered in the course of the literature review (vide summary in section 8.2.1 supra).   
There are countless references to public functions – mostly by other names – but the 
references are of a descriptive,  historical,  selective,  or polemical nature.   Public 
functions as phenomena in societal life – what they are,  how they relate to the 
community and to government,  how or why responsibility for their performance is 
deployed amongst levels or spheres of government – are not dealt with in an analytical,  
scientific manner,  and do not emerge as a distinct subject of authorship.   The 1998 
article by the author does deal with public functions as a whole,  but is essentially a 
critical comment on the relevant aspects of the 1996 Constitution,  culminating in a 
suggestion that there is room for a scientific approach to the assignment question 
(Robson 1998a).   The literature of federalism provides valuable insights concerning the 
(political) power environment relevant to the assignment of public function 
responsibilities,  and at times touches upon technical aspects of the assignment 
question,  but does not provide a developed theory as to which public functions,  or 
aspects of public functions,  belong at or in the various levels or spheres of government.   
The paucity of directly relevant literature is reflected in the Public Administration curricula 
of leading universities,  where the assignment question is either not dealt with,  or 
receives the briefest of treatment (vide section 2.2 of the thesis). 
 
The record of known research projects in South Africa shows no directly applicable 
research dealing with the subject of the present study,  and there is thus no emerging 
body of knowledge to hand from that quarter (vide section 8.2.1 supra).   Although not 
featuring in the research record,  presumably because no report was published,  the 
work done by the erstwhile Commission for Administration in 1993 in developing an input 
to the Multiparty Negotiating Process,  would appear to be significant in the context of 
building a body of knowledge.   The work in question is described,  examined and 
evaluated in section 6.4 of the thesis.   Particularly noteworthy in the present context are 
the attention paid to terminology,  the identification of what were thought to be relevant 
principles,  the design and application of a specific methodology,  the application of a 
  
300 
particular analytical approach,  and the involvement of experienced career officials in 
what could be seen as an instance of the employment of a participatory action research 
paradigm.   These aspects resonate well with the set of criteria proposed above for 
evaluating the scientific character of a particular activity.   It would seem that the 
knowledge generated by the Commission’s programme of work has enduring value and 
that it could find a place in an emerging body of knowledge concerning the assignment 
question. 
 
The question whether there is a group of people identifiable as being in possession of 
scientific knowledge of the assignment question,  and who are contributing to its 
increase,  is not amenable to a ready answer.   Judging by the research record and the 
literature surveyed,  the existence  of substantial expertise in the specific field is not 
apparent.   Experienced practitioners in public administration can be expected to have 
practical knowledge of the deployment to levels or spheres of government of the specific 
public functions in the performance of which they are actively engaged,  yet without 
being knowledgeable on the assignment question as a whole,  or at a theoretical level.   
It can reasonably be assumed that public administrationists – practitioners and 
academics – who have a particular interest in macro-organisational matters or in 
intergovernmental relations will have an understanding of the deployment of public 
function responsibilities,  and be qualified to participate in the assignment debate.   
However,  it is not possible to say to what extent their individual expertise would,  in 
respect of the assignment question,  encompass the basic criteria being applied in this 
summary evaluation.   The paucity of focused interest regarding the subject matter of the 
thesis has been a problem in conducting the research,  virtually ruling out the possibility 
of an in-depth exchange of views or a substantial dialogue with fellow researchers.   At 
the same time,  it can be said that the situation encountered serves to confirm the 
essentially exploratory nature of the research.                        
  
Regarding the identification and definition of the basic object of study,  viz public 
functions,  the research has shown that the concept,  as well as the term “function”,  are 
well established in public administration as practised in South Africa,  and are also 
recognised in the literature of Public Administration.   At least as far back as 1923 the 
Public Service Act has employed the term “function” with the general meaning of what 
government departments are mandated to do,  in other words their activities or 
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programmes of work.   Definitions of the term appear in  published lexicons of Public 
Administration;  two of these definitions are quoted in section 3.3.3 of the thesis.   These 
definitions are broadly acceptable,  but also notably succinct and limited in the extent to 
which they bring out the full meaning of the term.   In the thesis the term has been 
qualified by the addition of the word “public” and given a fuller connotative definition 
(vide section 3.3.3 of the thesis).   The term as defined could be useful in building a 
conceptual framework to encompass the assignment question. 
 
The research did not reveal an established conceptual framework or standardised 
terminology which can facilitate discourse on the assignment of public function 
responsibilities to levels or spheres of government.   It has been necessary,   therefore,  
to create a conceptual framework for purposes of the present study,  and the proposed 
framework has been built into the design of the research project (vide section 3.3 of the 
thesis).   The development work of the Commission for Administration to which reference 
is made supra,  could conceivably also be of use in the further development of a 
conceptual framework with its associated terminology. 
 
No classification of public functions compiled specifically for purposes of the assignment 
of responsibilities for their performance to levels or spheres of government was found in 
the literature surveyed.   Again,  the work done by the Commission for Administration in 
1993 could be of use in developing such a classification.   In his 1998 article the author 
suggested that it may be useful,  or even necessary,  to differentiate the policy-making,  
execution,  and control aspects of public functions for purposes of relating constitutional 
stipulations concerning legislative and executive powers to the discipline of Public 
Administration (Robson 1998a:25-26).   Such a division is in itself a classification,  which 
may need to be accommodated in a developing theory of assignment.   It needs to be 
noted that every country which assigns powers and functions to levels and spheres of 
government has in effect set up a classification of public functions.   However,  these 
arrangements can hardly be regarded as scientifically accountable classifications.   
Based on the research findings (vide chapter 4 of the thesis) such “classifications” are 
usually not comprehensive,  tending to concentrate on only two levels of government 
while acknowledging the existence of a third.   They do not cope satisfactorily with the 
requirement of exclusivity,  evincing a good deal of circumscription as well as the 
extensive use of qualifying conditions,  which make it difficult to determine what exactly a 
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particular level of government is responsible for in practice.   (Where the mechanism of 
concurrent powers is employed,  any notion of exclusivity is virtually negated.)   Finally,  
the basis of division is usually not clearly stated,  or more than one fundamentum 
divisionis is employed,  examples being a division based on both territorial and cultural 
considerations as in Belgium,   and the “own affairs” / “general affairs” model as applied 
in South Africa in the 1980’s. 
 
In the light of the patently under-researched status of the assignment question,  it is not 
surprising that no particular paradigm related to its study has been encountered.   It 
would seem that for a recognisable paradigm to become established,  some 
development with regard to theory and methodology related to the assignment of public 
function responsibilities to governments would have to take place,  and be 
acknowledged within the discipline of Public Administration.  
 
Finally,  it is necessary to assess the extent to which theory,  in the sense of an 
endeavour to understand and explain the phenomenon of the assignment of public 
function responsibilities,  has emerged.   In the ad hoc set of criteria which is being 
applied the theory aspect has been focused on the identification of propositions of an 
explanatory nature which have been,  or can be put forward,  whether in the form of 
principles,  models,  hypotheses or other forms of theory. 
 
The research has yielded no model of the nature described in section 8.3.1 supra,  viz a 
representation,  or analogy,  or metaphor of how a particular phenomenon functions in 
practice,  and which captures the dynamic as opposed to the static aspect of the 
phenomenon.   The function “blueprints” developed by the Commission for 
Administration in 1993 (vide section 6.4 of the thesis) did have a distinct,  relatively 
sophisticated structure,  and could perhaps be regarded as a form of modelling applied 
to the deployment of public function responsibilities over tiers of government.   For the 
rest,  the research did not reveal any clearly stated hypothesis seeking to explain the 
phenomenon in question,  although it could conceivably be argued that the so-called 
subsidiarity principle is in essence a hypothesis,  or at least that it has a significant 
hypothetical quality. 
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What the research did produce,  is a number of principles related to the assignment of 
public function responsibilities which seem to underlie,  or could underlie,  the way in 
which assignments are made.   The subsidiarity principle (vide section 3.3.3 of the 
thesis) is established in the literature as well as in the academic curriculum,  while at 
least one author has postulated the principle of exclusivity as being valid in relation to 
the assignment of responsibilities (Senelle 1990:40).   In South Africa the constitutional 
principles adopted in the course of the Multiparty Negotiating Process in 1993 have,  on 
analysis,  yielded a substantial crop of principles with apparent validity for the 
assignment of responsibilities.   The assignment principles derived from this source are 
the principle of national unity,  the principle of economic unity,  the principle of equality,  
the principle of co-operation,  the principle of provincial autonomy,  and the principle of 
cultural self-determination (vide section 6.3.3 of the thesis).   The degree to which the 
identified principles were realised in the drafting of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions is 
examined in sections 6.7.2 and 7.7.2 respectively of the thesis.   The finding is that the 
first four principles listed have been realised substantially,  while the principle of 
provincial autonomy and the principle of cultural self-determination have been realised to 
a lesser degree. 
 
The six assignment principles extracted from the constitutional principles would appear 
to have an applicability wider than the South African system of government.   In the 
evaluation of the assignment schemes of five other countries (vide section 4.7 of the 
thesis) the comment is made that there seems to be a general consensus that the public 
functions dealing with defence,  foreign affairs and public finance must be performed at 
the highest level of government.   In terms of underlying principles this finding can be 
interpreted as providing confirmation of the acknowledgement of the principles of 
national unity and economic unity in the sample of five countries surveyed.   It can 
reasonably be assumed that the principle of equality,  implying as it does that everyone 
is entitled to equal treatment by the institutions of government,  would be honoured in 
the particular five countries,  who are all generally regarded as  Western style 
democracies.   The principle of provincial autonomy,  which is amenable to application to 
subnational governmental units irrespective of the designation used,  is clearly also in 
evidence in other countries,  in the mere fact that powers and functions are deployed to 
subnational governments.   Of course the degree of autonomy granted may vary,  but 
such variations do not negate the directive influence and hence the importance of the 
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principle.   Adherence to the principle of co-operation is clearly in evidence in Belgium 
and Germany.  Although the Belgian constitution does not provide specifically for co-
operation between the various authorities,  extensive provision for co-operation is made 
in special legislation (Senelle 1990:150-155).   In Germany,  given the degree of 
functional intertwinement which has developed between the Federation and the Länder,  
co-operation between these units of government has become a matter of great 
importance,  for which the term “co-operative federalism” has been coined (Laufer 
1991:91-94; chapter 7).   Belgium provides a prime example of the application of the 
principle of cultural self-determination,  with its public function responsibilities organised 
on a dual basis,  viz the regional and the cultural (vide section 4.3 of the thesis).                                          
                      
A noteworthy additional principle encountered in the review of the assignment schemes 
of a sample of countries is that of asymmetry,  specifically as applied in Spain (vide 
section 3.5 of the thesis).   Briefly stated,  the principle stipulates that the public function 
responsibilities assigned to subnational units of government can differ from one such 
unit to another – presumably where there are reasons for such differentiation and 
differentiation is acceptable to an affected unit of government.   The principle was also 
found in the literature review;  however, with an indication that there would appear to be 
a tendency to favour a symmetrical above an asymmetrical allocation of powers to 
subnational units of government (Agranoff 1994:83; Gagnon 1994:132).         
 
In summary,  this assessment shows that a scientific approach to the assignment 
question is in evidence only to a limited degree.   A distinct,  dedicated body of 
knowledge is not apparent;  the particular phenomenon is under-researched;  expertise 
concerning the assignment of responsibilities is not readily available;  work remains to 
be done concerning the identification and definition of key concepts;  a conceptual 
framework and standardised terminology to facilitate discourse is not readily to hand;  an 
accountable,  relevant classification of public functions is not in existence;  a particular 
paradigm for the study of the assignment phenomenon has not become established;  
and little by way of theory has been put forward.   However,  the research has revealed 
the presence of a number of principles which would appear to underlie the assignment of 
public function responsibilities.   Also,  the work done by the erstwhile Commission for 
Administration regarding the development of function “blueprints” could be of value in an 
endeavour to build a knowledge base  concerning the assignment question. 
  
305 
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to provide an integrated overview of the research findings 
reported on more fully in the preceding chapters of the thesis,  and to evaluate the state 
of the assignment question in scientific terms.   It has been compiled in a manner 
intended to give the reader a concise yet clear picture of what the research was about,  
and of the main findings which have been made. 
 
In the first part of the chapter a summary has been provided of the research findings with 
regard to the assignment of responsibilities in a sample of countries other than South 
Africa;  the history of the assignment question in South Africa prior to 1994;  and,  in 
sequential chapters,  the assignment question as determined by the 1993 and the 1996 
Constitutions respectively.   Also included in the summary are salient points from the 
review of literature selected from the disciplines of Public Administration,  Constitutional 
Law,  and Political Science.   Two major lessons can be drawn from this research:  
firstly,  that the assignment schemes of different countries have a strongly sui generis 
character;  and secondly, that despite the obvious importance of the assignment of 
public function responsibilities,  not much by way of a scientific approach to the 
assignment question is in evidence.   These two findings would appear to be not 
unrelated.   In the second part of the chapter a closer,  more analytic and systematic 
look has been taken at assignment practices in scientific terms.   Here the finding is 
again that although the research has delivered some valuable insights,  especially as 
regards explanatory principles,  much remains to be done before there can be serious 
talk of a generally acceptable scientific approach to the assignment of responsibilities.   
In the ensuing chapter a tentative theoretical model for the assignment of responsibilities 
is presented for consideration.  
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CHAPTER 9:  A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The research into the assignment of public function responsibilities in South Africa,  as 
well as in a sample of other countries,  has yielded little evidence of a sound theoretical 
approach to the assignment question.   The literature review conducted as part of the 
research also did not yield a developed,  substantial or substantive theory aimed at 
understanding or explaining the assignment phenomenon.   These findings are cause for 
concern,  bearing in mind the implications of the assignment of responsibilities for a 
country’s system of government and administration.   This chapter endeavours to 
construct a provisional theoretical model as an aid to the accountable assignment of 
responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels or spheres of 
government. 
 
In South Africa,  the Constitution adopted in 1996 has established the term “sphere of 
government”,  in substitution of the term “level of government”,  as the one to be used in 
referring to one of the three constituent classes of government,  viz national,  provincial,  
and local.   However,  in analytical work regarding the assignment of responsibilities to 
the spheres of government it is at times – for example when dealing with the subsidiarity 
principle – more appropriate and meaningful to employ the term “level of government”.   
In this chapter both terms are employed as considered appropriate depending on the 
nature of the argument.   (Vide note concerning the concept “levels or spheres of 
government” in section 9.5.1 infra.) 
 
In building the model,  a number of simplifying assumptions have to be made.   It is also 
necessary to emphasise that a Public Administration approach is followed,  as 
presumably a quite different model could emerge if a different approach was followed,  
say for instance one based on the precepts of Constitutional Law.   Key elements of the 
model are language,  classification,  assignment principles,  and methodology.   All these 
aspects are dealt with in separate sections below.   First,  however,  it is necessary to 
pause for a moment at the concept or notion of a theoretical model.                               
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9.2 Models and modelling 
 
The proposed theoretical model uses the term “model” with a specific meaning.   Before 
presenting this meaning it is considered necessary to reflect on the use of the term,  
generally,  in scientific practice. 
 
According to Mouton (1996:196-198) models serve as analogies and scientific 
metaphors for real life occurrences;  they have a heuristic function,  which he describes 
as a form of guiding.   He distinguishes a model from a typology or classification:  
whereas a typology provides a static image of a phenomenon,  a model represents the 
dynamic aspect of the phenomenon. 
 
Definitions accessible on the internet generally support Mouton’s view;  three examples 
are quoted below: 
 
“An abstract model (a conceptual model) is a theoretical construct that represents 
physical,  biological or social processes,  with a set of variables and a set of logical and 
quantitative relationships between them” (Online 2005a). 
 
“A representation of a process or system that attempts to relate the most important 
variables in the system in such a way that analysis of the model leads to insights into the 
system” (Online 2005b). 
 
“A model is a simplified representation of how something happens or works in the real 
world” (Online 2005c). 
 
A published work dealing with research methods for public administrators,  offers the 
following definition: 
 
“Model.   A representation of reality,  it delineates certain aspects of the real world as 
being relevant to the problem under investigation and makes explicit the relationships 
among these aspects;  it enables the formulation of empirically testable propositions 
regarding the nature of these relationships”.   (O’Sullivan & Rassel 1989:475.)   
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Elsewhere in the same publication the elements of a model are identified as variables 
and constants (O’Sullivan & Rassel 1989:13). 
 
All the quoted definitions have two things in common:  they typify a model as a 
representation of something encountered in the real world,  and they emphasise that 
what is represented has a dynamic quality,  characteristic of a process,  or a system,  or 
of the functioning of something.   While the first mentioned of these common factors is 
applicable to the model developed in this chapter,  the second is not.   The proposed 
model does indeed represent something encountered in the real world - the assignment 
of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government - but it does not deal with the 
dynamics or the process of assigning responsibilities. 
 
The model presented here seeks to delineate an accountable basis on which 
responsibilities for public functions can be assigned to levels or spheres of government.   
It is built on what is seen as a Public Administration approach to the assignment 
question,  and it incorporates as its main components a defined conceptual framework,  
a number of principles which are assumed to be valid,  and certain aspects of scientific 
methodology.   It takes the form of an idealised scheme which could,  but need not 
necessarily be followed in practice.   In this sense it could be said to have a guiding 
function as referred to by Mouton (1996:196-198).   It is comparable to an endeavour by,  
say,  an educationist to conceptualise an ideal learning institution for secondary 
education,  or by an architect to envision an ideal set of buildings for such an institution.   
The model points to what could be done,  but does not presume to prescribe what 
should be done.   Ultimately – and again this is in line with a Public Administration 
approach – decisions on the assignment of responsibilities to national and subnational 
governments need to be taken within the political domain,  by bodies properly elected 
and constituted for that purpose. 
 
“Modelling” in the present context,  connotes simply the setting up of a model of the sort 
described in the foregoing paragraph.    
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9.3 Assumptions 
 
In building the proposed theoretical model it is necessary to make certain assumptions.   
Making assumptions is acceptable in scientific practice provided they are reasonably 
justified (Mouton 1996:14).   In the present instance some assumptions are considered 
to be justified because of the perceived complexity of developing a model capable of 
accommodating every possible variation in the assignment of public function 
responsibilities.   As is evident from the definitions quoted,  as well as the discussion,  in 
the preceding section,  a model is an idealised scheme and not necessarily an exact 
representation of the real world,  or something which is replicable exactly in practice. 
 
For purposes of the present modelling exercise,  three basic assumptions are made.   
Firstly,  that the state is a secular one;  in other words that while guaranteeing freedom 
of religion as a fundamental right (vide 1996 Constitution: section 15),  the state is not 
founded or organised in any way,  nor does it function,  in accordance with the doctrine 
or tenets of any religion.   Secondly,  that the state is organised on a geographical basis,  
with subnational governments focused on provinces,  and within provinces,  on 
municipalities.   It is assumed therefore that no governmental structures have been 
instituted or are envisaged for culturally distinct communities.   Lastly,  that all 
subnational governments,  provincial and municipal,  are viable;  in other words,  that 
they are fully capable in terms of material and human resources to satisfactorily 
discharge all the responsibilities entrusted to them.               
 
 
9.4 A  Public Administration approach 
 
In the construction of the present theoretical model a Public Administration approach is 
followed.   It is necessary to emphasise this particular orientation because of the interest 
displayed in the assignment or deployment of functions and powers within the state by 
the related disciplines of Constitutional Law and Political Science.   On the basis of the 
research done,  it can be postulated that these disciplines each view the assignment 
question from their own perspective,  which in turn determines their scientific and 
professional attitude to the question. 
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Constitutional lawyers have an obvious and intense interest in the allocation of powers 
within the state,  but their interest would appear to lie essentially in the legal rules which 
govern the institution and functioning of legislative and executive institutions,  as well as 
the role which judicial institutions have to play in this connection.   It would seem that for 
them the actual content of the public functions for which the various governments are or 
will be responsible,  is largely a given – a matter to be determined through a political 
process.   (Vide section 2.6.3 of the thesis.)   Political scientists again are concerned 
essentially with the accommodation of political power within the state.   While it is true 
that power is given form and substance by the assignment of responsibilities to national 
and subnational governments respectively,  the political scientist’s epistemic interest 
would not appear to extend to the consideration in detail of the actual content of the 
public functions which are or ought to be the responsibility of the various governments.   
(Vide section 2.6.4 of the thesis.)            
 
Applying a Public Administration approach implies that attention be given to a number of 
key facets;  these are addressed seriatim in the following sections. 
 
9.4.1 Value based guidelines 
 
Public administration is distinguished from other types of administration in the main 
because it has its own set of guidelines that underlie its theory and practice – thus avers 
Cloete (1994:87).   These guidelines are value based,  and fall in two major groups,  viz 
those emanating from the body politic,  and those emanating from the community 
(Cloete 1994:63-88).   Botes et al. (1996: part III; chapter 5) demonstrate a similar value 
focus,  under a heading “Deterministic guidelines or normative principles for public 
administration”.   Cloete (1994:64-82) identifies political supremacy,  public 
accountability,  and the tenets of democracy as emanating from the body politic;  and 
classifies religious doctrines and value systems,  fairness and reasonableness,  
balanced decisions,  thoroughness,  probity,  and economy,  effectiveness and efficiency 
in the category of “community values”.   The guidelines or principles identified by Botes 
et al. (1996:285-293) are guidance of the supreme political authority,  public 
accountability and responsibility,  public efficiency,  the application of administrative law,  
respecting the values of society,  pursuance of high ethical norms and standards,  and 
social justice and equality. 
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It is not considered necessary to examine all the value based guidelines referred to 
above,  in relation to the proposed theoretical model.   However,  three of the guidelines 
in question are particularly relevant in putting together – and applying – a theoretical 
model for the assignment of public function responsibilities to governments:  these are 
political supremacy,  democratic requirements,  as well as economy,  effectiveness and 
efficiency.   Brief comment concerning these guidelines is called for. 
Political supremacy:  It is necessary to bear in mind constantly that public institutions are 
established and function within a political environment and under the direction and 
control of the appropriate legislative and political executive institutions.   All fundamental 
decisions bearing on public administration – and decisions as to what the various levels 
or spheres of government should occupy themselves with are fundamental decisions – 
have to be taken by the properly constituted and empowered political bodies.   
Nevertheless,  it can be postulated that theorising and model building concerning the 
assignment of public function responsibilities to governments is also an appropriate 
activity for public administrationists to engage in.   Indeed,  they can conceivably make a 
substantial contribution in this field,  based on their professional knowledge and 
experience,  their theoretical insights,  as well as any appropriate studies and analyses 
which they may have done.   Ultimately,  however,  assignment decisions are political 
decisions.   An important implication to be noted is that a proposed theoretical model,  if 
it is to find practical application,  will first have to achieve acceptance by the key political 
institutions. 
Democratic requirements:  It can be postulated that the degree of commitment evinced 
by legislative and political executive institutions in upholding the tenets of democracy,  
and of satisfying democratic requirements in a practically effective way,  will have a 
decisive influence on the substance of the public function responsibilities assigned to 
subnational governments.   The country having opted for a fully democratic system of 
government the following scenario can be envisioned in relation to the deployment of 
public function responsibilities:  At each level or in each sphere of government,  
governments will be elected by universal suffrage exercised in separate elections (even 
if they do take place simultaneously).   If the Constitution -  as it does – requires a three-
tiered structure of government – and leaving aside for the moment the technical 
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difficulties inherent in demarcating public function responsibilities – it can be deduced 
logically that the national government will concern itself with national,  the provincial 
governments with provincial,  and the municipal governments with local matters.   Each 
level or sphere of government will have an appropriate and,  in descending order,  
narrower geographic focus.   It is almost certain that each provincial and each municipal 
government will have its seat of government located physically within its area of 
jurisdiction.   As public function responsibilities move away from the governmental centre 
of the state to positions of relative proximity to the communities to be served,  it can be 
contended that government is being brought closer to the people.   The deployment of 
public function responsibilities in this manner could be regarded as an appealingly 
positive outcome of the application of a democratic approach to government.                                                                                                                                             
 
Economy,  effectiveness and efficiency:  This guideline has an obvious applicability in 
the modelling of an assignment scheme.   Given the constitutionally decreed multiplicity 
of governmental structures,  with their concomitant cost outlays,  it makes good sense 
that responsibility for the performance of a particular public function should be assigned 
in a way that will ensure that,  as far as possible,  services are rendered economically,  
effectively,  and efficiently.   Such an ideal situation is obviously easier to envision in 
theory than to realise in practice;  but the importance of adhering consciously to the 
basic guideline in making assignment decisions is not thereby diminished.   To illustrate:  
it would be hard to imagine that economy,  effectiveness and efficiency would be 
promoted if a central government department in Pretoria were to be made responsible 
for the weekly removal of refuse from all households across the land.   Then again,  it 
can hardly be expected of each and every municipality in the country to provide a 
specialised hospital service to its inhabitants. 
 
9.4.2 Community needs,  public functions and government 
 
For purposes of the theoretical model it is accepted that public functions arise from and 
are directed at the satisfaction of community needs.   This is a long established view,  as 
evidenced for instance in the course content of a training programme in organisation and 
methods presented under the auspices of the then Public Service Commission in the 
1960’s (PSC 1969: lecture 21:1).   By extension it can be said that the country’s public 
administration,  encompassing as it does its public institutions and their activities,  has 
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as its fundamental purpose the satisfaction of community needs.   However,  it is not the 
responsibility of government to satisfy all the needs of all the members of the 
community. 
 
For theoretical purposes the assumption can be made that the individual members of the 
community,  either acting on their own or in voluntary association with one another,  can 
satisfy many of their personal or essentially private needs without looking to government 
for assistance.   However,  in contemporary society the further assumption needs to be 
made that there are substantial needs – for example the need for law and order,  the 
need for health services,  and the need for a clean and safe environment – which 
because of the human,  financial and other resources required,  cannot be satisfied by 
the individual members of society without the involvement of government.   Government 
steps in to satisfy such needs,  but the spectrum of needs which government will supply,  
and the manner and extent of its involvement,  is hardly likely to be the same in all 
countries at all times.   It can be postulated further that governmental involvement in 
community need satisfaction will be influenced by the political ideology adhered to by the 
government-of-the-day.   So for example,  it can be conjectured that a government 
espousing social democratic values will tend to become relatively more involved in 
community need satisfaction than one adhering to a liberal democratic ideology. 
 
The needs to be supplied by government can be ordered into three major groups of 
needs,  viz the need for safety and security,  the need for order in societal living,   and 
the need for an existence which is commensurate with human dignity.   On the basis of 
this broad categorisation it can be postulated that there are three major groups of public 
functions to be performed by government,  viz those focused on protection,  on 
regulation (of societal living),  and on the promotion of socio-economic development.   If 
this broad grouping of public functions is accepted as valid,  it can be postulated that the 
purpose of the state is to ensure for its people an existence that is safe,  orderly,  and 
commensurate with human dignity.      
 
No claim is made for the originality of the foregoing statements regarding community 
needs and their satisfaction;  they do,  however,  represent the author’s considered view 
of the matter,  based on many years of experience in the field.   It has been documented 
previously in an unpublished report on a comprehensive departmentalisation project 
  
314 
undertaken for the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape (Robson 1998b:10-
12). 
 
Against this background the hypothesis can be advanced that – at least in South Africa – 
all three spheres of government serve essentially the same purpose or,  stated more 
accurately,  are jointly and severally involved in the realisation of the all-encompassing 
national purpose,  viz to ensure for the inhabitants of the country an existence which is 
safe,  orderly and commensurate with human dignity.   Obviously,  the three spheres 
don’t all do the same things,  but there is no denying that all three are involved in one 
way or another in providing protection,  ensuring order,  and promoting socio-economic 
development.   An insightful confirmation of this view is provided by the 1996 
Constitution in relation to local government:  section 152(1)(c) of the Constitution 
requires specifically of a local government to promote the socio-economic advancement 
of its citizens.   This fundamental injunction would seem to imply that a local government 
must for example also interest itself in matters such as job creation,  welfare services,  
and education and training – matters which are primarily the responsibility of other 
spheres of government.        
 
The involvement of all three spheres of government in the prosecution of the national 
purpose as stated supra,  is a factor of crucial importance in considering the assignment 
of responsibilities for the performance of public functions to levels or spheres of 
government.   Argument about which sphere of government should be responsible for a 
particular public function is frequently fruitless,  or at best incorrectly focused.   A 
worthwhile argument is one in which the key question is the extent to which each of the 
three spheres of government ought to be involved in the performance of a public 
function.   Such a questioning approach could lead to a finding that it is necessary that 
one sphere of government should take complete responsibility for a particular public 
function;   but it could also lead to a finding that a particular public function could be 
performed best by involving more than one sphere of government in its performance.   
The question then to be decided is what aspect of a public function should be the 
responsibility of which sphere of government.   Another possible finding is that while a 
particular sphere of government need not be involved directly in the rendering of a 
service,  it needs to control or perhaps to co-ordinate the rendering of the service.   
There is evidently no easy answer to assignment questions,  or a simple “one pattern fits 
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all functions” approach which can be applied.   In a Public Administration approach to 
the assignment question each substantial public function needs to be analysed against 
the constitutionally instituted structure of government and a decision taken as to a 
workable and acceptable deployment of responsibility for its performance. 
 
9.4.3 Formalisation of public function responsibilities 
 
It is a virtually universal phenomenon that the public function responsibilities of levels or 
spheres of government are set out in the constitution or other founding law of a country.   
Frequently,  however,  recourse is also had to ordinary law for this purpose,  an obvious 
example being the assignment of responsibilities to the local level of government.   
Because of the importance to government and administration of having clarity as to the 
role to be played by each level or sphere of government in a country,  it is suggested 
that it is appropriate that the assignment of responsibilities be stipulated in the 
constitution.   An alteration to the assignment scheme will then entail a constitutional 
amendment,  subject to compliance with whatever special procedures or majorities are 
required for such an amendment.   In this way a substantial check can operate against 
over hasty or poorly considered changes to the assignment scheme.   The constitutional 
accommodation of the assignment scheme will of course also serve to promote stability 
in government and administration. 
 
Ideally,  it should be possible to determine by consulting a country’s constitution what 
each level or sphere of government is authorised to do.   This has generally not been the 
case in South Africa (vide sections 5.5,  6.7.5,  and 7.7.5 of the thesis),  or in other 
countries (vide section 4.7 of the thesis).   The research has shown that there are a 
number of ways in which the ideal situation can be undermined,  watered down,  or 
adulterated,  including the use of ordinary legislation to assign responsibilities to 
subnational governments;  empowering a legislature to delegate some of its powers to 
another legislature;  and allowing a political executive to delegate some of its powers to 
another political executive.   There is probably an argument to be made in favour of a 
degree of flexibility in legislative and executive arrangements;  however,  it is 
questionable whether any perceived advantage will outweigh the disadvantages of a 
situation in which the respective responsibilities of the national and subnational 
governments are not readily ascertainable. 
  
316 
 
Consideration of the formalisation of public function responsibilities poses not only the 
question of where responsibilities should be formally set out,  but also how they should 
be presented.   A Public Administration approach points to the application of a certain 
method,  which differs from that which has heretofore been applied in South Africa.   It 
calls for an analysis of all public functions to be made with a view to determining clearly 
and accurately which public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  “belong” with the 
respective spheres of government.   Ideally,  such an analysis should result in a 
comprehensive database pointing to the responsibilities to be discharged by each 
sphere of government,  whether legislative or executive,  or both,  in relation to particular 
public functions or aspects of public functions.   In this way clarity can be obtained 
concerning the substance of what each sphere of government should be required to do,  
and this data can then serve as a referential base for stipulating legislative and executive 
powers in the Constitution.   To illustrate:  the section of the Constitution regulating the 
powers of provincial legislatures could state simply that a provincial legislature shall 
have the power to make laws regarding matters indicated in column A of annexure X of 
the Constitution. 
 
The Constitutions of 1909,  1961,  1983,  1993,  and 1996 each dealt with,  or at present 
deals with,  the stipulation of legislative and executive powers in its own peculiar way,  
variously linking these powers to “classes of subjects” (1909 Constitution),  “own affairs” 
and general affairs” (1983 Constitution),  and “matters in functional areas” (1993 and 
1996 Constitutions).   In none of the Constitutions were,  or are,  the key provisions 
determining the public function responsibilities of levels or spheres of government based 
on a comprehensive,  prior analysis and reasoned allocation of such responsibilities.   
The resultant defects and shortcomings have been documented fully in chapters 5,  6 
and 7 of the thesis.                                      
 
 
9.5 Language       
 
In the study of the assignment schemes of a number of countries other than South Africa 
(chapter 4 of the thesis),  in the historical survey of the assignment of responsibilities in 
South Africa (chapter 5),  as well as in the examination of the assignment schemes 
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instituted by the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions (chapters 6 and 7),  one of the major 
findings throughout has been the poor and confusing use of language  in dealing with 
the assignment question.   In developing a theoretical model for the assignment of 
responsibilities it is imperative that close attention be paid to the use of language.   Two 
aspects are addressed in the following sections,  viz the building of a conceptual 
framework,  and the employment and consistent use of what is referred to as “public 
function language”. 
 
9.5.1 Conceptual framework 
 
In developing a theoretical model for the assignment of responsibilities it is important 
that the assignment question be placed in a properly constructed and clearly defined 
conceptual framework.   Conceptualisation as an integral part of research in the social 
sciences has been dealt with in setting out the research design of the present study 
(vide chapter 3 of the thesis).   The exposition already provided need not be repeated 
here,  except perhaps for reiterating the observation by Mouton (1996:181) that concepts 
are the building blocks of scientific knowledge.   It can safely be assumed that a 
conceptual framework for dealing with an aspect of a science – in this instance the 
assignment of public function responsibilities as an aspect of the science of Public 
Administration – cannot be determined in a single action.   The building of a conceptual 
framework necessarily has to begin at some point – or with some key concept – but it is 
reasonable to expect that the initial,  probably rudimentary,  framework would be 
elaborated with the passage of time as more knowledge of a phenomenon is gained and 
validated. 
 
It is proposed that the construction of a conceptual framework as an integral part of the 
theoretical model should proceed as follows:  To begin with a key concept or building 
block needs to be identified as the cornerstone for the conceptual framework.   Noting 
that the focal point of the exercise is the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions to levels or spheres of government,  the cornerstone is 
clearly the concept “public function”.   Without this concept the exercise becomes 
meaningless,  and no conceptual framework can be built.   On the other hand,  the 
concept “public function” taken in isolation is also of little use;  it is only when it is joined 
to the concepts “assignment”,  “responsibility”,  and “levels or spheres of government” 
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that a conceptually meaningful whole emerges which relates to the satisfaction of 
community needs by means of governmental action.   It is proposed therefore that the 
construction of a conceptual framework for the assignment of public function 
responsibilities be commenced by linking together the four basic concepts referred to.   
To this initial framework other relevant concepts can be added as appropriate. 
 
“Public function” and the other concepts in the initial framework need to be defined.   
Proceeding from the elucidation of concepts essayed in section 3.3.3 of the thesis,  it is 
proposed that the following definitions be adopted,  with acknowledgement of source  
materials as already indicated in that section:                            
 
“public function”:  A complex,  logically inclusive composite of activities undertaken by 
one or more government departments,  or other public institutions,  and which is directed 
at the satisfaction of a particular need of the community,  or part of the community. 
 
“assignment”:  The allotment (of responsibility) to levels or spheres of government as a 
share of the totality of governmental responsibility to be discharged in the country. 
 
“responsibility”:  A charge,  trust or duty assigned to a government and for which it is 
answerable or accountable to the elected representatives of the people for which it has 
been instituted to serve as a government.      
 
“levels or spheres of government”:  A hierarchical ordering of governments consisting 
typically,  from top to bottom,  of  a national government,  a number of provincial,  state 
or regional governments,  and a number of local governments. 
 
Note:  The 1996 Constitution dispensed with the term “level of government” used in the 
1993 Constitution,  replacing it with the term “sphere of government”.   A difference in 
meaning between the old and the new terms cannot,  however,  be deduced from a 
reading of the Constitution.   It is surmised that the drafters of the Constitution were not 
comfortable with the connotation of super-ordination and subordination inherent in the 
term “level of government”,  and also considered the term “sphere of government” to be 
more in line with the principle of co-operation adopted by them (vide constitutional 
principle XXI-7 and sections 6.3.3 and 7.7.2 of the thesis).            
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“government”:  A body of persons charged with the duty of governing the state or a 
constituent part of the state. 
 
For purposes of the theoretical model it is necessary to elaborate the initial framework by 
the addition of four other key concepts:  these are the concepts “activity”,  “subsidiarity”,  
“control”,  and  “co-ordination”.   The following definitions,  formulated to fit the emerging 
conceptual framework are proposed:   
 
“activity”:  An action forming part of a public function which must be carried out if the 
public function is to be performed satisfactorily. 
 
“subsidiarity”:  A relationship between levels of government in which governments at a 
higher level perform only those public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  which 
governments at a lower level cannot perform equally well or better. 
 
“control”:  An activity performed by governments at a higher level in relation to 
governments at a lower level in an effort to ensure that a public function,  or aspect of a 
public function,  is performed satisfactorily,  and which can include the issuance of 
directives,  the receipt of reports and returns,  the performance of inspections,  and the 
decision of individual cases or appeals. 
 
“co-ordination”:  An activity performed by governments at a given level in relation to 
governments at the same or a lower level in an effort to ensure that the services forming 
part of a public function are rendered in an integrated,  synchronised and balanced way. 
 
The formulations are those of the author but are based on formulations and insights 
contained in certain source documents which are noted below. 
 
The definition of “activity” follows closely the definition of “werksaamheid” generated as 
part of the Commission for Administration’s 1993 programme of rationalisation (CFA 
1993d: annexure E: terminology).   The definition of “subsidiarity” is based on one 
encountered in the literature review conducted as part of the study (Laufer 1991:262).   
The definition of “control” is a new formulation by the author;  however,  the four key 
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modes of control incorporated in the definition have been taken from a set of guidelines 
for the development of blueprints issued by the Commission for Administration in 1993 
(CFA 1993f: annexure G:4).   Finally,  the definition of “co-ordination” - also a new 
formulation – is based on an observation contained in vintage course material of the 
then Public Service Commission postulating that management obtains co-ordination “by 
properly balancing,  synchronising and integrating the work of the different units in the 
organisation” (PSC 1969: lecture 5:3-4).   In the author’s experience in public 
administration this is the essence of co-ordination,  whether the co-ordinating is to be 
done by an individual manager or an institution or a government. 
         
9.5.2 Public function language 
 
If there is to be worthwhile progress in bringing the assignment of public function 
responsibilities on to a scientific footing,  it is essential that greater precision and 
consistency be achieved in the language used in dealing with the assignment question.   
It could be said that the assignment question requires its own language.   In this regard 
the study of the assignment phenomenon would appear to be no different than the study 
of countless other phenomena in the real world,  in respect of which the establishment of 
an own appropriate terminology is an important factor in determining progress within the 
community of researchers. 
 
The research conducted into the assignment phenomenon as manifested in South Africa 
over many years and in a sample of other countries has brought to the fore a number of 
language related shortcomings,  chief among which are the following: 
 
?? “public function”,  as a key term connoting what governments do with a view to 
satisfying community needs,  is not generally recognised or applied,  although it must 
be said that one of the many uses of the word “function” is roughly equivalent in 
meaning to the term “public function”; 
?? there is evidence of a confusing practice of referring to public functions both in terms 
of something which is done – which in the author’s view is the correct connotation – 
and as a nominal subject or topic.   To take an early example:  in section 85 of the 
1909 Constitution there is included amongst the classes of subjects in relation to 
which provinces could make ordinances an entry which reads  “the establishment,  
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maintenance and management of hospitals and charitable institutions” (something 
which is done),  and another which reads “markets and pounds” (a nominal subject); 
?? public functions are indicated or represented by formulations varying in length from a 
single word to a relatively verbose statement.   To illustrate:  in part A of schedule 4 
of the 1996 Constitution there is an entry which reads, simply,  “Agriculture”,  and 
another which reads “Language policy and the regulation of official languages to the 
extent that the provisions of section 6 of the Constitution expressly confer upon the 
provincial legislatures legislative competence”;  and 
?? public functions are in places listed without any qualification and in other places with 
various qualifications attached.   The qualifications take the form of exclusions,  
subjections (to laws),  or limitations.   Examples,  again taken from part A of schedule 
4 of the 1996 Constitution,  are “Airports,  other than international and national 
airports” (qualified by exclusion),  “Indigenous law and customary law,  subject to 
chapter 12 of the Constitution” (qualified by subjection),  and the example of 
language policy referred to above (qualified by limitation).   The practice of employing 
qualifications of the nature described is not peculiar to South Africa (vide for example 
section 4.6 of the thesis dealing with the United Kingdom). 
 
In the author’s opinion these shortcomings can be rectified;  for purposes of developing 
a theoretical model for the assignment question it is essential that they are.         
 
The concept “public function” and some associated concepts making up an outline of a 
proposed conceptual framework for present purposes have been dealt with in section 
9.5.1 supra and no further comment is required at this point.   The other aspects 
identified as shortcomings are addressed in the following paragraphs. 
 
If the definition of the term “public function” as provided in the thesis (vide section 9.5.1 
supra) is adopted there can be no question of indicating or referring to a public function 
in any other way than as an activity or,  in the words of the definition,  “a composite of 
activities”.   It is simply not acceptable to stipulate that a government is responsible for,  
say,  agriculture,  or education,  or welfare services.   The activity style of formulation 
therefore has to be applied.   It can be stipulated,  for example,  that the national 
government is responsible for “the determination of national education policy”,  the 
provincial governments for “the provision of primary and secondary education”,  and the 
  
322 
municipal governments for “the protection of school children in the immediate vicinity of 
their schools”.   The utility of employing appropriate public function language for 
purposes of bringing out clearly the respective responsibilities of the three spheres of 
government in relation to a major public function is immediately apparent.   Indeed,  it is 
possible that a commitment to the disciplined use of appropriate language may facilitate 
the actual process of determining which aspect of a public function properly belongs with 
each sphere of government.              
 
In order to be able to deal efficiently and effectively with public functions,  both in 
theoretical discourse as well as in practice,  it is essential that a public function,  or an 
aspect of a public function,  be represented in words by a concise,  precise and 
understandable statement.   It is contended that it is possible to achieve this objective;  
how it could be done is examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
Connotatively,  a public function consists of activities directed at the satisfaction of a 
community need (vide definition in section 9.5.1 supra).   To refer to a specific public  
function it is necessary to change to the denotative style of description (vide section 
3.3.1 of the thesis;  it can then be said that some of the best known public functions are 
those focused on national defence,  foreign relations,  law and order,  civic affairs,  
education,  social welfare,  health services,  the environment,  and agriculture.   For 
purposeful communication about public functions two levels of formulation would appear 
to be necessary,  viz a broad formulation (core statement) conveying the essence of the 
public function,  and supplementary formulations describing the actual services to be 
rendered to the community,  together with certain concomitant activities (vide infra) 
which are inherent in the performance of the function.    
 
The foregoing can be illustrated by reference to one of the blueprints which emanated 
from the erstwhile Commission for Administration’s 1993 rationalisation programme,  
described and discussed in section 6.4 of the thesis.   The public function covered by the 
blueprint is “health services”,  which was described in the core statement as “(the) 
regulation and rendering of health services”.   The services to be rendered included the 
following: 
 
?? the provision of primary health care services in clinics and in the community; 
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?? provision of advanced treatment,  care and rehabilitation services in hospitals and 
institutions;  and 
?? regulation of the manufacture of medicine and specialised medical equipment. 
 
Each service consists of a multitude of activities;  these are not described in detail,  but 
are subsumed under the service as formulated. 
 
In order for the description of a public function,  or an aspect of a public function,  to 
have practical utility,  but at the same time a satisfactory degree of validity and reliability,  
it is necessary that it should be compiled with care and with due regard to some basic 
requirements.   The following criteria are postulated: 
 
?? The description should consist of a single concise sentence; 
?? it should be formulated so that it captures as fully as possible all the underlying 
activities of the public function; 
?? it should include in its envelope of meaning only those activities which make up the 
public function,  excluding activities which belong to another public function; 
?? the wording should be such that the average,  educated adult person will readily 
understand on reading the description what the particular public function entails;  and 
?? qualifying phrases,  which serve to include or exclude certain aspects,  or which 
stipulate limitations of coverage or other conditions,  should be avoided as far as 
possible. 
 
The criteria suggested above are an elaboration of a largely similar set of criteria 
determined by the Commission for Administration in 1993 (CFA 1993f: annexure G: 
paragraph 2.0). 
 
The description of public functions and their constituent activities is obviously not an 
exact science,  and is not likely to ever be one.   However,  it is imperative for a scientific 
approach to the assignment question that an appropriate,  theoretically defensible,  and 
practically useful style of language for dealing with public functions be developed and 
employed in a consistent manner.   The adoption and application of a set of criteria as 
suggested above could go some way to resolving the language problems encountered in 
the research and to which reference has been made at the beginning of this section.   In 
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the absence of precision and consistency in language usage the deliberation of 
assignment decisions could be rendered considerably more difficult than it already is.   It 
is especially important that professional analysts should master what is referred to here 
as “public function language”;  with the necessary training and experience they should 
be able to do so. 
    
  
9.6 Classification of public functions 
 
In the course of the research various classifications of governmental functions were 
encountered.   Riker (1964:53) identifies - perhaps somewhat tongue in cheek - two 
broad areas of governmental action,  viz “getting money” and “spending money”.   Under 
the first head he lists two items,  viz current financing and deferred financing.   The 
second broad area (“spending money”) is broken down into four major categories,  viz 
external affairs,  activities related to internal order,  activities related to trade,  and 
activities related to citizens’ welfare.   Various items recognisable as public functions are 
included in the four categories referred to.   Caiden (1971: chapter 6) devotes a chapter 
of his book to the identification and elucidation of governmental functions under the 
headings “traditional functions”,  “nation building functions”,  “economic management 
functions”,  “social welfare functions”,  and “environmental control functions”.   More 
recently,  and in South Africa,  Loxton (1993:iii-xi) provides a classification of what he 
refers to as the primary functions of the state,  identifying three broad categories,  viz the 
protective functions,  the promotive functions,  and the enabling and facilitative functions.   
The broad categories are broken down into functional items,  with numerous items 
identifiable as public functions as defined in this thesis,  including “defence”,  “law and 
order”,  and “environmental conservation” (amongst the protective functions),  and 
“welfare and social services”,  and “advancement of South Africa’s foreign interests” 
(amongst the promotive functions).   As indicated in section 9.4.2 supra,  the author has 
in his work as a consultant employed a threefold broad categorisation of public functions,  
viz protection,  regulation of societal life,  and socio-economic development. 
          
In everyday public administration terms the best known classification of governmental 
functions,  albeit a rather pragmatic one,  is the annual main budget document which 
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covers very much all activities of government,  sorted into the so-called votes,  sub-votes 
and programmes. 
 
All these classifications can be said to be essentially functional classifications,  that is to 
say they are based in a general sense on the functions to be performed by government 
departments and other public institutions.   To a large extent the basis of division 
(fundamentum divisionis) is the perceived different needs of the community to be 
satisfied by government action,  e.g. the need for protection,  the need for law and order,  
the need for education,  and the need for health services.   This type of classification 
does not,  however,  provide a basis for the assignment of public function responsibilities 
to levels or spheres of government,  where the object of the exercise is to effect a 
vertical deployment of responsibilities within a tiered structure of government. 
 
Given a three-tiered structure of government,  and the need to determine an appropriate 
and accountable assignment of responsibilities to each tier,  it is conceivable that on 
analysis it could be found that – 
 
(a) a public function can be allocated totally (that is to say with the inclusion of all 
activities making up the function) to a single tier of government;  or 
(b) a public function can be performed largely at one tier of government,  but that 
certain activities need to be performed at another tier;  or 
(c) a public function is so constituted that all three tiers of government need to be 
involved in its performance.   (CFA 1993b:4.)         
 
Taxonomically speaking,  what is required in order to address the scenario sketched in 
the preceding paragraph is a classification of the activities which make up a public 
function that would delineate logically differentiated packages of activities which,  where 
necessary,  could be allocated to different tiers of government. 
 
The blueprint format developed by the erstwhile Commission for Administration as part 
of its 1993 rationalisation programme required information concerning a main function to 
be provided under four headings,  viz “Service rendering”,  “Legislation”,  “Co-
ordination”,  and “Administrative control” (vide section 6.4.2 of the thesis).   In the 
author’s recollection the term “control” was qualified as indicated in order to make it clear 
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that what was at issue was the control exercised by one level of government over 
another,  and not the ongoing programme control exercised by managers.   Although 
there is no indication in the Commission’s documents of the time that a generic 
classification of the activities making up a function was being postulated,  it would seem 
from the present vantage point that the “headings” referred to,  can be converted readily 
and to purposeful effect into classes of activities.   In all four instances – the rendering of 
a service,  the putting in place of legislation to authorise and direct the service,  the co-
ordination of the actions of role-players involved in the rendering of the service,  and the 
control of their actions – certain activities have to be performed.   The sum total of all 
these activities equates to the “complex,  logically inclusive composite of activities” which 
constitutes a public function according to its definition (vide section 9.5.1 supra).    
 
On a moment’s reflection,  it is apparent that any particular public function could 
comprise of a large number of discrete activities.   Good scientific practice points to the 
delineation of classes of public function activities where a useful purpose can be served 
by such a classification.   In this instance,  and as pointed out supra,  there is indeed an 
important use to which a classification of activities could be put.   The classification 
would of course be purpose-specific,  but this is what classifications are intended to be 
(Copi & Cohen 1990:450).   The suggested classification can readily satisfy the three 
basic requirements for a classification scheme,  viz comprehensiveness,  a clear basis of 
division,  and mutually exclusive classes (Joseph 1906:103-105).   By the addition of an 
“other activities” class to the four classes already postulated,  it could in theory be said 
that the classification is comprehensive,  providing a “home” for any other public function 
activity which could possibly be identified;  the classes as set up will evidently be 
mutually exclusive;  and there is a clear basis of division to be discerned.   Regarding 
the latter requirement,  it can be postulated that the classes of public function activities 
are differentiated according to the generic sequence of public accountability.   Before 
any service can be rendered,  legislation must be put in place authorising and specifying 
the service;  where necessary the rendering of the service must be co-ordinated;  and to 
ensure compliance with legislative enactments the rendering of the service must be 
controlled,  as necessary on an ongoing or an ex post facto basis. 
 
It is proposed that as part of the theoretical model a classification scheme for ordering 
public function activities,  consisting of the classes “service delivery”,  “legislation”,  “co-
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ordination”,  “control”,  and “other activities” be adopted.   The last mentioned class is 
included principally for purposes of ensuring the completeness in a technical sense of 
the classification;  it may not be required for purposes of the analysis of a public function 
in terms of the theoretical model.   A classification scheme as proposed can be regarded 
as rooted in the science of Public Administration,  and would appear to be compatible 
with both the legislative and the executive arms of government.   It could serve as an 
appropriate and reliable tool when used in the analysis of public functions.   Referring 
again to the Commission for Administration’s 1993 programme,  the generic aspects of 
public functions which are now being postulated as classes of activities were in effect 
tested in regard to more than twenty main functions and found to be valid and useful in 
pinpointing the respective responsibilities of levels of government (vide section 6.4.2 of 
the thesis). 
  
 
9.7 Establishing a base of assignment principles 
 
A major finding of the research is that there are a number of principles which would 
appear to underlie the assignment of public function responsibilities,  not only in South 
Africa but also in other countries.   Obviously,  these principles need to be incorporated 
in the proposed theoretical model,  with an indication how they could be applied in a 
meaningful way in making assignment decisions. 
 
9.7.1 Sources of principles 
 
An analysis of the constitutional principles which were adopted in South Africa as part of 
the 1993 Constitution showed that from this set of basic guidelines six principles could 
be derived which have specific relevance for the assignment of responsibilities.   These 
were the principle of national unity,  the principle of economic unity,  the principle of 
equality,  the principle of co-operation,  the principle of provincial autonomy,  and the 
principle of cultural self-determination (vide section 6.3.3 of the thesis.)   To these 
principles can be added the principle of subsidiarity,  which is prominent in the literature 
(vide section 3.3.3 of the thesis) but which,  somewhat surprisingly,  did not find a place 
in South Africa’s set of constitutional principles.   Also encountered in the research were 
the principles of exclusivity and of asymmetry (vide sections 2.6.4.1,  2.6.4.2,  and 4.5 of 
the thesis) .    
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9.7.2 The role to be fulfilled by principles 
 
The role which the identified nine principles relevant to the assignment of public function 
responsibilities are envisaged as playing in the application of the proposed theoretical 
model is examined seriatim in the following paragraphs,  commencing with the principle 
of subsidiarity.       
 
9.7.2.1    The principle of subsidiarity 
 
If there is a single key principle relevant to the assignment question,  it is the principle of 
subsidiarity.   It alone of the eight principles identified above relates directly to the 
deployment of responsibilities within a tiered structure of government.   As indicated in 
section 3.3.3 of the thesis the interpretation of the subsidiarity relationship which is 
preferred is that of Laufer (1991:262) which,  translated from the German,  reads  
“… higher level communities should perform only those duties / tasks (“aufgaben”) which 
lower level communities cannot perform equally well or better”.   For present purposes 
the word “governments” can be substituted for the word “communities”.   In the section of 
the thesis referred to it was pointed out that “effective” or “satisfactory” performance of a 
function,  or provision of a service,  could also be used as the criterion for assigning a 
responsibility to a lower level of government.   However,  for purposes of the theoretical 
model it is suggested that the Laufer criterion of “equally well or better” has more 
discriminatory power and should therefore be used.   A problem foreseen with the 
“effective or satisfactory “ criterion is that a higher level of government could conceivably 
argue that it can also perform a particular public function activity effectively or 
satisfactorily,   and that there is no reason therefore to assign it to a lower level.   
Clearly, in cases where a lower level of government can do a better job,  the argument in 
favour of assignment to a higher level of government would fall away,  leaving only those 
cases where both levels are in a position to render satisfactory performance to be 
decided. 
 
Should the subsidiarity principle be applied consistently and rigorously it follows that in 
instances where it is proposed to assign a responsibility to a higher level of government,  
a convincing argument for such assignment needs to be made.   In the absence of a 
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convincing argument for assignment to a higher level,  the responsibility would be 
appropriately and accountably placed at the lower level. 
 
9.7.2.2    The principle of national unity 
 
This principle lies at the heart of the maintenance of the essential wholeness and 
integrity of the state.   Where a public function has a direct bearing on the maintenance 
of national unity its performance should be assigned to the national government.   A key 
question to be asked is whether performance of a public function,  or aspect of a public 
function,  has the potential to  harm or detract from the oneness of the state;  if the 
answer is in the affirmative,  assignment to a lower level of government is to be avoided.   
Again,  however,  a systematic,  scientific approach would require that,  if called for,  a 
convincing reason could be furnished to justify the centralisation of responsibility.   A 
cautionary note needs to be sounded:  even where there is a convincing argument in 
favour of the assignment of a responsibility to the national level of government,  there 
may still be a role to be played at a lower level.   To illustrate:  while it is abundantly clear 
that South Africa’s relations with foreign countries should be conducted at the national 
level of government,  the reality is that the majority of the nine provinces have common 
boundaries with foreign states,  and it may be in the country’s interests to involve these 
provinces in an appropriate way in the conduct of relations with neighbouring states. 
 
9.7.2.3    The principle of economic unity 
 
This principle is closely allied to the principle of national unity;  indeed,  it could be said 
that it captures the economic aspect of the essential wholeness and integrity of the state.   
The key question to be asked in this connection in considering the assignment of 
responsibilities,  is similar to the one posed in regard to national unity;  viz will the 
performance of a particular public function, or aspect of a public function,  at a lower 
level of government harm,  or detract from,  or destabilise the optimal functioning of the 
national economy?   Providing an answer could in many instances require a thorough 
analysis of a function if a situation is to be avoided where each and every responsibility 
with a perceived potential impact on the economy is assigned to the national level of 
government.   Even if the national government is granted a dominant role in economic 
matters,  close analysis of public functions may disclose substantial areas of 
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responsibility which could be shared with lower levels of government,  for example in 
regard to the stimulation or regulation of economic activity. 
 
9.7.2.4    The principle of equality 
 
This principle is directly tied to the Bill of Rights,  and its adoption and application in 
relation to the performance of public functions implies that individual members of the 
community should be treated equally,  at least in so far as the involvement of the state in 
their lives is concerned.   In the analysis of the constitutional principles in section 6.3.3 of 
the thesis a number of important aspects of government action related to equality in the 
treatment of people was identified,  viz the maintenance of essential national standards,  
the establishment of minimum standards for the rendering of services,  equality of 
opportunity,  and access to government services.   In areas where it is imperative that 
equality of treatment for all be ensured,  the adoption and application of the principle of 
equality would point to the national government taking the lead in policy making and 
legislation,  but not necessarily in actual service delivery,  which could be devolved to 
lower levels of government. 
 
9.7.2.5   The principle of co-operation 
 
This principle is essentially different to the other principles being dealt with here,  in that 
it does not provide a criterion or measure to be applied in making an assignment 
decision.   It recognises the reality that in a unified state – and all internationally 
recognised states are unified states – public function responsibilities cannot be assigned 
so exactly that each level or sphere of government can thereafter function completely 
independently of the others – in a self-contained functional cocoon so to speak.   While it 
may be essential to impose a structure on society by instituting levels or spheres of 
government,  the dynamic of societal and political life is such that interfaces and 
interaction between governments cannot be avoided.   The principle of co-operation 
binds levels or spheres of government to working together where necessary in order to 
promote the greater good of the state and its inhabitants. 
 
In section 7.6 of the thesis a reservation is expressed concerning co-operative 
government as mandated expressly by the present Constitution,  viz that co-operative 
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government – as the embodiment of the principle of co-operation – ought not to be 
misused as a means of remedying inherent defects or shortcomings in the assignment of 
responsibilities.   The goal should be to achieve an effective,  accountable assignment of 
public function responsibilities,  based on a credible scientific foundation,  with the 
principles and practices of co-operative government,  as decreed in chapter 3 of the 
Constitution,  acting as a sort of public function safety net against serious failure in the 
functioning of the country’s system of government. 
 
9.7.2.6   The principle of provincial autonomy 
 
It is a widespread phenomenon (vide chapter 4 of the thesis dealing with the assignment 
schemes of foreign countries,  as well as chapters 5,  6 and 7 dealing with the situation 
in South Africa) that public function responsibilities are deployed over national and 
subnational levels or spheres of government.   The application of the principle of 
provincial autonomy is thus widely in evidence,  but the manifestations of subnational 
autonomy are not absolute,  but relative,  and not the same in all countries or at all 
times.   In designing an assignment scheme the key question is therefore not whether 
there should be subnational autonomy,  but rather in which areas and to what degree 
subnational autonomy will be workable and generally acceptable.   Theoretically viewed,  
the answer to this question is not readily to hand;  however,  it can be accepted that a 
provisional answer will emerge through the application of other assignment principles 
and by following a well-founded analytical approach – aspects which are accommodated 
within the proposed theoretical model.   Ultimately,  however,  the nature and extent of 
provincial autonomy are matters to be decided within the political domain.   Such 
decision making would be facilitated if it were based on the results of thorough,  
theoretically based analyses,  provided of course that the particular theoretical approach 
is itself acceptable within the political domain. 
 
9.7.2.7   The principle of cultural self-determination 
 
One of the assumptions made for purposes of building the theoretical model is that the 
South African state will continue to be organised on a geographical basis,  that is to say 
without the addition of governmental structures focused on culturally distinct 
communities (vide section 9.3 supra).   How the application of the principle of cultural 
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self-determination could affect the assignment of public function responsibilities is 
therefore not taken further in this examination of the possible role of the assignment 
principles in the proposed theoretical model. 
 
9.7.2.8   The principle of exclusivity 
 
To apply the principle of exclusivity to an assignment scheme means simply to ensure 
that as far as possible public functions,  or aspects of public functions,  defined in terms 
of their content,  are mutually exclusive.   In section 9.5.2 of the thesis,  dealing with 
what is referred to as “public function language”,  it was postulated that two levels of 
formulation concerning public functions are required,  viz a formulation conveying the 
essence of a public function,  and supplementary formulations describing the activities to 
be performed.   Application of the principle of exclusivity requires that in theory public 
functions be formulated as to essence in a manner which will make it clear that the 
public function is uniquely different to all other public functions.   As regards services 
forming part of the public function,  each service should be described so as to exclude 
any other service constituting a part of the function.   It goes without saying that the 
formulation should be such as to also exclude any service forming part of another public 
function. 
 
9.7.2.9   The principle of asymmetry 
 
As indicated in sections 2.6.4.2 and 4.5 of the thesis,  the principle of asymmetry was 
encountered in the study of the assignment scheme of Spain as well as in the survey of 
literature on federalism.   The principle stipulates that the public function responsibilities 
assigned to subnational units of government can differ from one such unit to another – 
presumably where substantial grounds for differentiation exist,  and differentiation is 
acceptable to the affected unit or units of government.   The principle could be applied to 
resolve a situation where the capacity of governments at the same level of government 
to perform a particular public function,  or aspect of a public function,  differs markedly,  
with some governments fully capable of performing the required activities and others not.   
There is an indication in the literature of a tendency to favour a symmetrical above an 
asymmetrical allocation of powers to subnational governments (Agranoff 1994:83; 
Gagnon 1994:132).   On the basis of his direct involvement in the rationalisation of public 
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administration following the adoption of the 1993 Constitution,  the author is of the 
opinion that the asymmetrical allocation of powers to provinces in South Africa would 
probably not be acceptable.   For purposes of the theoretical model it has been 
assumed,  therefore,  that all subnational governments are capable of discharging 
satisfactorily the responsibilities assigned to them.   However,  there is a definite 
rationale underlying the principle,  sufficient to justify its inclusion in the proposed 
theoretical model,  albeit on purely theoretical grounds.    
 
9.7.3   Synopsis 
 
The principle of subsidiarity would appear to be the principle par excellence to be 
applied in the assignment of public function responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government.   However,  the principles of national unity,  of economic unity,  of equality,  
and of exclusivity are directly relevant to the assignment question,  and can be 
purposefully employed in determining criteria to be applied in the analysis of public 
functions.   The principle of co-operation by its nature is not applicable in the same way 
as the aforementioned principles;  however,  the principles and practices of co-operation 
can play an important role as a safety net against serious failures in the functioning of 
the system of government should there be lacunae or shortcomings in the formal 
assignment of responsibilities.   Acknowledgement of the principle of provincial 
autonomy can conceivably promote or strengthen a predisposition to relatively stronger 
provincial government when assignment decisions have to be taken at the political level.   
The principles of cultural self-determination and of asymmetry would appear to have a 
rightful place in a theoretical model for the assignment of responsibilities to levels or 
spheres of government,  but do not seem to have much scope for application in the 
present situation in South Africa.         
                                                   
 
9.8 Methodology for the ordering of public function responsibilities 
 
The term “methodology” is used here to refer to the carrying into effect of a particular 
theoretical approach and not to the development of the approach or model as such.   It is 
postulated that the methodology to be applied in developing an assignment of public 
function responsibilities to spheres of government should be treated as an integral part 
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of the theoretical model,  because of its inseparable link to the principles incorporated in 
the model,  and further because the efficacy of the model can be evaluated properly only 
when there is sufficient clarity as to how a specific methodology in combination with 
other components of the model can lead to a meaningful result. 
 
The methodology to be presented shows distinct points of similarity to the methodology 
adopted by the erstwhile Commission for Administration in 1993 for the development of 
blueprints for what were referred to as government functions (vide section 6.4 of the 
thesis),  but also differs in certain respects and incorporates a number of refinements.   It 
should be borne in mind that as pointed out in section 6.4.1 of the thesis the author at 
the time was responsible for the direction and oversight of the Commission’s 
programme. 
 
Various aspects of the proposed methodology are examined below.   Before doing so,  
brief comment is provided on methodology in relation to the Commission for 
Administration’s 1993 programme.           
 
9.8.1 Comment on the Commission for Administration’s methodology 
 
The methodology followed by the Commission in developing blueprints for the vertical 
deployment of government functions is described in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 of the 
thesis,  and is not repeated here.   Some comment is,  however,  called for. 
 
The Commission applied just two assignment principles,  viz the subsidiarity principle 
and what was referred to at the time as the competency principle.   The competency 
principle (vide section 6.4.2 of the thesis) can be equated with the principle of exclusivity 
(vide section 9.7.2.8 supra),  which is one of nine principles which are regarded as 
having relevance to the assignment of public function responsibilities (vide section 9.7 
supra).     The two principles were identified and employed specifically by the 
Commission with a view to realising what the Commission understood to be the views 
and objectives of the government-of-the-day regarding a future governmental 
dispensation.   In its programme document the Commission declared as follows:  “Aan 
die hand van die gestelde Regeringsbeskouinge en –oogmerke rakende ‘n toekomstige 
owerheidsbestel,  word die volgende beginsels geïdentifiseer vir navolging by die 
ontwikkeling van bloudrukke …” (CFA 1993f: annexure B:3).   A key objective of 
government referred to by the Commission was that there should be maximum 
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devolution of powers of decision making within the structure of the governmental 
dispensation (CFA 1993f: annexure B:2). 
 
The directive influence of the government-of-the-day is clearly discernible in the 
Commission’s programme,  exposing the work done at the time to the possible criticism 
that it was not free of political influence,  even granted that political supremacy is 
generally accepted as a basic guideline of public administration (Cloete 1994:64-69).   
However,  in the author’s opinion it would be an over-reaction to devalue the 
Commission’s work on the grounds that it lacked scientific objectivity.   The meaning 
accorded the concept of subsidiarity by the Commission,  viz to the effect that a 
government programme or activity should not be assigned to a higher level of 
government if it could be performed satisfactorily at a lower level,  is an accurate reading 
of the principle.   So too,  the three criteria prescribed by the Commission for applying 
the principle,  although formulated in somewhat general terms,  stay with the essence of 
the principle.   (Vide in the foregoing connection section 6.4.2 of the thesis.)        
 
The innovative “bottom to top” approach which the Commission required its analysts to 
follow in developing a view of how activities making up a function could be deployed 
over the structure of government (vide section 6.4.2 of the thesis),  although not fully 
motivated in the Commission’s documents,  can be regarded as a good,  and possibly 
the best way in which to proceed when applying the subsidiarity principle.   The 
Commission’s involvement of experienced officials with first-hand knowledge of a 
function in its analysis,  was a procedural measure which could contribute substantially 
to the workability and ultimate acceptability of a deployment proposal and,  as a form of 
participative research,  was certainly also compatible with a scientific approach. 
 
9.8.2 Identification of public functions 
 
By definition (vide section 9.5.1 supra),  a public function consists of activities directed at 
the satisfaction of  a community need.   It follows that not all activities in the public 
domain qualify to be regarded as constituting one or the other public function.   This is 
especially the case with activities which are directed not at the satisfaction of community 
needs,  but have as their purpose the satisfaction of internal requirements within the 
government sector,  such as the compilation and control of budgets,  auditing,  the 
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direction and control of human resource management,  and the supply and maintenance 
of office and other accommodation.   Important as these activities are,  they are not 
covered by the proposed theoretical model. 
 
The number and the identity of public functions are not a given;  both number and 
identity have ultimately to be decided by the authority with the competence to determine 
the deployment of public function responsibilities over the three spheres of government.   
However,  in the course of time public functions have crystallised into entities which are 
generally quite well known,  for example policing,  education,  health,  and welfare.   The 
input made by the Commission for Administration to the Multiparty Negotiating Process 
in 1993 encompassed 23 so-called main government functions,  ranging from 
agriculture,  civic affairs and migration,  and correctional services,  to transport affairs,  
water supply,  and works (vide section 6.4.2 of the thesis).   The last mentioned function 
– works – and another included in the list – finance – possibly do not qualify,  or qualify 
fully,  as public functions per definition.   Two noticeable omissions from the list are 
foreign affairs and defence.   A precise number of functions cannot be postulated on the 
basis of the research,  and the number could in any case vary depending on how public 
functions are demarcated  by the competent authority on the basis of constituent 
activities.   What is important in the context of the theoretical model is that the number of 
substantial public functions would seem to be sufficiently limited to bring a rigorous 
analytical approach to the assignment of public function responsibilities within the 
bounds of feasibility. 
 
Irrespective of how many public functions are formally recognised each one should be 
defined with care in accordance with the requirements and criteria suggested in section 
9.5.2 supra. 
 
9.8.3   Acquisition of knowledge of public functions 
 
In the author’s experience a public function is invariably vastly more complicated than 
may be suggested by its distinctive name,  such as education,  or health,  or welfare.   
To fully understand a public function – and a full understanding is obviously essential if a 
serious opinion is to be ventured as to the optimal deployment of responsibilities for its 
performance – requires thorough study.   Such study should include the reading of all 
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relevant legislation,  White Papers,  budget documents,  published and unpublished 
reports (including academic theses and dissertations),  literature,  speeches of key 
political and administrative figures,  parliamentary records,  media comment,  and web 
pages,  as well as wide-ranging and incisive discussions with experienced people 
engaged in the actual performance of the function.   All this by analysts with the training 
and experience to be able to embark on studies of this nature.   To do a credible public 
function analysis it is a sine qua non that the analyst must first master the nature and 
content of the function,  as well as the key issues related to its performance.            
 
9.8.4 “Bottom to top” approach 
 
It is postulated that the most accountable assignment of public function responsibilities 
can be achieved if the deployment of responsibilities is approached from the lowest 
sphere of government to the highest.   This approach was a feature of the Commission 
for Administration’s 1993 programme (vide section 6.4.2 of the thesis and section 9.8.1 
supra),  being referred to at the time as the “bottom to top” approach.   However,  an 
argument for this approach has still to be made;  this perceived need is addressed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Constitutional principle XVI is in its formulation the shortest of the thirty-four 
constitutional principles which directed the drafting of both the 1993 and the 1996 
Constitutions.   It states simply that “government shall be structured at national,  
provincial and local levels”.   In terms of the allocation of powers and functions the 
inference to be drawn is that each level of government should be given an appropriate 
but also a substantial and credible role to play in the country’s system of government.   
The term “government” is not qualified so it encompasses both legislative and executive 
government.   The inference drawn is supported by other constitutional principles:  so,  
for instance,  constitutional principle VIII requires representative government based on 
universal suffrage;  constitutional principle XVII requires that at each level of government 
there shall be democratic representation;  constitutional principle XVIII provides various 
guarantees related to the powers and functions of the provinces;  constitutional principle 
XX stipulates that each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate 
legislative and executive powers and functions that will enable each level to function 
effectively;  and constitutional principle XXIV stipulates that a framework for local 
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government powers,  functions and structures shall be set out in the Constitution.   The 
intention of these fundamental guidelines taken together is clear:  not only the national 
government but also the provincial and local governments should be worthy 
governments,  democratically elected and accountable,  and with substantial powers to 
exercise and functions to perform.   To achieve this objective the responsibilities to be 
assigned to the provincial and local spheres of government should,  in the author’s 
opinion,  receive as much attention as the responsibilities to be assigned to the national 
sphere.   It is postulated that the best way to ensure that full and proper attention is paid 
to each sphere of government,  is to look first at the local,  then at the provincial and,  
finally,  at the national sphere of government. 
 
The view advanced in the preceding paragraph resonates well with the subsidiarity 
principle,  which is incorporated in the theoretical model.   The principle stipulates that 
where an activity can be performed as well or better at a lower level of government it 
should not be allocated to a higher level.   In considering the deployment of 
responsibilities in regard to a public function the subsidiarity principle embodies a clear 
injunction:  Look first to the lower level of government.   Application of the principle 
implies further that should it be decided to assign the responsibility to a higher level of 
government,  a sound reason for doing so should exist.       
 
Finally,  the dynamic inherent in the functioning of the political system should also be 
brought into the reckoning.   The leading figures in the political world tend naturally to 
gravitate to the higher levels of public office,  and when placed in a situation of having to 
decide on the assignment of legislative or executive responsibilities,  may well be 
inclined to retain as much responsibility,  with the concomitant degree of political 
influence,  as possible at their own level of operation.   Proceeding from the lower to the 
higher levels of government when deliberating on the assignment of responsibilities,  
could counter this tendency and conceivably lead to a more accountable deployment of 
responsibilities over the spheres of government. 
 
9.8.5 Analysis of public functions 
 
It is proposed that an analysis directed at the deployment of public function 
responsibilities should be done in two steps.   As a first step the existing situation with 
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regard to the deployment of responsibilities should be established through empirical 
study,  with the data being recorded in a certain manner,  which will be indicated below.   
On the basis of the data generated in this way,  a critical analysis can then be done with 
the object of developing a view of how the deployment could look if the “tools” built into 
the proposed theoretical model are applied.   The methodological approach advocated 
differs from that followed in the Commission for Administration’s 1993 programme,  
where thorough empirical data collection and systematisation was not required 
specifically,  and analysts were simply instructed to produce a deployment proposal in 
the form of a blueprint.   It should be noted,  however,  that the Commission was acting 
under severe constraints of time (vide section 6.4.1 of the thesis).   The two steps are 
described below.   In order to facilitate presentation,  it is assumed that a single public 
function is being dealt with. 
 
A complete and accurate picture of the way in which responsibility for a public function is 
actually deployed can be obtained only through diligent study as indicated in section 
9.8.3 supra.   The data collected in the process needs to be aligned with the 
requirements of the theoretical model.   Most importantly,  the proposed generic 
classification of the activities making up a public function (vide section 9.6 supra) has to 
be applied in sorting and recording the data collected.   This means that for the purpose 
at hand data collection has to be focused on obtaining full and accurate information 
regarding service delivery,  legislation,  co-ordination ,  and control in relation to the 
particular public function.   The classification proposed in section 9.6. supra provides for 
a fifth category,  viz “other activities”,  but this category has been included mainly for 
technical reasons and will probably not be required for the development of an 
assignment proposal.   What is important is that all activities regarding service delivery,  
legislation,  co-ordination and control be captured in the data collection and sorted 
accurately.   To ensure the completeness and accuracy of the data,  the documented 
picture compiled in this manner should be cleared with experienced people with first-
hand knowledge of the performance of the function at the various levels of government.   
Work on the development of an assignment proposal can then proceed. 
 
With acknowledgement to the guidelines issued to its analysts in 1993 by the 
Commission for Administration (CFA 1993f: Annexure G),  but with adjustment,  
reformulation,  and elaboration to fit the proposed theoretical model,  the following are 
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the main steps to be taken in the development of a proposal regarding the assignment of 
responsibilities for the performance of a public function: 
 
?? Determine and define the services encompassed by the public function. 
?? In respect of each discrete service determine at which level of government it ought to 
be rendered. 
?? Determine whether legislation authorising and regulating the service should be 
effected at the same level of government or at a higher level. 
?? Determine whether it is necessary that a higher level of government co-ordinate the 
rendering of the service at lower levels of government. 
?? Determine whether a higher level of government should play a controlling role in 
respect of the rendering of the service by governments at a lower level,  and specify 
the nature of the controlling activity to be performed (vide definition of “control” in 
section 9.5.1 supra).   
?? Repeat the above mentioned steps in respect of all other services encompassed by 
the public function. 
?? Compile a statement (draft proposal) showing a deployment of responsibilities over 
all three levels of government in respect of the rendering of all the services 
encompassed by the public function,  together with their associated legislative,  co-
ordinating,  and controlling activities. 
?? Consult experienced officials with a sound knowledge of the public function about the 
draft proposal,  and finalise the proposal with due regard to any comments and 
suggestions received. 
 
A key action in developing a draft assignment proposal for a public function is the 
placement of the services encompassed by the public function.   In terms of the 
proposed theoretical model it is obligatory that a “bottom to top” approach be followed in 
considering the appropriate level of government at which services should be rendered,  
commencing with the lowest level.   A rigorous questioning technique needs to be 
applied,  based in the main on the assignment principles absorbed into the theoretical 
model (vide section 9.7 supra).   The primary principle relevant to the task at hand is the 
subsidiarity principle,  which directs that a service should not be placed at  a higher level 
of government if it can be performed equally well or better at a lower level.   The 
assumption should be in favour of placement at the lower level,  with the service being 
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moved to a higher level only if there is a good,  convincing reason to do so.   To 
determine whether there is such a reason the placement of the service should be 
considered in the light of other relevant assignment principles,  especially the principles 
of national unity,  of economic unity,  and of equality,  while the scope for the application 
of the principle of provincial autonomy should be assessed as well as can be done in the 
light of prevailing political thinking on the degree of autonomy to be allowed to the 
provincial level of government.   (It is realistic to do so;  however, a proper analysis of 
public functions based on an accountable theoretical model could also influence political 
thinking on the autonomy question.)    
 
Although the assignment question is being approached within the parameters of a 
proposed theoretical model,  there can also be practical considerations bearing on the 
level of government to which a service should be assigned;  these should be identified 
and carefully weighed.   Examples of such practical considerations are the need to 
centralise in certain instances scarce expertise at one point in the governmental 
structure,  the advisability of avoiding small,  uneconomic,  ineffective administrative 
units,  and the need perhaps to harmonise governmental and societal structures in 
relation to the performance of a service.   The important point,  however,  is to avoid an 
unthinking,  arbitrary placement of a service at a higher level of government than is 
rationally necessary. 
 
The analytical approach sketched above can be illustrated with reference to a specific 
government service.   The payment of social pensions is a service constituting an 
important activity within the public function “social welfare”.   The pensions are at present 
paid by the provincial administrations in terms of the provisions of national law with funds 
appropriated by Parliament.   On rigorous analysis in accordance with the proposed 
methodology,  it is possible that it could be found that there is not a convincing reason 
why the payments should be done at the provincial level of government,  in other words 
that the service could be rendered by municipal governments,  at least by those with 
adequate human,  managerial and technical resources.   As regards legislation,  
however,  the principle of equality – equal treatment of all -  would point to the national 
level of government as the level where social pensions legislation should be effected.   
There may be a convincing reason why provincial governments should co-ordinate the 
payment of social pensions by municipal governments,  while grounds may also exist for 
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either the national or the provincial governments,  or all these governments,  to perform 
specified controlling activities in relation to the payment of social pensions.   (Note:  A 
proposal as to the placement of the particular service is not being made;  before any 
such proposal could be made a thorough study of social welfare as a public function 
would have to be undertaken.   The particular service is used merely to illustrate very 
briefly how the proposed methodology could operate.) 
 
The following additional guidelines regarding the application of the methodology are 
suggested: 
 
?? A draft assignment proposal (vide supra) should cover the public function in relation 
to each level of government,  even if no activity is envisaged for a particular level,  as 
confirmation that proper study and systematic analysis have been done. 
?? Information on the activities to be performed at the various levels of government 
should be arranged in ascending order from the lowest to the highest level,  as an 
indication that each level has received the attention due to it. 
?? Subnational governments and their associated administrations may find it efficacious 
to co-ordinate on a voluntary basis certain activities for which they are responsible.   
It is not considered necessary that such voluntary co-ordination be reflected in a draft 
assignment proposal which is intended for eventual formalisation in legislation. 
?? Particular attention should be paid to the precise and consistent use of appropriate 
technical language in describing the services and other activities making up a public 
function (vide section 9.5 supra). 
 
9.8.6 Formalisation of responsibilities 
 
If it is accepted that the responsibilities assigned to levels or spheres of government 
should be reflected in the Constitution – which is the established practice in South Africa 
and other countries – the question arises as to the best way of accommodating the 
particular provisions in the Constitution. 
 
In line with the Public Administration approach advocated in section 9.4 supra,  it is 
proposed that legal drafting with regard to the public function responsibilities of the 
spheres of government,  should be based on a document structured so as to indicate in 
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respect of the subnational spheres of government the legislative and executive 
responsibilities to be discharged by them.   Public function responsibilities not indicated 
in the document will be those that fall to be discharged by the national level of 
government.   Of course,  the credibility and utility of the document will depend on the 
thoroughness with which all public functions have been identified and analysed so as to 
ensure that responsibilities which could and,  in terms of an accepted theoretical model,  
ought to be discharged by provincial or municipal governments,  are indeed assigned to 
them,  and not left to be discharged by the national government – by default so to speak.   
To facilitate linkage to the legislative and executive arms of government the document 
should consist of columns showing in respect of each public function the legislative and 
executive responsibilities to be discharged by the provincial and municipal spheres of 
government respectively.   The information to be inserted in the columns of the 
document will be sourced from the assignment proposals developed as described in 
section 9.8.5 supra.   Once finalised and accepted by the competent authority 
(Constitutional Assembly or Parliament) the document can be translated into a schedule 
to be affixed to the Constitution.   In the main text of the Constitution the assignment 
schedule can be referred to as appropriate.   So,  for example,  the provision in the 
Constitution dealing with the legislative powers of the provinces could stipulate that 
“provinces shall have the power to discharge the legislative responsibilities indicated in 
column A of schedule X” or,  alternatively,  that “provinces shall have the power to make 
laws with regard to matters indicated in column A of schedule X”.   As regards the 
national government,  the Constitution will need to stipulate that Parliament and the 
national political executive have the power to legislate on and administer matters not 
assigned specifically to any other sphere of government. 
 
On the basis of the author’s experience in the field,  it can be postulated that virtually all 
public function responsibilities appropriate to the provincial and municipal spheres of 
government can be captured in an assignment schedule to the Constitution.   However,  
it must be accepted that there can be public functions,  or aspects of public functions - 
almost certainly of relatively minor import - which may not find a place in an assignment 
schedule as envisaged.   It is proposed that any such public functions,  or aspects of 
public functions,  be placed under the residuary powers of Parliament,  with the result 
that Parliament can,  as necessary,  adopt legislation assigning responsibilities for their 
performance.  
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9.8.7 Comment regarding legislative powers 
 
The laws enacted by a legislative body can evince varying degrees of detailed 
prescription.   In many instances detail not contained in the law itself is accommodated 
in regulations which,  in terms of that law,  may be issued by a competent political office 
holder,  and will have the same legal force and effect.   Bearing in mind that – 
 
(a) a convincing reason may be found to exist why the power to legislate with regard 
to a particular service should be exercised by a level of government higher than the level 
at which the service is rendered; 
(b) the amount of detail to be included in a law is not self-evident but indeterminate;  
and 
(c) legal drafters may be inclined to opt for the setting out in a single law of a 
comprehensive scheme for the regulation of a matter, 
 
it may well happen that legislation drafted and adopted at the higher level of government 
will leave virtually no “legislative space” to be utilised by the lower level,  even though 
there may be aspects of the matter which could be legislated effectively at the lower 
level.   Such a tendency is evidently not acceptable if it is the intention to accord full 
value to each level of government in a tiered national structure of government. 
 
As pointed out in chapter 4 of the thesis,  the drafters of Germany’s Basic Law 
apparently took cognisance of the problem of the possible crowding out of subnational 
legislatures from the legislative domain,  and devised a solution in the form of the so-
called “framework legislation” (Basic Law: article 75 (1)-(2)).   The intention presumably 
is that in respect of specified matters the Federation should not legislate in a 
comprehensive,  detailed manner but restrict itself to the stipulation of principles and 
basic parameters,  leaving room for the Länder to adopt their own legislation regulating 
such matters in detail.   It could not be established as part of the research to what extent 
the mechanism of framework legislation has been a success in Germany .   In South 
Africa,  the German concept found favour with the erstwhile Commission for 
Administration which in its 1993 programme of rationalisation required of its analysts to 
differentiate with regard to subnational legislation between legislative powers which 
would be exercised within parameters determined by a higher level of government and 
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legislative powers  which would be exercised as an original competence (“in eie reg”) 
(CFA 1993f: annexure G:3). 
 
It is postulated that the true determinant of the status of a government,  as a government 
(vide definition in section 9.5.1 supra),  is the extent to which it is empowered to make 
laws rather than merely to administer laws.   If this postulate is accepted,  the implication 
is that in the deployment of governmental responsibilities as much legislative 
competence as possible should be assigned to provincial and municipal governments.   
Again,  the principle of subsidiarity,  applied in conjunction with a framework mechanism,  
would seem to point the way towards achieving an accountable deployment of legislative 
responsibilities. 
                 
 
9.9 Comment on co-operative government 
 
Due to the inherent complexity of public functions it would be impossible to achieve a 
once-off,  complete,  precise determination of the public function responsibilities of the 
three spheres of government.   Applying the proposed theoretical model could 
conceivably contribute to a deployment of responsibilities which would go a long way 
towards providing clarity as to what each sphere of government is authorised to do;  
however,  uncertainties and grey areas will remain,  as for example in – 
 
?? identifying those public functions,  or aspects of a public function,  in respect of which 
responsibility should not be assigned by the Constitution,  but be read into the 
residuary powers of the national government (vide section 9.8.6 supra); 
?? deciding on the timing and balancing of government programmes in an endeavour to 
achieve the optimal co-ordination of the activities making up a public function (vide 
section 9.5.1 (definition of “co-ordination”) and section 9.8.5 supra); 
?? determining the form of control,  or combinations of forms of control,  which need to 
operate in order to achieve the optimal performance of a public function,  and the 
adjustment of controlling arrangements when necessary (vide section 9.5.1 
(definition of “control”) and section 9.8.5 supra);  and 
?? determining the essential content and limits of prescription of a piece of framework 
legislation (vide section 9.8.7 supra). 
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The need for co-operative government will not lapse because the assignment question is 
dealt with in a more scientific manner,  nor will the constitutional principle of co-operation 
be invalidated.   Putting forward a theoretical model for the assignment of public function 
responsibilities does not detract in any way from the fundamental importance accorded 
co-operative government in the Constitution.   On the contrary,  it can be postulated that 
a concerted endeavour to limit as far as possible the areas of uncertainty in the 
deployment of responsibilities amongst the spheres of government will contribute 
substantially to the strengthening of co-operative government.   (Vide also the note on 
intergovernmental relations at section 7.7.4 of the thesis.) 
 
 
9.10 Conclusion 
 
All theory,  including theoretical models,  consists of propositions advanced provisionally 
or tentatively.   The key propositions are subject to amendment,  adjustment,  rejection,  
replacement,  or confirmation in the light of practical experience.   The proposed 
theoretical model is no different.   Whatever value it may have can be determined only 
by testing its efficacy in an actual exercise aimed at developing a proposal on the 
deployment of governmental responsibilities for the performance of one or more public 
functions.   It will no doubt then be found that the model can be improved upon,  refined 
or elaborated.   It needs to be noted that the theoretical approach presented here shows 
points of similarity with the approach employed by the Commission for Administration in 
1993 in the development of the so-called blueprints for the deployment of governmental 
functions;  it can therefore be said that  a degree of relevant testing has already taken 
place.   
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CHAPTER 10:  REFLECTION 
 
A relatively detailed summary,  analysis and interpretation of the research findings is 
provided in chapter 8 of the thesis,  and is not repeated here.   However,  it is considered 
to be appropriate that this concluding chapter should return to the genesis of the study 
and reflect briefly on what has been accomplished. 
 
The thesis can be regarded as a response to a problematic situation which was noted in 
the very first paragraph of the thesis,  and elaborated into a problem statement in section 
2.3.   The problem in essence is that despite the importance and the far-reaching 
implications for government and administration of the assignment of responsibilities for 
the performance of public functions to levels or spheres of government,  there is a 
paucity of scientific knowledge concerning the assignment question.   Against this 
background,  the purpose of the study was to make a research based contribution to the 
body of knowledge constituting Public Administration concerning the assignment 
question (vide section 2.4 of the thesis).   In order to provide direction to the study,  a 
number of research questions were identified (vide section 2.5 of the thesis).   The 
reflection on results proposed above can proceed conveniently by noting briefly the 
answers which have been found to the research questions.   The questions are dealt 
with seriatim below.      
 
What is the position as regards relevant literature?   The literature review covered 
samples of books and articles taken from the disciplines of Public Administration and 
Constitutional Law and one specialised field of study,  viz federalism;  it is summarised in 
section 8.2.1 of the thesis.   No evidence was found of an established,  defined body of 
knowledge dealing specifically with public functions and the assignment of 
responsibilities for their performance to levels or spheres of government. 
 
What recognition does the assignment question enjoy in academic circles?   To answer 
this question,  local academic curricula were reviewed briefly,  and the proposed national 
qualification unit standards for public administration and management checked.   The 
conclusion arrived at was that the assignment question is recognised as having a 
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definite place in the discipline of Public Administration but,  on the basis of the sources 
consulted and the verbal enquiries made,  is not at present accorded substantial,  in-
depth treatment (vide section 2.2 of the thesis). 
 
What does the research record show?   No instance could be traced in the available 
records of research conducted in South Africa,  at universities or other research 
establishments,  of a project dealing in a comprehensive,  fundamental way with the 
subject of the present study (vide section 2.6.1 of the thesis).   However, it is to be noted 
that development work done by the then Commission for Administration in 1993,  
although not reported as a research project,  is relevant to the subject of the study,  and 
exhibits a substantial degree of scientific relevance.   The work in question is examined 
and evaluated in section 6.4 of the thesis. 
 
How do other countries assign responsibilities?   The countries selected for study were 
Australia,  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  and the United Kingdom;  the results  are 
reported in chapter 4 of the thesis.   Some key findings are that while there is some 
consistency in placing certain public functions at the national level of government,  the 
various schemes are largely sui generis;  that the assignment schemes of these 
countries are focused largely on the national level of government and the level or sphere 
immediately below the national level,  with sparse treatment accorded to the local level;  
and that the formulations used in constitutional texts are notable for their complexity 
rather than their accessibility.   The general conclusion reached is that in none of the 
countries studied,  a clear,  comprehensive demarcation of public function 
responsibilities has been achieved,  and that there is little evidence of a scientific 
approach to the assignment question. 
 
How have responsibilities been assigned in South Africa?   Answering this question 
constituted a major part of the study and three chapters of the thesis (chapters 5,  6 and 
7) are devoted to the examination and evaluation of the assignment schemes instituted 
in the pre-democratic era,  as well as those instituted by the Constitutions of 1993 and 
1996.   The general finding in regard to the period from 1910 to 1994 is that the 
assignment of responsibilities was done in a pragmatic and ad hoc manner,  in which 
ideological considerations played a prominent role (vide section 5.5 of the thesis).   The 
1993 Constitution marked the advent of an objective approach to the assignment 
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question,  driven in large part by the set of constitutional principles which were adopted 
at the time;  however,  on evaluation (vide section 6.7 of the thesis) a number of 
shortcomings were found.   Some of these shortcomings are perpetuated in the 1996 
Constitution,  but the Constitution also shows a substantial advance on its precursor in 
certain respects (vide section 7.7 of the thesis).   Critically viewed,  however,  the finding 
is that the 1996 Constitution – which is also the present Constitution – does not provide 
a credible and clear-cut deployment of public function responsibilities over the three 
spheres of government.  
 
Where do we stand in scientific terms with the assignment of responsibilities?   This 
question is addressed in section 8.3 of the thesis.   To be in a position to answer it 
adequately,  it was considered necessary to develop a set of criteria for purposes of 
making an assessment of the extent to which the assignment of responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions to levels or spheres of government could be said to 
constitute a scientific endeavour.   Tested against the criteria,  the finding is that a 
scientific approach to the assignment question is in evidence only to a limited extent;  
further that a number of principles would appear to underlie the assignment of 
responsibilities,  and that the work of the Commission for Administration,  referred to 
above,  could be of value in building a knowledge base concerning the assignment 
question. 
 
Can a model be constructed for the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government on South Africa?   On the basis of the research done the answer to this 
question is in the affirmative.   Chapter 9 of the thesis puts forward a proposed 
theoretical model for the assignment of public function responsibilities,  following a 
Public Administration approach.   The model encompasses aspects such as the 
language to be employed,  classification in relation to public functions,  the 
establishment of a base of principles,  and methodology.     
 
In this concluding chapter it is necessary to pose and to attempt to answer a further 
question,  viz whether the theoretical model proposed in chapter 9 of the thesis can be 
applied in a redetermination of the respective public function responsibilities of the three 
spheres of government.   The task would obviously be a formidable one as the formal 
redetermination of responsibilities would entail an amendment,  and a substantial one at 
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that,  of the Constitution.   The drafting and adopting of amending legislation would have 
to be preceded by the development of assignment proposals based on a comprehensive 
analysis of the full spectrum of public functions,  followed by the processing of proposals 
through a credible and acceptable consultative structure involving political parties,  
existing organs of state,  and other institutions and bodies with a legitimate interest in the 
matter.   Even if there should be strong general support for a revision of this magnitude,  
if the necessary expertise could be marshalled,  and if suitable consultative structures 
could be set in place,  it is hardly likely that the task could be completed in anything less 
than eighteen months.   The sheer size and complexity of the task may militate against 
its ever being attempted,  although in the author’s opinion this would be the best way to 
achieve an assignment of responsibilities which would remedy present defects and 
shortcomings.   However,  an all or nothing approach to the revision and improvement of 
the country’s assignment scheme,  is not the only way of proceeding. 
 
A thorough,  systematic and critical analysis as envisaged in the proposed theoretical 
model could be applied to any public function at any time.   Nothing would be lost and 
much is to be gained by such an endeavour.   The exercise would undoubtedly 
contribute to a better understanding of the function and how its performance could best 
be deployed over the spheres of government.   Such insights could work to the 
advantage not only of those who are responsible for the performance of the function but 
also of those who are intended to benefit from its performance.   And the best part of it is 
that real change could be effected without necessarily amending the Constitution,  as 
illustrated briefly below. 
 
Equipped with a fuller understanding of a public function,  the National Assembly could 
limit its legislation regarding matters in the problematic concurrent category (vide section 
44(1)(a)(ii) and schedule 4 of the 1996 Constitution) to those aspects for which on 
rational grounds it should take responsibility,  leaving other aspects to the provincial 
legislatures,  or endeavour to achieve an effective dovetailing of provincial with national 
legislation by adopting appropriate framework legislation (vide section 9.8.7 of the 
thesis).   Where feasible the National Assembly could assign its legislative power with 
regard to a specific matter to the provincial legislatures or to municipal councils,  as 
provided for in section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution.   Similarly,  a provincial legislature 
could,  in the light of a new insight into the deployment of responsibilities regarding a 
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particular public function,  assign a legislative power to a municipal council in terms of 
section 104(1)(c) of the Constitution.   Within the political executive domain a Cabinet 
member could,  where appropriate,  assign a power to be exercised by him or her in 
terms of an Act of Parliament to a member of a provincial executive council or to a 
municipal council in terms of section 99 of the Constitution;  while a member of the 
executive council of a province could make a similar assignment to a municipal council 
in the province in terms of section 126 of the Constitution.   In addition the national and 
provincial governments could take steps to ensure that the administration of matters 
regulated by national and provincial legislation is indeed assigned as far as possible to 
municipalities,  as required by section 156(4) of the Constitution.   (The 
intergovernmental assignment and delegation of powers is dealt with more fully in 
section 7.7.3.3 of the thesis.) 
 
It is suggested that the flexibility built into the Constitution regarding the exercise of 
legislative and executive powers could best be utilised by applying a reasonably valid 
and reliable scientific approach to the analysis of public functions,  with a view to 
determining in a rational way where a function,  or aspects of it,  could best be 
performed in the general interest.   The research has lead to the conclusion that such an 
approach is feasible,  and that its purposeful application could lead to substantial 
improvements in the assignment of responsibilities.   However,  it needs to be observed 
that without a thoroughgoing amendment of the Constitution the problems concerning 
complexity,  and poor accessibility,  so much an unsatisfactory feature of the deployment 
of responsibilities by both the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions,  will remain.    
 
A final question to be posed,  is whether the purpose of the study,  viz to make a 
research based contribution to the body of knowledge constituting Public Administration 
concerning the assignment question,  has been accomplished.   The answering of this 
question is left to the family of public administrationists.             
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 Annexure 1 
 
 
 
EXTRACT:  AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION 
 
 
Section 51 
 
The Parliament shall,  subject to this Constitution,  have power to make laws for the 
peace,  order,  and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: 
 
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries,  and among the States; 
 
(ii) taxation;  but not so as to discriminate between States or parts of States; 
 
(iii) bounties on the production or export of goods,  but so that such bounties shall 
be uniform throughout the Commonwealth; 
 
(iv) borrowing money on the public credit of the Commonwealth; 
 
(v) postal,  telegraphic,  telephonic,  and other like services; 
 
(vi) the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States,  
and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the 
Commonwealth; 
 
(vii) lighthouses,  lightships,  beacons and buoys; 
 
(viii) astronomical and meteorological observations; 
 
(ix) quarantine; 
 
(x) fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits; 
 
(xi) census and statistics; 
 
(xii) currency,  coinage, and legal tender; 
 
(xiii) banking,  other than State banking;  also State banking extending beyond the 
limits of the State concerned,  the incorporation of banks,  and the issue of 
paper money; 
 
(xiv) insurance,  other than State insurance;  also State insurance extending beyond 
the limits of the State concerned; 
 
(xv) weights and measures; 
 
(xvi) bills of exchange and promissory notes; 
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(xvii) bankruptcy and insolvency; 
 
(xviii) copyrights,  patents of inventions and designs,  and trade marks; 
 
(xix) naturalisation and aliens; 
 
(xx) foreign corporations,  and trading or financial corporations formed within the 
limits of the Commonwealth; 
 
(xxi) marriage; 
 
(xxii)  divorce and matrimonial causes;  and in relation thereto,  parental rights,  and 
the custody and guardianship of infants; 
 
(xxiii) invalid and old-age pensions; 
 
(xxiiiA) the provision of maternity allowances,  widow’s pensions,  child endowment,  
unemployment,  pharmaceutical,  sickness and hospital benefits,  medical and 
dental services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription),  
benefits to students and family allowances; 
 
(xxiv) the service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and 
criminal process and the judgements of the courts of the States; 
 
(xxv) the recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws,  the public Acts and 
records,  and the judicial proceedings of the States; 
 
(xxvi) the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws; 
 
(xxvii) immigration and emigration; 
 
(xxviii) the influx of criminals; 
 
(xxix) external affairs; 
 
(xxx) the relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific; 
 
(xxxi) the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any 
purpose in respect of which the Parliament has powers to make laws; 
 
(xxxii) the control of railways with respect to transport for the naval and military 
purposes of the Commonwealth; 
 
(xxxiii) the acquisition,  with the consent of a State,  of any railways of the State on 
terms arranged between the Commonwealth and the State; 
 
(xxxiv) railway construction and extension in any State with the consent of that State; 
 
(xxxv) conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State; 
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(xxxvi)  matters in respect of which this Constitution makes provision until the 
Parliament otherwise provides; 
 
(xxxvii)  matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliament or 
Parliaments of any State or States,  but so that the law shall extend only to 
States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred,  or which afterwards adopt 
the law; 
 
(xxxviii) the exercise within the Commonwealth,  at the request or with the concurrence 
of the Parliaments of all the States directly concerned,  of any power which can 
at the establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia;  and 
 
(xxxix) matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in 
the Parliament or in either House thereof,  or in the Government of the 
Commonwealth,  or in the Federal Judicature,  or in any department or officer 
of the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
Blaustein, A.P. & Flanz, G.H.  (editors).  1991.  Australia, in Constitutions of the 
countries of the world.  Release 91-6, November.  Dobbs Ferry, New York:  Oceana. 
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 Annexure 2 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL “MAP” OF BELGIUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
Senelle, R.  1990.  The reform of the Belgian State:  volume V.  Brussels:  Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, External Trade and Co-operation and Development.  (Memo from 
Belgium:  “Views and surveys”, 198 – 1990.) 
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 Annexure 3 
 
 
EXTRACTS:  GERMANY’S BASIC LAW 
 
 
Article 74 (Subjects of concurrent legislation) 
 
(1) Concurrent legislative powers extend to the following subjects: 
 
1. civil law,  criminal law,  and corrections,  court organisation and procedure,  
the legal profession,  notaries,  and the provision of legal advice; 
 
2. registration of births,  deaths,  and marriages; 
 
3. the law of association and assembly; 
 
4. the law relating to residence and establishment of aliens; 
 
4a the law relating to weapons and explosives; 
 
5. (abrogated) 
 
6. matters concerning refugees and expellees; 
 
7. public welfare; 
 
8. (abrogated) 
 
9. war damage and reparations; 
 
10. benefits for persons disabled by war and for dependents of deceased war 
victims as well as assistance to former prisoners of war; 
 
11. the law relating to economic affairs (mining,  industry,  energy,  crafts,  trades,  
commerce,  banking,  stock exchanges,  and private insurance); 
 
11a. the production and utilisation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,  the 
construction and operation of facilities serving such purposes,  protection 
against hazards arising from the release of nuclear energy or from ionising 
radiation,  and the disposal of radioactive substances; 
 
12. labor law,  including the organisation of enterprises,  occupational safety and 
health,  and employment agencies,  as well as social security,  including 
unemployment insurance; 
 
13. the regulation of educational and training grants and the promotion of 
research; 
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14. the law regarding expropriation,  to the extent relevant to matters enumerated 
in Articles 73 and 74; 
 
15. the transfer of land,  natural resources,  and means of production to public 
ownership or other forms of public enterprise; 
 
16. prevention of the abuse of economic power; 
 
17. the promotion of agricultural production and forestry,  ensuring the adequacy 
of the food supply,  the importation and exportation of agricultural and forestry 
products,  deep-sea and coastal fishing,  and preservation of the coasts; 
 
18. real estate transactions,  land law (except for laws respecting development 
fees),  and matters concerning agricultural leases,  as well as housing,  
settlement,  and homestead matters; 
 
19. measures to combat dangerous and communicable human and animal 
diseases,  admission to the medical profession and to ancillary professions or 
occupations,  as well as trade in medicines,  drugs,  narcotics,  and poisons; 
 
19a. the economic viability of hospitals and the regulation of hospital charges; 
 
20. protective measures in connection with the marketing of food,  drink,  and 
tobacco,  essential commodities,  feedstuffs,  agricultural and forest seeds 
and seedlings,  and protection of plants against diseases and pests,  as well 
as the protection of animals; 
 
21. maritime and coastal shipping,  as well as navigational aids,  inland 
navigation,  meteorological services,  sea routes,  and inland waterways used 
for general traffic; 
 
22. road traffic,  motor transport,  construction and maintenance of long-distance 
highways,  as well as the collection of tolls for the use of public highways by 
vehicles and the allocation of the revenue; 
 
23. non-federal railways,  except mountain railways; 
 
24. waste disposal,  air pollution control,  and noise abatement; 
 
25. state liability; 
 
26. human artificial insemination,  analysis and modification of genetic 
information,  as well as the regulation of organ and tissue transplantation. 
 
 
Article 74a (Concurrent legislative power of the Federation:  remuneration,  
pensions,  and related benefits of members of the public service) 
 
(1) Concurrent legislative power extends also to the remuneration,  pensions,  and 
related benefits of members of the public service who stand in a relationship of service 
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and loyalty defined by public law,  insofar as the Federation does not have exclusive 
legislative power pursuant to clause 8 of Article 73. 
 
(2) . . .  
 
(3) . . .  
 
(4) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article apply correspondingly also to the 
remuneration,  pensions,  and related benefits of judges of the Länder.   . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
Flanz, G.H.  (editor).  2003.  Germany, in Constitutions of the countries of the world.  
Release 2003-3, May.  Dobbs Ferry, New York:  Oceana. 
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 Annexure 4 
 
 
EXTRACT:  SPAIN CONSTITUTION 
 
 
Article 148 
 
1. The Autonomous Communities may assume competences in the following 
matters: 
 
1) Organisation of their institutions of self-government. 
 
2) Alterations of the municipal boundaries contained within its area,  and in 
general the functions which belong to the State Administration concerning 
local corporations and whose transfer is authorised by the legislation on 
Local Governments. 
 
3) Regulation of the territory,  urbanism and housing. 
 
4) Public works of interest to the Autonomous Community in its own territory. 
 
5) Railways and highways whose itinerary runs completely in the territory of 
the Autonomous Community and within the same boundaries and 
transportation carried out by these means or by cable. 
 
6) Ports of refuge,  recreational ports and airports and generally all those 
which do not carry our commercial activities. 
 
7) Agriculture and livestock raising in accord with the general regulations of 
the economy. 
 
8) Woodlands and forestry. 
 
9) Activities in matters of environmental protection. 
 
10) Water projects,  canals and irrigation systems of interest to the 
Autonomous Community and mineral and thermal waters. 
 
11) Fishing in inland waters,  hunting and river fishing. 
 
12) Interior fairs. 
 
13) Promotion of the economic development of the Autonomous Community 
within the objectives marked by the national economic policy. 
 
14) Handicrafts. 
 
15) Museums,  libraries and conservatories of interest to the Autonomous 
Community. 
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16) Monuments of interest to the Autonomous Community. 
 
17) Promotion of culture,  research,  and when applicable,  the teaching of the 
language of the Autonomous Community. 
 
18) Promotion and regulation of tourism within its territorial area. 
 
19) Promotion of sports and adequate utilisation of leisure. 
 
20) Social assistance. 
 
21) Health and hygiene. 
 
22) The custody and protection of its buildings and installations;  the co-
ordination and other functions with respect to local police forces under the 
terms an organic law shall establish. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
Blaustein, A.P. & Flanz, G.H.  (editors).  1991.  Spain, in Constitutions of the countries of 
the world.  Dobbs Ferry, New York:  Oceana. 
 
Note 
 
The published source document is a translation from Spanish,  which presumably 
explains the peculiarities in the text as transcribed above. 
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 Annexure 5 
 
EXTRACT:  SPAIN CONSTITUTION 
 
 
Article 149 
 
1. The State holds exclusive competence over the following matters: 
 
1) The regulation of the basic conditions which guarantee the equality of all 
Spaniards in the exercise of their rights and fulfilment of their 
constitutional duties. 
 
2) Nationality,  immigration,  emigration,  alienage and the right of asylum. 
 
3) International relations. 
 
4) Defense and the Armed Forces. 
 
5) Administration of Justice. 
 
6) Mercantile,  penal and prison legislation;  procedural legislation,  without 
prejudice to the necessary specialties which in this order may derive from 
the particularities of the substantive law of the Autonomous Communities. 
 
7) Labor legislation,  without prejudice to its execution by the organs of the 
Autonomous Communities. 
 
8) Civil legislation,  without prejudice to the preservation,  modification and 
development by the Autonomous Communities of civil “fueros”,  or special 
rights,  where they may exist.   In any case,  the rules relative to the 
application and effectiveness of juridical norms,  civil-legal relations 
having to do with the form of matrimony,  regulation of registers and 
public instruments,  the bases for contractual obligations,  norms for 
resolving the conflicts of laws and the determination of the sources of the 
Law,  in this last case,  with respect to the norms of the “fueros” and 
special law. 
 
9) Legislation concerning intellectual and industrial property. 
 
10) System of customs,  tariffs and foreign trade. 
 
11) Monetary system,  foreign credits,  exchange and convertibility;  the 
general bases for the regulation of credit,  banking and insurance. 
 
12) Legislation on weights and measures,  determination of the official time. 
 
13) Bases and coordination of general planning and economic activity. 
 
14) General Finance and Debt of the State. 
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15) Promotion and general coordination of scientific and technical research. 
 
16) External health.   Bases and general coordination of health.   Legislation 
concerning pharmaceutical products. 
 
17) Basic legislation and economic system of Social Security,  without 
prejudice to the execution of its services by the Autonomous 
Communities. 
 
18) The bases of the juridical system of the public Administrations and the 
statutory system for its officials which shall in every case guarantee that 
the administered will receive a common treatment by them;  a common 
administrative procedure,  without prejudice to the specialties deriving 
from the particular organisation of the Autonomous Communities;  
legislation on forcible expropriation;  basic legislation on contracts and 
administrative concessions,  and the system of responsibility of all public 
Administrations. 
 
19) Maritime fishing,  without prejudice to the competences attributed to the 
Autonomous Communities in the regulation of the sector. 
 
20) Merchant marine and the ownership of ships;  lighting of coasts and 
maritime signals;  ports of general interest,  airports of general interest,  
control of the air space,  transit and transport,  meteorological service and 
registration of aircraft. 
 
21) Railroads and land transport which crosses through the territory of more 
than one Autonomous Community;  general communications system;  
traffic and movement of motor vehicles;  mail and telecommunications;  
aerial cables,  submarine cables and radio communications. 
 
22) The legislation,  regulation and concession of water resources and 
projects when the waters run through more than one Autonomous 
Community and the authorisation of electrical installations when their use 
affects another Community or when the transport of energy goes beyond 
its territorial area. 
 
23) Basic legislation on environmental protection without prejudice to the 
faculties of the Autonomous Communities to establish additional 
standards of protection.   Basic legislation on woodlands,  forestry 
projects and livestock trails. 
 
24) Public works of general interest or whose realisation affects more than 
one Autonomous Community. 
 
25) Bases of the mining and energy system. 
 
26) System of production,  sale,  possession and use of arms and explosives. 
 
27) Basic norms of the system of press,  radio and television and,  in general,  
of the other means of social communication,  without prejudice to the 
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faculties which in their development and execution belong to the 
Autonomous Communities. 
 
28) Protection of the cultural,  artistic and monument patrimony of Spain 
against exportation and exploitation;  museums,  libraries and archives 
belonging to the State without prejudice to their management by the 
Autonomous Communities. 
 
29) Public security,  without prejudice to the possibility of the creation of 
police by the Autonomous Communities in the manner which may be 
established in the respective Statutes within the framework of the 
provisions of the organic law. 
 
30) Regulations of the conditions for obtaining,  issuing,  approving and 
standardising academic and professional degrees and basic norms for 
carrying out Article 27 of the Constitution in order to guarantee 
compliance with the obligations of the public powers in this matter. 
 
31) Statistics for State purposes. 
 
32) Authorisation for the convocation of popular consultations via referendum. 
 
 
 
 Source: 
 
Blaustein, A.P. & Flanz, G.H. (editors).  1991.  Spain, in Constitutions of the countries of 
the world.  Dobbs Ferry, New York:  Oceana. 
 
 Note 
 
The published source document is a translation from Spanish,  which presumably 
explains the peculiarities in the text as transcribed above. 
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 Annexure 6 
 
 
EXTRACT:  FINANCIAL RELATIONS ACT 65 OF 1976 
 
 
Schedule 2 
 
MATTERS THE CONTROL OF WHICH AND THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN 
RESPECT OF WHICH MAY BE TRANSFERRED BY THE STATE PRESIDENT TO A 
PROVINCE IN TERMS OF PARAGRAPH (a) OF SUBSECTION (1) OF SECTION 11 
 
(Abbreviated) 
 
1. The destruction of vermin and the registration and control of dogs. 
 
2. The preservation of fauna and flora. 
 
3. The provision of grants in respect of agricultural and kindred societies . . . 
 
 4. The establishment,  control and management of libraries and library services,  
museums,  art galleries,  herbaria,  botanical gardens and similar institutions,  
and zoological gardens,  aquariums,  oceanariums,  snake parks and similar 
institutions . . . 
 
 5. The control and management of such places upon State land as the State 
President may reserve as being places of public resort,  of public recreation,  or 
of historical or scientific interest. 
 
 6. The establishment,  control,  management and regulation of cemeteries and 
crematoria and the regulation of matters relating to the removal or disposal of 
dead bodies. 
 
 7. The distribution of poor relief. 
 
 8. The regulation of the hours of opening and closing of shops. 
 
 9. The administration of the Labour Colonies Act, 1909 (Cape of Good Hope) . . . 
 
10. The establishment and administration of townships. 
 
 11. The licensing and control of vehicles and of any other conveyance or means of 
transport whatsoever . . . and of the drivers of any such vehicles or means of 
conveyance or transport. 
 
 12. The restriction,  regulation and control of horse racing,  the prohibition ,  
restriction,  regulation and control of other racing . . . 
 
13. The licensing,  regulation and control of places of amusement and recreation . .  
 
14. Town planning,  including - 
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(a) . . . ; 
(b) . . . ; 
(c) . . . ;  etcetera. 
 
 15. Irrigation schemes. 
 
 16. Land settlement schemes. 
 
 17. The establishment of labour colonies. 
 
 18. The control of indigenous forests and forest plantations. 
 
 19. The expropriation,  . . . of land for public purposes in a province. 
 
 20. The preparation and carrying out of schemes - 
 
(a) . . for the supply of water and the disposal of sewage and industrial   effluent 
in any area;  and 
(b)     for the provision of any service ordinarily provided by local authorities, . . . 
 
 21. Drive-in theatres,  . . . 
 
 22. The provision of insurance cover for the Administrator and members of the 
executive committee . . . 
 
 23. The establishment of and control over public resorts,  places of rest,  seaside 
resorts,  etcetera. 
 
 24. Notwithstanding the provisions of . . . (various Acts),  but subject to the provisions 
of section 85 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act,  1961 (Act No 32 of 
1961),  environmental pollution. 
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 Annexure 7 
 
 
EXTRACT:  REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CONSTITUTION ACT 110 OF 1983 
 
 
SCHEDULE 1 
 
Subjects referred to in section 14 
 
1. Social welfare,  but subject to any general law in relation to - 
 
(a) norms and standards for the provision or financing of welfare services; 
(b) the control of the collection of money and other contributions from 
members of the public for welfare services or charity;  and 
(c) the registration of social workers,  and control over their profession. 
 
 2. Education at all levels,  including - 
 
(1) instruction by way of correspondence,  and institutions providing such     
instruction; 
(2) the training of adults in the trades at centres established by the State 
President acting as provided in section 19(1)(a);  and 
(3) training of cadets at schools in terms of section 3(1)(a) of,  and subject to,  
the Defence Act,  1957,  and official school sport, 
 
  but subject to any general law in relation to – 
 
(a) norms and standards for the financing of running and capital costs of 
education; 
(b) salaries and conditions of employment of staff and professional 
registration of teachers;  and 
(d) norms and standards for syllabuses and examination and for certification 
of qualifications. 
 
 3. Art,  culture and recreation (with the exception of competitive sport) which affect 
mainly the population group in question. 
 
 4. Health matters,  comprising the following,  namely - 
 
(1) hospitals,  clinics and similar or related institutions; 
(2) medical services at schools and for indigent persons; 
(3) health and nutritional guidance;  and 
(4) the registration and control over private hospitals, 
 
but subject to any general law in relation to such matters. 
 
 5. Community development,  comprising the following,  namely - 
 
(1) housing; 
  
390 
(2) development of the community in any area declared by or under any 
general law as an area for the use of the population group in question,  
including the establishment,  development and renovation of towns and 
the control over and disposal of land (whether by alienation or otherwise) 
acquired or made available for that purpose;  and 
(3) rent control and control over and clearance of squatting,  in such an area 
in terms of any general law, 
 
but subject to – 
 
(a) any general law in relation to norms,  standards and income groups for 
the financing of housing;  and 
(b) the provisions of the general law referred to in paragraph (2). 
 
 6. Local government within any area declared by or under any general law as a 
local government area for the population group in question,  but subject to any 
general law in relation to matters to be administered on local government level on 
a joint basis,  and excluding - 
 
(a) any matter assigned to local authorities by or under any general law;  and 
(b) the exercise by any local authority,  otherwise than in accordance with 
general policy determined by the State President acting as provided in 
section 19(1)(b),  of any power to raise loans. 
 
 7. Agriculture,  comprising the following,  namely - 
 
(1) agricultural development services,  which include research,  advisory 
services and extension; 
(2) training at agricultural colleges;  and 
(3) financial and other assistance to farmers or prospective farmers,  or for 
the promotion of agriculture. 
 
 8. Water supply,  comprising the following,  namely - 
 
(1) irrigation schemes; 
(2) drilling for water for agricultural and local government purposes; 
(3) subsidising of drilling work and water works for agricultural or local 
government purposes;  and 
(4) financial assistance in relation to water works damaged by flood. 
 
 9. Appointment of marriage officers under any general law. 
 
 10. Election of members of the House of Parliament in question,  excluding matters 
prescribed or to be prescribed by or under any general law. 
 
 11. Finance in relation to own affairs of the population group in question,  including - 
 
(1) estimates of revenue and expenditure,  but excluding the form in which 
such estimates shall be prepared; 
(2) the appropriation of moneys for the purposes of such estimates,  but 
excluding such appropriation of moneys for any purpose other than that 
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for which they are by or under any general law made available for 
appropriation; 
(3) levies authorised by or under any general law,  on services rendered over 
and above payments for such services; 
(4) the receipt of donations; 
(5) the making of donations not amounting to a supplementation of 
appropriations contemplated in paragraph (2);  and 
(6) the control over the collection and utilisation of revenue,  subject to the 
provisions of the Exchequer and Audit Act,  1975, 
 
 but excluding the levying of taxes and the raising of loans. 
 
 12. Staff administration in terms of the provisions of any general law in relation to 
staff in the employment of the State. 
 
 13. Auxiliary services necessary for the administration of own affairs of the 
population group in question,  including the planning of and control over the work 
connected with the exercise or performance of powers,  duties and functions in a 
department of State for such affairs,  and the services provided by or in such a 
department,  and the acquisition,  alienation,  provision and maintenance of and 
the control over land,  supplies,  services,  buildings,  works and accommodation,  
transport and other facilities for the purposes of the performance or rendering of 
such work and services,  but subject to any general law in relation to such 
matters. 
 
 14. The rendering of services,  either with the approval of the State President acting 
as provided in section 19(1)(b) or in terms of arrangements made between 
Ministers with such approval,  to persons who are not members of the population 
group in question. 
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Annexure 8 
 
 
EXTRACT:  REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCILS ACT 109 OF 1985 
 
 
Schedule 2 
 
Functions referred to in section 3(1)(b) 
 
1. Bulk supply of water. 
 
2. Bulk supply of electricity. 
 
3. Sewage purification works and main sewage disposal pipelines. 
 
4. Land usage and transport planning in the region. 
 
5. Roads and stormwater drainage. 
 
6. Passenger transport services. 
 
7. Traffic matters. 
 
8. Abattoirs. 
 
9. Fresh produce markets. 
 
10. Refuse dumps. 
 
11. Cemeteries and crematoriums. 
 
12. Ambulance and fire brigade services. 
 
13. Health services. 
 
14. Airports. 
 
15. Civil defence. 
 
16. Libraries. 
 
17. Museums. 
 
18. Recreation facilities. 
 
19. Environment conservation. 
 
20. Promotion of tourism. 
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21. The establishment,  improvement and maintenance of other infrastructural services and 
facilities. 
 
22. Other regional functions. 
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Annexure 9 
 
 
EXTRACT:  SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES CONSTITTUION ACT 21 OF 1971 
 
 
Schedule 1 (as amended) 
 
(Abbreviated) 
 
1. The administration and control of departments . . . 
 
2. Education, . . . but excluding . . .  tertiary education . . . 
 
3. In respect of Blacks,  welfare services,  including . . . social benefit schemes . . . 
 
 4. The establishment,  maintenance,  management,  and control of clinics and other 
institutions in connection with services and schemes referred to in item 3. 
 
 5. The control of business and trading undertakings,  professions,  etc.,  . . . 
excluding the issue of licenses in connection with trading in arms and 
ammunition and explosives. 
 
 6. The planning,  establishment,  etc.,  of industrial,  trading,  finance,  mining and 
other business undertakings and projects. 
 
6A. Development corporations . . .  
 
 7. Agriculture,  including soil and veld conservation,  etc.,  . . . but excluding control 
over the importation into or exportation from the Republic of stock,  etc. .  
 
 7A. The provision of financial assistance to persons . . . who carry on . . . farming 
operations,  . . .  
 
7B. The levy and exemption of rental for and grazing fees on land. 
 
8. Nature conservation. 
 
9. The destruction of vermin. 
 
10. Public works and undertakings,  etc.,  . . .  
 
11. Markets and pounds. 
 
 12. The establishment and administration of . . . inferior courts and the administration 
of justice,  etc. . . .  
 
 13. Labour matters (excluding all matters dealt with in the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act,  1941 (Act 30 of 1941),  or the Unemployment Insurance Act,  1946 (Act 53 
of 1946)). 
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 14. The erection and maintenance of buildings and structures which the Government 
of the area may deem necessary for the exercise of its powers and the 
performance of its functions . . . 
 
15. A direct tax on - 
 (a) (i)   citizens or any particular category . . . of citizens; 
         (ii)   the income of citizens or any particular category . . . of citizens,  . . ; 
 (b) any or all non-citizens who reside,  work   etc.   within the area; 
(c)       property situated in the area. 
 
 16. Fees payable for services rendered by a department . . . or a tribal or regional 
authority . . .  
 
 17. Subject to the provisions of any proclamation issued in terms of section 2 - 
 
(a) the conditions of service of the members of the legislative assembly; 
(b) the convening of a session of the legislative assembly . . . ; 
(c) the amendment of the proclamation issued by the State President in 
terms of section 2(1). 
 
 18. The appointment,  conditions of service,  etc.,  of officers and employees . . .  
 
 19. Intoxicating liquor. 
 
 20. The appointment,  powers,  etc.,  of justices of the peace and commissioners of 
oaths. 
 
 20A. Civil defence. 
 
 20B. Fire brigade services. 
 
 21. The protection of life,  persons and property and the prevention of cruelty to 
animals. 
 
 21A. For the purpose of maintaining public safety,  public peace,  etc.,  the prohibition 
of any organisation or membership of such an organisation;  . . .  
 
 21B. Subject to the conditions determined by the Minister of Police of the Republic,  
the establishment,  control,  etc.,  of a police force. 
 
 22. The control,  organisation and administration of such personnel or such part of 
the Police Force stationed in the area concerned as may have been transferred  
to the Government of a self-governing territory . . .  
 
 23. The administration of deceased estates,  the execution of wills and matters 
relating to status,  guardianship,  etc.,  in respect of citizens. 
 
 24. Registration of deeds and surveys,  but excluding trigonometrical surveys. 
 
 25. The regulation and control of road traffic,  . . . but excluding,  subject to the 
provisions of item 25A,  all matters dealt with in the Motor Carrier Transportation 
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Act,  1930 (Act 39 of 1930),  or the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act,  1942 (Act 29 of 
1942). 
 
 25A. With effect from a date to be determined . . . in respect of any particular area,  
motor carrier transportation:  Provided that . . .  
 
 26. Births,  deaths,  marriages and customary unions. 
 
 27. The division of existing tribes,  the amalgamation of tribes,  the constitution of 
new tribes,  and the recognition,  appointment,  conditions of service,  etc.,  of 
paramount chiefs,  chiefs and headmen. 
 
 27A. The recognition, appointment,  conditions of service,  etc.,  of chiefs’ 
representatives outside the area concerned. 
 
 28. Townships and settlements (including the establishment of local government 
bodies). 
 
 29. The registration and control of dogs. 
 
 30(a). Tribal and regional authorities . . . and institutions of a similar nature. 
 
(b) Institutions or bodies other than such institutions as are referred to in paragraph 
(a) which have,  . . . similar powers and functions . . .  
 
 30A. The establishment of public holidays. 
 
 31. The collection and control over all revenues and fees which accrue to the 
Government concerned or to a tribal or regional authority. 
 
 31A. The raising of loans,  . . .  
 
 31B. All aspects regarding any matter having direct or indirect or possible reference to 
health,  health service or cognate professions,  the combating of nuisances and 
population development. 
 
 31C. With effect from a date to be determined . . . the establishment,  
disestablishment,  administration and control of prisons. 
 
 31D. Tourism,  . . .  
 
 31E. Legal aid. 
 
 31F. Amusements or entertainment tax. 
 
 31G. The licensing,  regulation and control of places of amusement and recreation, . .  
 
 31H. Auction dues. 
 
 31I. The restriction,  regulation and control of horse racing,  the prohibition,  
restriction,  regulation and control of other racing,  . . .  
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 31J. Licensing of totalisators . . . and licences,  taxes and fees in connection with 
horses and other racing and betting and wagering,  . . .  
 
 31K. The establishment,  control and management of libraries and library services. 
 
 31L. The establishment,  control and management of museums,  art galleries,  
herbaria,  botanic gardens and similar institutions,  and zoological gardens,  
aquariums,  oceanariums,  snake parks and similar institutions . . .  
 
 31M. The establishment,  control,  etc.,  of cemeteries and crematoria and the 
regulation of matters relating to the removal or disposal of corpses,  . . .  
 
 31N. Housing schemes. 
 
 31P. The reservation of places . . . as places of public resort or of public recreation or 
of historical or scientific interest and of movable or immovable goods of historical 
or scientific interest and the control and management of such places or goods,  . 
. .  
 
31Q.    (i) The conclusion or ratification of conventions,  treaties and agreements     
with the Government of the Republic . . . ; 
(ii) the conclusion of contracts and agreements,  . . . in order to give effect to 
powers granted to the government of the self-governing territory . . . ;  and 
(iii) the conclusion of agreements with the Government of the Republic 
extending the area of functions of a corporation or a development 
corporation which has been established by the government of a self-
governing territory,  outside such territory: . . .  
 
 31R. The establishment of new districts and the modification of the boundaries of 
existing districts in the territory. 
 
 31S. Sport and recreation. 
 
 31T. The registration of citizens and the issue of documents contemplated in section 
3(1)bis (c) of the Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) 
Act,  1952 (Act 67 of 1952):  . . . 
 
 31U. Conservation of the environment. 
 
 31V. The establishment,  control,  etc.,  of a law commission. 
 
 31W. Control over entrance into the territory by citizens of the Republic of South Africa 
who are not also citizens of the territory concerned . . .  
 
 31X. The establishment of a state attorney’s office. 
 
 31Y. The establishment of pension funds for,  and the pensioning of,  any persons 
other than officers and employees . . .  
 
 31Z. Land matters,  . . .  
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 32. With effect from a date and subject to . . . conditions . . . the provision and 
distribution of electricity. 
 
 32A. Meteorological services. 
 
 32B. The conservation and utilisation of water sources . . .  
 
 32C. Sectional titles. 
 
 32D. Appointment of commissions of enquiry. 
 
 32E. Mineral matters. 
 
 33. The imposition of penalties for a contravention of or failure to comply with any 
law made by the legislative assembly. 
 
 34. Any matter which by virtue of the provisions of section 37A falls within the power 
of the legislative assembly. 
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Annexure 10 
  
 
 
EXRACT:  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT 200 OF 
1993 
 
 
Schedule 4 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES WITH A BEARING ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF 
RESPONSIBILIITES TO LEVELS OR SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT 
 
I 
 
The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign 
state,  a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government 
committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races. 
 
VI 
 
There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature,  executive and judiciary,  
with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability,  responsiveness and 
openness. 
 
XVI 
 
Government shall be structured at national,  provincial and local levels. 
 
XVIII 
 
1. The powers and functions of the national government and provincial 
governments and the boundaries of the provinces shall be defined in the Constitution. 
 
2. The powers and functions of the provinces defined in the Constitution,  including 
the competence of a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its province,  shall 
not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in this 
Constitution. 
 
3. The boundaries of the provinces shall be the same as those established in terms 
of this Constitution. 
 
4. Amendments to the Constitution which alter the powers,  boundaries,  functions 
or institutions of provinces shall in addition to any other procedures specified in the 
Constitution for constitutional amendments,  require the approval of a special majority of 
the legislatures of the provinces,  alternatively,  if there is such a chamber,  a two-thirds 
majority of a chamber of Parliament composed of provincial representatives,  and if the 
amendment concerns specific provinces only,  the approval of the legislatures of such 
provinces will also be needed. 
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5. Provision shall be made for obtaining the views of a provincial legislature 
concerning all constitutional amendments regarding its powers,  boundaries and 
functions. 
 
XIX 
 
The powers and functions at the national and provincial levels of government shall 
include exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to perform functions for 
other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis. 
 
XX 
 
Each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and executive 
powers and functions that will enable each level to function effectively.   The allocation of 
powers between different levels of government shall be made on a basis which is 
conducive to financial viability at each level of government and to effective public 
administration,  and which recognises the need for and promotes national unity and 
legitimate provincial autonomy and acknowledges cultural diversity. 
 
XXI 
 
The following criteria shall be applied in the allocation of powers to the national 
government and the provincial governments: 
 
1. The level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the 
quality and rendering of services shall be the level responsible and accountable for the 
quality and the rendering of the services,  and such level shall accordingly be 
empowered by the Constitution to do so. 
 
2. Where it is necessary for the maintenance of essential national standards,  for 
the establishment of minimum standards required for the rendering of services,  the 
maintenance of economic unity,  the maintenance of national security or the prevention 
of unreasonable action taken by one province which is prejudicial to the interests of 
another province or the country as a whole,  the Constitution shall empower the national 
government to intervene through legislation or such other steps as may be defined in the 
Constitution. 
 
3. Where there is necessity for South Africa to speak with one voice,  or to act as a 
single entity – in particular in relation to other states – powers should be allocated to the 
national government. 
 
4. Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function,  the 
legislative power over that function should be allocated predominantly,  if not wholly,  to 
the national government. 
 
5. The determination of national economic policies,  and the power to promote 
interprovincial commerce and to protect the common market in respect of the mobility of 
goods,  services,  capital and labour,  should be allocated to the national government. 
 
6. Provincial governments shall have powers,  either exclusively or concurrently 
with the national government,  inter alia - 
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(a) for the purposes of provincial planning and development and the rendering of 
services;  and 
 
(b) in respect of aspects of government dealing with specific socio-economic and 
cultural needs and the general well-being of the inhabitants of the province. 
 
7. Where mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or where it is required to 
guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government  service,  the powers 
should be allocated concurrently to the national government and the provincial 
governments. 
 
8. The Constitution shall specify how powers which are not specifically allocated in 
the Constitution to the national government or to a provincial government,  shall be dealt 
with as necessary ancillary powers pertaining to the powers and functions allocated 
either to the national government or provincial governments. 
 
XXII 
 
The national government shall not exercise its powers (exclusive or concurrent) so as to 
encroach upon the geographical,  functional or institutional integrity of the province. 
 
XXIII 
 
In the event of a dispute concerning the legislative powers allocated by the Constitution 
concurrently to the national government and provincial governments which cannot be 
resolved by a court on a construction of the Constitution,  precedence shall be given to 
the legislative powers of the national government. 
 
XXIV 
 
A framework for local government powers,  functions and structures shall be set out in 
the Constitution.   The comprehensive powers,  functions and other features of local 
government shall be set out in parliamentary statutes or in provincial legislation or in 
both. 
 
XXXIV 
 
1. This Schedule and the recognition therein of the right of the South African people 
as a whole to self-determination,  shall not be construed as precluding,  within the 
framework of the said right,  constitutional provision for a notion of the right to self-
determination by any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage,  
whether in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other recognised way. 
 
2. The Constitution may give expression to any particular form of self-determination 
provided there is substantial proven support within the community concerned for such a 
form of self-determination. 
 
3. If a territorial entity referred to in paragraph 1 is established in terms of this 
Constitution before the new constitutional text is adopted,  the new Constitution shall 
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entrench the continuation of such territorial entity,  including its structures,  powers and 
functions.        
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Annexure 11 
 
 
 COMMISSION FOR ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
PROGRAMME FOR THE RATIONALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS 
(1993) 
 
KEY TERMS WITH DEFINITIONS 
 
(Quoted in the original Afrikaans,  with English translations) 
 
BEVOEGDHEID / POWER 
 
‘n Wetlik (ook grondwetlik) verleende mag aan die bekleër van ‘n amp of pos of aan ‘n 
wetlike liggaam of entitieit om in gespesifiseerde aangeleenthede te kan handel. 
 
A power assigned statutorily (also constitutionally) to the incumbent of an office or a post 
or to a statutory body or entity to act in specified matters. 
 
BLOUDRUK / BLUEPRINT 
 
‘n Voorgestelde toewysing van die werksaamhede waaruit ‘n hooffunksie saamgestel is 
aan (‘n) owerheidsvlak of owerheidsvlakke. 
 
A proposed allocation of the activities constituting a main function to a level or levels of 
government. 
 
DEKONSENTRASIE / DECONCENTRATION 
 
Die plasing van personeel en ander hulpbronne by kantore,  inrigtings en 
bedieningspunte weg van die hoofkantoor ten einde die benutting van ‘n diens vir kliënte 
gerieflik te maak. 
 
The placement of staff and other resources at offices,  institutions and service points 
away from the head office in order to facilitate the utilisation of a service by clients. 
 
DELEGASIE / DELEGATION 
 
‘n Bestuurshandeling waarvolgens die houer van ‘n bevoegdheid dit aan ‘n ander 
persoon vir uitoefening opdra,  onderworpe aan die nakoming van die voorwaaardes wat 
die delegeerder bepaal. 
 
A management action whereby the holder of a power assigns it to another person to be 
exercised by him or her,  subject to compliance with the conditions determined by the 
delegator. 
 
DESENTRALISASIE / DECENTRALISATION 
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Enige aksie om die uitoefening van ‘n bevoegdheid,  die verrigting van ‘n werksaamheid 
of die uitvoering van ‘n plig weg te voer van die sentrale punt waar die bevoegdheid,  
werksaamheid of plig aanvanklik gesetel het. 
 
Any action to move the exercise of a power or the performance of an activity or duty 
away from the central point where the power,  activity or duty was initially located. 
 
DEVOLUSIE / DEVOLUTION 
 
Die verlening van ‘n bevoegdheid aan ‘n owerheid benede die sentrale owerheid,  by 
wyse van grondwetlike ordening,  met die bedoeling dat die laerliggende owerheid die 
betrokke bevoegdheid in eie reg en outonoom sal uitoefen. 
 
The assignment of a power to a government beneath the central government,  by means 
of constitutional ordering,  with the intention that the lower government will exercise the 
particular power in its own right and autonomously. 
 
FUNKSIE / FUNCTION 
 
‘n Komplekse,  volledige samestelling van werksaamhede wat daarop ingestel is om ‘n 
bepaalde behoefte van die gemeenskap of die samelewing te bevredig. 
 
A complex,  complete composite of activities aimed at the satisfaction of a stipulated 
need of the community or of society. 
 
HOOFFUNKSIE / MAIN FUNCTION 
 
‘n Funksie – kyk omskrywing – wat gekenmerk word deur ‘n meerdere samestelling van 
werksaamhede wat op ‘n breë maar logies afgebakende behoefte van die gemeenskap 
of die samelewing ingestel is,  soos byvoorbeeld gesondheid,  landsverdediging en 
onderwys. 
 
A function – vide definition – characterised by a major composition of activities aimed at 
a broad but logically demarcated need of the community or of society,  as for example 
health,  national defence and education. 
 
OWERHEID / GOVERNMENT 
 
‘n Samestelling van wetgewende,  regerende,  ander uitvoerende,  en regsprekende 
instellings wat wetlik verleende bevoegdhede in ‘n omskrewe geografiese gebied 
uitoefen. 
 
A composition of legislative,  governing,  other executive,  and judicial institutions 
exercising statutorily assigned powers in a defined geographic area. 
 
SUBSIDIARITEIT / SUBSIDIARITY 
 
‘n Beskouing oor die toewysing van werksaamhede aan owerheidsvlakke waarvolgens 
werksaamhede aan die laagste werkbare owerheidsvlak toegewys word en ‘n 
werksaamheid aan ‘n hoërliggende owerheidsvlak toegewys word slegs waar dit vir 
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duidelike en afdoende rede nie bevredigend deur die laerliggende owerheidsvlak 
behartig kan word nie. 
 
A view regarding the allocation of activities to levels of government according to which 
activities are allocated to the lowest practicable level of government and an activity is 
allocated to a higher level of government only where for clear and sufficient reason it 
cannot be performed satisfactorily by the lower level of government. 
 
 
WERKSAAMHEID / ACTIVITY 
 
Enige van verskeie aktiwiteite waaruit ‘n funksie saamgestel is en wat moet plaasvind 
ten einde die funksie bevredigend ten uitvoer te bring. 
 
Any one of various activities or actions constituting a function and which must take place 
in order for the function to be performed satisfactorily. 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
South Africa.  Commission for Administration.  1993d.  Confirmation of rationalisation 
programme, 16 February.  List of terms for inclusion in annexure E of the rationalisation 
programme document.  Author’s file 2/1/2. 
 
